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Prefrerace
This compilation constitutes a complete supplement to the Georgia Code of
1926. It contains all of the general laws of the Legislature enacted during the
1927 session. The annotations are full and comprehensive. They cover volumes
161 to 163 of the Georgia Reports, both inclusive, and volumes 34 to 36 of the
Georgia Appeals Reports, both inclusive. The Federal Reports and United
States Supreme Court Reports to the date of publication are also included in the
Supplement.
The same standard of skillful editorial work which contributed to the popu-
larity of the Georgia Code of 1926 is maintained throughout this volume. Spe-
cial attention is directed to the editors' notes, pointing out the changes effected
by the Acts of 1927. It is believed that these notes will prove invaluable in saving
the lawyer from laborious comparisons.
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CODE OF GEORGIA-SUPPLEMENT
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
§ 4 (§ 4.) Construction of statutes.
Not a Question for Jury.—It should not be left to the jury
to determine whether a party could or could not substan-
tially comply with the code or amendatory laws. L,im*-
Cola Bottling- Co. v. Atlanta, etc., R. Co., 34 Ga. App. 103,
128 S. E. 226.
Reasonable Care Insufficient.—Where a substantial com-
pliance with a statute by a railway company would be suffi-
cient, the duty of compliance to that extent would be abso-
lute, and the company would not have discharged the duty
merely by the exercise of reasonable care to that end. Lime-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Atlanta, etc., R. Co., 34 Ga. App. 103,
128 S. E- 226.
When Last Day Falls on Sunday—Bill of Exceptions.—
When the last day numerically for presenting the bill of ex-
ceptions for certification falls on Sunday, the presentation of
the bill of exceptions to the trial judge for certification upon
the next day, Monday, is not too late. Maryland Casualty
Co. v. England, 34 Ga. App. 354, 129 S. E. 446.
Service of Process.—The giving of "five days notice of the
time and place of hearing," required by section 5154, of a
petition for discharge filed by a defendant in a suit in trover,
who is held in imprisonment in default of bail, is not com-
plied with by serving the plaintiff, on the first day of May,
with notice that the time of hearing the petition will be on
the fifth day of May following. From the first day of May
to the fifth day of May is only four days. Hardin v. Mutual
Clothing Co., 34 Ga. App. 466, 129 S. E. 907.
§ 10 (§ 10.) Waiver of law.
Failure to Object to Motion for New Trial.—Any point of
practice which, if sound, would be fatal to a motion for a
new trial should be presented to the trial court by a motion
to dismiss the application for a new trial, and, if not so pre-
sented, will be considered as having been waived. Walker
v. Neil, 117 Ga. 733, 45 S. E. 387; Hopkins v. Jackson, 147
Ga. 821, 822, 95 S. E- 675; Fairburn v. Brantley, 161 Ga. 199,
130 S. E- 67.
Waiving Process.—A person is entitled to legal service,
but may waive service of the original suit by appearing and
pleading to the merits. Failure to serve a motion for new
trial will afford grouncL-tfpon which the motion must be dis-
missed, but the fjtikfre may be waived. Fairburn v. Brant-
ley, 161 Ga. 199, 130 .8. E- 67.
§ 13 (§ ia.f^Bonds taken by officers.
Failing as Statutory Bond—Good as Common Law Bond.—
Where a bond was made payable to the levying officer and
was conditioned to deliver the property at the time and place
of sale but no affidavit of illegality was ever filed or at-
tempted to be filed, the bond taken is a good and valid ob-
ligation as a common-law bond and recovery on it can be
had. Mulllis v. Kennedy, 143 Ga. 618, 85 S. E. 845, cited and
approved. Garmany v. Loach,; 34 Ga. &PP- ^22, 724, 131 S.
E- 108 - \ V\ ,^—
^
FIRST TITLE
Divisions; of the Boundary, Sovereignty and Ju-
risdiction of the State
THE POLITICAL CODE
CHAPTER 3
Jurisdiction Ceded to the United States Over Cer-
tain Land
§ 26(1). Land for other public buildings.
—
The
SECOND TITLE
Elections by the People
CHAPTER l
Qualification of Voters
§ 34 (§ 32.) Qualification of voters.
Failure to Make Return of Taxes.—The failure or a tax
Consent of the State of Georgia is hereby given in payer to make a return of his taxes as required by law is
not, without more, a ground for disqualifying him" as a voter
for members of the General Assembly. As to taxes, it is
only non-payment which will disqualify the voter, and even
then the exception in paragraph 3 must be considered.
Daniel v. Claxton, 35 Ga. App. 107, 132 S. E. 411.
accordance with the 17th clause, 8th section, and
of the first article of the Constitution of the
United States, to the acquisition by the United
States by purchase, condemnation, or other-
wise, any land in this State which has been
or may hereafter be acquired for custom-houses,
post offices, arsenals, other public buildings what-
ever, or for any other government purposes. Acts
19127, p. 352.
§ 26(2). Same
—
Jurisdiction; exemption from
taxation.—The exclusive jurisdiction in and over
any land so acquired by the United States shall
be and the same is hereby ceded to the United
States for all purposes, except that the state re-
tains the right to serve thereon all civil and crimi-
nal processes issued under authority of the state;
but the jurisdiction so ceded shall continue no
longer than the said United States shall own such
lands.
The jurisdiction hereby ceded shall not vest
until the United States shall have acquired the
title to the said lands by purchase, condemnation
or otherwise; and so long as the said lands shall
remain the property of the United States when
acquired as aforesaid, and no longer, the same
shall be and continue exempt and exonerated from
all state, county, and municipal taxation, assess-
ment, or other charges which may be levied or
imposed under authority of the state.
CHAPTER 2
Registration of Voters
ARTICLE 2
Method of Registering on Voters' Book
§ 42 (§ 42.) Oath to be read or repeated at re-
quest of applicant.
Signature Required.—One can not lawfully register as a
voter without signing his name in the voters' book in person
or by making his mark as prescribed by this section. Turk
v. Royal, 34 Ga. App. 717, 131 S. E- 119.
ARTICL^^^V
Ballots, by Whom and'Wliere feast
§ 71. Voter changing residence. '
Must Apply to Registrjarsi>—One who had mtfved from an-
other county to that whef^jh an election was held, and, by
application to the tax-collector of the latter county, had had
his name transferred ^nd; entered upon the voters' book of
that county, but at n$ time had-.rnade any application to the
registrars thereof for such transfer, and had offered no proof
before them as to his qualifications to vote, was not qualified
to vote in such bond faction. **Turk v. Royal, 34 Ga. App.
717, 131 S. E. 119.
[1]
§ 80(b) BOND COMMISSIONER § 232
CHAPTER 3
Elections for Members of the General Assembly
ARTICLE 3
Elections; When and How Held
§ 80(b). In certain counties.—In all counties in
the State of Georgia, having, by the United States
census of 1920 or any future census, a population
of not less than 14,50] and not more than 14,505
inhabitants, all election precincts which are lo-
cated as a whole or in part in an incorporated
city or town having a population of 1,000 or more
according to the 1920 census of the United States,
shall remain open on all election days, whether
general, special, primary or otherwise, from 7 : 1
o'clock a. m. to 6:00 o'clock p. m. ; provided
however, that the provisions of this section shall
not apply to elections that are held by the mu-
nicipal authorities or the local board of education.
Acts 1927, p. 130.
§ 82 (§ 72.) Manner of conducting elections.
Superintendents Cannot Recount Ballots.—Under the provi-
sions of this paragraph, superintendents of election have
neither power nor authority to examine or recount ballots
cast in a county election for the purpose of correcting er-
rors, whether the same be due to mistake or fraud as pre-
scribed by this and the next paragraph of the section. Bacon
v. Black, 162 Ga. 222, 133 S. E. 251.
bonds," and that such ballots may have been used, did not
invalidate the election, notwithstanding the ordinance call-
ing the election prescribed that the ballots should bear the
words "for public school bonds for schoolhouse" or "against
public school bonds for schoolhouse." Edwards v. Clarkes-
ville, 35 Ga. App. 306, 133 S. E. 45. For similar holding as
to vote for local taxation in school district, see notes to §
1551(133) of the Georgia Code of 1926.
Specifying "Australian Ballot System."—Even in the ab-
sence of all provisions therefor, to say merely that the
election was to be held or was held under some system in-
definitely described as the "Australian ballot system" would
not affirmatively disclose that the election was void. Ed-
wards v. Clarkesville, 35 Ga. App. 306, 312, 133 S. E- 45.
ARTICLE 4
Penalty for Managers' Default
§ 84 (§ 74.) In case superintendents make false
return, etc.
Superintendent also Liable under iPenal Code.—If the num-
ber of votes is knowingly and falsely misstated by a super-
intendent of an election, he has failed to discharge a duty
imposed upon him by law, and he is liable to be prosecuted,
under section 658 of the Penal Code, for a misdemeanor al-
though this section also applies. Black v. State, 36 Ga. App.
286, 136 S. E. 334.
CHAPTER 7
Contested Elections
ARTICLE 3
Other Contested Elections
§ 125 (§ 111.) Contests in other elections.
Jurisdiction of Ordinary—Mandamus to Compel Hearing.—
Where on the hearing of a contested election case before an
ordinary, the contestee filed a demurrer to the petition,
which demurrer was sustained and the ordinary dismissed
the contest proceedings, and the contestant filed a petition
against the ordinary for a writ of mandamus to compel the
ordinary to hear and determine such election contest, alleging
that the ordinary had failed and refused to perform his legal
duty in the premises; the court did not err, in granting an
order making the mandamus absolute, and requiring the
ordinary to hear and determine such contest. Morgan v.
Wason, 162 Ga. 360, 133 S. E. 921.
CHAPTER 8
Primary Elections
§ 138(7%). Nominations for General Assembly
members and Superior Court Judges in certain
counties; specification of incumbent opposed; plu-
rality.—Candidates for the General Assembly in
all counties having within its borders a city or a
part of a city of population of 200,000 or more and
candidates for Judges of the Superior Court in all
judicial circuits having a county or counties of
population of 200,000 or more, according to the
last or any future census of the United States,
shall, when qualifying for a primary, specify the
particular incumbent which said candidate de-
sires to oppose or succeed, and all ballots shall be
prepared accordingly. The candidate receiving a
plurality of the votes cast for candidates for such
office shall be declared the nominee therefor. Acts
1925, p. 205; 1927, p. 246.
Editor's Note.—The amendment of 1927 limited the pro "
sion as to candidates for the General Assembly, to counties
"having within their borders a city or a part of a city."
THIRD TITLE
CHAPTER 2
The Secretary of State, Treasurer, Comptroller-
General, and Attorney-General
ARTICLE 4
Elections Not Set Aside for Formal Defects,
When
§ 126 (§ 112.) Election not void by reason of
formal defects.
Violation of Directory Provision Harmless.—An election
was not invalid because it did not appear that the mayor
and council had published the names of the election man-
agers in accordance with a certain provision of the city
charter, for this provision is directory. Edwards v. Clarkes-
ville, 35 Ga. App. 306, 133 S. E. 45.
Ballots Improperly Marked.—That the notice to the voters
provided that the ballots should have written or printed
thereon the words "for school bonds" or "against school
SECTION 10
Bond Commissioner
§ 232. State treasurer ex-officio Bond Commis-
sioner.—The State Treasurer shall be ex-officio
Bond Commissioner of this State, and as such
he shall receive a salary of $1,200.00 per annum;
and he is hereby authorized to appoint the chief
clerk in the treasury department, or some other
fit and competent person, to be Assistant Com-
missioner, and said assistant shall receive a salary
of $1,200.00 per annum; and said Bond Commis-
sioner shall be allowed such sum as may be nec-
essary, not to exceed the sum of $10,000.00 per
annum, for clerical assistance in performing the
duties of his office, which said sum, together with
the salaries of the Bond Commissioner and the
Assistant Bond Commissioner, shall be paid from
the State Treasury; it shall be the duty of the
Bond Commissioner and his assistant to receive,
file, record, care and provide for the deposit of
bonds or other securities offered for deposit as
the law may direct. Acts 1909, p. 145; 1923, p.
132; 1927, p. 131.
Editor's Note.—The amendment of 1927 wrought many
changes in the phraseology of this section. The substantial
innovations consist of the provision for a $12,000 salary for
both the Bond Commissioner and the Assistant Bond Com-
missioner, and the provision for allowance of $10,000 for
clerical assistance, and the source of its payment.
[2]
§ 233 INCORPORATION OF COUNTIES, ETC. § 354
§ 233. Fees of commissioner.—Each and every
depositing corporation or individual of whatever
name or class, which now has or may hereafter
have on deposit bonds or other securities, as the
law provides, is hereby required, within sixty days
from and after August 14th, 1909, and thereafter
on or before January 15th of each year, to pay
the said bond commissioner the following sched-
ules of fees, namely: Bonds or other securities ag-
gregating not over $5,000.00, $2.00; not over
$10,000.00, $3.75; not over $25,000.00, $7.<50; not
over $50,000.00, $12.50; not over $100,000.00,
$20.00; more than $100,000.00, $25.00; provided,
however, that the W. & A. R. R. lessees shall be
exempt from the operation of this section. All
fees collected as aforesaid shall be paid into the
general funds of the state treasury. In default of
the payment of the fees herein prescribed, the
bond commissioner shall refuse to accept the de-
posits required by law to be made, and shall not
certify their acceptance until the fee is fully paid
each year as herein provided, hut shall report
said default to the insurance commissioner, who
shall suspend or revoke the license of said delin-
quent company or individual until the fee required
under this section is fully paid. Acts 1927, p. 131.
FOURTH TITLE
General Regulations as to All Officers and Offices
CHAPTER l
Of Eligibility, Qualification, and Commissions of
Officers, and Vacation of Officers
ARTICLE 1
Eligibility and Qualification
§ 258 (§ 223.) Persons ineligible; de facto offi-
cers.
Pribr Removal for Misconduct.—The conviction of an offi-
cer for misbehavior and misconduct in office in the illegal
appropriation of public funds, and his removal from office,
are equivalent to an adjudication that he is ineligible to
hold said office for and during the remainder of the term
for which he was elected. McClellan v. Pearson, 163 Ga.
492, 136 S. E. 429.
§ 261 (§ 226.) Officers of this State must re-
side therein, hold until successor is qualified, and
keep seal.
Liability on Bond Continues.—The effect of this section is
to extend the term of office under the original appointment
until a successor has been qualified, with the further effect
that liability on an official bond continues where an official
elected for a fixed period thereafter holds over, after its ex
piration, until his successor is appointed. Emberton v. Jones,
35 Ga. App. 536, 133 S. E- 745.
CHAPTER 3
Official Bonds and Sureties Thereon
tion of liquor) commits a wrongful act under color of his of-
fice. Copeland v. Dunehoo, 36 Ga. App. 817, 138 S. E- 267.
Acts Entirely Unauthorized Not Breach of Bond.—A tax-
collector, having no authority of law whatever to make lev-
ies and sales under tax fi. fas., issued a fi. fa. purporting
to be for taxes due, and placed it in the hands of another
as his deputy, who, "armed" with the fi. fa. and acting un-
der the instructions of the tax-collector, seized property of
the alleged taxpayer and sold it, to the owner's damage. It
was held that such acts constituted no breach of the tax-
collector's bond and the surety on the bond was not liable
therefor. Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Smith, 35 Ga. App. 744, 134
S. E. 801.
ARTICLE 5
Bonds; How Far and for What Binding
§ 291 (§ 256.) Official bonds obligatory.
Color of office is defined in Fidelity, etc., Company v.
Smith, 35 Ga. App. 744, 748, 134 S. E- 801, quoting Luther v.
Banks, 111 Ga. 374, 36 S. E- 626.
When Acts Colore Officii—Illustration.—An officer shoot-
ing at the occupants of an automobile who have fled from
an attempted arrest for a misdemeanor (illegal transporta
[3
ARTICLE 10
Measure of Damages on Bonds
§ 299 (§ 264.) Measure of damages.
Meaning of "Smart-Money."—The term "smart-money,"
as employed in this section seems to be substantially sy-
nonymous with "punitive damages." Copeland v. Dunehoo,
36 Ga. App. 817, 821, 138 S. E- 267. Thus this section seems
to be an exception to section 4393. Id.
What Amounts to Bad Faith.—Any arbitrary omission by
the officer to do that which is required of him by law, or
any conscious disregard of the limitation upon his authority,
would amount to bad faith within the meaning of that term
as employed in this section. Copeland v. Dunehoo, 36 Ga.
App. 817, 824, 138 S. E- 267. See note of this case under sec.
2549.
Statement of Injury.—In an action for damages because of
the alleged breach of the official bond of a former clerk of a
city court, it not appearing from the petition that any ac-
tual injury was sustained by the plaintiff by reason of
the alleged breach, the petition did not set out a cause of
action. Donaldson v. Walker, 35 Ga. App. 224, 132 S. E- 649i
CHAPTER 4
Powers of Public Officers Limited
§ 303 (§ 268.) Powers of public officers.
As to liability on unauthorized acts of school trustees, see
note to sec. 1551(141).
When Public Is Estopped—Statements Without Authority.
—In Gill v. Cox. 163 Ga. 618, 137 S. E- 40, it was held that
the state is not estopped by statements made by the state
veterinarian, said statements not being made in the exercise
of any legal authority.
FIFTH TITLE
Legislative Department
CHAPTER 1
Of the General Assembly
ARTICLE 8
Pay of Members
§ 354 (§ 312.) Accounts of members and officers,
how audited^
In General.—By this section a method is provided for de-
termining what compensation, including per diem, is due to
the members of the General Assembly. This statute estab-
lishes a special tribunal for the determination of the mat-
ter in question. There certainly should be no judicial inter-
ference with this method and this tribunal, before any ac-
tion is taken by this special tribunal, by assuming that it
will certify per diem to which members are not entitled
under the constitution. Speer v. Martin, 163 Ga. 535, 537, 136
S. E. 425.
SIXTH TITLE
County Organization
CHAPTER 2
Incorporation of Counties, County
Property, and Claims
]
Contracts,
§ 383 CONTRACTS, HOW MADE BY COUNTIES § 389(2)
ARTICLE l
Counties Are Corporate Bodies
§ 383 (§ 340) Each county a body corporate.
Construed with Section 384.—Sections 383 and 384 must be
construed together, and they must receive a reasonable con-
struction. Decatur County v. Praytor, etc., Co., 163 Ga.
929, 931, 137 S. E- 247.
Extent of Power Conferred. — This section subjects the
counties of this State to suit, but not to suits upon all causes
of action. It does not make them generally liable to suits,
like individuals or as municipal corporations. Being politi-
cal subdivisions of the State, they can not be sued unless
made subject to suit expressly or by necessary implication.
Decatur County v. Praytor, etc., Co., 163 Ga. 929, 931. 137 S.
E. 247.
A county can always be sued upon any liability against it
created by statute, or for breach of any valid contract which
it is authorized by law to make. Decatur County v. Praytor,
etc., Co., 163 Ga. 929, 935, 137 S. E- 247. See sec. 384 and the
notes thereto.
ARTICLE 2
Suits against Counties
§ 384 (§ 341.) County, when liable to suit.
Editor's Note.—This section was codified from the deci-
sions of the court in the cases of Hammond v. Richmond, 72
Ga. 188, and Smith v. Wilkes & McDuffie Counties, 79 Ga.
125, 4 S. E- 20, and it must be construed in the light of these
decisions. See Decatur County v. Praytor, etc., Co., 163
Ga. 929, 932, 137 S. E- 247.
Broad Terms.
—
Language could not be broader or more
comprehensive, or more free from doubt, than the words of
this section. When it says the county shall not be liable
for any cause of action, it expressly negatives the idea of
exceptions other than provided therein, to wit, "unless made
so by statute." Wood v. Floyd County, 161 Ga. 743, 745, 131
S. E. 882.
General Rule.—Whenever a county is by statute made
liable for a given demand, an action against it will lie there-
for, though the statute does not in express terms authoriza
or provide for the bringing of such an action. Decatur County
v. Praytor, etc., Co., 163 Ga. 929, 933, 137 S. E. 247, citing nu-
merous cases.
Liability in Case of Bridges.—A county is liable to suit by
contractors for breach of a valid and binding contract for
the building of a bridge over a river in such county, upon
the assumption that the difference between the representa-
tions in the plans and specifications as to the facts and condi-
tions under the bed of tfie river, and the actual facts and
conditons thereof, amounted to a breach of the contract by
the county. Decatur County v. Praytor, etc., Co., 163 Ga.
929, 137 S. E. 247.
When County Officials Exceed Powers.—"When public of-
ficers, in discharging duties imposed upon them by law, under-
take other duties not imposed by law, although intending
it to be a benefit to the public, the latter, as represented by
county governments, can not be made responsible for torts
or ultra vires contracts." Wood v. Floyd Countv, 161 Ga. 743,
748, 131 S. E- 882.
ARTICLE 3
Contracts, How Made by Counties, Competition
in Bidding
§ 389 (1). Contract for public work void with-
out bond.
What Constitutes "Doing Work."—An employee of the con-
tractor is not doing work "under and for the purpose of" the
contract where he is engaged only in "winding up the af-
fairs" of his employer in the particular location, such as
collecting and looking after the machinery and "shipping it to
the next work they were going to do," all of this being done
after the work had been fully completed and after the mu-
nicipality has formally and finally accepted the same as a
compliance with the contract between it and the contractor.
Southern Surety Co. v. Williams, 36 Ga. App. 692, 137 S. E-
851.
Bond Protects Two Classes.—The bond required by this sec-
tion is for the use of two classes of persons: first, the muni-
cipality, and second, "all persons doing work or furnish-
ing skill, tools, machinery, or materials under or for the pur-
pose of such contract." Both classes of persons are entitled
to protection under the bond. Southern Suretv Co. v. Dawes,
161 Ga. 207, 212, 130 S. E- 577.
Necessity of Stating "Use" in Bond.—In an action by the
trustees of a school district "for the use" of a material-
man, who furnished material used in the construction of a
school building, against a bonding company as surety upon
the bond given by the contractor, where the bond contained
no provision that it was given "for the use of the obligee and
of all persons doing work or furnishing skill, tools, machinery
or materials under or for the purpose of such contract," nor
any similar clause, but specifically provided that "no right
of action shall accrue for the use or benefit of any other than
the obligee," the trustees can have no recovery on the bond
merely "for the use" of the materialman. Massachusetts
Bonding, etc. Co. v. Hoffman, 34 Ga. App. 565, 130 S. E. 375.
A bond which does not use the words "for the use of," but
the expressed obligation is to both "the City of Thomas-
ville" and "all persons doing work or furnishing skilled labor,
tools, machinery, or materials under or for the contract," is
a sufficient statutory bond under the section, notwithstanding
it does not expressly employ the words "for the use of" the
municipality or the members of the other class. Being such
statutory bond, a materialman, coming under the second class
of obligees can in his own name bring a suit on a certified
copy thereof, as is expressly provided in section 389 par. 4.
Southern Surety Co. v. Dawes, 161 Ga. 207. 211, 130 S. E- 577.
Bond Covering Two Principals.—Where a bond specifies
two corporations as principal and a surety company as se-
curity, and a suit is brought on the bond by a person cf
the second class, who alleges in the petition that certain ma-
terials for which he seeks a recovery were furnished by him
to one of the corporations named as principal, and that only one
of such principals contracted with the municipality, such al-
legation would not alone operate to discharge the surety on
the bond. In the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake induc-
ing the surety to excute the bond, he will be bound by his con-
tract as surety for both of the corporations named as prin-
cipals in the bond, and will not be relieved by mere allegation
in the petition that only one of the named principals to whom
the materials were alleged to have been furnished was a con-
tractor with the municipality. Southern Surety Co. v. Dawes,
161 Ga. 207, 213, 130 S. E- 577.
Liability of County for Failure to Take Bond.—A county
which has failed to take from the contractor the statutory
bond required under this act, is liable to any person furnish-
ing material to the contractor for the purpose of the con-
tract, for any loss resulting to such person from the
failure of the county to take the required bond. De-
catur County v. Southern Clay Mfg. Co., 34 Ga. App.
305, 129 S. E- 290; Ty Ty Consol. School Dist. v. Colquitt
Lumber Co., 153 Ga. 426, 112 S. E- 561, and Hannah v. Love-
lace-Young Lumber Co., 159 Ga. 856, 127 S. E. 225, were
cited in this case. Ed. Note.
Same—Necessity for Work to Be Completed.—It is not es-
sential to the county's liability under this act that the work
for which the county contracted shall have been completed.
Decatur County v. Southern Clay Mfg. Co., 34 Ga. App. 305,
129 S. E. 290.
Notice as Affecting Liability of Public Body.—A public body
can not, by notice to a materialman of its intention to pay
direct to the contractor all bills for material which may be
furnished to the contractor by the materialman for the pur-
pose of the contract, and that it will not be liable to the ma-
terialman for such material, relieve itself of the statutory li-
ability imposed upon it by this act, for loss to a materialman
resulting from the failure of the public body to take the
bond required. Nor will such notice to the materialman ope-
rate to estop him from asserting his right, under the statute,
to hold the public body liable. Board v. United States Sup-
ply Co., 34 Ga. App. 581, 131 S. E. 292.
Suit on Bond by Materialman, Workers, etc.—A material-
man furnishing material to the contractor in making the
improvements specified in the contract can in his own name,
where the city fails to sue in the time prescribed by the act,
maintain an action on the bond, although the bond does
not expressly state that it is "for the use of" persons furnish-
ing material for construction of the improvement. Southern
Surety Co. v. Dawes, 161 Ga. 207, 130 S. E. 577.
Substitutions of Parties Plaintiff.—Where a materialman
improperly brought suit in his own name against the surety,
and it appeared that under the terms of the bond no indemnity
was provided in behalf of the materialman, an amendment
was not allowable making the suit proceed in the name of
the county for the use and benefit of the materialman. Ameri-
can Surety Co. v. Bibb, 162 Ga. 388, 134 S. E. 100.
§ 389 (2). Approval and filing of bond.
Trustees Not Surety Liable.—The liability of the trustees
under this section, if existing, would not be one in which the
surety on the bond actually taken would be concerned where
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the bond contained no provision for the assumption of it.
In other words, if it could be said that the trustees had sub-
jected themselves to liability to the materialman in failing
to take a proper bond, the resulting damage to them would
flow from their own default, and not from the failure of the
contractor to perform his contract. The surety on the
bond which they actually obtained would not ordinarily
be liable for damage suffered by them because of their failure
to comply with the law and take a bond of different character.
Massachusetts Bonding, etc., Co. v. Hoffman, 34 Ga. App.
565, 568, 130 S. E. 375.
§ 389 (4). Action on bond.
In General.—This section specifies the order in which each
class may sue on the bond. The municipality primarily may
bring a suit on the bond, in which event the remedy of any
person in the second class is by intervention in such suit; but
if the municipality does not bring a suit within 90 days after
the completion of the contract and acceptance by the mu-
nicipality, any person of the second class may bring a su.t
upon the bond for the enforcement of any right concerning
which the bond affords him protection. Southern Surety Co.
v. Dawes, 161 Ga. 207, 212, 130 S. E. 577.
This section is express authority for a person of the sec-
ond class who has furnished material to a contractor for mak-
ing a public improvement, to bring an individual suit upon
the bond for his own benefit. Southern Surety Co. v. Dawes,
161 Ga. 207, 215, 130 S. E- 577.
Purpose of Provision for Certified Copy of Bond.—The pro-
vision for the obtainment of a certified copy of the bond and
the basing of a suit thereon is for convenience of persons en-
titled to sue on the bond, and is not to be construed as re-
quiring a suit to be based on such certified copy rather than
upon the original bond. To make such requirement would
place the certified copy above the original bond, with no
reason for making any such technical distinction. The cause
of action, if any, arises from the contract embodied in the
bond, not from the primary or secondary character of the
paper that might be set out in a petition suing on the bond.
Southern Surety Co. v. Dawes, 16l' Ga. 207, 212, 130 S. E.
577.
ARTICLE 11B
Residue of Bond Issue Used for Improvements
§ 431 (4). Use of balance of proceeds of bond
issue, to pay warrants in certain counties.—The
ordinaries or boards of county commissioners, or
other county authorities in this State where such
boards exist, and who have the management of
the revenues of the counties, in all the counties in
this State having a population of not less than
11,170 nor more than 11,200 according to the 1920
census, are hereby authorized and empowered,
whenever the purposes of a county bond issue has
been accomplished, which fact is to be judged of
by said county authorities in their discretion, and
there remains a balance of the proceeds of said
bond issue on hand, to use said balance in the sat-
isfaction of outstanding warrants representing the
costs of permanent county improvements, or in
making permanent county improvements. Acts
1927, p. 215.
ARTICLE 6
Claims against Counties
§ 411 (§ 362.) Claims to be presented, when.
In General.—Under this section a cause of action against
a county such as can be recovered upon does not exist un-
less the claim has been presented within twelve months
after its accrual. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mitchell
County, 36 Ga. App. 47, 48, 135 S. E. 223.
Allegation of Time.—An action against a county, brought
in 1923, to recover taxes alleged to have been illegally levied
and collected in 1919, and alleging that a month before the
filing of the suit a demand that the taxes so collected be
refunded was made upon the county authorities and refused,
was barred, under this section. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
v. Mitchell County, 36 Ga. App. 47, 135 S. E- 223.
County Warrants.—County warrants are not such claims
as are required by this section to be presented withm
twelve months after they accrue for the statute of limita-
tions does not begin to run against county warrants until
a demand for payment is repudiated or a fund out of which
they can be paid is provided. Central, etc., R. Co. v.
Wright, 35 Ga. App. 144, 132 S. E. 449.
Claim of Payee of Void Note.—A claim against a county
by a payee of a void note for money used by the county and
paid out on outstanding valid warrants, even if enforceable
against the county, was barred under this section, where
not presented within 12 months after accrual. Farmer's
Loan, etc. Co. v. Wilcox County, Ga., 2 Fed. (2d), 465.
Salary of Commissioner.—This section is not applicable to
allowances for salary of the road commissioner under a
local law as his salary is an allowance provided by law for
the benefit of the commissioner as a public officer, and has
no reference to contract or breach of duty. Sammons v
Glascock County, 161 Ga. 893, 131 S. E. 881.
ARTICLE llA
Co-operation of Counties with Municipalities for
Improvements
§ 431 (1). Co-Operation lawful.
Cited in Decatur County v. Praytor, etc., Contracting
Co., 163 Ga. 929, 935, 137 S. E. 247.
ARTICLE 12
System of Drainage
§ 439 (34). Bonds for drainage, how issued and
collected.
Sale of Bonds as Prerequisite to Validity of Contract.—
A contract is not in any wise invalid by reason of the fact
that there has been no actual sale of drainage bonds, assess-
ments for the improvements having been previously made
to an amount exceeding the total amount of the drainage
contract. Board v. Williams, 34 Ga. App. 731, 732, 131 S.
E- 911.
Effect of Collection upon Validity of Contract. — Where
the total liability under the drainage contract was within
the total amount of assessments, the contract was not
thereafter rendered invalid by reason of the fact that such
assessments were not collected or enforced, or by reason of
the fact that the full par value of all the drainage bonds
sold did not come into the district treasury, as this act
requires. Board v. Williams, 34 Ga. App. 731, 733, 131 S.
E- 911.
Redemption of Land Sold.—This law does not expressly
give the right to redeem where land is sold under execution
issued for an assessment to meet principal or interest, or
the cost of draining the land, in a drainage district. Sig-
mon-Reinhardt Co. v. Atkins Nat. Bank, 163 Ga. 136, 135 S.
E. 720.
The only language of this section bearing upon exemp-
tions simply means that executions issued to collect an
assessment are collected in the same manner as tax execu-
tions are collected. The procedure for their collection is
the same as the procedure for the collection of tax execu-
tions. This is a different thing from giving to any lien-
holder, or person having an interest in the land, the right
to redeem. Sigmon-Reinhardt Co. v. Atkins Nat. Bank,
163 Ga. 136, 138, 135 S. E- 720.
CHAPTER 3
County and Municipal Bonds and Debts—Sink-
ing Funds
ARTICLE 1
Election on Issue of Bonds or Incurring New
Debt
§ 440 (§ 377). Notice of election on issue of
bonds.
I. IN GENERAL.
Issue of Bonds in Installments.—Nothing in the constitu-
tion or this section is inconsistent with authorization of an
issue of bonds in installments and the levy of the tax for
the payment of each installment in the year of its issue.
Brady v. Atlanta, 17 Fed. (2d), 764.
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II. SUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE.
Publication—For Thirty Days.—Where it appeared that an
election was held on Saturday, January 23, 1926, and that
notice thereof had been published in the proper newspaper
once a week for six weeks, beginning on Friday, December
18, 1925, and ending on Friday, January 22, 1926, since the
notice was inserted the -first time at least 30 days before
the date of the election and as nearly that precise number
of days immediately preceding such date as was possible
under the circumstances, the fact that the publication be-
gan more than 30 days prior to such date was immaterial
and afforded taxpayers no cause for attacking the validity
of the notice. Clark v. Union School Dist., 36 Ga. App. 80,
135 S. F- 318.
Notice Affecting Custodian of Funds.—In Bank v. Hage-
dom Const. Co., 162 Ga. 488, 134 S. F. 310, it was held that
a bank as custodian of the proceeds of county bonds is
chargeable with the notice given under this section as to
the purpose of the bond issue and must not permit the
funds to be used for other purposes.
§ 444 (1). Bonds of municipalities to be issued
without referendum.
By the act of 1921, p. 212, the certificate of the chief of
construction, that the petition was signed by the owners of
more than fifty per cent of the property abutting on the
street or portion* of the street sought to be paved, is made
prima facie evidence of this fact. The act of 1919 makes
this prima facie / presumption conclusive, if the owners do
not file objections to the passage of the preliminary ordi-
nance providing for the payment. Montgomerv v. Atlanta,
162 Ga. 534, 545, 134 S. E. 152.
ARTICLE 2
Bonds, How Validated
§ 446. Duties of the attorney-general or solici-
tor-general.
Sufficiency of Petition.—It is necessary, of course, to state
the facts, and this should be done with sufficient partic-
ularity to meet the requirements of good pleading. A peti-
tion which fails to show, except by a bare conclusion, that
the election resulted prima facie in favor of the issuance of
the bonds is fatally defective and subject to general de-
murrer. Fdwards v. Clarkesville, 35 Ga. App. 306, 310, 133
S. F. 45.
Same—Unnecessary Allegations.—The law does not re-
quire an allegation as to publication of the notice to the
voters, or as to the furnishing of the list of the registered
voters (it being sufficient merely to show the number of
such voters), or as to the city's indebtedness not exceeding
the limit allowed by the constitution. Fdwards v. Clarkes-
ville, 35 Ga. App. 306, 310, 133 S. F- 45.
§ 447. Trial of the case and bill of exceptions.
Court Can Determine Validity of Votes.—In a proceeding
to validate bonds, it is within the power and jurisdiction
of the superior court, upon proper pleadings and sufficient
evidence, to pass upon the validity of any votes cast in the
election, and to eliminate such votes as are shown by the
pleadings and the evidence to be illegal. Turk v. Royal, 34
Ga. App. 717, 131 S. E: 119.
Burden on State to iProve Material Facts.—See Clay v.
Austell School Dist., 35 Ga. App. 109, 132 S. F. 127, quoting
the paragraph set out under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
Final Judgment Prerequisite to Bill of Exceptions.—Where
an answer filed by intervenors is dismissed as being insuffi-
cient to prevent validation, but the order of dismissal pro-
vides merely that the petitioners "may take an order con-
firming and validating," it does not constitute a final
judgment "confirming and validating the issuance of the
bonds" from which a bill of exceptions will lie, as provided
by this section. Veal v. Deepstep Consol. School Dist., 34
Ga. App. 67, 128 S. F- 223.
§ 461. Bonds for refunding or paying off prior
issue.—Any county or municipality, desiring to
validate any issue of bonds proposed to be issued
for the purpose of refunding or paying off and dis-
charging a prior issue of bonds issued by such
county or municipality, may have the same vali-
dated before issuing, in the manner hereinbefore
provided, by presenting a petition to the solicitor-
general of the circuit in which said county or
municipality is located, or to the attorney-general
of the State of Georgia when the solicitor-general
is absent from his circuit, setting forth a full de-
scription of the bonds to he issued, as well as the
bonds to ibe paid off by such refunding issue, with
a full copy of the resolution and all proceedings
authorizing the original issue of said bonds
sought to be paid off by the refunding issue, also
resolutions and proceedings authorizing the re-
funding issue of bonds. Such petition, being pre-
sented to the solicitor-general, or the attorney-
general, as the case may be, it shall be the duty
of such officer to bring proceedings for the valida-
tion of such issue of refunding bonds in the mat-
ter hereinbefore provided, save and except that in
such cases the county or municipality seeking the
validation of such bonds shall pay all court costs,
and the fee of $25.00 to the solicitor-general. But
no bonds shall be allowed validated hereunder
that have been issued for a bonded debt created
since the Constitution of 1877. Acts 1927, p. 135.
Editor's Note.—Prior to the amendment of 1927 only bonds
issued between the adoption of the Constitution of 1887 and
the passage of the Act of 1897 could be validated by the
operation of this section.
CHAPTER 4
Change of County Lines
§ 471(1). Election in town of 400 to 500 popu-
lation—Whenever the boundary lines of one or
more of the counties of this State shall lie within
the corporate lines of any town or city haying a
population of not less than four hundred or more
than five hundred inhabitants, according to the
census of 1920 or any future census, and it is de-
sired to change the county lines and bring the
said town or city wholly within the limits of one
county only; the change of such county Lines shall
be effected in the following manner:
Whenever a petition, signed by not less than
thirty qualified voters of said town or city shall
be addressed to the governing authorities of said
town or city asking that an election shall be held
as in this Act prescribed, provided that there shall
be not less than fifteen petitioners from each of
the counties whose boundary lines lie within the
corporate limits of said town or city, and said peti-
tion be approved by a majority of the members
of the governing board of said town or city, it
shall be the duty of said governing authorities to
submit the matter, as herein provided, to the law-
ful voters of said municipality at any general elec-
tion therein, or at any special election held for
that purpose, after advertising the same in either
case once a week for four weeks in the public
gazette in which sheriff's advertisements are pub-
lished in each of the counties whose boundary
lines lie within the limits of said municipality, and
also in the public gazette in said municipality if
there be one published therein. Said special elec-
tion shall not be held earlier than thirty days after
the publication of first notice, and shall be held
under the same rules and regulations as provided
for the election of members of the General As-
sembly. At any such general or special election,
the question shall be submitted in such manner as
to enable each voter to say whether he desires a
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change in existing boundary lines so .as to bring
the municipality wholly within the line of one oi
the adjacent counties, and which of the adjacent
counties he desires the municipality to be included
within. Whenever at such general or special elec-
tion, a majority of the votes oast shall ibe in favor
of changing the county lines so as to bring the
municipality wholly within the line of one of the
adjacent counties, and a majority of the votes
cast shall be in favor of one of said adjacent
counties, the mayor and clerk of said town or city
shall within thirty days certify and declare the re-
sult of said election to the ordinaries or board of
county commissioners or other officers having the
control of the county business in each of the
county [counties] affected. The said municipal
and county authorities shall thereupon proceed to
readjust and change the lines of the counties af-
fected, in such manner as to include the said
municipality wholly within the limits of the par-
ticular county fixed upon by said election, and
shall cause a description and map of the new line
to be filed and recorded in the office of the clerks
of the Superior Courts of each county affected,
and shall cause an official notice of the change
and description to be published once a week for
four weeks in a public gazette in their respective
counties; and thereupon the new line or lines
shall be held to be established in lieu of the origi-
nal line or lines. The costs of said proceedings
shall be paid by the said town or city desiring the
same. Acts 1927, p. 209.
CHAPTER 7
County Revenue
ARTICLE l
From Taxation
SECTION 1
Special and Extra Tax
§ 504. (§ 395.) Extra tax, how levied
Public Improvements.—The object stated in paragraph 2
of section 513, although for a county purpose, is held not
to be within the purview of section 508; consequently, a tax
''to build or repair courthouses or jails, bridges or ferries,
or other public improvements, according to contract" does
not require the recommendation of a grand jury. Seaboard
Air Eine R. Co. v. Wright, 34 Ga. App. 88, 90, 128 S. E. 234.
See note of this case under § 507.
§ 507. (§ 398.) Tax not sufficient.
Gives County Four Years.—This section clearly provides
that the county under certain contingencies may have four
years in which to pay its accumulated debt. Central, etc.,
R. Co. v. Wright, 35 Ga. App. 144, 153, 132 S. E- 449.
Nature of Tax.—See Seaboard Air-Eine R. Co. v. Wright,
34 Ga. App. 88, 89, 128 S. E- 234, which contains the same
holding set out under this catchline in the Georgia Code of
1926.
Same—Editor's Note.—The question as to the amount of the
tax which the county authorities can levy under this section
to pay current expenses seems to be at present somewhat in
doubt. By the holding in Southwestern R. Co. v. Wright,
156 Ga. 1, 118 S. E- 552 and Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Wright,
156 Ga. 13, 118 S. E. 709 the authorities may legally levy a
tax not exceeding 100 per cent of the state tax to pay ac-
cumulated debts or current expenses or either. This is by
virtue of this section. However in Seaboard Air Line v.
Wright, 161 Ga. 136, 129 S. E. 646, it was held that the levy
of a tax for the purposes specified in section 508 cannot ex-
ceed 50 per cent of the state tax and that this limit extends
to current expenses. This decision seems in direct conflict
with the holding in the two cases, supra, but the court did
not refer to them. The same question arose in Central, etc.
R. Co. v. Wright, 36 Ga. App. 386, 137* S. E- 93 and the
Court of Appeals after considering both cases declined to
follow the Seaboard Case, supra, and upheld the power to
levy the 100 per cent tax.
In considering Central, etc., R. Co. v. Wright, 36 Ga. App.
386,. 137 S. E. 93, it should be noted that in this case certio-
rari was granted by the Supreme Court and also that there
is another case between the same parties and involving the
same point before that court at the present time.
"Current Expenses."—It may be said generally that "cur-
rent expenses" include the ordinary expenses of the county
arising during the year for which the tax is levied, and
"county purposes" include all purposes for which county
taxation may be levied; that is, the ordinary expenses of
the county and the unusual and extraordinary expenses as
well. Seaboard Air-Line R. Co. v. Wright, 34 Ga. App. 88,
90, 128 S. E. 234. This case also adopts the holding set out
in the first and second paragraphs under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 508. (§ 399.) Tax for county purposes.
County Purposes.—See note "Current Expenses" under
section 507. See, also, note under section 504.
Same—Includes Current Expenses.—The levy of a tax for
the purposes specified in this section can not exceed fifty
per cent of the State tax. This limit extends to current
expenses. Seaboard Air-Line R. Co. v. Wright, 161 Ga. 136,
129 S. E- 646.
SECTION 3
Purposes for Which County Tax May Be As-
sessed
§ 513. (§ 404.) Objects of county tax.
In General.—This section names nine purposes for which
taxes may be levied, and when a tax is levied for any one
of these nine purposes it includes all items named in that
purpose. Central, etc., R. Co. v. Wright, 35 Ga. App. 144,
132 S. E. 449.
Paragraph 1—Accumulated Indebtedness.—Under the terms
"due" and "past due" is embraced, necessarily, the "ac-
cumulated indebtedness" of the county. Indebtedness of
the county "due" or "past due" may possibly be more
extensive, in the last analysis of those expressions, than
"accumulated indebtedness," but "accumulated indebtedness"
can not be more extensive than the aggregate of the indebt-
edness which is due and that which is past due. And conse-
quently a tax for the purpose of paying "accumulated indebt-
edness" is provided for exclusively under this section. Cen-
tral, etc., R. Co. v. Wright, 35 Ga. App. 144, 153, 132 S. E-
449.
And it follows that a tax for the purpose of paying ac-
cumulated indebtedness, as allowed under section 507, can
not be lawfully levied under item 9 of section 513, which
authorizes a levy "to pay any other lawful charge against
the county." Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Wright, 35 Ga. App.
144, 153, 132 S. E- 449.
Paragraph 2.—See notes to §§ 504, 507.
SECTION 4
Assessment and Collection of Taxes
§ 523. (§ 414.) On failure to pay.
Execution against Sheriff.—An execution could not be
legally issued under this section against the sheriff of a
county on the bond given by the sheriff of a city court of
the county, although both offices may have been filled by
the same individual. Martin v. Decatur County, 34 Ga.
App. 816, 131 S. E- 302.
§ 526. (§ 417.) County tax may be remitted.
As to when claims against county are barred, see section
411 and note.
ARTICLE 2
From Other Sources
§ 530. (§ 421.) Licenses, exhibitions, etc.
Test for Local Ordinance.—In determining whether the
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occupation tax imposed by a local ordinance upon peddlers
is reasonable, the courts should take into consideration the
occupation taxes imposed by this section. Landham v. La-
Grange, 163 Ga. 570, 576, 136 S. E. 514.
ARTICLE 4
Paupers
§ 554. (§ 439.) Parents and children bound to
support each other.
When Mother Must Support Children.—On the death of a
father the duty of supporting the children devolves upon
the mother, where the mother has the ability, and the in-
fant child is without means, and is unable to earn a main-
tenance. Thompson v. Georgia R., etc., Co., 163 Ga. 598,
603, 136 S. E. 895.
CHAPTER 9A
County Manager Form of Government
§ 615 (24). Uniform county manager form of
government provided; operation of act.—This act
shall be a general law to provide a uniform county
commissioner's law for all such counties in this
State as may require a commission form of county
government composed of a board of county com-
missioners of roads and revenues for such county,
with a county manager as the chief executive of-
ficer thereof, to be known as the county-manager
form of government, and shall not prevent any
county in this State from having a county com-
missioner's form of county government by local
Act as now provided by law, provided such local
Act shall not provide a county-manager form of
government for such county; and this Act shall
not go into effect in any county of this State ex-
cept upon a majority vote of the qualified voters
of the county, and the operation of this Act in any
county adopting the same shall be suspended and
terminated in like manner upon a majority vote
of the qualified voters of the county; and upon
the suspension of the operation of this Act in any
county, the local Act of force in such county shall
automatically be revived and shall have full force
and effect in such county, as if its operation had
not been suspended in such county by the adop-
tion of this Act by such county; provided, how-
ever, that this provision shall not affect a county
in this State having a population of 44,051 by the
1920 census taken by the United States govern-
ment, and this Act shall go into force and effect
in a county of this State having a population of
44,051 by the 1920 census taken by the United
States government, and the operation of this Act
in' such county adopting the same shall be sus-
pended and terminated only upon an election
called for the purpose of submitting to the quali-
fied voters of the county the question whether
the county-manager form of county government
shall be established or abolished in such county
as provided in this Act. If a majority of the quali-
fied voters of such county, voting in such election,
shall vote in favor of establishing the county-man-
ager form of county government in and for such
county, this Act shall thereupon become of full
force and effect in such county; and if a majority
of the qualified voters of such county voting in
such election shall vote in favor of abolishing the
county-manager form of county government in
such county, such form of county government
shall thereupon be suspended and terminated in
such county; and upon the suspension of the opera-
tion of this Act in such county, the local Act of
force in such county shall automatically be re-
vived and shall have full force and effect in such
county as if its operation had not been suspended
in such county by the adoption of this Act by
such county; provided, however, that the mem-
bers of the board of commissioners of such
count}', in office under the provisions of this Act
at the time of the suspension of the operation of
this Act in such county, shall hold office and act
as the commissioners of such county under the
provisions of such local Act of such county until
the expiration or their respective terms of office
under the provisions of this Act, and until their
successors shall be elected and qualified under the
provisions of such Act for such county; provided,
further, that the operation of this Act in any
county of this State shall not be suspended and
terminated by any election held within two full
years after this Act shall be put into effect in
such county. If the ordinary of the county shall
be in charge of the affairs of such county at the
time of the adoption of this Act in such county,
the ordinary shall take charge of the affairs of
such county upon the supervision of the operation
of this Act in such county, as now provided by
law for counties having no county commissioners.
Acts 1922, pp. 83, 93, 94; 1927, p. 211.
Editor's Note.—The first proviso and all the provisions
that follow it down to the second proviso, were inserted bv
the amendment of 1927.
CHAPTER 12
Roads, Bridges, Ferries, Turnpikes, Causeways,
Crossings, etc.
ARTICLE l
Public Roads
SECTION 1
Classification of Roads and Districts
§ 629 (1). Post roads deemed public roads;
maintenance.
Effect upon Classification of Roads.—This section does
not prohibit the county authorities from classifying the road
as a first, second, or third-class road as provided by law.
Browne v. Benson, 163 Ga. 707, 137 S. E. 626. See section
631.
§ 631. (§ 511). Roads may be classified.
The road commissioners mentioned in this section are pro-
vided for in section 724. Browne v. Benson, 163 Ga. 707, 137
S. E. 626.
Effect of Section 694.—The provision of this section, with
regard to "concurrence of the majority of the road commis-
sioners" (such commissioners as are provided in section
724), is inconsistent with the exclusive power granted to
county commissioners of roads and revenues in section 694
et seq. This ruling is based upon the theory that the pro-
vision for "concurrence of the majority of road commission-
ers," found in section 631, also applies to the establishment
of third-class roads. In fact section 633, codified from Ga.
Laws 1894, p. 100, does not mention road "commissioners."
The act did authorize classification of third-class roads.
Buchanan v. James, 130 Ga. 546, at page 549. The act merely
amends the road laws so as to provide for third-class roads
and how such roads shall be worked. Section 724 provides
for district road commissioners, and their duties are speci-
fied in section 729. All of these duties, where the alterna-
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tive road law is operative, are reposed solely in the county
board of roads and revenues. Browne v. Benson, 163, Ga. 707,
137 S. E- 626.
§ 633. (§ 513). Third-class roads.
See note under section 631.
SECTION 3
Roads; How Laid Out, Altered, or Discontinued
§ 640. (§ 520). Public roads, how laid out or
altered.
Method Not Exclusive as to Establishing.—It has several
times been ruled that sections 640 et seq., is a general law,
providing a method of establishing roads. It is not the only
method, but is cumulative, and it has also been held that
the establishment of a public road without compliance with
sections 640 et seq. is illegal. Shore v. Banks County, 162
Ga. 185, 132 S. E- 753, citing numerous cases.
Does Not Apply to Question of Classification.—This sec-
tion applies to "any new road, or alternation in an old road,"
but has no application to the question of whether county
commissioners alone have authority to classify public roads
into first, second, and third-class as provided in section 631.
Browne v. /Benson, 163 Ga. 707, 137 S. E- 626. See note to
sec. 631.
Adoption of Alternative Road Law.—When the alternative
road law is adopted by the recommendation of the grand
jury, road commissioners cease to exist in that county, and
an exercise of any judicial functions whatever by those per-
sons who may previously have been road commissioners be-
comes legally impossible. Varner v. Thompson, 3 Ga. App.
415, 60 S. E- 216. Browne v. Benson, 163 Ga. 707, 137 S. E. 626.
State Highway Department Cannot Proceed Hereunder.—
This section provides a method applicable alone for the con-
demnation of rights of way for public roads to be laid out by
the proper county authorities and the state highway depart-
ment cannot proceed by virtue of this section to condemn
rights of way for State-aid roads. McCallum v. McCallum,
162 Ga. 84, 132 S. E. 755.
Who May Be Appointed Commissioners. — Anderson v.
Howard, 34 Ga. App. 292, 129 S. E- 567, following Brown v.
Sams, 119 Ga. 22, 45 S. E. 719, as set out in first paragraph
tinder this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Same—Presumptions of Validity.—In the absence of any-
thing to the contrary, the presumption would be that the ap-
pointment was properly made. Anderson v. Howard, 34
Ga. App. 292, 129 S. E- 567.
Description of Road.—Where it was objected that the road
commissioners, or reviewers, did not physically "mark out"
the road as required by this section, and the evidence was
that they did not actually stake or mark out the road on
the ground, or designate its location in any other way ex-
cept on paper, but they did attach to and make a part of
their report a map or plat containing all the information and
data necessary for the definite location of the proposed road,
this was held a sufficient compliance. Anderson v. Howard,
34 Ga. App. 292, 297, 129 S. E- 567.
§ 642. (§ 522). Persons in possession to be
notified.
Notice Signed by Majority Sufficient.—It is not necessary
that the notice served on the objectors should be signed by
all the commissioners. A majority is sufficient. Anderson v.
Howard, 34 Ga. App. 292, 129 S. E. 567.
Clerical Error in Notice.—The words in a notice, "said
road to be fifty feet in length," clearly appeared to be a
clerical error, and, the length of the road otherwise appear-
ing therein, it was proper to overrule a motion to dismiss
the proceeding, based on the ground that the notice showed
that the road was to be only fifty feet long, and for that rea-
son could not be of public utility. Anderson v. Howard, 34
Ga. App. 292, 129 S. E. 567.
Failure to Serve All Parties.—Where the citation was pub-
lished as required by sec. 641, a plaintiff cannot object to the
proceedings on the ground that certain other persons, through
whose land the road would pass, had not been served with
written notice as required by this section. Anderson v. How-
ard, 34 Ga. App. 292, 296, 129 S. E- 567.
Meaning of "Vicinage."—The word "vicinage," in this
section means the neighborhood, or surrounding or adjoin-
ing district; and its extent does not depend upon an arbi-
trary rule of distance or topography, but varies according
to the sparseness or density of settlement in county or city
districts. Graves v. Colquitt County, 34 Ga. App, 271, 129
S. E. 166.
ARTICLE 2
Alternative Road Law
§ 6#4. (§ 573). County authorities to lay out
roads.
Does Not Include Roads Inside of Cities.—The word "road,"
wherever used in these sections, seems clearly to indicate
that roads lying outside the municipalities only are in-
cluded in the term itself. Especially is this true when sec-
tions 695 and 696 are considered; for the residents of cities
are not affected by the provisions of section 695, declaring
who shall be subject to road duty, nor are they subject to the
payment of the commutation tax provided for in section
696. Mitchell County v. Cochran, 162 Ga. 810, 817, 134 S.
E- 768.
Classification under Alternative Road Law.—The alterna-
tive road law having been adopted in Muscogee County, the
commissioners of roads and revenues of that county had the
exclusive right to classify the roads of that county at any
time, in their discretion. Browne v. Benson, 163 Ga. 707, 137
S. E- 626. See in connection with classification of roads sec-
tion 631 and notes.
ARTICLE 6
Commissioners of Public Roads
SECTION l
Appointment and Obligation to Serve
§ 724. (§ 584) j Three commissioners for each
district, two may act.
See sec. 631 and notes thereto.
§ 678.
redressed.
SECTION 9
Damages, How Assessed
(§ 557). Landowners aggrieved* how
ARTICLE 12
Private Ways
§ 808. (§ 662). Not more than fifteen feet wide.
See note "Prescriptive use Unnecessary" under section 819.
§ 819. (§ 673). Can not be closed after one
year without notice.
Way Need Not Be Established.—This section, properly
construed, means that notwithstanding a road may not be a
private way within the meaning of the law, yet if persons
have used it—-traveled it—for as long as a year as though
it were such in fact, the owner can not obtruct or close it
without first giving the prescribed notice. It is not the
purpose of this section to enable the user of the road to
hold the owner at bay until the road may become a priv-
ate way by prescription, but its clear intent is that if the
owner sits by and for a year or more permits another to
travel a road over his land as though it were a private way,
such conduct on his part speaks of a necessity for the way
to the extent that the law will preserve the status for 30
days in order that the parties using the road may take steps
to have it made permanent by condemnation. Barnes v.
Holcomb, 35 Ga. App. 713, 716, 134 S. E. 628, citing Neal v.
Neal, 122 Ga. 804, 50 S. E. 929.
Prescriptive Use Unnecessary.—The provisions of the pres-
ent section were in the earler codes, and, what is more, the
article in which they appeared in each of such earlier codes
was devoted exclusively to the acquisition of private ways
by express grant and by condemnation. It is thus seen that
the right definied in this section was not dependent upon
such use as could ultimately have resulted in prescription.
These facts regarding the history of this section apply
equally to the history of section 808. Barnes v. Holcomb, 35
Ga. App. 713, 719, 134 S. E. 628.
Necessary Allegations.—An application to prevent closing
a road until the thirty days notice is given will be suf-
ficient to show the jurisdiction of the ordinary where it de-
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scribes the road with reasonable certainty, and alleges that
the road has been used by the applicant as a private way
for as much as a year, and that the owner of the land over
which it passes has obstructed or closed it without first
giving the 30-days notice in writing. In such a case it is
not necessary to make the allegations required in an ap-
plication for the removal of obstructions from a private
way claimed by prescription under the provisions of section
824. Barnes v. Holcomb, 35 Ga. App. 713, 716, 134 S. E.
628.
ARTICLE 13
State Highway Department. Reorganization.
SECTION l
Reorganization, Assent to Federal Law and
Membership of Department
§ 828 (1). State Highway Department reor-
ganized.
As to construction through municipality without consent
of local authorities, see note to sec. 828(31).
SECTION 6
Powers and Duties of Highway Department
§828 (18). Control of road work, etc.
Effect of Section upon Rights to Condemn.—The provi-
sion that no road or portion thereof shall become a part of
the system of State-aid roads until so designated by the
State highway board does not prevent that board from
instituting condemnation proceeding to acquire right-of-
way. On the contrary, the law authorizes this proceeding.
Cook v. State Highway Board, 162 Ga. 84, 97, 132 S. E. 902.
§ 828 (22). Labor, contracts for construction,
etc.; condemnation of right of way.
As to liability of county where state condemns right-of-
way, see note to sec. 828(27).
As to necessity of designating road as part of system as
prerequisite to condemnation proceedings, see note to §
828(18).
Power of Condemnation Exercised by State.—This law
prescribes a full and complete State method of laying out,
constructing, and maintaining State-aid roads. The State
highway board is given full authority and power to con-
demn rights of way for these roads. This power was so
exercised in the case at bar and it can not be said that the
proceeding was brought for and in behalf of the county
and not in behalf of the State. Cook v. State Highway
Board, 162 Ga. 84, 98, 132 S. E. 902.
§ 828 (27). Rights of way, counties to give.
Condemnation by State—Liability of County.—The fact
that the proper county authorities are required to furnish
rights of way, free to the State highway board, does not
prevent that board from condemning rights of way for
State-aid roads whenever the county authorities fail or re-
fuse to furnish said rights of way. This provision may
make the counties liable for expenditures incurred by the
State highway board in acquiring these rights of way; but
it does not bar this board from proceeding to condemn
rights of way. Cook v. State Highway Board, 162 Ga. 84,
97, 132 S. E. 902.
SECTION 7
Construction of Roads by County
§ 828 (31). Reimbursement of counties for ex-
penditures.
Construction by State Through Municipality—Liability
for Damages.—The decision in Lee County v. Smithville, 154
Ga. 550, 115 S. E- 107, to the effect that the State highway
department, in conjunction with the county authorities, may
construct a "State-aid road" through a municipality without
its consent and even against its will, can have no applica-
tion so as to preclude a liability against the municipality
for damage done to private property by a change in a
grade of one of its streets which the municipality knowingly
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permitted to be made where such street is not part of the
highway being constructed or repaired but is entirely dis-
connected therefrom and is graded merely for the purpose
of obtaining dirt with which to widen another street or road
which is occupied as a part of the highway. Cleveland v.
Kimsey, 34 Ga. App. 480, 130 S. E- 159.
The municipal authorities in such a case having power
to prevent such change in the grade of the street may be
held liable for damages to private property resulting there-
from where they knowingly permit the work to be done.
Cleveland v. Kimsey, 34 Ga. App. 480, 130 S. E. 159.
Power of County to Construct Municipal Roads.—County
authorities are not authorized to expend the proceeds of
the sale of bonds issued by the county for the purpose of
raising money with which to pave and grade the public
roads in that county, for the pavement or grading or im-
provement of streets in a municipality located in the
county; and the court did not err in granting an injunction
to restrain them from so doing. Mitchell County v. Coch-
ran, 162 Ga. 810, 134 S. E. 768.
§ 828 (33). Power to sue and to condemn
rights of way.
As to liability for payment, see note to § 828(27).
CHAPTER 14
County Police, Election, and Maintenance
§ 855 (1). Policemen of good character to be
appointed.
County Policeman Not an Employee under Compensation
Act.—See note under this catchline under section 3154(2)
subdivision (b).
SEVENTH TITLE
Municipal Corporations
ARTICLE l
Assessors
§ 862. (§ 717.) Tax assessors for city.
Effect upon Existing Power.—As stated in the proviso of
the section, the charter powers conferred upon the mayor
and aldermen of Savannah as assessors were not taken away
by the subsequent enactment of this section. Tietjen v.
Mayor, 161 Ga. 125, 130, 129 S. E. 653.
ARTICLE 3
Assessments for Street and Other Improvements
§ 869. (§ 723). Municipalities may issue exe-
cutions for paving, etc.
Similar to a Tax Fi. Fa.—A fi. fa. issued by a city under
this section is in the nature of a tax fi. fa. and governed
by the same procedure, and must be taken to be subject
to the same period of limitation. Lewis v. Moultrie Bank-
ing Co., 36 Ga. App. 347, 348, 136 S. E. 554. See Brunswick
v. Gordon Realty Co., 163 Ga. 636, 136 • S. E- 898.
ARTICLE 3
Limitation of Powers of City and Its Officers
§ 894. (§ 745). Obstructions in street.
Use of Streets Not Absolute.—The use of streets and high-
ways is not absolute and unrestricted, but is subject to
reasonable regulation. Scblesinger v. Atlanta, 161 Ga. 148,.
129 S. E. 861.
Same—Restriction of Busses.—The use of streets by com-
mon carriers for the purpose of gain is extraordinary and
may be conditioned or prohibited as the legislature or mu-
nicipality deems proper. Hence, if the State or city deter-
mines that the use of streets by busses should be re-
stricted or prohibited there is nothing in the Constitution
of the United States or this State which prohibits such ac-
tion. Schlesinger v. Atlanta, 161 Ga. 148, 161, 129 S. E- 861,
citing numerous authorities.
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§' 898. (§ 749). Municipal corporations liable
for injuries, when.
General Rule.—Stated in Atlanta v. Robertson, 36 Ga.
App. 66, 135 S. E- 445, as set out under this catchline in the
Georgia Code of 1926.
Proximate Cause.—Irrespective of whether a municipal
corporation is exercising a "governmental function" in al-
lowing a part of its sewerage system to become worn and in
a bad state of repair, where a traveler upon a public street
in a city is injured in consequence of a dangerous condi-
tion under the surface of a street, of which the city knew
or should have known in time to repair it or to give warn-
ing of its existence before the injury, the city can not escape
liability upon the ground that such condition of the streets
was due to its failure to repair its sewerage system. Atlanta
v. Robertson, 36 Ga. App. 66, 135 S. E- 445.
§ 899. (§ 750). Municipal property not sub-
ject to levy.
Property Cannot Be Encumbered.—A city board of educa-
tion has no authority to place an incumbrance upon articles
which it had unconditionally purchased on account several
months previously, and which it had installed as necessary
to the operation of the schools. Southern School Supply
Co. v. Abbeville, 34 Ga. App. 93, 101, 128 S. E. 231, and
cases cited.
§ 900. (§ 751). Voting when personally inter-
ested.
Effect on Contract.—A contract between the City of At-
lanta and a construction company, in which a member of
council is a large stockholder, is null and void, although
such member of council did not vote for the ordinance au-
thorizing such contract, and did not use his influence in
procuring other members of council to approve and author-
ize the making of such contract, and although such contract
is fair and free from fraud. Montgomery v. Atlanta, 162
Ga. 534, 134 S. E- 152.
Where such an illegal contract has been made, it can-
not subsequently be ratified by the resignation of the
interested councilman and the confirmation • of the contract
by the council. Montgomery v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 534, 547,
134 S. E- 152.
CHAPTER 11
Repeal or Amendment of Municipal Charters
§ 913(19). Referendum, when necessary.—No
local law seeking a repeal of a municipal charter of
cities of less than fifty thousand inhabitants, or
an amendment to any municipal charter of cities
of less than fifty thousand inhabitants, which
amendment materially changes the form of gov-
ernment of a municipality or seeks to substitute
other officers for municipal control other than
those in control under existing charter, shall be-
come effective until such repeal or amendment
shall be voted upon by the qualified voters off the
municipality to be affected as hereinafter provided.
Acts 1925, p. 136; 1927, p. 245.
Editor's Note.—Prior to the amendment of 1927, this sec-
tion applied to repeal or amendment of charters of cities which
have a population of less than two hundred thousand. The
present section is limited to cities with a population of less
than fifty thousand.
CHAPTER 12
Street Improvements in Certain Cities
§ 913(23). Definitions.—In this Act the term
"municipality" means any city or town in the
State of Georgia now or hereafter incorporated,
having a population of six hundred or more.
"Governing body" includes mayor and council,
board of aldermen, board of commissioners, or
other chief legislative body of a municipality.
The words "improve" and ''improvement" in-
clude the grading, regrading, paving, repaving,
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macadamizing, and remaeadamizing of streets,
alleys, sidewalks, or other public places or ways,
and the construction, reconstruction, and alter-
ing of curbing, gutting, storm-sewers, turnouts,
water-mains, and water, gas, or sewer connections
therein.
The word "streets" includ.e streets, .avenues,
alleys, sidewalks and other public places or ways.
The word "pave" shall include storm drainings,
paving, macadamizing, and grading.
"Frontage" means that side or limit of the lot
or parcel of land in question which abuts on the
improvement. Acts 1927, p. 322.
§ 913(24). Referendum as to adoption of this
Act.—The governing body of any municipality
in the State of Georgia is hereby authorized and
empowered to hold an election (or elections), at
such time and under such conditions as may be
determined by said governing body, for the pur-
pose of adopting the provisions of this chapter;
and when such election has been duly held and a
majority of the qualified electors voting therein
shall have voted in favor of such adoption, and
the election managers shall have duly certified
the results of such election to the governing body,
and the same shall have been adopted and entered
on the minutes thereof, then the aforesaid govern-
ing body of such municipality shall be and is
hereby authorized and empowered to improve
any street or streets in such municipality when-
ever in the judgment of its governing body the
public welfare or convenience may require such
improvement, subject only to the conditions and
limitations herein prescribed. Acts 1927, p. 322.
§ 913(25). Resolution declaring improvement
necessary; publication; protest; contract assess-
ment; etc.—Whenever the said governing body
shall deem it necessary to improve any street or
any part thereof either in length or width, within
the limits of said municipality, and said governing
body shall iby resolution declare such improve-
ment necessary to be done, and publish such reso-
lution once a week for at least three consecutive
weeks in the newspaper in which the sheriff's ad-
vertisements of the county in which such munici-
pality is located are published, and if the owners
of a majority of the lineal feet of frontage of the
lands abutting on said improvement shall not in
fifteen days after the last day of publication of
such resolution file with the clerk of said city
their protest in writing against such improvement,
then said governing body shall have power to
cause said improvement to be made, and to con-
tract therefor, and to make assessments and fix
liens as provided for herein. Any number of
steets or any part or parts thereof to be so im-
proved may be included in one resolution, but
any protest or objection shall be made as to each
street separately; provided, however, that if the
owners of a majority of the lineal feet or frontage
of the land liable to assessment for such improve-
ment shall petition the governing body for such
improvement, citing this chapter and designating
by general description the improvement to be un-
dertaken and the street or streets or part thereof
to be improved, it shall thereupon be the duty of
said governing body to proceed, as hereinafter
provided, to cause said improvements to be made
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in accordance with the prayers of said petition
and their own best judgment, and in such cases
the resolution hereinbefore mentioned shall not
be required. The petition shall be lodged with the
clerk of the municipality, who shall investigate
the sufficiency thereof, submit the petition to the
governing 'body, and certify the result of his in-
vestigation. Acts 1927, p. 323.
§ 913 (26). Assessment on basis of frontage;
Intersecting streets,—Each lot or parcel of land
abutting upon said improvement shall be charged
on a basis of lineal-foot frontage at an equal
rate per foot of such frontage with its just pro
rata of the entire cost of said improvement, lesis
any amounts paid by street or steam railways or
others; provided, however, that the cost of the
sidewalks, curbs, and gutters shall be charged
entirely to the lots or parcels of land abutting on
that side of the street upon w'hich the same are
constructed. The frontage of intersecting streets
shall be assessed as real estate abutting upon
the improvement, and the municipality, for all
purposes of this chapter, shall be deemed to the
owner thereof, and the mayor or chairman of the
board of commissioners shall have authority to
sign the petition or file objections provided for
herein; and the governing body of the municipal-
ity shall pay from the city treasury, as other cur-
rent bills are paid, its just pro rata of the entire
cost of said improvement, unless the owners of a
majority of the aforesaid frontage in the petition
hereinbefore provided for shall agree to pay the
entire cost of said improvement, or unless in the
resolution hereinbefore provided for it shall be
stated that the entire cost of the improvement is
to be paid by the abutting property owners. Acts
1927, p. 324.
§ 913(27). Railroads.—Any railroad or street
railway having tracks located in a street at the
time of the proposed improvement as provided
herein shall be required by the governing body
to pave the width of its tracks and two feet on
each side thereof, and, except as hereinafter pro-
vided, with the same material and in the same
manner as the rest of the street is to be paved, and
such work shall be performed under the supervi-
sion and subject to the approval of the city's en-
gineer, and if such railway shall not, within a pe-
riod of thirty days after receipt by such railway of
the notice to do such work, agree in writing to
•comply with such order, or if the work is not
completed to the satisfaction of the city's engineer
within such time as may be described by the gov-
erning body, said governing body may have such
work done and charge the cost and expense there-
of to such railway company located in the munici-
pality and said lien shall have the same rank and
priority and shall be enforced in the same manner
as the liens provide for in section 913(31). The
governing body may, however, require such pav-
ing to be of a different material and manner of
construction, when, in its judgment such is ren-
dered necessary by the railway uses of the street.
Acts 1927, p. 324.
§ 913(28). Powers as to ordinances.—When-
ever the petition provided for in section 913(25)
is presented, or when the said governing
body shall have determined to improve any street,
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and shall have passed the resolution provided for
in said section 913(25), the said governing
body shall then have the power to enact all
ordinances and to establish all such rules and reg-
ulations as may be necessary to require the
owners of all the property abutting on the im-
provement and of any railway in said street to
pay the cost of such improvement, and to cause
to be put in and constructed all water, gas, or
sewer-pipe connections to connect with any exist-
ing water, gas, or sewer-pipes in and underneath
the streets where such improvement is to be
made, and all cost and expense of making such
connections shall be taxed solely against such
property, but shall be included and made a part
of the general assessment to cover the cost of
such improvement. Acts 1927, p. 325.
§ 813(29). Resolution as to kind and extent of
improvement; contracts; bonds; etc.—After the ex-
piration of the time for objection or protest on the
part of the property owners, if no sufficient pro-
test is filed, or on receipt of a petition for such im-
provement signed by the owners of a majority of
the frontage of the land to be assessed, if such pe-
tition be found to be in proper form and properly
executed, the governing bod}' shall adopt a resolu-
tion reciting that no protest has been filed, or the
filing of such petition, as the case may be, and ex-
pressing the determination of said governing body
to proceed with the said improvement, stating the
kind of improvement and defining the extent and
character of the same, and other such matters as
may be necessary to instruct the engineer em-
ployed by said municipality in the performance of
his duties in preparing for such improvement the
necessary plans, plats, profiles, specifications, and
estimates. Said resolution shall set forth any and
all isuch reasonable terms and conditions as said
governing body shall deem proper to impose with
reference to the letting of the contract and the
provisions thereof; and said governing body shall
by said resolution provide that the contractor shall
execute to the city a good and sufficient bond as
provided in the Act entitled "Contractors of Pub-
lic Work Bonded," approved August 19, 1916, and
may require a bond in an amount to be stated in
such resolution for the maintenance of good con-
dition of such improvements for a period of not
less than five (5) years froni the time of its com-
pletion, or both, in the discretion of said govern-
ing body. Said resolution shall also direct the
clerk of said municipality to advertise for sealed
proposals for furnishing the materials and per-
forming the work necessary in making such im-
provements. The notice of such proposals shall
be published in at least six consecutive issues ot
a daily paper, or at least two of a weekly paper,
having a general circulation in said municipality,
and shall state the street or streets to be improved,
the kinds of improvements proposd, what, if any,
bond or bonds will be required to be executed by
the contractor aforesaid, and shall state the time
when and the place where such sealed proposals
shall be filed and when and where the same will
be considered by said governing body. At the
time and place specified in such notice the govern-
ing body shall examine all bids received, and with-
out unnecessary delay award the contract to the
lowest and best bidder, who will perform the work
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and furnish the materials which may be selected
and perform all the conditions imposed by said
governing" body as prescribed in such resolutions
and notice for proposals, and the said govern-
ing body shall have the night to reject any and all
bids and readvertise for other ibids when the bids
submitted are not, in its judgment, satisfactory.
Acts 1927, p. 326.
§ 913(30). Appraisers to apportion cost to abut-
ting land.—After the said contract is let and the
cost for such improvement, which shall include
all other expenses incurred by the city incident
to said improvement in addition to the contract
price for the work and materials, is ascertained,
the said governing body shall by resolution ap-
point a board of appraisers consisting of three
members to appraise and apportion the cost and
expense of the same to the several tracts of land
abutting on said improvement as hereinbefore pro-
vided. Within thirty days from the date of the
resolution appointing said board, it shall file with
the clerk of the municipality a written, report of
the appraisal and the assessment and cost upon
the several lots and tracts of land abutting on said
street, or upon the property of any street or steam
railwa}^ whose tracks are located in such street
where such railway has failed or refused to do
the paving provided herein when and as required
iby the governing body. When said report shall
have been returned and filed, the said governing
body shall appoint a time for the holding of a ses-
sion, or shall designate a regular meeting of their
body for the hearing of any complaints or objec-
tions that may be made concerning the said ap-
praisement, apportionment, and assessment by
any person interested, and notice of such session
for the said hearing shall be published by the
clerk of the governing ibody once a week for two
weeks in a newspaper having a general circula-
tion in said municipality, and said notice shall
provide for an inspection of such return by any
property owner or other party interested in such
return. The time fixed for said hearing shall not
be less than five nor more than ten days from the
date of the last publication. The said governing
body at said session shall have power, and it shall
be its duty, to review and correct said appraise-
ment, apportionment, and assessment, and to' hear
objections to the same, and to confirm the sarne
either as made by said board or as corrected by
said governing body. The said governing body
shall by ordinance fix the assessments in accord-
ance with said appraisement and apportionment,
as so confirmed, against the several tracts of land
liable therefor; provided, however, that the rate
of interest to be taxed shall not exceed one per
cent per annum over and above the rate of in-
terest stipulated in the 'bonds herein provided for.
Assessment in conformity to said appraisement
and apportionment as confirmed 'by said munici-
pality shall be payable to the treasurer of such
municipality in cash, and, if paid within thirty
days from the date of the passage of said ordi-
nance, without interest; provided however, that in
the event the owner of the land or of any street
railway so assessed shall, within thirty days from
tne passage of the ordinance making the assess-
ment final, file with the clerk of the said munici-
pality his or its written request asking that the
assessments be payable in installments in accord-
ance with the previsions hereof, the same shall
thereupon be and become payable in ten equal an-
nual installments and shall bear interest at the
rate of not exceeding seven per cent per annum
until paid, and each installment together with the
interest on the entire amount remaining unpaid
shall be payable each year at such time and place
as shall be provided by resolution of the govern-
ing body. Acts 1927, p. 327.
§ 913(31). Lien of assessment;, date of lien.—
Such special assessment and each installment
thereof, and the interest thereon and the expense
of collection, are hereby declared to be a lien
against the lots and tracts of land so assessed
from the date of the ordinance levying the same,
coequal with the lien of other taxes and prior to
and superior to all other liens against such lots or
tracts, and such lien shall continue until such as-
sessment and interest thereon shall be fully paid,
and shall be enforced in the same manner as are
liens for city taxes. Acts 1927, p. 328.
§ 913(32). Bonds.—The said governing body,,
after the expiration of thirty days from the pas-
sage of said ordinance confirming and levying
said assessment, shall by resolution provide for
the issuance of bonds in the aggregate amount of
such assessments remaining unpaid, bearing date
not more than thirty days after the passage of the
ordinance fixing the said assessment and of such
denomination as the said governing body shalL
determine, which bond or bonds, unless authority
is hereafter granted and exercised for making the
same a direct obligation of the municipality, shall
in no event become a liability of the municipality
or of the governing body of the municipality is-
suing same. One tenth in amount of any such
series of bonds with interest upon the whole
series to date, shall be payable on such day and
at such place as may be determined by the govern-
ing body, and one tenth thereof with the yearly
interest upon the whole amount remaining un-
paid shall be payable on the same day in each
succeeding year until all shall be paid. Such
bonds shall bear interest at a rate not exceeding
six per cent per annum from their date until
maturity, payable annually, and shall be desig-
nated as "street-improvement bonds," and shall
on the face thereof recite the street or streets, part
of street or streets, or other public places for the
improvement of which they have issued, and,
unless authority is hereafter granted and ex-
ercised for making the same a direct obliga-
tion of the municipality, that they are payable
solely from assessments which have been fixed
upon the lots or tracts of land benefited by said
improvement under authority of this chapter. Said
bonds shall be signed by the mayor or chairman
of the board of commissioners, and attested by
the clerk of the governing body, and shall have
the impression of the corporate seal of such mu-
nicipality thereon, and shall have interest coupons
attached, and all bonds issued by authority of this
chapter shall be payable at such place either with-
in or without the State of Georgia as shall be des-
ignated by said governing body. Said bonds shall
be sold by said governing body at not less than
par, and the proceeds thereof applied to the pay-
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me nt of the contract price and other expenses in-
curred pursuant to the provisions of this chapter,
or such bonds in the amount that shall be neces-
sary for that purpose may be turned over and
delivered to the contractor at par value in pay-
ment of the amount due him on his contract,
and the portion thereof which shall be necessary
to pay other expenses incident to and incurred
in providing for said improvements shall be sold
or otherwise disposed of as the said governing
body shall direct. Any proceeds from the sale
of said bonds remaining in the hands of the treas-
urer after the payment hereinbefore provided for
shall go into the treasury of the municipality as
compensation for the services to be rendered by
it as contemplated herein. Acts 1927, p. 329.
§ 913 (33). Treasurer's duty as to collection;
sales to pay assessment; affidavit of illegality.—
The assessment provided for and levied under the
provisions of this chapter shall ibe payable as the
several installments become due, together with
the interest thereon, to the treasurer of the mu-
nicipality, who shall keep an accurate account
of all such collections by him made, and such
collections shall be kept in a special fund to t>e
used and applied for the payment of such bonds
and the interest thereon and expenses incurred
incident thereto, and for no other purpose, until
all said bonds are paid in full; and said treasurer
shall give bond in amount to be fixed by the
governing body, conditioned upon the faithful
performance by him of the duties imposed herein.
It shall be the duty of said treasurer, not less than
thirty days and not more than fifty days before
the maturity of any installment of such assess-
ments, to publish at least one time, in a newspaper
having a general circulation in said municipality
a notice advising the owner of the property af-
fected by such assessment of the date when such
installment and interest will be due, and desig-
nating the street or streets or other public places
for the improvement of which such assessments
have been levied, and that, unless the same shall
be promptly paid, proceedings will be taken to
collect said installment and interest, or in lieu
thereof to mail such notice within the time limits
aforesaid to the owners of record of the property
affected, at their last known address. And it shall
be 'the duty of said treasurer, promptly within
fifteen days after the date of the -maturity of any
such installment or assessment or interest, to is-
sue an execution against the lot or tract of land
assessed for such improvement, or against the
party or person owning the same for the amount
of such assessment or interest, and shall turn
over the same to the marshal or chief of police
of the municipality or his deputy, who shall levy
the same upon the abutting real estate liable
for such assessment and previously assessed for
such improvements, and after advertisement and
other proceedings as in case of sales for city
taxes the same shall be sold at public outcry to
the highest bidder, and such sales shall vest an
absolute title in the purchaser, subject to the
lien of the remaining unpaid installments with
interest, and also subject to the right of redemp-
tion as provided in section S80, 1169, 1170, 1171,
and 1172 of the Code of Georgia; provided that
the defendant shall have the right to file an affi-
davit denying that the whole or any part of the
amount for which said execution issued is due,
and stating what amount he admits to be due,
which amount so admitted to be due shall be paid
and collected 'before the affidavit is received, and
the affidavit received for the balance. All affi-
davits (and the foregoing and following provi-
sions shall apply to the railroads or street rail-
ways against whom execution shall foe issued for
the cost and expense of paving) shall set out in
detail the reasons why the affidavit claims the
amount is not due, and, when received by the
city marshal or chief of police, shall be returned
to the superior court of the county wherein, the
municipality is located, and there be tried and
the issue determined as in cases of illegality, sub-
ject to all the pains and penalties provided for
in other cases of illegality for delay under the
Code of Georgia. The failure of said treasurer or
clerk to publish or mail said notice of maturity
of any installment of said assessment and interest
shall in no wise effect the validity of the assess-
ment and interest and the execution issued there-
for. Acts 1927, p. 330.
§ 913(34). Suit to enjoin assessment, etc.; time
limit.—No suk shall be sustained to set aside any
such assessment, or to enjoin the said governing
body from making or fixing or collecting the same
or issuing or levying executions therefor or is-
suing such bonds or providing for their payment
as herein authorized, or contesting the validity
thereof on any grounds or for any reason other
than the failure of the governing body to adopt
and publish the preliminary resolution provided
for in section 913(25) in cases requiring such
resolution and its publication, or to give no-
tice of the hearing of the return of the ap-
praisers as herein provided for, unless such suit
shall 'be commenced within . thirty days after the
passage of the ordinance making such assess-
ment final; provided, that in the event any special
assessment shall be found to be invalid or insuf-
ficient in whole or in part for any reason whatso-
ever, the said governing body may at any time,
in the manner provided for the -making of an
original assessment, proceed to cause a new as-
sessment to be made and fixed, which shall have
like force and effect as an original assessment.
Acts 1927, p. 3312.
§ 913(35) Assessment where county is land
owner.—Whenever the abutting-land owners of
any street of said municipality petition the gov-
erning body as herein set out, or said governing
body pass the resolution provided for in section
913(25) for the improvement of any street
where the county is owner of property on
said street, and the governing body of such
county has assented to the proposed improvement
and has provided funds to pay in cash its propor-
tionate part of the cost of said improvement, the
frontage so owned is to be counted as if owned
by an individual, for all the purposes of this chapter
and the chairman of the board of commissioners
of such county is authorized to sign the aforesaid
petition or file objections in behalf of the county.
Acts 1927, p. 332.
§ 913 (36) Special laws not repealed. — This
chapter shall not be construed to repeal any special
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or local law, or affect any proceedings under such
for the making of improvements hereby author-
ized or for raising the funds therefor, but shall be
deemed to be additional and independent legisla-
tion for such purposes and to provide an alterna-
tive method of procedure for such purposes, and
to be a complete Act not subject to any limita-
tions or restrictions contained in any other publ ; c
or private law or laws except as herein otherwise
provided. Act 1927, p. 33i2.
§ 913(37) Payment of part by municipality.—
Where the municipality desires to pay any por-
tion of the cost of the improvements contemplated
herein, in addition to the amounts hereinbefore
provided for, the (balance may be assessed against
the abutting property or the owners thereof, or
the owners of any street or steam railway there-
in, as hereinbefore provided for. Acts 1927, p. 333.
§ 913(38) Proceeding to validate lien.—Any
time within sixty days after the assessments are
finally determined and fixed as hereinbefore pro-
vided for, it shall be lawful for the municipality
to file a petition in the superior court of the
county in which the said municipality is situated,
wherein shall be alleged the fact of the passage
and approval of the ordinance, and a copy there-
of, the street or part of a street affected thereby,
the character of paving or other improvement in-
tended, and the approximate estimate of the cost.
Said petition shall allege that the ordinance is
authorized by law, and that it will create a lien on
all real property abutting on such street or part
of a street, for the payment by the owner of each
lot or parcel of land so abutting, of the pro rata
share of expense assessed to each said lot or par-
cel of land, as well as on any street or other rail-
road therein, if any such there be, and shall pray
for a judgment iby the court declaring such ordi-
nance valid, legal, and binding, and that the liens
be set up as alleged. It shall not be necessary in
such petition to allege the names of the owners
of the abutting property of railroads to be af-
fected, but shall be sufficient to describe the street
or portion thereof to be improved, and to indi-
cate, as hereinbefore provided, that the property
on said street is to ibe charged with the expense.-
*At or ibefore the filing of such petition, the same
shall 'be presented to the judge of said court, w'ho
shall thereupon pass an order calling upon all
persons owning or interested in the real estate
abutting on said street, or on the designated part
thereof, to show cause, at a time and place to be
in said order named, why the prayer of the peti-
tion should not be granted and the ordinance
and assessments declared valid and the liens be
fixed as legal and (binding, which time shall not
be less than thirty nor more than sixty days later
and either in term time or vacation, and either in
open court or at chambers. It shall thereupon ibe
the duty of the clerk to publish once a week
for four weeks in the official organ of the
county, a statement of the case and a copy of said
order. At the time and place named, or at such
other time and; place as the hearing may he ad-
journed to, any person interested shall be heard
to show cause in writing, which writing shall be
filed with the clerk, why the prayer should not be
granted. The court shall hear all questions
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of law or fact, and all competent evidence may
be offered as in other cases; and the court shall
thereupon pass an appropriate order finding and
adjudging that said ordinance is lawful and valid
and said liens legal and binding, or otherwise, as
the law and facts may warrant. The municipality
or any person appearing, and who may be dis-
satisfied with said judgment, may within ten days
file a bill of exceptions and carry the matter up
to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals,
as the case may be, for review as in cases of in-
terlocutory injunction. If the final judgment of
the superior court shall be in favor of the validity
of the ordinance and of the liens claimed, the
same shall forever be conclusive, and said mat-
ters so determined shall never be thereafter drawn
in question in any court. Bonds issued under the
provisions of this chapter after such judgment
shall have written or stamped thereon the words
"Validated and Confirmed by judgment of the
Superior Court," specifying also the date when
such judgment was rendered and the court where-
in it was rendered, which shall be signed by the
clerk of the said superior court, and said entry
shall be original prima facie evidence of the fact
of such judgment, and receivable as such in any
court of this State. In any case in which similar
bonds have been heretofore issued by any munic-
ipality under the authority of particular local
Acts, it shall be lawful to validate the same and
fix the assessments by final judgment of the su-
perior court under like proceedings and with like
effect; provided, however, that before the munic-
ipality shall institute such proceedings in such
cases, the holder or holders of such bonds or
any part thereof shall give to the municipality
good and sufficient bond and security to indem-
nify and hold harmless the municipality against
any court costs or other expenses incident to
such validating proceedings, the sufficiency of such
bond and the security to be approved by the
chief executive officer of the municipality. Acts
1927, p. 333.
EIGHTH TITLE
Public Revenue
CHAPTER 1
Taxation
ARTICLE 1
Ad Valorem, and Occupation Taxes
§ 993 (4). Poll tax; exemptions; registered
female voters.
Registration as Prerequisite to Tax.—A female more than
21 years of age, by the provisions of the act of 1923, prop-
erly construed, is not required to pay poll-tax except for
those years in which she may be registered as a voter. Haw-
thorne v. Turkey Creek School Dist., 162 Ga. 462, 134 S. E.
103.
Poll Tax Prior to 1922.—Females in this State, who were
otherwise qualified to vote, might have voted at any time
between August 26, 1920, and December 20, 1922, without
paying poll-tax prior to such voting. Davis v. Warde, 155
Ga. 748, 118 S. E. 378. Thus there was no poll-tax required
of females prior to December of 1922. Hawthorne v. Turkey
Creek School Dist., 162 Ga. 462, 468, 134 S. E. 103.
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§ 893 (24). Cars operated for hire.
Effect upon Municipal Taxation.—The imposition of a tax
under this act and its payment by jitney owners does not
confer upon them the right to operate their jitneys on the
streets of a city so that the latter can not prohibit their
operation. Schlesinger v. Atlanta, 161 Ga. 148, 163, 129 S.
E. 861.
§ 993 (49). Coal, coke, wood and lumber.
Constitutionality.—This section as amended in 1924, is not
unconstitutional and void because it violates the commerce
clause of the Federal Constitution, or the uniform-tax pro-
vision of the State Constitution. Georgia-Carolina Lumber
Co. v. Wright, 161 Ga. 281, 131 S. E- 173.
§ 993 (54). Foreign corporations.
Effect of Failure to Pay upon Contract.—The failure on
the part of the corporation to register with the comptroller-
general and pay the tax required by this act, does not
render the contracts of the corporation void and unenforce-
able, since the purpose of the general tax act, as denned by
its caption, is merely to raise revenue, and it can not be
taken to impliedly nullify contracts made in the absence of
compliance with its provisions. Toole v. Wiregrass De-
velopment Co., 142 Ga. 57, 82 S. E. 514; Morris v. Moore,
143 Ga. 512, 85 S. E. 635; McLamb v. Phillips, 34 Ga. App.
210, 129 S. E. 570; Alston v. New York Contract Purchase
Corp., 36 Ga. App. 777, 138 S. E. 270.
§ 993 (65). Travelling horse traders or gyp-
sies.
Taxation under This Section and Section 993(80). — The
plaintiff, a Georgia corporation, having a fixed and perma-
nent place of business, and being a bona fide resident of
the State, and having paid the occupation tax imposed by
section 993(80), to the tax-collector (who issued his certifi-
cate showing the payment, etc.) was not subject to the tax
imposed under this section. Fulton Trading Co. v. Baggett,
161 Ga. 669, 131 S. E- 358.
§ 993 (69). Travelling, etc., agents of assess-
ment, etc., companies.
Industrial Life Insurance Agents.—Because of section
2507, this section is not applicable to industrial life in-
surance agents. Hoover v. Pate, 162 Ga. 206, 132 S. E. 763.
§ 993 (80). Live stock dealers.
As to payment under both this section and section 993(65),
see note to section 993(65).
§ 993 (149). Cigarette and cigar dealers; "whole-
sale" and "retail" dealer defined.
Number of Sales to Constitute One Dealer.—Where the
evidence shows only one sale and no attempt at others or
intent to engage in retail trade, it is not sufficient to clas-
sify the seller as a dealer under the definition of this sec-
tion. Lichtenstein v. State, 34 Ga. App. 138, 128 S. E- 704.
§ 993 (169). Specific and occupation taxes.—
In addition to the ad valorem tax on real estate
and personal property, as required by the Con-
stitution and now provided for by Law, the fol-
lowing specific and occupation taxes shall be
levied and collected each year after the passage of
this Act, beginning in 1928. In all cases in this
Act where population controls the amounts of
tax or license fee to be paid, the last census re-
port of the Federal government shall govern.
Acts 1927, p. 57.
§ 993 (170). Poll tax; exemptions,—Upon each
and every inhabitant of the State between the
ages of twenty-one and sixty years, on the day
fixed for the return of property for taxation a
poll tax of ($1.00) one dollar, which shall be for
educational purposes in instructing children in the
elementary branches of an English education only.
Provided, this shall not be demanded of blind
persons, nor crippled, maimed, or disabled Con-
federate veterans relieved of such taxes under
and by authority of section 766, volume 1, of the
Code of 1895, nor shall this tax be required or
demanded of female inhabitants of the state who
do not register for voting.
§ 993 (171). Ad valorem tax for sinking fund
for retirement of State Bonds.—The governor, by
and with the assistance of the Comptroller-Gen-
eral, is authorized and empowered annually to
levy and assess a tax on the ad valorem value
of the taxable property of this State, such rate as
may be sufficient to raise a net amount of $100,-
000.00 as a sinking-fund to pay off and retire
the valid outstanding bonds of the State as they
fall due, as required by article 7, section 14, par-
agraph 1, of the Constitution. The tax ahove
authorized shall be specially levied and collected,
and separate accounts of the same shall be kept
by the Treasurer, and the money arising there-
from shall be applied to paying off the valid bonds
of the State as they mature. The said amount
so received each year shall be applied to paying
off and retiring the valid bonds of the State,
maturing in- their order continuously. All bonds
retired under the provisions of this Act shall be
cancelled and stamped with the words "sinking
funds," by the Treasurer, and filed in his office.
In addition to the foregoing levy, the Governor,
by and' with the assistance of the Comptroller-
General, shall also levy and assess such addi-
tional rate of tax on the taxable property of this
'State as may be necessary to meet the appropria-
tions of the General Assembly of Georgia for each
succeeding year. The aggregate ad valorem tax
levy in any one year not to exceed the tax-rate
limit fixed b}^ the Constitution of this State.
§ 803 (172). Professional tax.—Upon each and
every practitioner of law, medicine, osteopathy,
chiropractic, chiropodist, dentistry, and upon each
and every veterinary surgeon, optician, optome-
trist, masseur, public accountant, or embalmer,
and upon every civil, mechanical, hydraulic, or
electrical engineer, or architect, charging for their
services as such, $15.00, and the validity of their
licenses is made contingent upon the payment of
the tax herein provided. And no municipal cor-
poration or county authority shall levy or
collect an additional tax on the professions, busi-
nesses, or occupations enumerated above, which
shall be returned to the tax-receiver of the county*
of his residence by any person engaged therein
on the first day of January, and entered by the
receiver oh the digest of the county.
§ 993(173). Presidents and officials of corpora-
tions,—Upon the president of each express, tele-
graph, telephone, railroad, street-railroad, steam-
boat or navigation company, electric light, gas
company, water company, sleeping-car company,
palace car-company, building and loan association,
and investment and loan company, doing business
in this State, $25.00. Provided, said tax shall not
apply to local building and loan associations fos-
tered as a civic undertaking and not conducted
for financial gain or profit. In case the president
of any of the companies enumerated in the pre-
ceding paragraph does not reside in this State,
then in each case the general agent, superintend-
ent, or other person or official in charge of the
business of such companies, residing in this State,
shall be required to pay the tax of $25.00 hereby
imposed; and no municipal corporation, or county
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authorities shall levy or collect an additional tax
on the officials enumerated above, either as a li-
cense, tax, or fee. The president or other officials
herein named, of the companies enumerated
above are required to make a return as such to
the tax-receiver of the county of his residence as
of January 1st, which return shall be entered on
the digest by said receiver.
§ 993(174). Advertising agents.— Upon each
person, firm, or corporation conducting business
of an advertising agency using other means than
billboards, $50.00; upon each person, firm, or cor-
poration conducting the business of advertising
by signs painted, pasted, or printed on billboards
or other places where space is leased, rented, or
sold, in each county where located, one dollar
($1.00) for each location, and a location is denned
to be 75 lineal feet or fractional part thereof; and
provided further, that before painting or posting
such locations or fractional part thereof, it shall
be the duty of the person or persons so advertis-
ing to register with the ordinary and tax-col-
lector of said county as required by law, and in
case of any increase of advertising said ordinary
shall in each instance be notified as to the number
of locations.
§ 993 (175). Agencies, collecting, commercial,
and mercantile.—Upon each person, firm, or cor-
poration engaged in business as a collecting,
commercial, mercantile, or any other agency of
like character, $200.00 in every county in the
State where they have an office or branch office.
§ 993(176). Detective agenciesi — Upon each
person, firm, or corporation operating a detec-
tive agency or doing detective work for hire or
compensation, for each office established in this
'State, in or near cities or towns of 25,000 or more
inhabitants, $200.00; in or near cities or towns
from 10,000 to 25,000 inhabitants, $50.00; and in
or near cities or towns of less than 10,000 inhabit-
ant, $25.00.
§ 993 (177). Amusement parks. — Upon each
person, firm, or corporation running, leasing, or
operating an amusement park, other than base-
ball, football, or bicycle parks, hereinafter men-
tioned, where two or more amusement devices,
resorts, or attractions are .operated, and an admis-
sion fee is charged for any one or more of the ex-
hibits, resorts, or attractions, $250.00. Provided,
this paragraph shall not be construed to exempt
or relieve any individual device, resort, amuse-
ment, or attraction located in said park from pay-
ing any specific or license tax herein imposed.
§ 993 (178). Athletic clubs. — Upon every ath-
letic club, and upon every association or person
giving boxing or sparring or wrestling exhibitions
where an admission of 50 cents to $1.00 is charged
$50.00 for each exhibition; where admission
charged is $1.00 to $1.50, $100.00; and where the
admission charged is $1.50 and over, $200.00 for
each exhibition.
§ 993 (179). Auctioneers.—Upon each and ev-
ery auctioneer selling by auction in this State
jewelry, junk, furniture and household goods, live
stock farm implements and produce, and real
estate, $100.00 in each county in which he con-
ducts said business. Provided that this section
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shall not apply to sheriffs and the parties acting
as auctioneers for executors, administrators, guard-
ians, and commissioners conducting sales by vir-
tue of the order of any court of this State. Pro-
vided that the foregoing provision shall not apply
to auctioneers of tobacco or other farm prod-
ucts, nor to attorneys at law conducting sales un-
der power of sale, or other legal sale for their
clients.
§ 983 (180). Automobile and truck dealers.—
Upon every agent of, upon every dealer in, and
upon every person soliciting orders for retail sale
of automobiles or trucks, not including wholesale
dealers or distributors soliciting or canvassing for
local dealers, the sum set out below, viz. In each
county with a population of less than 20,000,
$25.00; in each county with a population of be-
tween 20,000 and 30,000, $55.00; in each county
with a population of between 30,000 and 50,000,
$85.00; in each county with a population between
50,000 and 75,000, $110.00; in each county with a
population between 75,000 and 100,000, $165.00;
in each county with a population (between 100,000
and 150,000, $220.00; in each county with a popula-
tion exceeding 150,000, $275.00. Provided, how-
ever, that nothing in this Act shall conflict with
the provisions fixing a liicense upon exclusive
dealers in used cars. Such dealer, agent, or so-
licitor selling or offering for sale automobiles or
trucks at retail shall be required to pay one license
fee only in each county, so as to provide that all
persons soliciting orders, or selling auto-mobiles
or trucks at retail, shall pay a license to become
a dealer or agent, and such license shall entitle
such dealer to sell any makes of new or second-
hand automobiles or trucks; and shall entitle said
dealers to operate, in connection with said busi-
ness, a service-station in said county in which
said license is paid; any dealer having paid such
tax to be allowed any number of employees for
the purpose of selling cars within the county
wherein such tax has been paid. The service-
station under this paragraph includes work done
only on the makes of cars sold by the dealer un-
der this tax.
§ 993 (181). Dealers in used cars.—Upon every
person, firm, or corporation dealing exclusively
in used automobiles or trucks, or second-hand
automobiles or trucks, the following sums, viz:
In each county with a population of less than
20,000, $25.00; in each county with a population
of over 20,000 and not over 50,000, $50.00; in each
county with a population exceeding 50,000, $100.00.
§ 993 (182). Automobile tires or accessories;
(Wholesale).—Upon every wholesale dealer in au-
tomobile tires or automobile accessories of
any kind whatsoever, the sum of $100.00 for each
place of business.
§ 993 (183). Automobile tires or accessories (Re-
tail).—Upon every retail dealer in automobile
tires or automobile accessories of any kind what-
soever, the sum of $10.00 for each place of busi-
ness.
§ 993 (184). Automobile assembling; plants. —
Upon every agent or representative of any foreign
or non-resident corporation, said agent or repre-
sentative having an office in this State, operating.
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an automobile assembling-plant, $300.00 in each
county.
§ 993 (185). Automobile truck assembling-
plants.—Upon each person, firm, or corporation
operating an automobile truck assembling-plant,
$300.00 in each county.
§ 993 (186). Automobile garages.—Upon each
person, firm, or corporation carrying on the busi-
ness of operating garages, either for storage or
repairing automobiles, in cities of more than
85,000 inhabitants, $75.00; in cities between 20,000
and 35,000 inhabitants, $50.00; in cities between
10,000 and 20,000 inhabitants, $25.00; in, cities
and towns of 1,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, $15.00;
in cities and towns of less than 1,000 inhabitants,
$5.00; and persons operating such garages within
one mile of the limits of all incorporated cities,
$5.00.
§ 993(187). Automobile parking-places.—Upon
each iperson,, firm, or corporation operating
what is commonly known as automobile parking-
places, said parking-places being located on
vacant lots, in cities or towns with a population
of 50,000 or more inhabitants, $50.00; cities or
towns of 25,000 to 50,000, $25.00; in cities or
towns with a population of less than 25,000 in-
habitants, $15.00, for each location where cars
are parked for hire.
§ 993 (188). Awning and tent makers.—Upon
all awning and tent makers, $15.00 in each county.
§ 993 (189). Bagatelle, billiard, jenny lind, pool
or tivoli tables.—Upon each person, firm, or cor-
poration operating for public use and charging for
the use thereof, any billiard, bagatelle, jenny lind,
pool or tivoli tables, for each table, a tax according
to the following scales: In cities of 100,000 in-
habitants or more, $100.00; in cities of 50,000 to
100,000 inhabitants, $75.00; in cities of 25,000 to
50,000 inhabitants, $50.00; in cities of 10,000 to
25,000 inhabitants, $30.00; in cities or towns of
less than 10,000 inhabitants, $20.00.
§ 993 (190). Ball and racing parks.—Upon each
person, firm, or corporation owning, leasing, or
operating any park or place where baseball, foot-
ball, or other similar game is played, or w'here
automobile, motorcycle, horse, or bicycle races
or contests are held, and where admission fees
are charged, in cities of more than 50,000 inhab-
itants, or within five miles thereof, $200.00; in
cities with 20,000 to 50,000 inhabitants, or within
five miles thereof, $100.00; in, cities with 10,000
to 20,000 inhabitants, or within five miles thereof,
$50.00; in cities or towns of less than 10,000 in-
habitants, or within five miles thereof, $20.00.
Provided that this tax shall apply only to those
parks and places wherein professional games are
played or professional contests are held.
§ 993 (191). Barber-Shops.—Upon every barber-
shop the sum of $5.00 for each chair in use, ex-
cept that in cities or towns of less than 5,000 in-
habitants the amount shall be $2.50 for each chair
in use.
§ 993 (192). Barber supplies.—Upon all agents
for barber supplies, $50.00 for each place of busi-
ness.
§ 993 (193). Beauty parlors.—Upon each beauty
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parlor or shop, or manicure shoip, $25.00 for each
place of business. Provided, that this tax shall
not apply to -manicure shops operated in connec-
tion with barber-shops.
§ 993 (194). Bicycle dealers. — Upon every bi-
cycle dealer selling or dealing in bicycles, either
at wholesale or retail, for themselves or upon
commissions or consignments, $10.00 for each
place of business. All unsold bicycles belonging
to dealer shall be liable to seizure and sale for
payment of such tax.
§ 993 (195). Bill distributors. — Upon all bill
distributors and parties engaged in the business
for profit in towns or cities, $25.00; provided, this
tax is limited to cities of 15,000 population or
more.
§ 993(196). Book agents*.—Upon each agent or
canvasser for books, maps, or lithographic prints,
in each county in which he shall do business,
$5.00. Provided this shall not apply to bona fide
students earning their way through school or col-
lege, or to persons selling Bibles only.
§ 993(197). Bottlers (non-resident). — Upon
each non-resident person, firm, or corporation
delivering for sale by truck or trucks any carbo-
nated beverages in this State, $150.00.
§ 993 (198). Brokers; stocks and bonds. —
Upon each person, firm, or corporation dealing in
bonds or stocks, either exclusively or in connec-
tion with other business, the sum of $100.00 for
each town or city in which ^uch persons, firms,
or corporations maintain an office
§ 993(199)- Brokers; real estate.—Upon each
person, firm, or corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of buying or selling real estate on commis-
sion, or as agents renting real estate, in cities of
50,000 or more inhabitants, $50.00; in cities of
25,000 to 50,000 inhabitants, $30.00; in cities of
10,000 to 25,000 inhabitants, $20.00; in cities or
towns of less than 10,000 inhabitants, $15.00.
And if such person shall engage in auctioneering
or selling property at public outcry or by auction
sales, he shall also be liable for and required to
pay the tax required of real estate auctioneers by
paragraph 10 of this section, to wit: $100.00 in
each county.
§ 993 (200). Burglar-Alarms. — Upon all bur-
glar alarm companies, or agents therefor, the
sum of $25.00 for each agency or place of
business in each county.
§ 993 (201). Cafes and restaurants. — Upon
every person, firm, or corporation, except hotels,
operating any cafe, restaurant, or lunch-room
with fifty or more tables, $100.00; twenty-five
to fifty tables, $50.00; ten to twenty-five tables,
$25.00; five to ten tables, $10.00; less than five
tables, $5.00. Provided, that four seats or stools
at tables or counters shall be construed on the
same basis as a table.
§ 993 (202). Carbonic acid gas.—Each per-
son, firm, or corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of manufacturing or vending soft drinks
made of or containing carbonic acid gas or any
substitute therefor shall pay, as a privilege li-
cense to carry on such business, 4 cents on each
pound of carbonic acid gas, or any substitute
18]
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therefor so used. Provided, that bottled drinks
on which this license shall have paid may be re-
sold in original packages without the payment of
any further license, under this schedule. Each
person, firm, or corporation engaged in such busi-
ness shall keep accurate books and invoices
showing the quantity of carbonic acid gas or any
substitute therefor used in such business, and
such other information relating to the business as
may be reauired by the Comptroller-General, to
enable the State tax officials to check up the re-
turns herein required. At the end of each calen-
dar quarterly period every person, firm, or corpo-
ration engaged in such business shall make a re-
port to the Comptroller-General on blanks to be
furnished by the Comptroller-General, showing
the amount of carbonic acid gas or other substi-
tute therefor consumed during the preceding
quarter, and such other information as the Comp-
troller-General may require, verified by affidavit,
and shall with the report remit the license herein
provided for each pound of carbonic acid gas or
other substitute therefor consumed, as shown by
the report, and such remittance shall be paid into
the State Treasury. If such report or remittance
is not made within fifteen days after the end of
the calendar quarter, there shall be added to the
sum due for such license for the preceding quar-
ter 10% additional license. The tax officials of
the State shall have authority to examine th^
books and papers of any one engaged in such
business, for the purpose of ascertaining the cor-
rectness of all reports and remittances. Any per-
son wilfullv failing or refusing to make the re-
ports and remittances herein required shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and any person wilfully
making a false affidavit as to any report herein
required shall be guilty of perjury.
§ 993 (203). Cars operated for hire.—Upon each
person, firm, or corporation operating or keeping
automobiles for hire, whether in connection with
a garage or not. a tax according to the following
scale, whether in or outside of the corporate lim-
its of any city or town, for each automobile so
operated in or near cities or towns with less than
1,000 inhabitants, $5.00; in or near cities with 1,000
to 5,000 inhabitants, $10.00; in or near cities with
5,000 to 15,000 inhabitants, $15.00; in or near
cities with 15,000 to 30,000 inhabitants, $20.00; in
or near cities with 30,000 to 50,000 inhabitants,
$25.00; in or near cities with more than 50,000 in-
habitants, $40.00.
§ 993 (204). Cars operated for hire over fixed
routes.—Upon every person, firm, or corporation
operating automobiles for transportation of pas-
sengers upon a regular fixed route, commonly
known as jitneys, for a uniform fare, for each five
passenger car or less, $15.00; and for each car
carrying more than five passengers, $25.00.
§ 993 (205). Cars for hire; "Drive-It-Your-
self." — Upon each person, firm, or corporation
operating or keeping for hire automobiles, com-
monly known as "Drive-It-Yourself" business, or
automobiles without drivers for hire, $150.00 for
each place of business. Provided that the tax
fixed herein shall not exceed $10.00 for each car
operated.
§ 993 (206). Coal and coke. — Upon each per-
son, firm, or corporation dealing in coal and coke,
whether for themselves or as agents or as
brokers, in cities of more than 1,000 inhabitants
and not more than 10,000, $10.00; in cities of more
than 10,000 and not more than 20,000 inhabitants,
$50.00; in cities of more than 20,000 inhabitants,
$100.00 for each place of business.
§ 993 (207). Cemetery companies. — Upon all
cemetery companies, agencies, offices, etc., $100.00
in each county.
§ 993 (208). Circuses.—Upon each circus com-
pany or other company or companies giving such
exhibition beneath or within a canvas enclosure,
advertised in print or parade in any manner what-
soever as a circus, menagerie, hippodrome, spec-
tacle, or show implying circus, the following tax
measured by the number of railroad-cars, auto-
mobiles, trucks, or wagons used in transporting
said circus—railroad cars, automobiles, trucks and
wagons hereinafter referred to as cars. A circus
requiring more than 80 cars, $1,000.00 per day;
40 to 80 cars, $500.00 per day; 20 to 40 cars,
$100.00 per day; 10 to 20 cars, $50.00 per day;
less than 10 cars, $25.00 per day, for each day it
may exhibit in the State of Georgia.
§ 993 (209). Circus side-shows. — Upon each
side-show accompanying a circus company in any
county having a town or city of 5,000 population
or more, $50.00 per day; and in all other coun-
tries, $25.00 per day.
§ 993 (210). Concerts, shows, and exhibitions.
—Upon all concerts, shows, and exhibitions
charging an admission, in or near cities of less
than 5,000 inhabitants, $25.00; in or near cities of
more than 5,000 and not more than 20,000, $50.00;
in or near cities of more than 20,000 and not more
than 50,000, $75.00; in or near cities of more than
50,000, $100.00 for each day. Provided, that this
section shall not apply to exhibitions given by lo-
cal performers, nor to exhibitions the entire pro-
ceeds of which are for charitable, benevolent pur-
poses, nor to entertainments commonly known as
ohautauquas. Prov1 ded further, this section shall
not appl} r to histrionic, dramatic, and operatic per-
formances given in regular licensed theaters and
opera houses, but upon each such theater or opera
house, in towns of less than 2,000 inhabitants,
$2.50 per month; in cities from 2,000 to 5,000 in-
habitants, $4.00 per month; in cities from 5,000 to
10,000 inhabitants, $7.00 per month; in cities from
10,000 to 25,000 inhabitants, $10.00 per month; in
cities of over 25,000 inhabitants, $12.50 per
month.
§ 993 (211). Commercial reporting agencies.—
Upon each person, firm, or corporation engaged
in the business of a commercial reporting agency,
in each county in the State where they have an
office or branch office, $125.00.
§ 993 (212). Street carnivals.—Upon every mid-
way combination of small shows, or street fair
or street carnival, the sum of $25.00 each week
or fractional part thereof, for each separate tent,
enclosure, or place where an admission fee is
charged or collected, either directly or indirectly,
co witness or hear any performance, or where
anything may be exhibited for admission or
ticket; and upon every merry-go-round or flying
horse accompanying any midway combination,
street fair or street carnival, in each city or town
[19]
§ 993(213) AD VALOREM, SPECIFIC, AND OCCUPATION TAXES § 993(218)
in this State in which it does business, or in each
county where they may operate outside of the
limits of any city or town in this State, $25.00.
Provided, that should the said midway combina-
tion, or any of them specified above, be held in
connection with county, district, or State agri-
cultural fairs of this State and under the direction
of, and within the grounds at the time of holding
said fairs, the whole amount of said tax for said
attraction when so held shall be $25.00 per week
or fractional part thereof.
§ 993 (213). Corporations, domestic.—All cor-
porations incorporated under the laws of Georgia
shall, except those that are not organized for pe-
cuniary gain or profit and those that neither
charge nor contemplate charging the public for
services rendered, in addition to all other taxes
now required of them by law, are hereby re-
quired to pay each year annual license or occupa-
tion tax as specified in the following scale:
Corporations with capital not exceeding $10,-
000, $10.00.
Corporations with capital over $10,000, and not
over $25,000, $15.00.
Corporations with capital over $25,000, and not
over $50,000, $20.00.
Corporations with capital over $50,000 and not
over $75,000, $30.00.
Corporations with capital over $75,000, and not
over $100,000, $50.00.
Corporations with capital over $100,000 and not
over $300,000, $100.00.
Corporations with capital
not over $500,000, $200.00.
Corporations with capital
not over $1,000,000, $300.00.
Corporations with capital over $1,000,000 and
not over $2,000,000, $500.00.
Corporations with capital over $2,000,000 and
not over $3,000,000, $600.00.
Corporations with capital over $3,000,000, and
not over $4,000,000. $700.00.
Corporations with capital over $4,000,000, and
not over $5,000,000, $800.00.
Corporations wth capital over $5,000,000, and
not over $6,000,000, $900.00.
Corporations with capital over $6,000,000, $1,-
000.00.
Tax required by this paragraph to be paid to
the tax-collector of the county where such corpo-
ration has its home office of business, and the
payment of this tax will relieve such corporation
from the payment of said tax in any other county
in which it does business, and to that end the tax-
collector shall furnish such duplicate receipts as
may be needed for authorized agents of the cor-
poraton in other counties of this State.
§ 993 (214). Corporations, foreign. — Upon
every agent or representative of any foreign or
non-resident corporation, said agent or represen-
tative having a place of business or office in this
State, in addition to all other taxes now required
of them by law, shall be and they are hereby re-
quired to pav each year an annual license or oc-
cupation tax fixed in accordance with the capital
stock of the corporation represented by them, as
specified in the preceding paragraph of this sec-
tion (wherein is fixed the license or occupation
tax required of corporations chartered under the
laws of Georgia), per schedule or scale therein
over $300,000 and
over $500,000 and
set forth. Provided, that if such foreign or non-
resident corporations shall pay to the Comptrol-
ler-General of this State the amount of the occu-
pation or license tax prescribed as per said sched-
ule for resident corporations, then the agents of.
such foreign or non-resident corporations shall
be relieved from said occupation tax. And to this
end said foreign corporations shall register their
name, capital stock, and the names of their agents
with the Comptroller-General at the beginning of
each year; and upon said license or occupation.
tax being paid, it shall be the duty of the Comp-
troller-General to furnish said corporation a cer-
tificate or duplicate receipt for each agent that
said tax has been paid, and the presentation of
such certificate or duplicate receipt by such agent
to the tax-collector of his county shall be sufficient
evidence of such payment and authorized the
agent to be relieved of said tax. The payment of
this tax shall not be construed so as to relieve the
corporation or agent of an}^ other license or occu
pation tax whatever. Provided, that this and
paragraph 44 of this section shall not apply to in-
surance companies, or to sewing-machine com-
panies, which are separately taxed by other pro-
visions of this Act. Provided further, that all
returns by corporations, resident or non-resident,
must be made under oath; and when any corpora-
tion paying this license or occupation tax requires
or demands more than two duplicate certificates
for agents, then such corporation shall be required
to pay an additional fee of $1.00 for each duplicate
certificate or receipt over and above the first two
mentioned.
§ 993(215). Dance halls.—Upon each person or
persons operating public dance halls where danc-
ing is permitted or taught for hire, $100.00 for
each place of business.
§ 993(216). Devices, bowling and ten-pin alleys,
cane racks, shooting galleries, etc.—Upon each
person, firm, or corporation operating for gain a
bowling, box-ball, ten-pin alley or alley of like
character, shooting galleries, or booth where fire-
arms are used for firing at a target, and upon per-
sons operating for gain any table, stand, machine,
or place for performance of games not prohibited
by law, and any rack or booth or place for pitch-
ing or throwing rings at canes, knives, or other
things of value, or any table or stand for rolling
balls for play or for sale or disposition of prizes,
for each stand, table, alley, gallery, machine, rack,
booth, or other place put in use at each place of
business in this State, the sum of $50.00; provided
this paragraph shall include automatic baseball
games of all kinds.
§ 993 (217). Directories. — Upon each person,
firm, or corporation compiling a city directory or
directories of any character, and selling or supply-
ing the same on subscription, the sum of $25.00 for
each county in which a directory is published.
The above tax shall not be construed to apply to
telephone companies issuing directories for use in
the telephone exchanges.
§ 993 (218). Dry-Cleaning.—Upon all persons,
firms, or corporations, engaged in dry-cleaning,
$25.00 for each place of business. Provided, this
paragraph shall not apply to laundries paying the
tax imposed b}' paragraph 62 of this Act, nor to
pressing-clubs paying the tax imposed by para-
graph 89 of this Act.
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§ 993(219). Electrical contractors.—Upon all
electrical contractors, $25.00 for each county.
§ 993(220). Emigrant agents.—Upon each emi-
grant agent, and upon each employee of such
agents, doing business in this State, $1,000.00 for
each county in which such agents or employee
may do or offer to do business. Provided, that
no emigrant agent or employee shall take from
this State or attempt to take from this State any
person until after first giving a bond to be ac-
cepted and approved by the Commissioner of
Commerce and Labor, conditioned to pay any
valid debt owing by said person to any citizen of
this State.
§ 993(221). Employment agencies. — Upon all
•employment agencies or bureaus doing business
in this State, $50.00 for each county.
§ 993(222). Fire-Engines and apparatus.—Upon
each dealer in fire-engines and apparatus or either
•of them, $100.00 for each place of business.
§ 993(223). Fish dealers.—Upon each person,
firm, or corporation engaged in the business of
packing or shipping oysters, shrimp, or fish, $50.00
for each county.
§ 993(224). Hotels.—Upon every person, firm,
or corporation operating a hotel, in counties of
over 30,000 inhabitants, a tax of $1.00 for each
sleeping-room per annum, and in counties of less
than 30,000 inhabitants, 50 cents per annum for
each sleeping-room.
§ 993(225). Horse-Traders (traveling) or gypsies.
—Upon each company of traveling horse-traders,
or traveling gypsies, or traveling companies or
other transients, traveling persons or firms, en-
gaged in trading or selling merchandise of live
stock of any kind, or clairvoyant, or persons en-
gaged in fortune-telling, phrenology, or palmistry.
$250.00, to be collected by the tax collector in each
county and distributed as follows: To the county
where collected $125.00; to the State $125.00. This
tax to be collected in each county where they
carry on either kind of business herein mentioned.
This tax shall apply to any person, firm, or cor-
poration, who themselves or by their agents travel
through the State carrying live stock and carrying
with them cooking utensils, and live in tents or
travel in covered wagons and automobiles, and
who may be a resident of some county or who
reside without the State, and who are commonly
called traveling horse-traders and gypsies, and
such persons or corporations shall be liable to
pay this tax. Such tax shall constitute a lien on
any live stock owned by such traveling persons
or firms. Provided, that no Confederate Soldier,
indigent, or any other person, firm, or corporation
shall be exempted from the tax provided under
this section. Provided, that nothing herein shall
prevent any municipality, by proper ordinance,
from prohibiting the practice of fortune-telling,
phrenology, palmistry, or like practices within its
limits.
§ 993(226). Ice cream dealers.—Upon each per-
son, firm, or corporation manufacturing ice cream
or selling same at wholesale, in or near cities of
more than 50,000 inhabitants, $100.00; in or near
cities from 20,000 to 50,000 inhabitants, $75.00; in
or near cities from 10,000 to 20,000 inhabitants,
$50.00; and in or near cities of less than 10,000
inhabitants, $10.00.
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§ 993(227). Insurance agents.— (a) Upon each
and every local insurance agent, and upon each
and every solicitor or subagent, for any resident
or non-resident life, fire, marine, accident, casu-
alty, liability, indemnity, fidelity, bonding or surety
insurance company doing business in this State,
$10.00, payable to the Insurance Commissioner,
for each county in which said agent, solicitor, or
subagent shall transact or solicit business.
(b) Upon each and ever}- local insurance ageni,
and upon each and every solicitor or subagent,
for any resident or non-resident assessment life-
insurance company, or industrial life, accident, or
sick-benefit insurance company, live-stock insur-
ance company or fire and storm co-operative as-
sessment fire-insurance companies doing business
in this State, $10.00 payable to the Insurance Com-
missioner, for each county in which said agent,
solicitor, or subagent shall transact or solicit
business.
(c) Upon each and every general, special, travel-
ing, state, or district agent, or manager, or assist-
ant manager, by whatever name he may be
designated in his contract, of any resident or non-
resident life, fire, marine, accident, casualty, lia-
bility, indemnity, fidelity, bonding or surety in-
surance compan}^, doing business in this State,
$100.00 payable to the Insurance Commissioner,
whose receipt shall authorize the person named
therein to go into any county in the State without
the payment of an additional tax.
(d) Upon each and every general, special, travel-
ing, state, or district agent, manager, district man-
ager, assistant manager, superintendent, or assist-
ant superintendent, by whatever name he may be
designated in his contract, of any resident or non-
resident assessment life-insurance company, or in-
dustrial life, accident, or sick-benefit insurance
company, or live-stock insurance company, doing
business in this State, $100.00 payable to the In-
surance Commissioner, whose receipt shall au-
thorize the person named therein to go into any
county in the State without the payment of an
additional tax.
(e) Upon all adjustment bureaus employing ad-
justers, a tax of $50.00 for each person who adjusts
any loss, said tax payable to the Insurance Com-
missioner, whose receipt shall authorize the per-
son named therein to go into any county in the
State.
(f) Upon each and every person not connected
with an adjustment bureau, who adjusts insurance
losses. $50.00 payable to the Insurance Commis-
sioner, whose receipt shall authorize the person
named therein to go into any county in the State.
Provided, that this tax shall not apply to local in-
surance agents who adjust losses without re-
muneration.
(g) The occupation taxes imposed by this par-
agraph must be paid in advance by said agents to
the Insurance Commissioner, for the fiscal year
for which they are levied, before said agent shall
be authorized to act as agent for any insurance
company. Provided, that railroad-ticket agents
selling accident tickets shall not be deemed in-
surance agents in the sense of this paragraph.
§ 993 (228). Junk dealers.—Upon each person.
firm, or corporation engaged in the business of
dealing in junk, in or near cities of over 50,000
inhabitants, $100.00; in or near cities of from 10,000
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to 50,000 inhabitants, $50,00; in or near cities of
from 3,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, $25.00; in cities
or towns under 3,000 or within ten miles thereof,
$10.00. Each junk dealer, his clerk, agent, or
employee shall keep a book, open to inspection,
in which he shall make entries of all railroad iron,
brass, pieces of machinery, plumbing materials,
unused farm implements, automobile parts, fix-
tures, or accessories purchased by him, together
with the name of the party from whom pur-
chased; and upon failure to keep such books or
record and produce it on demand, the said dealer
shall forfeit his license.
§ 993 (229). Legerdemain and sleight of hand.—
Upon each exhibition of feats of legerdemain or
sleight of hand, or other exhibition and enter-
tainment of like kind, $25.00 in each county.
§ 993 (230). Legislative agents. — Upon each
person registered under the Act of the General
Assembly approved August 11, 1911 (see Acts
1911, page 151), the sum of $250.00 for every
person, firm, or corporation represented by said
agent.
§ 993 (231). Laundries. — Upon each person,
firm, or corporation operating a laundry or dye-
ing establishment, $100.00 if employing ten or
more persons; $50.00 if employing five and not
more than ten persons; $25.00, if not employing
more than five persons.
§ 993 (232). Lighting systems. — Upon each
person, firm, or corporation selling, whether as
manufacturer, agent, or dealer in any lighting
system, whether gas, gasoline, or electrical, $25.00
in each county.
§ 993 (233). Lightning-rods. — Upon each per-
son, firm, or corporation who may contract for
or engage in the business of fitting up or erecting
lightning-rods in this State, the sum of $10.00
for each county in which he may contract for, or
erect, or put in place any lightning-rod or rods
upon any structure or building therein; and it
shall be the duty of the tax-collector to whom the
tax is paid to issue the person paying such tax a
license receipt showing such payment. When a
license for erecting a certain brand or make or
rod has been issued for a county, additional li-
censes for erecting the same brand or make shall
be issued upon the payment of $5.00 each.
§ 993 (234). Live-stock dealers. — Upon each
person, firm, or corporation dealing in live stock,
having a fixed place of business, in or near cities
of more than 50,000 inhabitants, $25.00; in or near
cities of from 10,000 to 50,000 inhabitants, $15.00;
in or near cities or towns of less than 10,000 in-
habitants, $10.00 for each place of business.
§ 993 (235). Lumber dealer's. — Upon every
person, firm, or corporation engaged in the man-
ufacture of lumber products of any character or
dealing in lumber or lumber products, whether
for themselves or as agents or brokers, in or
near cities of 1,000 inhabitants and not more than
10,000, $10.00; in or near cities of more than 10,-
000 and not more than 20,000 inhabitants, $50.00;
in or near cities of more than 20,000 inhabitants,
$100.00 for each place of business.
§ 993 (236). Machines (Store cash registers).—
Upon each manufacturer or wholesale dealer in,
or agent for the sale of, any cash or account reg-
ister, $100.00 for each place of business in this
State.
§ 993 (237). Machines (Weighing or calculat-
ing). — Upon each manufacturer or wholesale or
retail dealer in, or agent for the manufacturer of,
any weighing scale or scales for calculating weight
or prices of commodities, $25.00 for each place of
business in this State.
§ 993 (238). Machines (Adding machines). —
Upon every manufacturer of, or wholesaler or re-
tail dealer in, or agent for the sale of any adding
or calculating machine, check-protector, and do-
mestic ice machines retailing for more than ten
dollars, $25.00 for each place of business in coun-
ties of 20,000 population or under; $50.00, in coun-
ties of a population of over 20,000 and under 50,-
000; and $100.00 in counties of over 50,000, for
each place of business in this State.
§ 993(239). Machines (Typewriters). — Upon
every manufacturer of, or wholesaler or retail
dealer in, or agent for the sale of any typewriter
or typewriting machine, $25.00 for each place of
business in counties of 20,000 population or un-
der; $50.00 in counties of over 20,000 population
and under 50,000; $100.00 in counties of over 50,-
000; this tax to be paid for each place of business
in the various counties of this State.
§ 993 (240). Machines (Slot). — Upon every
machine, punchboard, or other device, operated,
used, or kept in this State, wherein is kept any
article to be purchased by depositing therein or
paid therefor any coin or thing of value, and for
which may be had any article of merchandise
whatsoever, where there is no chance incurred by
reason thereof, and where the deposit of coin or
other thing of value does not exceed one cent
per operation, $2.00 for each machine, punchboard,
or other device for each county where kept, set
up, used, or operated.
(b). Upon each slot-machine wherein may be
seen any picture or music ma}^ be heard by de-
positing in said machine any coin or thing of
value, and each weighing machine or scale, and
every machine making stencils by use of contriv-
ances operated by slot, wherein coin or other
thing of value is to be deposited or used, the de-
posit of coin or other thing of value not exceed-
ing one cent per operation, $1.00 for each ma-
chine where kept, set up, used, or operated. On
all other machines described in this paragraph,
charging more than one cent per operation, $5.00
for each machine where kept, set up, used, or
operated. Provided further, that no machine
described in this paragraph shall be subject to
more than one tax.
§ 993 (241). Machinery and equipment.—Upon
every manufacturer of reaping, mowing, binding,
or thrashing machines, gas, electrical, or oil en-
gines, agricultural machinery propelled by gas,
and road-building machinery propelled by gas or
oil, culverts, road-machines and road-graders,
selling or dealing in such machinery by itself or
its agents in this State, and all wholesale and re-
tail dealers in the above-mentioned machinery,
selling such machinery manufactured by compa-
nies that have not paid the tax thereon named,
shall pay $100.00 annually to the Comptroller-
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General on the first of January of each year or at
the time of commencement of business, same to
be known as a license fee for the privilege of do-
ing business in this State. All companies and
others paying this license fee shall, at the time of
payment, furnish the Comptroller-General with
a list of all agents authorized to sell the aforesaid
machinery of their manufacture, or under their
control, and shall pay to said Comptroller-Gen-
eral the sum of $10.00 for each of said agents, for
the fiscal year or fractional part thereof, for each
county in which the said agents may do business.
Upon the payment of $10.00 the Comptroller-
General shall issue to each of said agents a certifi-
cate of authority to transact business in this State.
Before commencing business in this State all such
agents shall be required to register their names
with the Ordinaries of those counties in which
they intend to do business, and shall exhibit to
said ordinaries their license from the Comptroller-
General; wholesale and retail dealers in the above-
mentioned machinery shall be required to pay tax
provided herein for manufacturers of the above
machines sold by them, unless said manufac-
turers, have paid the tax required by this Act. All
unsold machinery belonging to manufacturers,
dealers, or other agents, or in their possession or
the possession of others, shall be liable to seizure
and sale for the payment of such fees, license, or
tax. None of the provisions of this paragraph shall
apply to licensed auctioneers selling second-hand
machinery, or to officers of the law under legal
process, or to merchants buying or selling said
machinery on which a license tax has been paid as
herein provided, and who keep the same and sell
and deliver them from their place of business.
Any person who shall violate the provisions of
this paragraph shall be liable to prosecution for a
misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be punished
as prescribed in section 1065, volume 2 of the Code
of 1910.
§ 993(242). Merry-Go-Rounds. — Upon the
owner, manager, keeper, or lessee of any merry-
go-round or flying horses, or flying swings, or
human roulettes, or scenic devices run by machin-
ery, or of an elevated railway or scenic railway,
similar contrivance kept for gain, either directly
or indirectly, for each place of business in this
State, and for each place where operated, in coun-
ties in which there is a city of 50,000 or more in-
habitants, $50.00; in all counties in which there are
cities between 10,000 and 50,000 inhabitants, $30.-
00; in counties having a city between 5,000 and
10,000 inhabitants, $20.00; in all other counties,
$10.00.
§ 993 (243). Monument dealers. — Upon each
person, firm, or corporation selling monuments or
tombstones, $25.00 in each county in which they
shall have a place of business.
§ 993 (244). Motor-Buses.—Upon every person,
firm, or corporation, operating a motor-bus for the
transportation of passengers upon a regular or
fixed route, $25.00 for each bus of a passenger
capacity of seven or le§s, and on each bus of more
than said capacity the sum of $50.00; provided
they shall be exempt from local •municipal license
tax; provided further, that this section shall not
apply to passenger buses transporting school chil-
dren exclusively.
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§ 993 (245). Motor-Trucks and trailers.—Upon
every person, firm, or corporation engaged in the
operation of motor-trucks or trailers for the trans-
portation of freight for hire, $25.00 for each truck
or trailer. Provided, this section shall not apply
to persons, firms, or corporations hauling farm
produce, livestock, and fertilizers exclusively.
Provided, that the width of load of trucks and
trailers shall not be more than eight feet.
§ 993 (246). Motorcycle dealers.—Upon every
person, firm, or corporation selling or dealing in
motorcycles or motor attachments for bicycles,
whether in connection with the business of selling
bicycles or automobiles or otherwise $25.00 for
each place of business.
§ 993 (247). Moving pictures.—Upon each and
every electric show or exhibition of moving
pictures, or illustrated songs, except where given
for educational purposes, for each place of busi-
ness in or near cities or towns of less than 2,000
inhabitants, $2.00 per month; in or near cities or
towns of from 2,000 to 5,000 inhabitants, $3.00 per
month; in or near cities of from 5,000 to 10,000
inhabitants, $7.00 per month; in or near cities of
from 10,000 to 25,000 inhabitants, $10.00 per
month; in or near cities of from 25,000 to 50,000
inhabitants, $12.50 per month; in cities of 50,000
or more inhabitants, $25.00 per month, except in
suburbs of cities of more than 50,000 inhabitants
where the tax shall be $12.50 per month.
§ 993 (248). Motion picture supply houses. —
Upon all motion-picture supply-houses, or film-
distributing agencies, $100.00 for each place of
business.
993(249). Musical instruments, graphophones,
organs, phonograph pianos, and victrolos, radios
or radio supplies.—Upon each person, firm, or cor-
poration engaged in the business of selling or
renting, as agents or dealers, any of the above or
similar instruments, in or near cities of more than
50,000 inhabitants, $100.00; in or near cities from
25,000 to 50,000 inhabitants, $50.00; in or near
cities of from 10,000 to 25,000 inhabitants, $25.00;
in or near cities or towns of less than 10,000 in-
habitants, $10.00 for each place of business.
§ 993 (250). News dealers.—Upon each person,
firm, or corporation carrying on the business of
selling books, magazines, papers, fruits, confec-
tions, or other merchandise on the railroad-trains
in this State, $500.00. No county or municipality
shall have authorit}' to levy any additional tax for
the privilege of carrying on said business.
§ 993 (251). Packing-Houses.—Upon every in-
dividual agent or firm of agents of any packing-
house, and upon any and every individual agent
or firm of agents of any person, firm, or corpora-
tion dealing in any packing-house products or
goods, doing business in this State, for each place
of business in each county having a city situated
therein with a population of 30,000 or more,
$300.00; for each place of business in each county
with a population of from 15,000 to 30,000, $150.-
00; for each place of business in each county with
a population of from 5,000 to 15,000, $50.00; for
each place of business in each county with a pop-
ulation of less than 5,000, $25.00.
§ 993 (252). Patent rights.—Upon each person,
3]
§ 993(253) AD VALOREM, SPECIFIC, AND OCCUPATION TAXES § 993(264)
firm, or corporation selling patent rights ir>
Georgia, the sum of $50.00 for each county in
which said business is carried on.
§ 993(253). Selling in baseball parks. — Upon
each person, firm, or corporation, in cities having
a population of 40,000 or more inhabitants, carry-
ing on the business of selling papers, fruits,
drinks, or other articles of merchandise in base-
ball-parks, $100.00.
§ 993 (254). Pawnbrokers.—Upon each person,
firm, or corporation carrying on the business of
pawnbrokers, for each place of business in this
State, $200.00. If any pawnbroker shall sell, or
offer for sale, or expose in his place of business
any pistol, pistol or rifle cartridges, dirk, bowie-
knife, or metal knucks, whether sold as unre-
deemed pledges or otherwise, he shall also be held
subject to and required to pay the license-tax re-
quired of the dealers in such articles by section
993 (257).
§ 993 (255). Peddlers.—Upon every peddler or
traveling vendor of any patent or proprietary
medicine or remedies, or appliances of any kind,
or special nostrum, or jewelry, or stationery, or
drugs, or soap, or of any kind of merchandise or
commodity whatsoever (whether herein enumer-
ated or not), peddling or selling any such goods or
articles or other merchandise, in each county
where the same or any of them are peddled, sold
or offered for sale, $50.00. Provided, that no
vendor or peddler of perishable farm products
raised on Georgia farms shall be required, under
this paragraph or any other of this Act, to pay
any license fee or tax, State, county or municipal,
when same is accompanied by affidavit that such
farm product is exclusively Georgia grown. And
provided further, that any person qualifying un-
der this papagraph and under sections 18:86 et
sequitur of Civil Code of Georgia, 1910, to peddle,
shall be entitled to one helper only to assist him
in carrying on his business as a peddler.
(b) Upon every peddler of stoves or ranges for
cooking purposes or clocks or albums, or picture-
frames, for each county wherein he may sell or
offer for sale either of said articles, $25.00.
(c) Upon any traveling vendor of any patent
churn, or patented fence, or patented agricultural
implements, or tools, or other patented articles,
$25.00 for each county in which he may sell or
offer to sell either of the enumerated articles.
(d) Upon every traveling vendor using boats,
barges, or other water-craft for the purpose of
selling goods of any kind, not prohibited by law,
on the rivers or waters within the limits of this
State, for each county where he may sell such
wares, goods, or merchandise, $50.00. The tax
shall be a lien upon the boat, barge, or other water-
craft, and its contents, without regard to the
ownership thereof.
(e) The term "peddler" is hereby defined as
follows, to wit: Any person carrying goods, wares
or merchandise of any description with him, other
than farm products, either in a pack or vehicle of
any character whatever, and who makes delivery
of goods ordered on the day of taking orders, shall
be held and deemed a peddler, whether such sales
are for consumption or resale.
§ 993(256). Pictures and picture-frames.—Upon
[:
every person, firm, or corporaton who, in person
or through its agents, sells and delivers photo-
graphs or pictures of any character, or picture-
frames, whether they make charge for such
frames or not, $15.00 in each county in which this
business is done. Provided, this shall not apply
to regular merchants dealing in such goods at
their usual place of business.
§ 993 (257). Pistols. — Upon each and every
dealer in pistols or in toy pistols which shoot
cartridges, or who deals in pistol cartridges, or
rifle cartridges, dirks, bowie-knives, or metal
knucks, for each place of business in this State,
in or near towns or cities of 10,000 or less inhabi-
tants, $50.00; in or near cities of over 10,000 in-
habitants, $100.00, provided further, thai no per-
son shall be exempted from the payment of this
tax.
§ 993 (258). Playing-Cards.—Upon each dealer
in playing-cards, $10.00 for each place of business.
§ 993 (259). Photographers. — Upon every
daguerrean, ambrotype, photographic, and simi-
lar artists carrying on the business of making
pictures, $10.00 in each county.
§ 993 (260). Pressing-Clubs. — Upon each per-
son, firm, or corporation operating a pressing-
club, $5.00 for each place of business. Provided,
that if such person, firm, or corporation shall en-
gage any dry-cleaning business, he shall in addi-
tion pay the sum provided for in section 993(218).
herein.
§ 993 (261). Practioners (Itinerant). — Upon
every intinerant doctor, dentist, optician, optom-
etrist, veterinary surgeon, osteopath, chiroprac-
tor, or specialist of any kind, doing business in
this State, $25.00 for each county in which they
may practice or do business. Provided, that if
any one said itinerant specialists shall peddle or
sell any drug, medicine, remedy, appliance, spec
tacles, glasses, or other goods in connection with
the practice of his profession, he or they shall be
subject to the tax required of peddlers, or travel-
ing vendors of patent or proprietary medicine,
nostrums, etc., by section 993(225), $50.00
in each county where they may offer to sell such
articles. Provided further, that the provisions ot
this paragraph shall not apply to persons whose
fixed place of business is in any county of this
State, and who have paid the professional tax re-
quired by section 993(172).
§ 993 (262). Rinks (Skating). — Upon the
owner, manager, keeper, or lessee of any skating-
rink in this State, where any fee or charge is made
for admission, for the use of skates or skating, in
counties having a population of more than 100,-
000, the sum of $100.00; in counties having a pop-
ulation of 50,000 and not over 100,000, the sum of
$50.00; in counties having a population less than
50,000, the sum of $25.00 for each place of busi-
ness.
§ 993(263). Salary and wage buyers.—Upon
each person, firm, or corporation or partnership
buying salary or wage accounts and all negotiable
papers, $100.00 for each office or place of business
maintained.
§ 993(264). Safes and vaults.—Upon each per-
son, firm, or corporation or agent thereof selling
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safes or vaults, or vault doors or other vault fix-
tures, $100.00 for each place of business.
§ 993(265). Sanitariums—Upon hospitals and
sanitoriums, or institutions of like character,
whether incorporated or net, conducted for gain,
in or near cities of more than 20,000 population,
$100.00. In or near cities or towns of less than
20,000, $25.00. Provided, that the above tax shall
not apply to public hospitals maintained by
municipal corporations for charitable purposes
only.
§ 993(266). Shows (Dog and pony.)—Upon
each dog, pony, or horse show, where the entire
show is exclusively an exhibition of trained dogs,
ponies, or horses and monkeys, or a combination
of any of them, beneath a tent, canvas, or enclos-
ure, where an admission fee of fifteen cents or
more is charged, the sum of $50.00 for each day it
may exhibit; and upon such shows with an admis-
sion fee of less than fifteen cents, the sum of
$30.00 for each day it may exhibit in this State.
§ 993 (267). Shows (Vaudeville).—Upon each
person, firm, or corporation operating vaudeville
shows which are given under tents or places other
than regular licensed theaters, in or near cities
or towns of less than 1,000 inhabitants, $2.50 per
week; in or near cities or towns of 1,000 to 5,000
inhabitants, $5.00 per week; in or near cities or
towns of 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants, $7.50 per
week; in or near cities or towns of 10,000 to 25,000
inhabitants, $10.00 per week; in or near cities or
towns of 25,000 to 50,000 inhabitants, $20.00 per
week; in or near cities or towns of more than 50,-
000 inhabitants, $50.00 per week.
§ 9193(268). Sprinklers (Automatic).—Upon all
automatic sprinkler companies, or agents there-
for, the sum of $25.00 for each agency or place of
business in each county.
§ 993 (269). Soda-Fountains.—Upon each per-
son, firm, or corporation running or operating
soda-fountains in this State, having one draught
arm or similar device used in drawing carbonated
water, $5.00; and for each additional arm or de-
vice, $5.00.
§ 993 (270). Soft-Drink syrups.—Upon all per-
sons and companies carrying on, in this State, the
business of manufacturing or selling, by wholesale
or retail, or distributing from any depot, car, or
warehouse or agency, any carbonated waters or
syrups or other articles to be used in corbonated
water, or intended to be fixed with or blended
with corbonated water to be sold as soft drinks
(not including imitations of beer, wine, whiskey,
or other intoxicating liquor), as an occupation
tax for the privilege of carrying on said business,
an amount payable at the end of each quarter,
equal to one half one per cent ( l/2 %) of the
gross receipts from said business for said
quarter in this State. Within three days from the
end of each quarter of the calendar year each per-
son or company engaged in said kind of. business
shall make returns under oath to the Comptroller-
General of this State, showing the amount of said
gross receipts, with a detailed statement of the
parties from whom said receipts are received. In
case of a corporation, th*e return shall be made
under oath by the president, if a resident of this
[2
State; and if the president is not such resident,
by the officer or person in charge of the business
of said corporation in this State. Upon failure of
any person required by this paragraph to make
such returns within ten days after the expiration
of such quarter, he shall be quilty of a misdemea-
nor, and shall be liable to prosecution and be pun-
ished as now provided in cases of misdemeanor.
Upon the making of such returns, the person or
company liable to said tax shall pay the same to
the Comptroller-General, and upon failure to pay
the same the Comptroller-General shall issue an
execution for said tax against the property of the
person or company liable to said tax. If no re-
turns be made or if the Comptroller-General be-
lieves said returns are false, the Comptroller-Gen-
eral shall ascertain the amount of said gross re-
ceipts from the best information in his power, and
assess the tax according, after giving the company
or person liable to said tax at least five day's no-
tice of the time of assessing said tax, and issue his
execution accordingly against the person or cor~
poration carrying on said business. Any person,
company, or agent carrying on any kind of busi-
ness specified in this paragraph, after failure to
pay the tax herein levied for any preceding quarter
during which he or it was liable to tax, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor. It is hereby enacted that
all of said taxes received or collected under this
paragraph shall be paid into the State treasury. It
is also enacted that any person or company pay-
ing the tax herein levied shall be relieved of any
and all occupation tax or license fees to the State
under existing laws on or for the kind of business
specified in this paragraph. Provided, however,
that said tax shall be collected upon said syrup or
corbonated water only once, and shall be paid by
the wholesale dealer in said syrup if sold within
the confines of this State by such wholesale dealer;
and if said syrup or carbonated water shall be
purchased by the retail dealer without the limits
of this State and shall be shipped to a point with-
in the limits of this State, the same shall be taxed
in the hands of such retail dealer, and for the pur-
ooses of this tax the price paid for such syrup
or carbonated water shall determine the receipts
for the same.
§ 993 (271). Swimming-Pools.—Upon each and
every person, firm, or corporation operating a
swimming-pool where admission fees are charged,
or upon persons, firms, or corporations keeping
and renting bathing-suits for hire, $20.00 in coun-
ties of over 50,000 population, and $10.00 in coun-
ties of under the 50,000 population; upon persons,,
firms, or corporations conducting or operating a
bathing resort in or near the ocean and ocean and
gulf front of this State, for hire, the sum of
$200.00 in each county where such bathing re-
sort is located.
§ 993 (272). Toll-Bridges and ferries.—Upon
all persons or corporations operating ferries,
$15.00. Upon all persons or corporations operat-
ing toll-bridges, $100.00, said tax to be paid to the
tax-collector of the county in which the bridge is
located or situated. Provided, that this tax shall not
be required of any ferry or toll-bridge the receipts
from which do not amount to more than $500.00
per annum. And provided further, that the pro-
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visions of this paragraph shall apply to line
bridges as well as bridges wholly within the con-
fines of this State.
§ 993 (273). Trucks (Gasoline or Oil).—Upon
each person, firm, or corporation selling oil or gas-
oline from a wagon or truck, $10.00 for each wag-
on or truck.
§ 993(274). Undertakers.—Upon each person,
firm, or corporation whose business is that of
burying the dead and charging for same, com-
monly known as undertakers, in, or within a ra-
dius of fifteen miles of the corporate or town lim-
its of cities of more than 50,000 inhabitants,
$200.00; in or near cities from 10,000 to 50,000 in-
habitants, $100.00; in or near cities from 5,000 to
10,000 inhabitants, $50.00; in or near cities or
towns of from 2,500 to 5,000 inhabitants, $20.00;
in or near towns of less than 2,500 inhabitants,
$10.00 for each place of business.
§ 993 (275). Warehouses (Cotton).—Upon each
person, firm, or corporation operating a ware-
house or yard for the storage and handling of cot-
ten for compensation, license-tax is as follows:
Where 500 to 5,000 bales are handled in one year,
$10.00; where 5,000 to 10,000 bales are handled in
one year, $25.00; where 10,000 to 20,000 bales are
handled in one year, $50.00; where 20,000 to 30,000
bales are handled in one year, $100.00; where more
than 30,000 bales are handled in one year, $200.00.
§ 993 (276). Warehouse (Merchandise, etc).—
Upon each person, firm, or corporation operating
a warehouse or yard for storage of goods, wares,
or merchandise and farm products other than cot-
ten, and charging for the same, $25.00. Provided,
that any warehouse that pays taxes as provided
in section 993 (275) shall not be subject to the
tax required by this paragraph.
§ 993 (277). Wood dealers.—Any person, firm,
or corporation dealing in wood shall pay a tax of
$10.00 for each place of business.
§ 993 (278). Plumbing, heating, steam-fitting
and tinning contractors—Upon every plumbing,
heating, steam-fitting and tinning contractor, in
counties having a city with a population over
50,000 the sum of $2i5.0O; in counties havting a
city with a population less than 50,000 and over
15,000, the sum of $15.00; in counties having a
city or towns less than 15,000 the sum of $10.00.
§ 993 (279). Malt syrups. — Upon all persons
and companies carrying on in this State the busi-
ness of manufacturing or selling, by wholesale or
retail, any and all malt syrups, as an occupation
tax for the privilege of carrying on said business,
an amount payable at the end of each quarter,
equal to one half of one per cent (^2%) of the
gross receipts from said business in this State.
Within three days from the end of each quarter
of the calendar year each person or company en-
gaged in said kind of business shall make returns
under oath to the Comptroller-General of this
'State, showing the .amount of said gross receipts,
with a detailed statement of the parties from
whom said receipts are received. Provided that said
malt syrups shall not be additionally taxed under
section 993 (270).
§ 993 (280). Chain of stores. — Upon every per-
son, firm, or corporation, owning, operating, main-
taining, or controlling a chain of stores consisting
of more than five stores, the sum of $250.00
for each store in excess of five. "Chain of
Stores" as used herein shall mean and include
five or more stores owned, operated, maintained,
or controlled by the same firm, person, or cor-
poration in which goods, wares, or merchandise
of any kind are sold at retail in the State of Geor-
gia. Provided, that the provisions of this para-
graph shall apply to wholesale chain-stores as
well as retail chain-stores, and in no event shall
be construed to apply to persons, firms, or cor-
porations engaged in the sale of gasoline, motor
oils, and kindred lines when not sold in grocery
stores. That the enforcement of the provisions of
this section is hereby delegated to the department
of revenue.
§ 933(281). Fish and sea food peddlers ; non-
resident.—Upon each non-resident firm or individ-
ual engaged in peddling fish, oysters, shrimp, or
other sea food, ten ($10.00) dollars for each vehi-
cle operated in each county in the State.
§ 993 (282). Dogs.—All dogs are hereby made
personal property, and shall be given in and taxed
as other property of this State is given in and
taxed, such tax be enforced by levy and sale as other
taxes are collected, and not to interfere with the
imposition and collection of any municipal taxes
on dogs, whether such dog or dogs be owned by
the taxpayer, his wife or minor children.
§ 993 (283). Sewing-Machines. — Upon every
sewing-machine [company] selling or dealing in
sewing machines by itself or its agents in this
State, and all wholesale and retail dealers in sew-
ing-machines, selling machines manufactured by
companies that have not paid the tax herein,
$400.00 for each fiscal year or fraction there-
of, to be paid to the Comptroller-General at
the time of commencement of business, and
said companies or dealers shall furnish the
Comptroller-General with a list of agents au-
thorized to sell machines of their manufac-
ture or under their control, and shall pay to
said Comptroller-General the sum of $10.00 for
each of said agents for the fiscal year or frac-
tional part thereof, for each county in which said
agents do business for said company. Upon the
payment of said additional sum the Comptroller-
General shall issue to each of said agents a
certificate of authority to transact business in
this State. Before doing business under this Act,
all sewing-machine agents shall be required to
register their names with the ordinaries of those
counties in which they intend to operate, and ex-
hibit to said ordinaries their license from the
Cbmpitrfoller-iGeneral, and to keep such license
posted on their vehicles, or at their place of busi-
ness. Wholesale and retail dealers in sewing-
machines shall be required to pay the tax pro-
vided herein for each manufacturer of sewing-
machines sold by them, except where the tax
required by this Act has been paid by said manu-
facturer. All unsold sewing-machines belonging
to sewing-machine companies, dealers, or their
agents, in possession of said companies, dealers,
their agents or others, shall be liable to seizure
and sale for payment of such fees, license, or tax.
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Any person who shall violate the provisions of
this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,
and on conviction shall be punished as prescribed
in Section 1065, Volume 2, of the Code of 1910.
None of the provisions of this section shall apply
to licensed auctioneers selling second-hand sew-
ing-machines, or to officers of the law under legal
process, or to merchants buying and selling ma-
chines on which a license tax has been paid as
herein provided, and who keep the machines and
sell and deliver them at their place of business,
such sales not being on commission. Provided,
that if said merchant shall employ an agent or
agents to deliver or sell the machines, the provi-
sions of this Act shall apply to said agent or
agents.
§ 993 (284). Taxes, how returned—The tax
provided for in section 993 (291), requires return
made to the Comptroller-General in accordance
with the law of Georgia. The tax required by §§
993 (172), 993 (173) shall be returned to the re-
ceiver of tax returns in the county of the residence
of the person liable to such tax, and shall be
entered by the receiver upon the digest of taxable
property. In the case of the tax imposed upon
foreign corporations by § 993 (212), and the
tax imposed by § 993 (241) upon manufacturers
of machinery and implements, upon soft-drink
syrups by § 993 (270), and upon carbonic acid gas
by § 993 (200), the return is required to be made
and the tax paid to the Comptroller-General. The
tax imposed by § 993 (227) on Insurance Agents
is required to be paid to the Insurance Commis-
sioner. The tax imposed upon legislative agents
by § 993 (230) shall be paid to the Secretary of
State when each person registers, and he shall not
be allowed to register until such tax is paid. All
other taxes enumerated and set forth in § 993 (169)
to § 993 (281) shall be returned and paid to the tax
collector of the county where such vocations are
carried on. Provided, however, that nothing in
this section shall be construed as changing any
other provision in this Act as to whom any tax
shall be paid.
Editor's Note.—Note that the Act of 1927 from which this
section is taken refers to paragraph 111 of section 2 of the
act. But paragraph 110, section 993(281) is the last para-
graph of said section.
§ 993 (285). Taxes, how paid.—Be it further
enacted by the authority aforesaid, that the taxes
provided for in this Act shall be paid in full for
the fiscal year for which they are levied; and
except where otherwise provided, said taxes shall
be paid to the tax-collectors of the counties where
such vocations are carried on, at the time of
commencing to do business. Before any person
shall be authorized to open up or carry on said
business, they shall go before the ordinary of
the county in which they propose to do business
and register their names, the business they pro-
pose to engage in, the place where it is to be con-
ducted; and they shall then proceed to pay the tax
to the collector, and it shall be the duty of the
said ordinary to immediately notify the tax-col-
lector, of such registration, and at the end of each
quarter to furnish the Comptroller-General with
a report of such special tax registration in his
office. Any person failing to register with the
ordinary or, having registered, failing to pay the
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special tax as herein required, shall ibe guilty of
a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be fined
not less than double the tax, or ibe imprisoned, as
prescribed by Section 1065 of Volume 2 of the
Code of 1910, or both in the discretion of the
court; one-half of said fine shall be applied to
the payment of the tax and the other to the
fund of fines and forfeitures for the use of the
officers of the court. Provided, however, that
in all counties of this State where the officers
of the Superior Court, or city court, are now or
may hereafter be upon the salary basis, the other
half of the fine shall be paid into the treasury of
such counties and shall become the property of
such counties.
§ 993 (286). Insurance companies.—(1) All for-
eign and domestic insurance companies doing
business in this State shall pay one and one-half
(1/^2%) Per cent, upon gross premiums received
by them in this State for the year, with no de-
ductions for dividends, whether returned in cash
or allowed in payment or reduction of premiums,
or for additional insurance; nor shall any deduc-
tion be allowed for premium abatements of any
kind or character, or for reinsurance, except com-
panies doing business in Georgia, or for cash
surrender values paid, or for losses or expenses of
any kind, said tax being imposed upon gross pre-
miums without any deductions whatever except
for premiums returned on change of rate and
cancelled policies and on reinsurance as aibove
provided. Provided, that local organizations
known as Farmers' Mutual Insurance Companies,
operating in not more than four counties, shall
not be subject to this tax. Provided, further,
that -mutual fire insurance companies chartered by
this State, which require their members to make
premium deposits to provide for losses and ex-
penses, and which premium deposits are used
wholly for the payment of losses and expenses
and returned to the policyholders or held to pay
losses and expenses and as reinsurance reserves,
shall not be subject to this tax.
(2) Every insurance company incorporated un-
der the laws of this State, and doing business on
the legal-reserve plan, shall ibe required to return
for taxation all of its real estate as other real
estate is returned, and all of the personal property
owned by it shall be ascertained in the following
manner: From the total value of the assets held
by the company, both real and personal, shall be
deducted the assessed value of all real estate owned
>by the company in this State, the non-taxable
funds deposited by the company with the State
Treasurer, and the amount of the reserve or net
value of the policies required by law to be held
by the company for its policyholders, and which
belong to such policyholders; the remainder shall
be the value of the personal property owned by
and taxable against such companies.
(3) That whenever any insurance company do-
ing business in this State shall make it appear by
proof to the Insurance Commissioner that one-
fourth of the total assets are invested in any or
all of the following securities or property, to wit:
Bonds of this State or of any county or munici-
pality of this State, property situated in this State
and taxable therein, loans secured by liens on real
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estate situated in this State, or policy loans by
insurance policies issued by such company on
lives of persons resident of this State, then the
premium tax levied by the first paragraph of this
section shall be abated or reduced to one per
centum upon the gross receipts of such company
,
and if the amounts so invested by any such com-
pany shall be as much as three fourths of the
total assets of such company, then said premium
tax shall be abated or reduced to three fourths
of one per centum upon such gross receipts of
such company.
§ 993 (287). Manufacturing companies.—Be it
further enacted by the authority aforesaid, That
the president, superintendent, or agents of all
manufacturing and other companies, whether in-
corporated or not (other than railroad, telegraph,
telephone, express, sleeping and palace-car com-
panies, and such other companies as are required
to make return of the value of their franchise
to the Comptroller-General under the provisions
of the Act approved December 17th, 1902, en-
titled an Act to provide for and require the pay-
ment of taxes on franchises, and to provide the
method for the return and payment of said taxes),
and all persons and companies conducting busi-
ness enterprises of every nature whatsoever, shall
return for taxation at its true market value of all
their real estate to the tax-receiver of the county
wherein said real estate is located. Provided,
That if the real estate, upon which said manufac-
turing or other business enterprise of whatsoever
nature is carried on, lies on or across the county
line, or county lines, and in two or more counties,
said real estate shall be returned to the tax-re-
ceiver of the county wherein are located the main
buildings containing the -machinery, or most of the
main buildings. Provided further, that all per-
sons, companies, and corporations not excepted
above, conducting any business enterprise upon
realty not taxable in the county in which such pei -
sons reside or the office of the company or corpo-
ration is located, shall return for taxation their
stock of merchandise, raw materials, machine^,
live stock, and all other personalty employed in the
operation of such business enterprises, together
with the manufactured goods and all other
property of such business enterprises and notes
and accounts made and the money used in
the prosecution of such business enterprises on
hand at the time for the estimation of property
for taxation, including all personalty of whatso-
ever kind connected with or used in such enter-
prises in any manner whatsoever, in the county
in which is taxable the realty wherein such busi-
ness enterprises are located or carried on. Pro-
vided further, that the agent in this State of any
person, firm, or corporation resident without this
State, w7ho shall have on hand and for sale, stor-
age, or otherwise, a,s such agents, merchandise or
other property, including money, notes, accounts,
bonds, stocks, etc., shall return the same for tax-
ation to the tax-receiver of the county wherein
the same may be taxed for State and county pur-
poses as other property in this State is taxed. The
wrord "merchandise" shall be held to include
guano, commercial fertilizer, save and except that
all canal and slackwater navigation companies shall
make, through their respective executive officers
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or stockholders in possession of the same, returns
to the tax-receiver of each county in which the same
is located, or through which the same shall pass
in whole or in part, of the right-of-way, locks,
and dams, toll-houses, structures, and all other
real estate owned by or used by the company or
stockholders thereof. Provided, that this Act
shall not make subject to taxation any property
of canal or navigation companies which is not
subject to taxation by the laws of this State now-
existing. The president of every manufacturing
company in this State, and agent, general man-
ager, or person in possession or charge of the busi-
ness and property in this State of any non-resi-
dent persons, firm, or corporation, shall be re-
quired to answer under oath, in addition to those
provided by law, the following questions:
1. What is the true market value of the real
estate of the company you represent, including
the buildings thereon?
2. What is the true market value of your ma-
chinery of every kind?
3. What is the true market value of real estate
not [now?] used in the conduct of the business of
your company?
4. What is the true market value of raw ma-
terials on hand on the day fixed for return of
property for taxation?
5. What is the true market value of manufac-
tured goods or articles on hand on the day for
the return of property for taxation, whether at
your principal office or in the hands of agents,
commission merchants, or others?
6. How much money did your company have on
hand the day fixed for the return of property for
taxation, whether within or without the State?
7. State separately the true market value of the
notes, bonds, and other obligations for money or
property of every kind on hand on the day fixed
for the return of property for taxation. And such
company shall be taxed upon its entire property
so ascertained, and the Comptroller-General iis
authorized' to frame and have propounded any
other questions which in his judgment will pro-
duce a fuller return.
§ 993 (288). Railroads; return, to whom made.—
(1). All railroad companies, street and suburban
railroads, or sleeping-car companies, or persons
or companies operating railroads or street-rail-
roads or suburban railroads or sleeping-cars in
this State, all express companies, including rail-
road companies doing express, telephone, or tel-
egraph business, and all telephone and telegraph
companies, person or persons doing an express,
telephone, or telegraph business; all gas, water,
electric light or power, hydro-electric power,
steam heat, refrigerated air, dockage or cranage,
canal, toll-road, toll-bridges, railroad equipment,
and navigation companies, person or persons do-
ing a gas, water, electric light or power, hydro-
electric power, steam heat, refrigerated air, dock-
age or cranage, canal, toll-road, toll-bridge, rail-
road equipment, or navigation business, through
their president, general manager, owner, or agent
having control of the company's offices in this
State, shall be required to make annual tax returns
of all property of said company located in this
State, to the Comptroller-General; and the laws
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now in force providing for the taxation of rail-
roads in this State, shall be applicable to the
assessments of taxes from said businesses as
above stated. Provided, that small telephone com-
panies, or person or persons doing a telephone
business, whose capital stock or property is of
less value than ($5,000.00) five thousand dollars,
shall be required to make returns to the tax-re-
ceivers of the counties in which such property is
located, instead of making returns to the Comp-
troller-General.
(2). Sleeeping car companies. That each non-
resident person or company whose sleeping-cars
are run in this State shall be taxed as follows:
Ascertain the whole number of miles of railroads
over which sleeping cars are run, and ascertain the
entire value of all sleeping cars of such person or
company, then tax such sleeping cars at the regular
tax rate imposed upon the property in this State
in the same proportion to the entire value of such
sleeping-cars that the length of lines in this State
over which such cars are run bear to the
length of lines of all railroads over which such
sleeping-cars are run. The returns shall be made
to the Comptroller-General by the president, gen-
eral agent, agent or person in control of such cars
in this State. The Comptroller-General shall
frame such questions as will elicit the informa-
tion sought, and answers thereto shall be made
under oath. If the officers above referred to in
control of said sleeping-cars shall fail or refuse
to answer, under oath, the questions propounded,
the Comptroller-General shall obtain the informa-
tion from such sources as he may, and he shall
assess a double tax on such sleeping-cars. If the
taxes herein provided for are not paid, the Comp-
troller-General shall issue executions against thp
owners of such cars, which may be levied by the
sheriffs or any county in this State upon the sleep-
ing-car or cars of the owners, who have failed to
pay the taxes.
(3). Railroad equipment companies. Any per-
son or persons, copartnership, company, or corpo-
rations, wherever organized or incorporated, own-
ing or leasing or furnishing or operating any kind
of railroad cars except dining, buffet, chair, parlor,
palace, or sleeping-cars, which cars are operated,
or leased or hired to be operated, on any railroad
in this State, shall be deemed an equipment com-
pany. Every equipment company, as here-
in defined, shall be required to make re-
turns to the Comptroller-General, and shall be
taxed as follows : Ascertain the total number and
the value of all cars of such equipment company,
the total car-wheel mileage made by said
cars in the United States, and the total car-
wheel mileage in Georgia. Then tax such
cars at the regular rate imposed upon prop-
erty of this State in the same proportion to the
entire value of such cars that the car-wheel
mileage made in Georgia bears to the entire car-
wheel mileage of said cars in the United States.
The returns shall be made to the Comptroller-
General by the president, general manager, agent,
or person in control of such cars ; and the Comp-
troller-General shall frame questions as will elicit
the information and answers thereto shall be
made under oath. If the officers above referred
to in control of said cars shall fail or refuse to
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answer under oath the questions propounded, the
'Comptroller-General shall obtain the information
from such sources as he may, and he shall assess
a double tax on .such cars. If the taxes herein
provided are not paid, the Comptroller-General
shall issue executions against said equipment com-
pany, which may be levied by the sheriff of any
county in this State upon any car or cars owned,
leased, or operated by the company failing to pay
the tax.
§ 993 (289). Railroad returns and by whom made.
—The presidents of all railroad companies doing
business in this State shall make returns to the
Comptroller-General in the manner provided by law
for the taxation of the property or the gross receipts
or net income of such railroads, and shall pay
the Comptroller-General the tax to which such
property or gross receipts or net income may be
sulbject according to the provisions of this Act
and the laws now in force relating to the tax on
railroads; and on failure to make returns or re-
fusals to pay tax, said company shall be liable to
all the penalties now provided by law, and the
Comptroller-General is hereby required, upon fail-
ure of such companies to make returns, or if made
and not satisfactory to said officer, to proceed
against such 'companies as provided in Section 1050
of the Code of 1910, Volume 2.
§ 993 (290). Banks.—No tax shall be assessed
upon the capital of banks or banking associations
organized under the authority of this State, or the
United States, located within this State, but the
shares of the stockholders of the banks or .bank-
ing associations, whether resident or non-resident
owners, shall be taxed in the county where the
bank or banking association are located, and not
elsewhere, at their full market value, including
surplus and undivided profits, at the same rate
provided in this Act for the taxation of other
property in the hands of private individuals. Pro-
vided, that nothing in this section contained shall
be construed to relieve such banks or banking
associations from the tax oh real estate held or
owned by them, but they shall return said real
estate at its true market value in the county where
located. Provided further, that where real estate
is fully paid for, the value at which it is returned
for taxation may be deducted from the market
value of their shares; and if said real estate is not
fully paid for, only the value at which the equity
owned by them therein is returned for taxation
shall be deducted from the market value of their
shares. The bank or 'banking associations them-
selves shall make the returns of the property and
the shares therein mentioned and pay the taxes
herein provided. Branch banks shall be taxed on
the value of the capital employed in their opera-
tion, in the counties, municipalities, and districts
in which they are located, and the parent bank
shall be relieved of taxation to the extent of the
capital set aside for the exclusive use of such
branches.
§ 993 (291). Building and loan associations.—
Be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid,
that mutual building and loan associations operat-
ing only in the county of their charter, and limit-
ing their loans to members, shall not be assessed
on their capital loaned to stockholders or members
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thereof. All other building and loan associations
or other association of like character shall ibe
required to return, to the tax-receiver of the
county where such associations are located, all
real and personal property of every kind and char-
acter belonging to such associations, except the
real property located in another county shall be
returned to the tax-receiver of that county.
§ 993 (292). Return by resident agents^—Be it
further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that
the president and principal agents of all incor-
porated companies herein mentioned, except such
as are required to make returns to tax-receivers
of the counties, shall make returns to the Comp-
itroller-General under the rules and regulations
provided by law for such returns and subject to
the same penalties and modes of procedure for the
enforcement of taxes from companies or persons
required by law to make returns to the Comp-
troller-General.
§ 993 (293). Duties of tax-collectors, sheriffs,
etc.—It shall be the duty of the sheriffs, their
deputies and constables of this State to look care-
fully after the collection of all taxes that may be
due the State of Georgia under this Act, or any
other special taxes due the State of Georgia. It
shall be the duty of all tax-collectors and sheriffs
and constables of this State to direct and see
that all persons, firms, or corporations violating
this Act or any of the tax Acts of this State shall
be prosecuted for all violations of the tax laws;
and every person convicted for a violation of this
Act or any of the special tax laws of Georgia,
upon the information of any citizen of this State,
one fourth of the fine imposed upon any person
for violation of the tax laws shall, by order of said
court, be paid to such informant or prosecutor.
§ 993 (294). "In towns and cities" defined.—
Whenever in any section or paragraph of this Act
the words "in towns or cities" occur, the same
shall be construed to mean "within one mile of
villages, towns, or cities," unless otherwise speci-
fied.
§ 993 (295). Fuel distributors; terms defined—
The terms used in §§ 993 (295) to 993 (302) shall
be construed as follows: ''Fuels" shall include
gasoline, benzol, naptha, and other fuels used in
internal combustion engines, but shall not include
any such articles which, under a distillation test
conducted as prescribed by the bureau of -mines
of the United States Government for gasoline,
will show distillation of the first drop at a temper-
ature of not less than 200 degrees Fahrenheit, and
shall not include kerosene oil, or the distillates
commonly known as crude fuel oils. "Kerosene"
as used in this Act shall include the ordinary
household petrolem oil used with wick burners
for illuminating, heating, and cooking purposes.
"Distributor" shall include any person, associ-
ation of persons, firm, corporation, and political
subdivision of this State, (a) That imports or
causes to be imported, and sells at wholesale or
retail or otherwise within this State, any of the
fuels or kerosene as specified above; or (b) That
imports or causes to be imported, and withdraws
for use within this State, by himself or others,
any of such fuels or kerosene from the tank-car
or other original container or package in which
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imported into this State; or (o) That manufac-
turers, refines, produces, or compounds any of
such fuels or kerosene within this State, and sells
the same at wholesale or retail or otherwise with-
in this State for use or consumption within this
State.
The term "distributor" shall not include any
retail dealer in such fuels or kerosene, or opera-
tor or proprietor of a gasoline filling-station or
public garage or other place at which such fuels
are sold, where such dealer or other person pro-
cures his entire supply thereof from a "distributor"
as above defined, who has qualified, as such as
hereinafter provided. Act 1927, p. 104.
§ 993 (296). Fuel distributors; amount of tax.—
Each distributor of fuels who engages in such
business in this State shall pay an occupation tax
of four cents per gallon, for each and every gal-
lon of such fuels (1) imported and sold within
this State, or (2) imported and withdrawn for
use within this State, or (3) manufactured, re-
fined, produced, or compounded within this State
and sold for use or consumption within this
State, or used and consumed within this State
by the manufacturer, refiner, producer or com-
pounder. Nothing in this Act contained shall
be so construed as to cause double taxation
on any of the products specified herein. Where
kerosene or fuels are manufactured or refined
in this State and shipped out of this State, and are
brought back into this State and used or con-
sumed, the respective taxes herein fixed shall be
paid on such kerosene and fuels. Any manufac-
turer or refiner in this State may sell to any duly
licensed distributor under the terms of this Act,
and require the purchasing distributor to pay the
tax herein imposed; provided, such manufacturer
or refiner shall report all such sales to the Comp-
troller-General not later than the next business
day after the shipment was made, giving full de-
tails of the sale, including quantity, the car ini-
tials and number if a carload shipment, date of
shipment, and name and address of consignee.
That the proceeds derived from said tax shall be
distributed as follows: Two and one-half (2*/0
cents per gallon to the State-aid fund for use in
construction on the State aid system of roads, and
one (l) cent per gallon to the several counties
of this State, as now provided by law. The x/z
cent of said gas tax not allocated under the terms
of this bill is hereby set aside to the public
schools of said State for an .equalization school
fund.
§ 993(297). Fuel distributors; tax on kerosene
distributors.—Each distributor of kerosene who
engages in such business in this State shall pay
an occupation tax of one (1) cent per gallon; the
proceeds of such tax to foe covered into the gen-
eral treasury. All of the subsequent regulatory
provisions of this Act, except the rate of tax, shall
apply to distributors of kerosene. The (1) cent
of kerosene oil tax levied under this section is
hereby set aside to the public schools of said State
for an equalization school fund.
§ 993 (298). Fuel distributors; registration.
—
Every such distributor shall register with the
Comptroller-General of this State on or before
September 1st, 1927, and on or before the same day
30]
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of the same month of each succeeding year, giving
his or its name, place of business, and post-office
address; and shall obtain from said Comptroller-
General a license to do business as a distributor
of motor-fuels and kerosene in this State. The
Comptroller-General shall keep a well-bound book
to be used for the purpose of registration as herein
described.
§ 993 (299). Fuel distributor; invoices and bills.
—Be it further enacted .by the authority aforesaid,
that such distributor shall keep and preserve all
invoices of bills of fuels and kerosene sold for the
period of one year, and submit the same to the
Comptroller-General of this State, whenever re-
quired by him.
§ 993 (300). Fuel distributors; monthly reports.
—All distributors of fuels and kerosene in this
State shall make a monthly report, to the Comp-
troller-General of this State, of all fuels and
kerosene sold or used by them. The first such
return or report shall be made on or before Octo-
ber 20, 1927, and shall embrace and include all
fuels and kerosene sold or used during the month
of September, 1927, and a similar return or report
shall be made on or before the 20th of each month
thereafter, and shall embrace and include all fuels
and kerosene sold, or used during the immediately
preceding calendar month. Said report or return
shall show the number of gallons sold or used,
and shall be sworn to before an officer of this
State duly authorized to administer oaths.
§ 993(301). Payment to Comptroller-General.
—Each distributor of fuels and kerosene engaged
in such business in this State shall pay the oc-
cupation tax of four cents per gallon on fuels and
one cent per gallon on kerosene, as herein pro-
vided, to the Comptroller-General of this State.
The first such payment shall be made on or be-
fore October 20, 1927, and shall embrace and
include the tax for all fuels and kerosene sold or
used during the month of September, 1927; and on
or before the 20th of each month thereafter he
shall pay to the Comptroller-General said occupa-
tion tax on all fuels and kerosene sold or used
during the immediately preceding calendar month.
§ 993 (302). Fuel distributors;, bond by distribu-
tor.—From and after the passage of this Act each
distributor of motor fuels and kerosene engaged
in such business in this State shall give a good and
sufficient indemnifying bond, payable to the
State of Georgia, in a sum not less than $25,000.00.
Said bond shall be for the payment of the occu-
pation tax, the making of the monthly report and
the annual registration as hereinbefore set forth,
and for the full, complete and faithful performance
of all the requirements of this Act. Said bond
shall be made by a surety company authorized to do
business in this State, and the cost of same shall
be paid by the distributor. Provided further,
that when a distributor collects less than $25,000.00
per month in taxes due the State, his bond shall
be fixed in the discretion of the Comptroller-
General of the State.
ARTICLE 3
Exemption of Property
§ 998. (§ 762). Property exempt from taxation.
Productive Property Taxable.—Under the constitution of
this state, productive property is taxable, even thoug-h the
income be used for charitable purposes. Atlanta Masonic
Temple Co. v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 244, 133 S. E. 864.
Illustration—Masonic Lodge.—A masonic company fur-
nishing various city lodges with quarters, by renting and
maintaining a building, is not a purely charitable institu-
tion within the meaning of this section, although the lodges
occupying the building may be institutions of such character.
Atlanta Masonic Temple Co. v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 244, 133 S.
E. 864.
ARTICLE 4
Persons and Property Subject to Taxation.
§ 1003. Property shall be returned at its value.
Power under City Charter.—The power to "lay" and "en-
force the payment" of "such taxes on the inhabitants" of,
and "those who hold taxable property" in, a city as the
"corporate authorities may deem expedient," conferred upon
the city by its charter, is not taken away by this section or
section 1004. Tietjen v. Mayor, 161 Ga. 125, 129 S. £• 653.
§ 1004. "Fair market value," meaning of.
See note under section 1003.
In General.—This section merely states a rule to be ap-
plied by municipalities in arriving at the value at which
taxable property shall be assessed for the purposes of taxa-
tion, and does not purport to limit investigations or the
manner or agencies by which the municipal authorities shall
inquire into such value of taxable property. Tietjen v.
Mayor, 161 Ga. 125, 131, 129 S. E. 653.
ARTICLE 7
County Taxation of Railroads
§ 1041. Affidavit of illegality.—If any railroad
company shall dispute the liability to such county
tax, it may be done by an affidavit of illegality,
to be made by the president of said railroad, or
other officer thereof having knowledge of the
facts, in the same manner as other affidavits
of illegality are made, and shall be returned for
trial to the superior court of the county where
such tax is claimed to be owing and where it is
sought to be collected, where such cases shall be
given precedence for trial over all other cases, ex-
cept tax cases in which the State shall be a party.
Acts 1889, p. 29; 1916, p. 34; 1927, p. 137.
Editor's Note.—By the amendment of 1927 other officers
than the President having knowledge of the facts, may make
the affidavit prescribed by this section.
ARTICLE 8
Estate and Inheritance Taxes
§ 1041(1). Federal Estate Tax return; duplicate
to be filed with State Tax Commissioner.—It shall
be the duty of the legal representative of the es-
cate of any person who may hereafter die a resident
of this State, and whose estate is subject to the
payment of a Federal Estate Tax, to file a dupli-
cate of the return wihich he is required to make
to the Federal authorities, for the purpose of
having the estate taxes determined, with the State
Tax Commissioner. When such duplicate is filed
with the said official, he shall compute the amount
that would be due upon said return as Federal
Estate Taxes under the Act of Congress relating
to the levy and collection of Federal Estate Taxes
upon the property of said estate taxable in Geor-
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gia, and assess against said estate as State inherit-
ance taxes eighty per centum of the amount
found to be due for Federal Estate Taxes. Pro-
vided, that if after the filing of a duplicate return
and the assessment of the State inheritance taxes
the Federal authorities shall increase or decrease
the amount of the Federal Estate tax, an amended
return shall be filed with the State Tax Commis-
sioner, showing all changes made in the original
return and the amount of increase or decrease in
the Federal Estate tax and such official shall
assess against said estate 80 per cent of the addi-
tional amount found to be due for Federal Estate
tax. In the event of a decrease in the Federal
Estate tax, the State shall refund to said estate
its proportion of said decrease. Acts 1925, p.
63; Ex. Sess. 1926, p. 15, 16; 1927, p. 103.
Editor's Note.—Supplemental to the Editor's Note under
this section in the Code of 1926, the court pointed out in
McAlpin v. Davant, 163 Ga. 309, 136 S. E- 83, that the
act of 1925 does not specifically mention the act of 1913 as
amended, and does not expressly repeal that law.
The act of 1925 operates only in the future, and does not
conflict with the pre-existing act of 1913 as amended, in so
far as that law imposed an inheritance tax upon estates
left by decedents who died prior to passage of the act.
Consequently the act of 1925 does not authorize the assess-
ment and collection of the inheritance tax therein provided
for from estates that were left by decedents who died prior
to the passage of the act. McAlpin v. Davant, 163 Ga. 309.
136 S. E. 83.
The amendment of 1926 inserted the word "hereafter" near
the beginning of the section, and raised the percentage of the
state inheritance taxes from 25% to 80% of the amount of
the Federal Estate Taxes. Subsequently, the amendment of
1927 added the proviso, with all that follows it, to the end of
the section.
Assessment of Estates Left Prior to 1925.—Where there
was no assessment or collection of any inheritance tax upon
such estate prior to the passage of the act of 1925, the es-
tate was subject to have an inheritance tax assessed and
collected therefrom under the act of 1913 as amended, un-
affected by the passage of the act of 1925, and was not sub-
ject to a tax under the act of 1925. McAlpin v. Davant, 163
Ga. 309, 136 S. E- 83.
§ 1041(2). Duties of County Ordinaries.—When
the amount of the of the inheritance taxes to be
paid by any estate has been determined, as pro-
vided for in § 1041(1), it shall be the duty of said
State official to certify the same to the Ordinary
of the county where said estate is being adminis-
tered, who shall enter the same upon the minutes
of his Court, and notify the executor or adminis-
trator of the amount found to be due, which shall
be a charge against the estate and not the several
distributive shares. The ordinary shall receive for
his services the sum of $3.00 to be taxed as a
part of the cost of administration. The tax as-
sessed under the terms of this Act shall be paid
direct to the Comptroller-General. Acts 1925, p.
63; 19127, p. 104.
Editor's Note.—By the amendment of 1927, the provision as
to the compensation for the services of the ordinary was in-
serted; and the tax assessed was made payable to the comp-
troller general instead of to the county tax collector.
Note that while the act of 1927 purports to amend section
2 and 4 of the act of 1926 it is obvious that 1925 was inserted
—
Query as to constitutionality.
§ 1041(4). Failure to pay; executions.—When-
ever the legal representative of any estate taxable
under this Act fails to pay the amount assessed
against said estate, within six months after notice
from proper authority as to the amount, to be
paid it shall be the duty of the Comptroller-
General to issue execution for the amount of such
tax, against said estate, which execution shall be
enforced by levy and sale. Acts 1925, p. 63; 192 i,
p. 104.
Editor's Note.—The provision as to the enforcement of the
execution was added, and the duty formally resting upon the
county collector was imposed upon the comptroller general,
by the amendment of 1927. See Editor's Note to § 1041(2).
§ 1041(17). Tax on transfer of property of non-
resident decedent.—A tax of two per centum of
its actual value is hereby imposed upon the trans-
fer of the following property of a non-resident
decedent:
a. Real or personal property or any interest
therein within this State.
b. Shares of stock or registered or coupon bondis
or certificates of interest of corporations organ-
ized under the laws of this State, or of national
banking associations located in this State, or joint
stock companies or associations organized under
laws of this State.
c. Such tax shall not apply to bonds of this
State or any of its subdivisions, or on money de-
posited in a bank, trust company or other simi-
lar institution in this State, if such deposit is
owned by a non-resident decedent. Acts 1927, p.
101.
§ 1041(18). Valuation, how made. —The vaiue
of any property taxable under -the provisions of
this Act and the amount of tax imposed thereon
shall be determined by the State Tax Commis-
sioner, who shall give notice and an opportunity
to 'be heard to the transferor, administrator, trus-
tee, or other person liable for the payment there-
of. The tax shall be imposed upon the transfer
of the property situated within this State, and not
upon the persons to whom the property is trans-
ferred. No deduction shall be allowed from the
value of any property taxable under this Act,
except an incumbrance upon real property in this
State or personal property held within this State
as collateral or security for a loan.
§ 1041(19). Time for payments; discount inter-
est.—All taxes imposed by this Act shall be
due and payable at the time of the transfer, and
shall be paid to the Comptroller-General of the
State. If such tax is paid within six months of
the death of the decedent a discount of five per
centum shall be allowed and deducted therefrom. If
such tax is not paid within eighteen months from
date of death, interest shall be charged and col-
lected at the rate of ten per centum from the date
of death. The tax herein imposed shall be and
remain a Hen upon the property transferred until
paid, and the transferor, executor, administrator,
or trustee of the estate shall be personally liable
for such tax.
§ 1041(20). Authority to prescribe rules and
forms.—The State Tax Commissioner, with the
approval of the Comptroller-General, shall have
the power to prescribe such rules and regulations
and forms not inconsistent with the terms of this
Act as may be necessary to carry out the provi-
sions of this Act.
§ 1041(21). Exemption.—The tax imposed by
this Act on personal property (except tangible
personal property having an actual situs in this
State) shall not be payable if the laws of the State
of residence of the descendent at the time of hi?
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death exempted residents of this State from trans-
fer taxes or death taxes on such property.
CHAPTER 2
Taxes, How Returned and Collected
ARTICLE 2
Returns to Receiver of Tax Returns
SECTION 9
Double Tax, When Collected
§ 1105. (§ 847). Defaulters to be doubly taxed.
Land Assessed for Owner.—Where the owner of land fails
to return it for taxation, under the authority of this sec-
tion it may be assessed for him. Wiley v. Martin, 163 Ga.
381, 382, 136 S. E- 151.
§ 1106. (§ 848). Property not returned to be
doubly taxed.
Assessed as Unreturned Property.—If the owner of land
fails to return it for taxation, and if the owner is unknown,
under the authority of this section it is to be assessed as
unreturned property. Wiley v. Martin, 163 Ga. 381, 382, 136
S. E. 151.
SECTION 15
Colored Taxpayers' Returns
§ 1116(11). Meeting of board; duties.
Effect of Failure to Give Notice.—It is proper to direct a
verdict for the plaintiffs in an action to enjoin the collection
of taxes where the returns of the plaintiffs were raised
without giving the required notice, the plaintiff tendering
the amount admitted due. Smith v. Shackelford, 163 Ga.
835, 137 S. E- 255.
Abandonment of Demand for Arbitration.—Where the
contestant and his arbitrator fail to appear at the place and
time fixed for the arbitration the demand for arbitration
will be considered as abandoned. Rogers v. Hamby, 163
Ga. 771, 137 S. E. 231.
Who May Be Arbitrators.—As to the effect of not object-
ing to a third arbitrator known by the contestant to be re-
lated to the tax collector, see Rogers v. Hamby, 163 Ga.
771, 137 S. E. 231.
ARTICLE 5
Tax Fi Fas. and Sales
SECTION 1
Lien of Tax Fi. Fas.
§ 1140. (§ 883). Taxes to be first paid.
When Lein Takes Effect.—Property returned or held at
the time of giving in is subject to the lien of the State, and
can not be divested by sale. Bibb National Bank v. Colson,
162 Ga. 471, 473, 134 S. E. 85.
SECTION 3
Transfer of Tax Fi. Fas.
§ 1145. (§ 888). Transfer of tax fi. fas.
Recordation—As to Defendant.—The ground that the
transfer of a tax fi. fa. to its present owner was not entered
of record as provided for by this section is without merit,
since such recording is not necessary to make it binding on
the property of the taxpayer; nor is such recording neces-
sary to preserve its priority, except as to subsequent bona
fide purchasers for value. Eewis v. Moultrie Bkg. Co., 36
Ga. App. 347, 136 S. E. 554.
Ga—
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SECTION 4
Dormancy of Tax Fi Fas
§ 1147. (§ 890). Tax fi. fa. dormant, when.
No Contractual Lien to Prevent Bar.—In cases of tax fi.
fas. there is no contractual lien, fixing a period of limitation
different from that provided by the statute, to fall back on,
so as to prevent the bar of the dormant-judgment act.
Eewis v. Moultrie Bkg. Co., 36 Ga. App. 347, 350, 136 S. E-
554.
SECTION 15
Redemption of Property Sold for Taxes
§ 1169. Land sold may be redeemed.
The Premium.—This section and section 1173 show that
the legislature had in mind a difference between interest
at a stated rate per annum and a premium in the form of
a lump sum to be paid within the time in which the differ-
ent classes of property could be redeemed, and that it so
declared. Reynolds v. Bickers-Goodwin Co., 161 Ga. 378,
379, 131 S. E- 55. Section 1173 specifically states that the
interest shall be at a stated rate per annum, the absence
of such a provision in this section negatives the assumption
that payment should be in the same manner. Id.
Same—Time of Payment.—The premium provided for
means payment of ten per cent in addition to the amount
of purchase-money, without regard to the time elapsing
between the sale and the redemption. Reynolds v. Bickers-
Goodwin Co., 161 Ga. 378, 131 S. E. 55.
Execution to Meet Interest, (Principal, or Cost of Drain-
ing.—The right of redemption is not given where land is
sold under execution issued for an assessment to meet in-
terest or principal, or the cost of draining the land ,in a
drainage district. Sigmon-Reinhardt Co. v. Atkins Nat.
Bank, 163 Ga. 136, 137, 135 S. E- 720.
§ 1172. Quitclaim deed by purchaser.
Execution to Pay Interest, Principal, or Costs of Drain-
ing.—Where land is sold under execution issued for an as-
sessment to meet interest, principal, or costs of draining
the land in a drainage district, the vendee will not be re-
quired to execute and deliver a quitclaim deed, as provided
in this section. Sigmon-Reinhardt Co. v. Atkins Nat.
Bank, 163 Ga. 136, 135 S. E. 720.
§ 1173. (§ 910). How redeemed.
See notes to section 1169.
CHAPTER 3
Delinquent Tax Receivers and Collectors
ARTICLE 2
Execution Against Defaulting Receiver or Collec-
tor or Sureties
§ 1187. (§ 924.) Comptroller to issue executions
vs. collector and sureties on default.
Quoted and applied in State v. Bank, 162 Ga. 292, 133 S.
E- 248.
§ 1190. (§ 927.) Lien on property of principles
and sureties, bound.
Superiority of State's Lien.—The State's lien is superior
to a security deed for money borrowed by the collector to
pay a prior shortage. State v. Bank, 162 Ga. 292, 133 S. E-
248.
Subrogation of Securities. — A bank, lending money to a
collector to cover a shortage, is not entitled to a superior
lien on account of subrogation to the rights of the State.
State v. Bank, 162 N. C. 292, 133 S. E- 248.
ARTICLE 5
Tax Collectors
SECTION 7
Collector, When Ex Officio Sheriff
§ 1225. Collector ex-officio sheriff in some coun-
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ties.—The tax-collectors of counties which contain
a population of one hundred and twenty-five
thousand or more and the tax-collectors of coun-
ties having a population of not less than 26,133
and not more than 26,200, according to the census
of 1920 or any future census, and the tax-collec-
tors of counties which contain within their bor-
ders the whole or a part of a city having a popu-
lation of two hundred thousand or more, accord-
ing to the census of 1920 or any future census,
shall be ex-officio sheriffs in so far as to enable
them to collect the taxes due the State and county,
by levy and sale under tax executions; and said
tax-collectors shall not turn over any tax execu-
tions to the sheriffs or to any other levying offi-
cials of the said State, except when it may be-
come necessary, for the purpose of enforcing the
same, to send said executions to any other county
or counties than that in which issued; but said
tax-collectors, by virtue of their office, shall have
full power and authority to levy all tax executions
heretofore or hereafter to be issued by them in
their respective counties; and the compensation
of said tax-collectors shall not exceed fifty cents
for issuing each fi. fa., and for levying and selling
the same fees as are now allowed by law to the
sheriffs of said State; and said tax-collectors shall
have full power to bring property to sale, and
sales made by them be valid, and shall convey the
title to property thus sold as fully and completely
as if made by the sheriffs of said counties. Acts
1890-1, p. 101; 1915, p. 11; 1927, p. 138, 139.
Editor's Note.—Prior to the amendment of 1927, the tax
collectors of only the counties which contain a population of
one hundred and twenty five thousand or more, fell within
the scope of this section.
Note that this section is twice amended by the Acts of
1927—the latter amendment taking no account of the former.
Judicial Notice of Population.—The courts will take judi-
cial cognizance of the population of counties for the purpose
of determining whether this section is applicable therein.
Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Smith, 35 Ga. App. 744, 746, 134 S. E.
801, citing the following authorities: L,eadbetter v. Price,
102 Ore. 159 (199 Pac. 633, 17 A. L. R. 218); Standard Oil
Co. v. Kearney, 106 Neb. 558 (18 A. L. R. 95, 184 N. W.
109); 15 R. C. L. 1129.
§ 1227(1). Counties with populations of 7,320.
—All tax-collectors of such counties of the State
of Georgia as have a population of not less than
7,320, nor more than 7,330, according to the cen-
sus of the United States for the year 1924, shall
be ex-officio sheriffs of their respective counties,
in so far only as to give them full power and
authority to collect all taxes due the State of
Georgia in their respective counties, and all other
taxes required to be collected by them, by levy
and sale under tax executions, and that said tax-
collectors be vested with full power and authority
to levy any and all fi. fas. issued by them, whether
prior to or subsequent to the passage of this Act,
and that the compensation to be received by said
tax-collectors for rendering services as such ex-
officio sheriffs shall be the same as that now
allowed by law to sheriffs for the same or like
services; that said tax-collectors shall have the
powers of sheriffs to bring all property to sale
that is subject to said fi. fas., and shall have full
authority to execute any and all necessary con-
veyances or bills of sale or other instruments re-
quired by law of sheriffs to be given to the pur-
chasers at public sales, and shall have authority to
do and perform all other Acts and to exercise all
other powers vested in sheriffs with respect to the
levy of said fi. fas., the sale of property thereun-
der, and the execution of conveyances therefor,
or with respect to any other feature connected
with the collection of said fi. fas. by levy and
sale, and all sales made by them as ex-officio shall
pass title and be as valid in all respects as if made
by the sheriffs of the respective counties. Acts
1927, p. 335.
§ 1227(2). Same—Advertisements of sales.—In
the levy of said fi. fas., and in the making of the
sales thereunder, in the advertisement of said
sales, said tax-collectors shall in all respects con-
form to the provision of the law governing such
sales by the sheriffs of this State, and all adver-
tisements of sales required to be inserted in a
newspaper shall be published in the newspaper in
which the sheriff's advertisements for said county
are published, and shall be published for the same
period of time.
§ 1227(3). Same—Deputies. — Said tax-collec-
tors shall have powers to appoint one or more
deputies under the provision of this Act, and all
deputies thus appointed shall be vested with all
of the powers herein granted unto the tax-collec-
tors, and said tax-collectors shall be responsible
for the Acts of their said deputies as sheriffs are
liable for the Acts of their deputies, and the com-
pensation of such deputies shall be paid by said
tax-collector.
§ 1227(4). Counties with population of 15,160.
—All tax-collectors of such counties of the State
of Georgia as have a population of not less than
15,150 and not more than 15,160, according to the
census of the United States for the year 1920.
shall be ex-officio sheriffs of their respective coun-
ties in so far only as to give them full power and
authority to collect all taxes due the State of
Georgia in their respective counties, and all other
taxes required to be collected by them, by levy
and sale under tax executions, and that said tax-
collectors be vested with full power and authority
to levy any and all fi. fas. issued by them, whether
prior to or subsequent to the passage of this Act,,
and that the compensation to be received by said
tax-collectors for rendering services as such ex-
officio sheriffs shall be the same as that now al-
lowed by law to sheriffs for the same or like serv-
ices; that said tax-collectors shall have the powers
of sheriffs to bring all property to sale that is sub-
ject to said fi. fas., and shall have full authority
to execute any and all necessary conveyances or
bills of sale or other instruments required by law
of sheriffs to be given to the purchasers at pub-
lic sales, and shall have authority to do and per-
form all other Acts and to exercise all other
powers vested in sheriffs with respect to the levy
of said fi. fas., the sale of property thereunder,
and the execution of conveyances therefor, or
with respect to any other feature connected with
the collection of said fi. fas., by levy and sale, and
all sales made by them as ex-officio sheriffs shall
pass title and be as valid in all respects as if made
by the sheriffs of the respective counties. Acts
1927, p. 337.
§ 1227(5). Advertisements of sales.—In the
levy of said fi. fas., and in the making of the sales
thereunder, in the advertisement of said sales, said
tax-collectors shall in all respects conform to the
provisions of the law governing such sales by the
sheriffs of this State, and all advertisements of
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sales required to be inserted in a newspaper shall
be published in the newspaper in which the sher-
iff's advertisements for said county are published,
and shall be published for the same period of
time.
§ 1227(6). Same—Deputies. — Said tax-collec-
tors shall have power to appoint one or more
deputies under the provision of this Act, and all
deputies thus appointed shall be vested with all of
the powers herein granted unto the tax-collec-
tors, and said tax-collectors shall be responsible
for the Acts of their said deputies as sheriffs are
liable for the Acts of their deputies, and the com-
pensation of such deputies shall be paid by the
said tax-collectors.
CHAPTER 4A
Payment of Revenue into Treasury
§ 1248(1). Money collected by departments,
etc., for maintenance, to be paid into State treas-
ury.— It shall be the duty of every department,
commission, bureau, and other branch or agency
of the government of this State, and of every offi-
cial head of every department, commission, bu-
reau, and other branch or agency of the govern-
ment of this State created by special Act, the
support and maintenance of which has been pro-
vided by special Act and not by direct appropri-
ations of the General Assembly, to collect and
forthwith to pay into the State treasury all
moneys, fees, commissions, penalties, or other
charges which they are authorized by law to col-
lect for the support and maintenance of such de-
partment, commission, bureau, or other branch
or agency of the State Government. Acts 1927,
p. 311.
§ 1248(2). Expenses of maintenance to be paid
from treasury.—The costs and expenses of the
maintenance and support of every department,
commission, bureau, and other branch or agency
of the State government shall be paid out of funds
in the State treasury by warrant of the Governor
drawn on appropriations duly made by the Gen-
eral Assembly.
§ 1248(3). Exceptions.—The provisions of this
Act shall not apply to boards and fees col-
lected by the educational institutions of this State;
and such funds as may be derived from sale of
farm products, nor funds collected from sale of
farm produce equipment or other material de-
rived from the expenditure of Federal research
funds, nor to funds received by the Health De-
partment for sale of medical supplies, nor fees
received by health institutions, nor to gifts, dona-
tions and internal income received by said educa-
tional institutions; nor shall the provisions of
this Act apply to the Court of Appeals or Su-
preme Court.
§ 1248(4). Exception of funds collected to
match Federal aid funds.—Wherever by Act of
Congress conditions have been or may be pre-
scribed for matching Federal aid by State funds,
and such conditions are in conflict with the pro-
visions of this Act, then the department or bu-
reau or agency of this State having to do with
such Federal aid and collecting funds with which
to match such Federal aid may and it is hereby
authorized to withhold from depositing in the
Treasury an amount sufficient for matching
such Federal aid; but all other funds belonging
to the State collected by such department, bureau,
or agency of the State shall be paid into the State
Treasury, as hereinbefore provided.
§ 1248(5). Time of payment to treasury.— It
shall be and it is hereby made the duty of each
and every official head described in section
1248(1) to pay over and to deposit in the State
Treasury, on or before January 1, 1928, all sums
remaining in their hands, collected before said
date, and remaining undisbursed under existing
laws.
§ 1248(6). Appropriation or allocation of cer-
tain funds not affected.—Nothing in this Act
shall be construed to affect the appropriation or
allocation of the motor-vehicle fees and licenses
and pro rata of gasoline taxes to the State High-
way Department; nor shall it be construed to
affect the appropriation or allocation of the pro
rata of gasoline taxes to the counties of this
State; nor shall it be construed to affect the ap-
propriation or allocation of the proceeds of the
cigar and cigarette taxes to the payment of pen-
sions. Nor shall this Act be construed to affect
either the appropriation and allocation of the pro-
ceeds of the tax on lumber dealer or dealers in other
forest products to the State forestry fund, or the
allocation of the proceeds of fees and penalties to
State game and fish protection fund; and pro-
vided further, that as to those departments,
branches, agencies, commissions, and bureaus of
State government who under the law can only
assess a sufficient amount of fees, licenses, penal-
ties, etc., to support such department, commission,
board, bureau, agency, or branch of government,
all assessments levied for such support shall be
the maintenance appropriation of such depart-
ment, board, bureau, agency, or branch for each
year. None of the provisions of this section shall
be construed to exempt or except any of the
funds, taxes, monies, fees, commissions, penalties,
or other charges received, collected, or paid into
any of the agencies named in this section from
the requirement of section 1248(1) that they
shall all be paid into the State Treasury.
§ 1248(7). Penalty for violation of Act.—
Should the official head of any department, com-
mission, bureau, or other branch or agency of the
State government violate any of the provisions
hereof, he or she shall, upon conviction, be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and punished as
provided therefor, and in addition thereto shall be
thereafter ineligible to hold such office.
CHAPTER 5
State Depositories
§ 1249. (§ 982.) State depositories provided for
in various cities.—Buchanan, Glennville and the
town of Dexter were added to the list of deposi-
tories by the Acts of 1927, pp. 140, 141, 142.
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ELEVENTH TITLE
Education
CHAPTER l
The University of Georgia and Its Organization
ARTICLE 2
Branches of the University
§ 1397 (§ 1300). Branches of the University.
The name of the State Normal School was changed to The
Georgia State Teacher's College by the acts of 1927, p. 171.
A college of agricultural and mechanical arts, to be known
as the Middle Georgia Agricultural and Mechanical Junior
College was added as a branch by the acts of 1927, p. 161.
CHAPTER 4
Public School System
ARTICLE 5
County Boards of Education
§ 1551(84^). Compensation of members in
certain counties.—Members of the county boards
of education, in counties having above 200,000
population according to the last or any future
United States census, may be paid a salary of fifty
dollars ($50.00) per month each; and their ac-
counts for service shall be submitted for approval
each month to the county superintendent of
schools, and they shall not receive any other com-
pensation for said service. Acts 1927, p. 156.
§ 1551 (89). School terms; schools property;
separation of races.
Editor's Note.—The Supreme Court in Dominy v. Stan-
ley, 162 Ga. 211, 216, 133 S. E. 245, in construing section
1484 of the Civil Code, which forms that part of this section
beginning "The said boards are invested with the title"
etc., and ending with the words "according to the order of
the board," used the following language: "This section,
however, confers no authority upon the board of education
of the county to control or to sell and dispose of the land
in question, which was given by private parties for a spe-
cific purpose [i e., a charitable trust]. Moreover, we do
not think that the doctrine of cy pres can be so extended
as to allow the trustees, who have no title to this property,
to sell the same or cut down the timber on the same for
the purpose of building up an entirely different institution
in an entirely different neighborhood."
It will be noticed that in this case the court was constru-
ing a section of the old law contained in sections 1532-1551
of the Civil Code, which sections are superseded by sec-
tion 1551(1) et seq. For a full treatment concerning the
confusion arising out of construction of the former law
see Editor's Note under sections 1432-1551, Georgia Code of
1926.
Length of Terms.—The county board has power, after hav-
ing specified the duration of a particular term, to pass a
resolution, after expiration of six months of such term,
closing the term prior to the time originally provided for
expiration of the term. Board v. Thurmond, 162 Ga. 58,
132 S. E. 427.
Same—Effect of Promise to Commissioners.—The board of
commissioners of a county has no power to contract with
the county board of education as to bind the board of edu-
cation to operate the schools for any particular time, and the
board of education will not be bound by any promise to the
board of county commissioners in regard to the length of
time it will operate the public schools at any term. Board
v. Thurmond, 162 Ga. 58, 132 S. E. 427.
Same—Closing Early to Apply Fund to Prior Indebtedness.
—On the facts of this case, the board of education did not
abuse its discretion in closing a term earlier than originally
planned, and in applying the funds derived from local taxa-
tion to payment of the debts accumulated during previous
years for money borrowed to pay teachers and operate the
schools. Board v. Thurmond, 162 Ga. 58, 132 S. E. 427.
§ 1551 (96). Consolidation.
Name of New District.—Where two or more local school
districts are consolidated, it is not necessary that the word
"consolidated" appear as a part of the name selected for
the consolidated district ; and it is proper for a proceeding
to validate bonds to be conducted in the name of the dis-
trict as fixed by the proper school authorities. Hawthorne
v. Turkey Creek School Dist., 162 Ga. 462, 134 S. E. 103.
§ 1551 (97). Appropriation for consolidated
schools.—Beginning with the year 1927 the State
Superintendent of Schools shall set aside $350,-
000 or so much thereof as may be necessary, and
for 1928 and the years to follow the State Su-
perintendent of Schools shall set aside $400,000 or
so much thereof as may be necessary, from funds
derived from the poll-tax collected and paid into
the treasury, to aid in the establishment and
maintenance of consolidated school in this State.
When the county board of education shall com-
bine smaller schools into a standard or approved
consolidated school with at least four teachers,
and evidence of this fact is furnished by the
County School Superintendent and Board of Edu-
cation to the State Superintendent of Schools,
and when it is made to appear to the State Super-
intendent of Schools that aid is needed to support
such consolidated school, the State Superinten-
dent of Schools shall be authorized to transmit
$500.00 annually to the support of such school.
If in addition the local school authorities pro-
vide for an approved or standard four-year high
school, and evidence of this fact is made to ap-
pear to the State Superintendent of Schools, that
aid is needed to support said four-year high
school, the State Superintendent of Schools shali
be authorized to transmit $1,000.00 annually to
the support of said school; such funds in both
cases shall be used by local authorities in the pay-
ment of salaries of principal and teachers.
When two or more schools in any county qual-
ify under this Act, either for the $500.00 aid or
for the $1,000.00 aid, the State Superintendent of
Schools shall determine to which one of such
schools said sums shall be paid; the State Super-
intendent of Schools shall be governed in his de-
cision by the extent to which the consolidated
district has utilized its local ability in building,
equipping, and supporting its school, and the
number of children to be reached by the consoli-
dation, the number of teachers, the qualifications
of the teachers employed, and the character of
the work being done by the school. No county
now receiving, or that may hereafter receive, aid
for both the consolidated ($500.00) and the high-
school ($1,000.00) aid shall be eligible to further
apply for such aid until every county in the State
has had an opportunity to apply. If those coun-
ties not receiving both aids fail to qualify, then
the State Superintendent of Schools is authorized
t-o extend further aid to those counties receiving
either or both aids as provided in this bill, and on
same conditions as set forth above. Acts 1925, p.
147; 1927, p. 158.
Editor's Note. — The amendment of 1927 increased the
amounts to be set aside by the superintendent of schools.
\bout the middle of the third paragraph, the phrase "the
'jualification of the teachers employed" was inserted by the
same amendment.
§ 1551 (98). Division of school districts.
Effect of Previous Election When District Divided. —
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Where the county board of education has duly divided one
school district into two school districts, under the provi-
sions of the act, act of 1911, (similar to this section) one of
the districts so created may have an election for local school
taxation under the statute, although an election for such
purpose has been held during the same year and failed to
carry in the old district as constituted before the division.
Tyson v. Board, 150 Ga. 247, 103 S. IS- 158; Dutton v. Rahn,
162 Ga. 189, 190, 132 S. E- 756.
§ 1551 (99). Rearrangement of districts.
Prerequisites to Calling Election.—Walker v. Hall, 161 Ga.
460, 131 S. E. 160, approving and following Shields v. Field,
151 Ga. 465, 107 S. E. 44.
Interference by Equity to Enjoin Proceeding.—A court of
equity will not enjoin a consolidation of districts by a county
board which has held an election and declared the result
to be in favor of the consolidation, because, even if the act
can be construed to give the right to contest the election
(there being no express provisions to that effect), it must be
done before the result is declared. Clark v. Board, 162 Ga.
439, 134 S. E- 74.
§ 1551 (100). Transportation of pupils.—When-
ever the county board of education or local dis-
trict trustees deem it for the best interest of the
school, they shall have the right to provide
means for the transportation of the pupils and
teachers to and from said school. Acts 1919, pp.
288, 327; 1927, p. 174.
Editor's Note.—The local district trustees were brought
within the scope of this section by the amendment of 1927.
§ 1551 (104). Term of loan.
Repayment from Local Tax.—A Board of Education hav-
ing lawfully incurred debts for money loaned to pay teachers
and operate the public schools of the county, and such debts
having accumulated from year to year, it was in the power
of that board to repay such debts from any funds that could
lawfully be applied to such purpose, including funds derived
from the levy of a local tax in the fall of the school year in
which the debts are paid for operating the schools. Board
v. Thurmond, 162 Ga. 58, 132 S. E- 427.
ARTICLE 6.
Local Taxation for Schools.
§ 1551 (130). Power to collect taxes.
Restrictions upon Construction. — This statute, dealing
with the subject of taxation, is to be interpreted in the
light of the fundamental restriction upon taxation imposed
by the constitution of this State, and will not be given a
construction which violates such constitutional provision.
Penick v. Foster, 129 Ga. 217, 58 S. E- 773, 12 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 1159, 12 Ann. Cas. 346; Almand v. Board, 161 Ga. 911,
131 S. E. 897.
Levy of Tax upon City.—This statute does not authorize
county authorities to levy a tax upon taxable property with-
in an independent school district existing in a city, for the
support of the public schools of the county under the con-
trol of the county board of education. Almand v. Board,
161 Ga. 911, 131 S. E. 897, overruling Hanks v. D'Arcv, 156
Ga. 55, 118 S. E- 656.
§ 1551 (133). Election for. school district.
Validity of Election When District Abolished and Sub-
stantially Recreated.—In Dutton v. Rain, 162 Ga. 189, 191,
132 S. E- 756, it was said: "On authority of Stephens v.
School District, 154 Ga. 275(6), 277 (114 S. E. 197), we hold
that the action of the county board of education in rescind-
ing their former action creating the consolidated school dis-
trict, and at the same meeting creating substantially the
same district, can not be held by this court, as a matter of
law, to be a fraud, and that it did not render such election
void." The court here has reference to an election for a
school district tax, and was considering the following pro-
vision taken from § 1535, Civil Code of 1910. "An election
for the same purpose shall not be held oftener than
every twelve months." It will be noticed that this section
contains the same provision. Ed. Note.
Substantial Compliance with Ballot Sufficient.—See § 126
and the note thereto.
§ 1551 (141). Trustees and secretary; powers
and duties.
Powers of Trustees—To Borrow Money.—The trustees of
a local school district are not empowered or authorized by
law to borrow money. Consequently, where such trustees
borrowed $2200 from a bank upon the draft of the secretary
of said board of trustees upon the tax-collector, which was
accepted by the latter, no liability attached to the local
school district or to the trustees who succeeded the original
borrowers. Powell v. Bainbridge State Bank, 161 Ga. 855,
132 S. E- 60.
ARTICLE 6A.
Payment of Teachers.
§ 1551 (154a). Governor's authority to make
debt to pay teachers. — Pursuant to the amend-
ment to Article 7, Section 3, Paragraph 1 of the
Constitution of this State, authorizing the con-
traction by or on behalf of the State of a debt in
an amount of $3,500,000.00 for the purpose of
paying the public-school teachers of the State,
the Governor is hereby authorized and empowered
to execute a note or notes for such amount and
for such time of payment as the condition of the
treasury may demand, at any time in his discre-
tion, for the purpose of paying the public-school
teachers of the State. The aggregate of said note
or notes shall not at any time exceed the afore-
said constitutional limit, and said note or notes
shall not mature later than February of the year
succeeding the time of the execution thereof, and
the principal amount so borrowed shall be repaid
each year out of the common-school appropria-
tion, and the interest thereon shall be paid each
year out of the general funds of the State, ac-
crued during the year of issue of said notes.
Said notes shall be signed by the Governor and
countersigned by the Comptroller-General and
Secretary of State. Acts 1927, p. 168.
§ 1551 (154b). Authority to use funds allocated
for other purposes.—The Governor is further au-
thorized and empowered, at any time in his dis-
cretion, to impress, use, and employ for the pay-
ment of public-school teachers of the State, and
without payment of interest thereon, any funds in
the Treasury which may have been allocated for
any special fund or purpose, so as to obviate the
necessity of increasing the public debt of the
State and the payment of interest. Provided,
however, that it shall be the duty of the Gov-
ernor, when any fund shall be so used to replace
said fund or funds by borrowing the same, if nec-
essary, at such time as will not interfere with the
expenditure for the purpose appropriated of any
special or allocated fund or funds so drawn upon
by the Governor by virtue of the authority
granted in this Act.
§ 1554c. Limit of authority. — The Governor
shall not during any calendar year impress, use,
or employ any funds in the Treasury allocated or
belonging to any special fund or purpose in ex-
cess of the borrowing power of the Governor un-
der this Act.
ARTICLE 7.
Building Houses in Local Tax Districts.
§ 1551 (155). Election for bonds to build and
equip school houses.
What Amounts to Selection of Registered Voters.—Where
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the tax-collector took the list furnished to him by the
trustees, went over it, and struck from it such names as
he thought did not belong there, the voters entitled to reg-
istration were selected by him, and not by the trustees of
the school district, the managers of the election, or the
attorney for the trustees who copied the list at the request
of the collector. Hawthorne v. Turkey Creek School Dist.,
162 Ga. 462, 467, 134 S. E. 103.
When Sections 440 et seq. Followed. — This statute re-
quires that the trustees "shall" follow the law as required
of county authorities in section 440 et seq. in the issue of such
bonds. Veal v. Deepstep Consolidated School District, 34 Ga.
App. 67, 128 S. E. 223.
Notice of Election.—"As a condition precedent to the hold-
ing of an election for school bonds a notice of such election must
be published for thirty days next preceding the day of the
election, in the newspaper in which the sheriff's advertise-
ments for the county are published." Burnam v. Rhine Con-
solidated School District, 35 Ga. App. 110. 132 S. E. 137, fol-
lowing Scott School Dist. v. Carter, 28 Ga. App. 412, 111 S.
E. 216.
TWELFTH TITLE.
Police and Sanitary Regulations
CHAPTER 7.
County Sanitary Regulations, Boards of Health,
Sanitary Districts, Cemeteries, Hospitals, etc.,
Contracts for Sanitation.
§ 1676(14). Cemeteries, hospitals, etc., out-
ride municipalities.
Necessity of Assignment to Users of Permit. — Where a
proposed corporation on being organized after the issuance
of a permit to a private person, acquired the property named
for the purpose, it was not essential to its use and enjoy-
ment of the permission to establish such cemetery that the
person by whom such permission was obtained should make
an assignment of the same to the corporation. Fairview
Cemetery Co. v. Wood, 36 Ga. App. 709, 138 S. E. 88.
Revocation after Expenditures Made.—Where the person
to whom the permission was granted or one succeeding
thereto had, on the faith thereof, expended large sums of
money in the expectation of using and enjoying the per-
mission so granted, a resolution thereafter adopted by the
county authorities, for the purpose of rescinding their pre-
vious action in making the grant, was void and of no effect,
where its adoption was without a hearing and without any
sort of notice to the person to be adversely affected, where
also there was nothing to show any of the conditions of
such permission had been violated. Fairview Cemeterv Co.
v. Wood, 36 Ga. App. 709, 138 S. E- 88.
CHAPTER 8A.
Registration of Births and Deaths.
§§ 1681(1) to 1681(26). Superseded by the Acts
of 1927 p. 353, herein codified as §§ 1681(27) et seq.
§ 1681 (27). Registration of births and deaths.
—The State board of health shall have charge of
the registration of births and deaths in this State,
shall prepare the necessary instructions, forms,
and blanks for obtaining and preserving such
records, and shall procure the faithful registra-
tion of same in each primary registration district
as constituted in section 1681 (29) , and in the
central bureau of vital statistics at the Capitol of
the State. The said board shall be charged with
the uniform and thorough enforcement of this
law throughout the State, and shall from time to
time recommend any additional legislation that
may be necessary for this purpose. Acts 1927, p.
354.
The proper person to issue a burial permit is the registrar
of the city or militia district, as the case may be, in which
the person died or the body was found. Fairview Cemetery
Co. v. Wood, 36 Ga. App. 709, 719, 138 S. E. 88.
§ 1681 (28). Bureau of vital statistics; State
registrar; appointment, qualifications.—The sec-
retary of the State Board of Health shall have
general supervision over the central bureau of
vital statistics, which is hereby authorized to be
established by said board, and which shall be un-
der the immediate direction of the State Regis-
trar of Vital Statistics, whom the State Board of
Health shall appoint, and who shall be a medical
practitioner of not less than five years practice in
his profession,' and a competent vital statistician.
The term of office of the State Registrar of Vital
Statistics shall be four years, and he shall con-
tinue in office until his successor has qualified. A
successor shall be appointed for the ensuing term
at least ten days before the expiration of each
term. Any vacancy occuring in such office dur-
ing a term shall be filled by appointment for the
unexpired part of the term. The State Board of
Health shall provide for such clerical and other
assistant as may be necessary for the purposes of
this Act, who shall serve during the pleasure of
the board. The compensation of the State Regis-
trar of Vital Statistics and the compensation of
said assistants shall be paid by the said board out
of the funds appropriated by the General As-
sembly for the maintenance of the State Board
of Health. The custodian of the capitol shall
provide for the Bureau of Vital Statistics, at the
State Capitol,' suitable offices, which shall be
properly equipped with fireproof vaults and filing
cases for the permanent and safe preservation of
all official records provided for by this Act.
§ 1681 (29) Districts for registration.—For the
purpose of this Act the State shall be divided in-
to registration districts as follows: Each city,
each incorporated town, and each militia district
or part thereof outside of a city or incorporated
town shall constitute a primary registration dis-
trict. The State Board of Health may combine
two or more primary registration districts as one
district, or may establish additional districts by
dividing a primary registraton district into two
or more districts, when necessary to facilitate
registration.
§ 1681 (30). Local registrars.—In each city of
this State the city clerk, and in each incorporated
town the town clerk, and in each militia district
or part thereof outside of a city or of an incorpo-
rated town the justice of the peace therefor, or,
if there be no justice of the peace, the notary
public and ex-officio justice of the peace there-
of, shall be the local registrar of vital statis-
tics, except where another person has been ap-
pointed as such registrar by the State board of
Health, the said board being hereby authorized
to appoint the local registrars in any and all reg-
istration districts, in their discretion. Each local
registrar shall appoint a deputy registrar, who
shall serve as registrar when the local registrar,
is not immediately accessible for the purpose
of registration or the issuance of certificates or
permits as required by this Act; and should the
local registrar and his deputy both be absent
from their registration district, the duties of the
local registrar of that district may be performed
by the local registrar of any adjoining district in
the same county; and in such cases the registrar
acting in the absence of the local registrar shall
note on each certificate issued bv him the date of
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filing, and shall forward the certificate in ten
days, and in all cases before the third day of the
following month, to the local registrar in whose
place he has acted. Any local registrar or deputy
registrar who, in the judgment of the State Boaru
of Health, fails to make a proper and complete
return of births and deaths, or to discharge any
of his other duties as prescribed by this Act, may
be summarily removed by said board, and he
shall be subject to such penalties as are provided
for such officers under section 303(10) Penal
Code.
§ 1681 (31). Burial or removal permit. — The
body of any person whose death occurs in this
State, or which shall be found dead therein, shall
not be interred, deposited in a vault or tomb, cre-
mated, or otherwise disposed of or removed from
or into any registration district, or be temporarily
held pending further disposition more than sev-
enty-two hours after death, unless a permit for
burial, removal, or other disposition thereof shall
have been properly issued by the local registrar
of the registration district in which the death oc-
curred or the body was found. And no such
burial or removal permit shall be issued by the
registrar until, where practicable, a complete and
satisfactory certificate of death has been filed
with him as hereinafter provided; provided, that
when a dead body is transported from outside -of
the state into this State or from one registration
district into another registration district within
this State, for burial, the transit or removal per-
mit issued in accordance with the law and health
regulations of the place where the death occurred
shall be accepted by the sexton or person in
charge of the cemetery in lieu of a burial permit
at the place of burial.
§ 1681 (32). Stillborn child to be registered
twice.—A stillborn child shall be registered as a
birth and also a death, and separate certificates
of both the birth and the death shall be filed with
the local registrar, in the usual form and manner,
the certificate to contain, in the place of the name
of the child, the word "stillbirth," provided that
a certificate of birth and a certificate of death
shall not be required for a child that has not ad-
vanced to the fifth month of uterogestation. The
medical certificate of the cause of death shall be
signed by the attending physician, if any, and
shall state the cause of death as "stillborn,"
with the cause of stillbirth, if known, whether a
premature birth, and if born prematurely, the pe-
riod of uterogestation, in months, if known; and
the burial or removal permit of the prescribed
form shall be required. Midwives shall not sign
certificates of death for stillborn children; but
such cases, and stillbirths occuring without at-
tendance of either physician or mid-wife, shall be
treated as deaths without medical attendance, as
provided for in section 1681(34).
§1681(33). Death certificate; contents.— The
certificate of death shall contain the following
items, and such other items as are deemed neces-
sary for legal, social, and sanitary purposes sub-
served by registration records: (1) Place of
death, including State, county, incorporated town,
village, or city. If in a city, the ward, street, and
house number: if in a hospital or other institu-
tion, the name of the same to be given instead of
the street and house number. If in an industrial
camp, the name of the camp to be given. (2) Full
name of decedent. If an unnamed child, the sur-
name preceded by "Unnamed," (3) Sex. (4)
Color or race; as white, black, mulatto (or other
Negro descent), Indian, Chinese, Japanese, or
other. (5) Conjugal relation; as single, married,
widowed, or divorced. (6) Date of birth, includ-
ing year, month, and day. (7) Age, in years,
months, and days. If less than one day, the
hours or minutes. (8) Occupation. The occupa-
tion to be reported of any person male or female,
who had any remunerative employment, with the
statement of (a) trade, profession, or particular
kind of work; (b) general nature of industry,
business, or esta/blishment in which employed (or
employer). (9) Birthplace, at least State or for-
eign country, if known. (10) Name of father. (11)
Birthplace of father, at least State or foreign
country, if known. (12) Maiden name of mother.
(13) Birthplace of mother, at least State or for-
eign country, if known. (14) Signature and ad-
dress of informant. (15) Official signature of reg-
istrar, with the date when the certificate was filed
and registered number. (16) Date of death, year,
month, and day. (17) Certification as to medical
attendance on decedent, fact and time of death,
time last seen alive, and cause of death, with con-
tributory (secondary) cause of complication, if
any, and duration of each, and whether attributed
to dangerous or insanitary conditions or employ-
ment; signature and address of physician or offi-
cial making the medical certificate. (18) Length
of residence (for inmates of hospitals or other in-
stitutions, transients or recent residents) at place
of death and in the State, together with the place
where the disease was contracted, if not at place
of death, and former or usual residence. (19)
Place of burial or removal, date of burial. (20)
Signature of undertaker or person acting as such,
and post-office address. The personal and sta-
tistical particulars (items 1 to 13) shall be au-
thenticated by the signature of the informant,
who may be any competent person acquainted
with the facts. The statement of facts relating
to the disposition of the body shall be signed by
the undertaker or the person acting as such. The
medical certificate shall be made and signed by
the physician, if there was any, last in attendance
on the deceased, who shall specify the lime
in attendance, the time he last saw the deceased
alive, and the hour of the day at which the death
occurred. And he shall further state the cause of
the death, so as to show the course of the disease
or sequence of causes resulting in the death, giv-
ing first the name of the disease causing death
(primary cause) and the contributory (secondary)
cause, if any, and the duration of each. Indefi-
nite and unsatisfactory terms, denoting only
symptoms of disease or conditions resulting from
disease, will not be held sufficient for the issuance
of a burial or removal permit, and any certificate
containing only such terms, as defined by the
State Registrar, shall be returned to the physi-
cian or person making the medical certificate, for
correction and more definite statement. Causes
of deaths which may be the result of either disease
or violence shall be carefully defined; and if vio-
lence, the means of injury shall be stated, and
whether (probably) accidental, suicidal, homi-
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cidal. And for the deaths in hospitals or insti-
tutions, or of non-residents, the physician shall
supply the information required, under this head
(item 18), if he is able to do so, and may state
where, in his opinion, the disease was contracted.
§ 1681(34). Death without medical attention.—
In case of any death occurring without medical
attention, it shall be the duty of the undertaker
to notify the local registrar of the death, and
when so notified the registrar shall, prior to the
issuance of the permit, inform the local health
officer, if there be such officer in the district
where the death occurred, and refer the case to
him for immediate investigation and certification;
provided, that when the local health officer is not
a physician, and in such cases only, the registrar
is authorized to make the certificate and return
from the statement of relatives or other person
having adequate knowledge of the facts; provided,
further, that if the registrar has reason to believe
that the death may have been due to unlawful act
or neglect, he shall then refer the case to the cor-
oner or other proper official for his investigation
and certification. And the coroner or other proper
official whose duty it is to hold an inquest on the
body of any deceased person, and to make the cer-
tificate of death required for a burial permit, shall
state in his certificate the name of the disease
causing the death, or, if from external causes,
(1) the means of death, and (2) whether (prob-
ably) accidental, suicidal, or homicidial, and shall
in any case furnish such information as may be
required by the State Registrar in order to clas-
sify the death properly.
§ 1681(35). Procedure, in obtaining burial per-
mit.—The undertaker, or the person acting as
undertaker, shall file the certificate of death with
the local registrar of the district in which the
death occurred, and obtain a burial or removal
permit prior to any disposition of the body. He
shall obtain the required personal and statistical
particulars from the person best qualified to sup-
ply them, over the signature and address of his
informant. He shall then present the certificate
to the attending physician, if there was any, or to
the health officer, or coroner, as directed by the
local registrar, for the medical certificate of the
cause of death and other particulars necessary to
complete the record as specified in sections 1681-
(33), 1681(34) and he shall then state the facts re-
quired relative to the date and place of burial or
removal, over his signature and with his address,
and present the complete certificate to the local
registrar in order to obtain a permit for burial, re-
moval, or other disposition of the body. The un-
dertaker shall deliver the burial or removal permit
to the person in charge of the place of burial, be-
fore interring or otherwise disposing of the body,
or shall attach the transit permit to the box con-
taining the corpse when shipped by any trans-
portation company; said permit to accompany
the corpse to its destination where, if within the
State of Georgia, it shall be delivered to the per-
son in charge of the place of burial. Every per-
son, firm, or corporation selling a coffin or burial
casket shall keep a record showing the name of
the purchaser, and the purchaser's post-office ad-
dress, and the name of the deceased, which rec-
ord shall be open to inspection of the State Reg-
istrar at all times. On the first day of each month
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the person, firm, or corporation selling coffins or
burial caskets in this State shall report to the
State Registrar each sale for the preceding
month, on a blank provided for that purpose;
provided, however, that no person, firm, or cor-
poration selling coffins or burial caskets to deal-
ers or undertakers only shall be required to keep
such record, nor shall such report be required
from the undertakers when they have direct
charge of the disposition of the dead body.
Every person, firm, or corporation selling cof-
fins or burial caskets at retail, and not having
charge of the body, shall inclose within the casket
or coffin a notice furnished by the State registrar,
calling attention to the requirements of the law,
a blank certificate of death, and the rules and reg-
ulations of the State Board of Health concerning
the burial or other disposition of a dead body.
§ 1631(36). Contents of burial permit.— If the
interment or other disposition of the body is to
be made within the State, the wording of the bur-
ial or removal permit may be limited to a state-
ment by the registrar, and over his signature, that,
a satisfactory certificate of death having been filed
with him as required by law, permission is granted
to inter, remove, or dispose otherwise of the body,
stating the name, age, sex, cause of death, and
other necessary details upon the form prescribed
by the State Registrar.
§ 1681(37). Burial without permit prohib-
ited; indorsement and return of permit.—No
person in charge of any premises on which in-
terments are made shall inter or permit the in-
terment or other disposition of any body unless
it is accompanied bv a burial, removal, or transit
permit as herein provided, and every such person
shall indorse upon the permit the date of the in-
terment, over his signature, and shall return all
permits so indorsed to the local registrar of his
district within ten days from the date of inter-
ment, or within the time fixed by the local board
of health. He shall keep a record of all bodies
interred or otherwise disposed of on the premises
under his charge, in each case stating the name
of each deceased person, place of death, date of
burial or disposal, and name and address of the
undertaker, which record shall at all times be
open to official inspection; provided, that the un-
dertaker or person acting as such, when burying
a body in a cemetery or burial ground having no
person in charge, shall sign the burial or removal
or transit permit giving the date of burial, and
shall write across the face of the permit the words
"No person in charge," and file the burial or re-
moval or transit permit within ten days with the
registrar of the district in which the cemetery is
located.
§ 1681(38). Birth registration.—The birth of
each and every child born in this State shall be
registered as hereinafter provided.
§ 1681(39). Certificate of birth to be filed.—
Within ten days after the date of each birth, there
shall be filed with the local registrar of the dis-
trict in which the birth occurred a certificate of
such birth, which certificate shall be upon the form
adopted by the State Registrar, upon advice and
consent of the State Board of Health, with a view
of procuring a full and accurate report with re-
spect to each item of information enumerated in
section 1681(40). In each case where a phv-
40]
§ 1681(40) REGISTRATION OF BIRTHS AND DEATHS § 1681(43)
sician, or midwife, or person acting as a midwife
was in attendance upon the birth, it shall be the
duty of such person to file in accordance here-
with the certificate herein contemplated. In each
case where there was no physician, or midwife,
or person acting as midwife, in attendance upon
the birth, it shall be the duty of the father or
mother of the child, or the householder or the
owner of the premises where the birth occurred,
having knowledge of such birth, or the manager
or superintendent of the public or private insti-
tution where the birth occurred, each in the order
named, within ten days after the date of such
birth, to report to the local registrar the fact of
such birth. In such case, and in case the physi-
cian, or midwife, or person acting as midwife, in
attendance upon the birth, is unable, by diligent
inquiry, to obtain any item or items of informa-
tion contemplated in section 1681(40), it shall
be the duty of the local registrar to secure
from the person so reporting, or from any other
person having the required knowledge, such in-
formation as will enable him to prepare the cer-
tificate of birth herein contemplated, and it shall
be the duty of the person reporting the birth, or
who may be interrogated in relation thereto, to
answer correctly and to the best of his knowl-
edge all questions put to him by the local regis-
trar which may be calculated to elicit any in-
formation needed to make a complete record of
the birth as contemplated by section 1681(40) and it
shall be the duty of the informant, in any state-
ment made in accordance herewith, to verify such
statement by his signature, when requested so to
do by the local registrar.
§ 1681(40). Contents of birth certificate.—The
certificate of birth shall contain the following
items, and such other items as are deemed nec-
essary for the legal, social, and sanitary purposes
subserved by registration records: (1) Place o*
birth, including State, county, incorporated town,
village, or city; if in a city, the ward, street, and
house number; if in a hospital or other institu-
tion, the name of the same to be given instead
of the street and house number. (2) Full name
of child. If the child dies without a name, be-
fore the certificate is filed, enter the words "died
unnamed." If the living child has not yet been
named at the date of filing certificate of birth,
the space for full name of child is to be left
blank, to be filed out subsequently by a supple-
mental report, as hereinafter provided. (3) Sex
of child. (4) Whether a twin, triplet, or other
plural birth. A separate certificate shall be re-
quired for each child in case of plural births.
(5) For plural births, number of each child in
order of birth. (6) Whether legitimate or ille-
gitimate. (7) Date of birth, including year,
month, and day. (8) Full name of father; pro-
vided that if the child is illegitimate, the name
of the putative father shall not be entered with-
out his consent, but the other particulars relat-
ing to the putative father (items 9 to 13) may
be entered if known, otherwise as "unknown."
(9) Residence of father. (10) Color or race of
father. (11) Age of father at last birthday, in
years. (12) Birthplace of father, at least State
or foreign country if known. (13) Occupation
of father, occupation to be reported if engaged
in any remunerative employment, with the state-
of work: (b) general nature of industry, busi-
ness, or establishment in which employed (or
employer). (14) Maiden name of mother. (15)
Residence of mother. (16) Color or race of
mother. (17) Age of mother at last birthday,
in years. (18) Birthplace of mother, at least
State or foreign country, if known. (19) Oc-
cupation of mother. The occupation to be re-
ported if engaged in any remunerative employ-
ment, with the statement of (a) trade,
profession, or particular kind of work, (b) Gen-
eral nature of industry, business, or establish-
ment in which employed (or employer). (20)
Number of children born to this mother, in-
cluding present birth. (21) Number of children
of this mother, living. (22) The certification
of the attending physician or midwife as to the
attendance at birth, including statement of year,
month, day (as given in item 7), and hour of
birth, and whether child was born alive or still-
born. This certification shall be signed by the
attending physician or midwife, with the date of
signature and address; if there is no physician
or midwife in attendance, then by the father or
mother of the child, householder, owner of the
premises, or manager or superintendent of pub-
lic or private institution where the birth occurred,
or other competent person, whose duty it shall
be to notify the local registrar of such birth, as
required by section 1681(39). (23) Exact date
of filing in office of local registrar, attested
by his official signature, and registered number
of birth, as hereinafter provided.
§ 1681(41). Supplemental report.—When any
certificate of birth of a living child is presented
without the statement of the given name, then
the local registrar shall make out and deliver to
the parents of the child a special blank for the
supplemental report of the given name of the
child, which shall be filled out as directed, and
returned to the local registrar as soon as the child
shall have been named.
§ 1681(42). Registration of midwives.—Every
midwife shall register his or her name, address,
and occupation with the local registrar of the
district in which he or she resides, or may here-
after establish a residence, such registration to be
made on or before the first day of February in
each year, or, if such residence is established
after that date, then within thirty days after the
same is established; and shall thereupon be sup-
plied by the local registrar with a copy of this
Act, together with such rules and regulations
as may be prepared by the State registrar rela-
tive to its enforcement. Within sixty days after
the close of each calendar year each local regis-
trar shall make a return to the State Registrar
of all midwives who have registered in his dis-
trict. No fee or other compensation shall be
charged by local registrars to midwives for reg-
istering their names under this section or mak-
ing returns thereof to the State Registrar.
§ 1681(43). Blanks supplied by State regis-
trar.—The State Registrar shall prepare, print,
and supply all registrars all blanks and forms
used in registering, recording, and preserving
the returns, or in otherwise carrying out the pur-
poses of this Act, and- shall prepare and issue
such detailed instructions as may be required to
ment of (a) trade, profession, or particular kind I procure the uniform observance of its provisions
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and the maintenance of a perfect system of reg-
istration; and no other blanks shall be used than
those supplied by the State Registrar, except
that in the transportation of dead bodies the
standard form of permit adopted by the State
Board of Embalmers may be used. He shall
carefully examine the certificates received
monthly from the local registrars; and if any
such are incomplete or unsatisfactory, he shall
require such further information to be supplied
as may be necessary to make the records com-
plete and satisfactory. And all physicians,
midwives, informants, or undertakers, and all
other persons having knowledge of the facts, are
hereby required to supply, upon a form provided
by the State Registrar or upon the original cer-
tificate, such information as they may possess
regarding any birth or death, upon demand of
the State registrar, in person, b}^ mail, or through
the local registrar. No certificate of birth or
death, after its acceptance for registration by the
local registrar, and no record made in pursuance
of this Act shall be altered or changed in any re-
spect otherwise than by amendments properly
dated, signed and witnessed. The State Regis-
trar shall further arrange, bind, and permanently
preserve the certificates in a systematic manner,
and shall prepare and maintain a comprehensive
index of all births and deaths registered, said in-
dex to be arranged alphabetically, in case of
deaths, by name of decedents, and in case of
births, by the names of the fathers, or the
mothers in the event the name of the father is not
known. He shall inform all registrars what dis-
eases are to be considered infectious, or commu-
nicable, and dangerous to the public health, as de-
cided by the State Board of Health, in order
that when deaths occur from such diseases proper
precautions may be taken to prevent their spread.
If any cemetery company or association, any
church or historical society or association, or any
other company, society, or association, or any in-
dividual is in possession of any record of births
and deaths which may be of value in establishing
the genealogy of any resident of this State, such
company, society, association, or individual may
file such record, or a duly authenticated transcript
thereof, with the State registrar, and it shall be
the duty of the State Registrar to preserve such
record or transcript, and to make a record and in-
dex thereof in such forms as to facilitate the find-
ing of any information contained therein. Such
record and index shall be open to inspection by
the public, subject to such reasonable conditions
as the State Registrar may prescribe. If any per-
son desires a transcript of any record filed in ac-
cordance herewith, the State Registrar shall fur-
nish the same upon application, together with a
certificate that it is a true copy of such record as
filed in his office.
§ 1681(44). Local registrar's duties; unsatis-
factory certificate of death.—Each local regis-
trar shall supply blank forms of certificates to
such persons as require them. Each local regis-
trar shall carefully examine each certificate of
birth or death when presented for record, in or-
der to ascertain whether or not it has been made
out in accordance with the provisions of this Act
and the instructions of the State Registrar. And
if any certificate of death is incomplete or unsat-
isfactory, it shall be his duty to call attention to
the defects in the returns, and to withhold the
burial or removal permit until such defects are
corrected. All certificates either of birth or
death shall be written legibly in durable black
ink, and no certificate shall be held to be complete
and correct that does not supply all the items of
information called for therein, or satisfactorily
account for their omission. If the certificate of
death is properly executed and complete, he shall
then issue a burial or removal or transit permit
to the undertaker; provided, that in case the
death occurred from some disease which is held
by the State Board of Health to be infectious,
contagious, or communicable or dangerous to the
public health, no permit for the removal or other
disposition of the body shall be issued by the reg-
istrar, except under such conditions as may be
prescribed by the State Board of Health. If a
certificate of birth is incomplete, the local regis-
trar shall immediately notify the informant, and
require him to supply the missing items of in-
formation if they can be obtained. He shall num-
ber consecutively the certificates of birth and
death, in two separate series, beginning with
number one for the first birth, and the first death
of each calendar year, and sign his name as regis-
trar in attest of the date of filing in his office.
He shall also make a complete and accurate copy
of each birth and each death certificate on the
form provided by the State registrar for that pur-
pose, and he shall, on or before the tenth day of
each month, transmit to the State Registrar all
original certificates registered by him for the pre-
ceding month, and shall forward to the ordinary
of the county in which his district is located his
copy of the same, or, if there be a full-time city
health officer or a full-time county health officer
located in his county, he shall forward his copy
to said health officer instead of to the ordinary.
And if no birth or no death occurs in any month,
he shall on the tenth day of the following month
report that fact to the State Registrar on a card
provided for that purpose. And all birth and
death certificates filed with a local registrar when
the birth or death occurred outside his district
must be forwarded by him, within ten days, to
the local registrar of the district in which the
birth or death occurred. The ordinary or health
officer, as the case may be, shall file and pre-
serve in his office all copies of certificates re-
ceived by him.
§ 1681(45). Fees.—Each local registrar shall
be paid a fee of fifty cents for each birth
certificate and for each death certificate prop-
erly made out and registered with him, and
correctly recorded and promptly returned by
him to the State Registrar as required by this
Act. And in case no birth or no death certificate
was registered during a month, the local regis-
trar shall be paid a fee of twTenty-five cents for
each report made by him to that effect, if such re-
port be made promptly as required by this Act.
All amounts payable to a local registrar under
the provisions of this section shall be paid from
count}r funds by the treasurer of the county in
which the registration district is located, and the
State Registrar shall annually, or, in the discretion
of the State Board of Health, from time to time
during the year, certify to the treasurers of the
several counties the number of births and deaths
properly registered, with the names of the local
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registrars and the amounts due each at date of
said certificate; provided that before such fees are
paid by the county treasurer, the State Regis-
trar's certificate as to the amount due for such
fees shall be verified by a certificate of the ordi-
nary of the county, or city or county health offi-
cer, as the case may be, to whom copies of the
original certificates have been furnished by the
local registrar as provided in section 1681(44).
The ordinary or the county or city health
officer, as the case may be, shall be paid a fee of
ten cents for each copy of birth and each copy of
death certificate properly filed by him under sec-
tion 168il(44), said fee to be paid from county
funds by the county treasurer.
§ 1681(46). Certified copies.—The State regis-
trar or ordinary or the county or city health offi-
cer shall, upon request, supply to any applicant, a
certified copy of the record of any birth or death
registered under the provisions of this Act, and
any such copy of the record of a birth or death,
when properly certified by the State registrar or
ordinary or city or county health officer, as the
case may be, shall be prima facie evidence in all
courts and places of the facts therein stated, for
which said applicant shall pay a fee of fifty cents.
The United States Census Bureau may obtain,
without expense to the State, transcripts or cer-
tified copies of births and deaths.
CHAPTER 9
Practice of Medicine; How Regulated.
ARTICLE 1
Practitioners
§ 1684. (§ 1479). Practitioners must register.
Section Repealed.—See rotes to § 1697(6).
ARTICLE 2
State Board of Medical Examiners
§ 1697(5). License required before practice;
how obtained.
Constitutionality.
—The right to practice medicine is, like
the right to practice any other profession, a valuable right,
which is entitled to be protected under the constitution
and laws of the State. But the State in the exercise of the
inherent police power of the sovereign may place such re-
strictions on a licensee as may be necessary for the welfare
and safety of society. A statute which regulates the right
to practice medicine, but leaves the field open to all who
possess the prescribed qualifications, does not abridge the
privilege or immunities of citizens. Hughes v. State Board,
162 Ga. 246, 134 S. E- 42.
This law is not unjustly discriminatory so as to render it
void. Hughes v. State Board, 162 Ga. 246, 134 S. E. 42.
A license to practice medicine is not a contract, and gives
the licensee no right to continue in the practice in the future
unrestricted, and such license may be revoked for good cause,
and such revocation alone is not a taking of property with-
out due process of law. Hughes v. State Board, 162 Ga. 246,
134 S. E. 42.
§ 1697(6). Recording of certificate; fee; report.
Editor's Note.—Section 3 of the act of 1881, embodied in
section 1684 of the Code, was repealed by implication by the
act of December 12, 1894 (Ga. E. 1894, p. 85). The act of
1894 was in turn repealed, either expressly or by implication,
by the act of 1913 (now this section), and after August 18,
1913, a physician licensed under the act of 1894 was not re-
quired to register in accordance with the provisions of the
act of 1881, and a physician licensed under the act of 1894,
who had caused his certificate to be recorded as required by
that act, could recover for services rendered after August
18, 1913, although the record of his certificate had been made
prior to August 18, 1913. Friedman v. Mizell, 164 Ga. 1, 137
S. E. 400; Friedman v. Mizell, 36 Ga. App. 615, 137 S. E.
864.
§ 1697(13). Refusal and revocation of licenses.
Editor's Note—Constitutionality.—This section is not vio-
lative of the constitution, section 6545, which provides that
"The right of trial by jury, except where it is otherwise pro-
vided in this constitution, shall remain inviolate," etc.
Lewis v. State Board, 162 Ga. 263, 133 S. E- 469.
Nor is it violative of the due-process clauses of the State
and Federal constitutions. The section provides for notice
of the time and place of hearing, for service of the notice,
for the production of the defendant's evidence, and for mak-
ing his defense, and also for an appeal from the State Board
of Medical Examiners to a jury in the superior court; and
this provides due process of law. Hughes v. State Board,
162 Ga. 246, 134 S. E- 42.
The language of this section which declares that a licen-
tiate's name may be removed from the records in the office
of any clerk of court in this State, and his license revoked
upon the ground of "conviction of crime involving moral
turpitude," is not so vague, uncertain, and indefinite as to
render the same void. The words "moral turpitude" are
capable of accurate definition. The legislature may enact
that one who has been convicted of crime "involving
moral turpitude" shall no longer practice medicine. Hughes
v. State Board, 162 Ga. 246, 134 S. E- 42.
Nor is the provision that "said appeal to be had as in
other cases now provided by law," void for uncertainty.
Hughes v. State Board, 162 Ga. 246, 134 S. E. 42.
Retroactive Effect.—This section is not retroactive as ap-
plied to the facts of the case at bar. Hughes v. State
Board, 162 Ga. 246, 134 S. E. 42.
Prohibiting Advertisements.—Under the police power of
the State the legislature may prohibit advertisements by
licensed physicians with reference to "any disease of the
sexual organs':" and provide for a revocation of the license
of such practicing physician upon a majority vote of the
State Board of Medical Examiners, for a violation of the
above provision of the act. Hughes v. State Board, 162
Ga. 246, 134 S. E. 42.
Notice—Specifying Law Alleged to Be Violated.—In pre-
ferring charges against a practicing physician in order to re-
voke his license under the act of 1913, as amended by the
act of 1918, it is not necessary to specify the law under
which the charges are preferred. Hughes v. State Board,
162 Ga. 246. 134 S. E. 42.
CHAPTER 10
Professional Nursing
ARTICLE 1
Board of Examiners
§§ 1698 to 1711(1).—Repealed by the Acts of
1927, p. 247, herein codified as §§ 1711(7) et seq.
ARTICLE 3
Profession Regulated
§ 1711(7). Board of Examiners of nurses cre-
ated; members.—The Board of Examiners of
Nurses for Georgia is hereby created. It shall be
composed of five persons to be elected and ap-
pointed in the following manner: The Georgia
State Nurses' Association will, within thirty (30)
days after this Act takes effect, nominate to the
Governor of this State ten (10) of its members,
none of whom is in any way connected with any
training-school for nurses. The said nurses
must have had at least three (3) years of practice
in their profession immediately preceding their
appointment. From this number the Governor
shall, within thirty (30) days thereafter, appoint
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for places on the said board one nurse who shall
hold office for one (l) year from date of appoint-
ment; and two (2) shall hold office for two (2)
years from said date, and two (2) shall hold office
for three (3) years from said date. All of the said
appointments shall have the same date; provided
no two of the nurses so appointed shall have
graduated from the same training-school. Upon
the expiration of the term of office of any member
of said board the Governor of this State shall ap-
point a successor to fill the said term of office, who
shall hold office for three (3) years from the date
of the expiration of, the said term of office. The
said appointment shall be made from a list of five
(5) members of the said association, to be fur-
nished to him by the said association. All vacan-
cies occurring on this board shall be filled by the
Governor for the unexpired term from like nom-
inations furnished to him by the said association
within thirty (30) days after the vacancy occurs;
provided, that if the said association fails to make
the nominations herein required within the time
here specified, the Governor shall make such ap-
pointments by nominating such members of the
nursing profession hereto as may seem to him to
be proper. Acts 1927, p. 247.
§ 1711(8). Officers. — The members of this
State Board of Examiners shall, within thirty
(30) days after appointment, organize by the elec-
tion of one of its members to be the president of
the said board, and another to be the secretary
and treasurer, who shall hold office for a period of
one year and until their respective successors are
elected and have qualified; said officers shall be
elected by the board annually, and in case of a
vacancy in either of said offices the board shall,
within forty (40) days after the vacancy occurs,
elect one of its number to fill the said office; and
in the event there is no such election writhin the
time named, the Governor shall appoint a mem-
ber of said board to fill the vacancy. The secre-
tary is required to certify to the Governor the
names of the officers so elected; and in the case
of a vacancy, this shall likewise be certified by the
secretary to him; and in the event of a vacancy
in the office of the secretary, the president of the
board shall certify the same to him, and shall
certify the name of the person chosen to fill the
vacancy in the event the vacancy is filled by the
board.
§ 1711(9). Quorum; records; seal; certifi-
cates.—Three (3) members of said Board of Ex-
aminers shall constitute a quorum, but no action
of said board shall be valid unless authorized by
the affirmative vote ojf three (3) mem'bers
thereof. The secretary of the board is directed to
keep a record of the minutes of the meetings of
said board, and a record of the names of all per-
sons applying for registration hereunder, and of
the action of the board thereon, and a register of
all nurses who have complied with the require-
ments of this Act, all of which said records shall,
at all reasonable times, be open to public inspec-
tion. Said board is authorized to have and use
an official seal which shall bear the words:
"State Board of Examiners of Nurses for Geor-
gia." The certificate of the secretary of said
board under the seal thereof as to the action or
non-action of the board shall be accepted in evi-
dence in the courts of this State as the best evi-
dence of the minutes of the said board; and like-
wise the certificate of the secretary under the said
seal, as to the registration or non-registration of
any person, shall be accepted as the best evidence
as to the registration or non-registration of the
said person under the requirements of this Act.
The secretary shall issue to all nurses admitted to
registration hereunder a certificate under the seal
of the said board, showing that fact.
§ 1711(10). Examinations; Notice.—It shall be
the duty of said board to meet for the purpose of
examining applicants for registration, at least
once in each year, and oftener should it be
deemed necessary by said board. Notice of said
meetings shall be given of the time and place of
said meetings by written notice posted, postage
prepaid, to the last known address of each appli-
cant, at least ten (10) days before the time of
said meeting, and by publication in a daily paper
of general circulation in Atlanta, and in a
nurses' journal, if there be one published in Geor-
gia. The said notice shall be published at the
same rates charged for sheriffs' advertisements.
Said notice shall be inserted at least once, and
the first insertion shall be made at least two
weeks prior to said meeting. Provided, the sec-
retary of said board shall issue a temporary per-
mit to each application for registration, which
permit will authorize said applicant to do nursing
as a registered nurse until the next meeting of the
board.
§ 1711(11). Deposit fee by applicant; dental
nurses.—All graduate nurses making application
for registration as graduate nurses under this Act
shall deposit with the Secretary of the said board,
at the time of making such application, the sum of
ten ($10.00) dollars as an examination or regis-
tration fee. Provided, that no person shall en-
gage in practice as a dental hygienist or dental
nurse without first obtaining a certificate therefor
to be issued by the Board of Dental Examiners
of Georgia, which certificate shall be issued by
said Board of Dental Examiners upon written ex-
amination conducted by and satisfactory to said
board, which shall include the subjects of Dental
Anatomy, Physiology, Bacteriology, Dental
Pathology, Sterilization, Office Routine, and Oral
Hygiene and Prophylaxis. Provided further, that
applicants for certificates as dental hygienists or
dental nurses shall be of good moral character,
shall be at least 19 years of age, shall Have had
such preliminary education and training as may
be prescribed by said Board of Dental Examiners,
and shall pay to said Board of Dental Examin-
ers a fee of ten dollars for such examination.
Provided further, that no person to whom such
certificate is issued shall engage in practice as a
dental hygienist or dental nurse except under the
supervision of a licensed denist, and no such per-
son shall practice dentistry, or do any kind of
dental work other than to remove calcareous de-
posits, secretions, and stains from the normally
exposed surfaces of the teeth, and to apply ordi-
nary wash or washes of a soothing character, and
to do sterilization and office routine.
§ 1711(12). Qualifications.—Each applicant for
registration as a graduate nurse must be at least
twenty-one (21) years of age, of good moral
character, a graduate of a regular chartered
training-school for nurses, connected with a gen-
eral hospital or sanatorium (in which medical,
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surgical, obstetrical, and pediatric cases, and
where men, women, and children, are treated)
where three (3) years of training with a system-
atic course of instruction on the above-mentioned
classes of cases is given in the hospital or other
educational institution, or must have graduated
from a training-school connected with a hospital
of good standing, supplying a three (3) years'
training corresponding to the above standard,
which training may be obtained in two or more
hospitals. All qualifications of the applicant shall
be determined by the State Board of Examiners
of Nurses for Georgia, which is empowered to
prescribe such examinations for the applicants as
will best test their fitness and ability to give effi-
cient care to the sick. All applicants at the same
examination shall be subject to the same kind of
examination; provided that the said board shall
have the power to grant advanced credit, not in
any case of excess of twelve (12) months, for
didactic and laboratory work done in an accred-
ited college, or for credits either time or scholas-
tic, earned in an institution other than the one
from which graduated.
§ 1711(13). Registration without examination.
—All nurses graduating on or before June 1, 1909,
from such training-schools as are referred to in
the preceding sections shall be, by that fact, en-
titled to registration without examination, upon
paying the application fee of ten ($10.00), dollars,
as provided in this Act, and submitting sufficient
evidence of good moral character. Nurses who
shall show to the satisfaction of the said board
that they are graduates of training-schools con-
nected with a hospital or sanitorium, giving two
years' systematic course of instruction, or if they
graduated before or during the year 1897 from
such a school giving one year's training, and who
are in good moral and professional standing,
and are engaged in the practice of the profession
of nursing at the passage of this Act, also nurses
in training at the time of the passage of this Act
and shall graduate hereafter and possess the qual-
ifications herein specified, shall, upon the pay-
ment of the application fee, be entitled to regis-
tration without examination, provided application
is made for registration on or before February 1,
1928. There may be an appeal from the judg-
ment of the said board by the party who is re-
fused a license by the board, or whose license is
revoked, as the case may be, if dissatisfied with
the judgment, to a jury of the Superior Court of
the county of the residence of such dissatisfied
party; said appeal to be had as in other cases now
provided by law.
§ 1711(14). Nursing without certificate from
board; penalty.—After the expiration of six months
from the passage of this Act it shall be unlawful
for any person or persons to practice professional
nursing as a graduate nurse or registered nurse
in this State without a certificate from said board;
and any person violating any of the provisions of
this Act shall be guilty of misdemeanor, and upon
conviction thereof shall be punished in accordance
with section 1065 of the Penal Code of the State
of Georgia. Each graduate nurse who registers
in accordance with the provisions hereof shall be
styled and known as a registered nurse, and no
other nurse shall assume or use such title, or use
the abbreviation "R. N.," or any other letters,
words, or figures to indicate that he or she is a
graduate or registered nurse; and a violation
hereof shall be deemed a misdemeanor, and shall
upon conviction be punished accordingly. Annu-
ally during the months of January or February
every registered nurse of Georgia shall be re-
quired to have her certificate validated by the is-
suance of a card attesting to her right to practice
ais a registered nurse for the current year. This
request for validation shall be accompanied by a
fee of one ($1.00) dollar, and sent to the secre-
tary of the State Board of Examiners of Nurses
for Georgia. On March 1 of each year the roster
of nurses who have validated their certificates
shall be taken; and the same shall be printed
within sixty days thereafter in such form and
manner as may be determined by the board.
Any certificates not validated may be revoked.
§ 1711(15). Licenses to undergraduate nurses.
—The Board of Examiners of Nurses shall issue
a license to engage in the care of the sick to un-
dergraduate nurses. Each applicant must be at
least nineteen (19) years of age, of good moral
character, must present to the Board of Examin-
ers a certificate showing that he or she has had
at least twelve (12) months training in a regular
chartered training-school for nurses connected
with a general hospital or sanitorium, in which
medical, surgical, obstetrical, and pediatric cases,
and where men, women and children are treated.
§ 1711(16). Fee from undergraduate nurse.— It
shall be the duty of said board of Examiners to
determine all the qualifications of applicants, and
provide for examination for license for undergrad-
uate nurse. Upon filing application for examina-
tion and registration as a licensed undergraduate
nurse, each applicant shall pay a fee of five ($5.00)
dollars, and annually during the months of Jan-
uary or February every licensed undergraduate
nurse shall be required to have her certificate val-
idated by the issuance of a card attesting to her
right to practice as a licensed undergraduate nurse
for the current year. This request for validation
shall be accompanied by a fee of fifty (50) cents.
Any certificate not validated may be revoked.
This shall not apply to attendants or orderlies
employed in hospitals. All undergraduate nurses,
practicing at the passage of this Act, and possess-
ing the qualifications herein specified, shall, upon
the payment of the application fee, be entitled to
registration without examination, provided appli-
cation is made for registration on or before Feb-
ruary 1, 1928. After the expiration of six months
after the passage of this Act, it shall be unlawful
for any person or persons to practice as under-
graduate nurse in this State without a certificate
from said Board of Examiners, except in hos-
pitals; and any person violating any of the pro-
visions of this Act shall be guilty of misdemeanor,
and upon conviction thereof shall be punished in
accordance with section 1065 of the Penal Code
of the State of Georgia. Each licensed under-
graduate who registers in accordance with the
provisions hereof shall be styled and known as a
licensed undergraduate nurse, and no other per-
sons shall assume or use such title, or use the
abbreviation "L. U. N.," or other letters, words,
or figures for the purpose of representing that
he or she is a licensed undergraduate nurse within
the meaning of this Act.
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§ 1711(17). Emergency nursing.—This Act
shall not be construed to affect or apply to gra-
tuitous nursing of the sick by friends of the fam-
ily, or as an emergency aid. And this shall not be
construed to affect a situation in the event of pub-
lic emergency pronounced by the State Board of
Health to exist in the State at large, or any part
thereof, or in the event of an emergency declared
by national health authorities, requiring nursing
service within or without the State, in which case
unlicensed persons may be permitted to nurse or
care for the sick for hire during the continuance
thereof.
§ 1711(18). Revocation of certificate; notice to
holder.—The said board may revoke any certifi-
cate issued by it, for sufficient cause to be ad-
judged by it; but no such certificate shall be re-
voked without a hearing, notice of the time and
place of which shall be given to the holder of the
certificate by the secretary at least (30) days be-
fore the day set for said hearing, which notice
shall plainly set forth the charges against the
holder of said certificate, and the trial shall be
only upon the grounds specified. Said notice
shall be mailed to the said person so accused, at
his or her last known address, postage prepaid;
or the same shall be delivered personally to the
person so accused. The presiding officer of the
.said board is authorized and empowered to ad-
minister oaths to all witnesses giving evidence at
such hearing, and no evidence shall be received
at such hearing if the same is not under oath.
§ 1711(19). Salary of secretary.—Out of the
funds of the said board, accruing from the appli-
cation fees herein provided, the secretary of said
board shall be paid a salary and all necessary ex-
penses, the salary to be determined by the said
Board of Examiners. The members of the board
shall be entitled out of the funds to receive not
less than six ($6.00) dollars per day for each day
actually engaged in the service of the board, and
all necessary expenses. All payments out of said
funds, or any funds of the board, shall first be
approved by the presiding officer of said board.
Be it further enacted, that one or more persons
be employed by the board, to work under the di-
rection of the secretary, and to be paid out of
funds accruing from application fees, to assist in
carrying out the rules and regulations adopted
by the said board, and for giving advice and en-
couragement to nurse-training schools in prepar-
ing applicants for registration. Duties and sala-
ries shall be determined by the board, and shall
be paid as other expenses are paid.
§ 1711(20). Certificates of registration without
examination.—The Board of Examiners shall
have authority to issue certificates of registra-
tion without examination to graduate nurses of
a State other than Georgia, or of a foreign coun-
try, who hold bona fide certificates of registra-
tion issued under the laws of such a State or
foreign country; provided, the standards of reg-
istration are equivalent to those provided in this
Act, and the individual qualifications of the nurse
meet the requirements of this Act. The regis-
tration fee of ten ($10.00) dollars for graduate
nurses herein provided shall accompany each ap-
plication for a certificate. Be it further enacted,
that the Board of Examiners shall have authority
to issue a certificate of registration or license
without examination to undergraduate nurses
registered in a State other than Georgia, or of a
foreign country, whose qualifications meet the
requirements of this Act. The registration fee
of five ($5.00) dollars, as herein provided for un-
dergraduate nurses, shall accompany each appli-
cation for certificate.
§ 1711(21). Continuation of members of ex-
isting board; its books, etc., to be property of
new board.—The membership of the present
Board of Examiners of Nurses for Georgia shall
continue for the terms for which each member
was chosen or appointed; and that the books, rec-
ords, files, furniture, and property of the present
board shall be the property of the board herein
created. The board herein created shall be the
successor or continuation of the board now in
existence, and the acts of the present board here-
tofore done shall continue to be in all respects
valid and lawful, and all registrations heretofore
made or authorized by the said present board
shall continue of full force and effect.
§ 1711(22). Nurses not affected by this Act—
The provisions of this Act shall not affect nurses
known as practical nurses, not holding themselves
out to be either graduate or undergraduate nurses
within the meaning of this Act.
CHAPTER 11
State Board of Embalming
§ 1717(4). Disinterred bodies.
As to permit where family consents to disinterment, see
note to P. C. 408.
CHAPTER 12
State Board of Pharmacy
§§ 1722 to 1731.—Repealed by the Act of 1927,
pp. 291 et seq., herein codified as §§ 1731(1) et
seq.
§ 1731(1). Georgia Board of Pharmacy cre-
ated.—There is hereby created and established a
board to be known as the Georgia Board of
Pharmacy, with the duties and powers as are
hereinafter in this Act provided. Acts 1927, p.
291.
§ 1731(2). Members of existing board to be
on new board.—Said board shall consist of five
(5) members, and the members of the now ex-
isting Georgia State Board of Pharmacy shall
continue in office and act as members of the said
Georgia Board of Pharmacy hereby created, with
all the duties and powers as herein provided, un-
til their respective terms of office expire, the va-
cancies as they may occur to be filed in keeping
with the requirements of this Act.
§ 1731(3). Governor to commission members;
term 5 years.—Members of said Georgia Board
of Pharmacy shall be commissioned by the Gov-
ernor, and shall serve for a term of five (5) years,
or until their successors are duly appointed and
qualified. No person shall be eligible for appoint-
ment to membership on said board who is not a
licentiate of the Board of Pharmacy of the State
of Georgia, and who has not been actually en-
gaged for a period of five (5) years or more in
the retail drug business. If any member, of said
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board after his appointment and qualification shall
cease to be actually engaged in the retail drug
business, his membership on said board shall at
once become vacant; nor shall any person be
eligible to appointment on said board who has
any official connection with any school or col-
lege of pharmacy, and if any member of said
board shall, after his appointment and qualifi-
cation, become connected with any school or col-
lege of pharmacy, his membership on said board
shall immediately become vacant. No member
of the board who has served one full term shall
be eligible to reappointment until there has in-
tervened a period of one (l) full term from the
date of the expiration of his membership to the
date of his reappointment.
§ 1731(4). Annual election of member for
next vacancy.—The Georgia Pharmaceutical As-
sociation shall from its membership annually elect
one member for the next occurring vacancy on
said board, who shall meet the qualifications as
required by this Act. When regularly submitted
to him by the secretary of the said association,
the Governor shall make the appointment for the
vacancy occurring in said board.
§ 1731(5). Unexpired term.—Vacancies occur-
ring other than by expiration of the term of a
member shall be filled for the unexpired term
only by the member receiving next highest num-
ber of votes at last annual convention of the
Georgia Pharmaceutical Association.
§ 1731(6). Oath of appointee.—The appointee
to said board shall immediately after his appoint-
ment take and subscribe to an oath or affirma-
tion, before a qualified officer, that he will faith-
fully and impartially perform the duties of the
office, which oath shall be filed with the Secretary
of State; whereupon the Secretary of State shall
issue to said appointee a certificate of appoint-
ment.
§ 1731(7). Pay of members.—The members
of said board shall receive as their compensation
the sum of fifteen dollars ($15.00) per day while
in the actual performance of their duties as mem-
bers of said board, and in addition shall receive
their actual traveling expenses while in the per-
formance of their duties on said board, such com-
pensation to be paid out of the funds received by
said board under the provisions of this Act.
§ 1731(8). Organization of board.— The said
board shall, as soon as practicable after this Act
becomes effective, meet and organize and from
their members elect a president, a vice-president,
and a secretary.
§ 1731(9). Secretary's salary. — The said sec-
retary shall be paid a salary for his services, the
amount of the same to be fixed by said board,
and paid out of said funds.
§ 1731(10). Examinations by board, time of.
—The said board shall meet for examination of
applicants for licenses at such place or places,
and at such times, as the board may decide. In
no case shall the board hold more than three
meetings annually.
§ 1731(11). Drugs to be compounded only by
or under supervision of registered pharmacist.—
It shall be unlawful for any proprietor, owner, or
manager of any drug-store or pharmacy to al-
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low any person in his employ except a registered
pharmacist to compound or mix any drugs, med-
icines, or poisons for sale, except an employee un-
der the immediate supervision of a registered
pharmacist.
§ 1731(12). Qualifications of Applicants. —
Applicants for registered pharmacists must be not
less than twenty-one (21) years of age, and shall
have at least a high school education with a mini-
mum of sixteen (16) units as are designated by
the Association of Accredited Schools, and not
less than thirty-six (36) months experience in
a drug store or place where poisons are dis-
pensed by a licensed vendor registered under
the laws of the State of his abode, or in lieu of
the foregoing a graduate of a recognized school
of pharmacy; provided, this Act shall not be
construed to affect a person who has had three
(3) years practical experience under the direct
supervision of a registered pharmacist at the
time of the passage of this Act.
§ 1731(13). Examination fee.—Applicants for
examination as registered pharmacists under this
Act shall pay to said board an examination fee
of fifteen dollars ($15.00). All fees shall be
paid to the secretary of said board at the time
of the filing of the application for examination.
Any applicant failing to make the required mark
is entitled to another examination without any
additional charge, provided he takes the second
examination within one (1) year from the first.
§ 1731(14). License to one reigstered in
another State.—The said board may in its dis-
cretion grant licenses as pharmacists to persons
who furnish proof that they have been regis-
tered as such in some other state, and that they
are of good moral character; provided that such
other State in its examination requires the same
general degree of fitness as is required by the
examination in this State.
§ 1731(15). Election of representative to meet-
ing, of association of other States.—The said
board, in order to determine and be informed
of the status of the boards of other States de-
siring reciprocal registration, and in order to be
advised also regarding the progress of phar-
macy throughout the country, may annually
elect one of their members to meet with like
representatives from other State Boards of
Pharmacy, the expenses of such member in at-
tending such meeting to be paid out of the
funds received by the said board under the pro-
visions of this Act. The said board through its
representatives may, with like representatives
from other State Boards of Pharmacy, join in
creating and maintaining an Association of
members of the several States, to be engaged in
the general advancement of pharmacy and the
keeping of records of reciprocal registration.
§ 1731(16). Refusal or revocation of license.
—Said board may refuse to grant a license to
any person found guilty of a felony, or gross
immorality, or who is addicted to the use of al-
coholic liquors or narcotic drugs to such an
extent as to render him or her unfit for the
practice of pharmacy, and may after due hear-
ing revoke a license for such cause, or revoke
any license which has been procured by fraud.
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§ 1731(17). Who may compound or sell
drugs, etc.—No person shall engage in the
compounding or vending of medicines, drugs,
or poisons within the State without full com-
pliance with this Act, except: (1) such drug-
gists as are exempted from the operation of the
present law by the statute of the State of Geor-
gia, and such druggists as have heretofore ob-
tained a license and are legally authorized by
existing laws to compound and vend drugs,
poisons, and chemicals; (2) physicians putting
up their own prescriptions and dispensing med-
icines from their own offices. (3) This item
shall be construed in the interest of the pub-
lic health, and shall not be construed to pro-
hibit the sale by merchants of home remedies,
not poisons, or the sale by merchants of prep-
arations commonly known as patent or pro-
prietary preparations when sold only in the
original and unbroken packages, Paris green,
arsenate of copper, arsenate of lead, or prep-
arations containing any of these articles used
for killing Lincoln-bugs, cabbage-worms, cater-
pillars, all and similar insects, provided the la-
bels, cartons, and packages containing such
preparations have the word "Poison" printed
across the face, and conform to the United
States Pure Food and Drug Act, and general
merchants other than druggists shall not be re-
quired to register under the provisions of this
Act.
§ 1731(18). Duty of board as to examina-
tion, license, prosecution.—It shall be the duty
of said board to examine all applicants for li-
censes under the provisions of this Act sub-
mitted in proper form, and to grant certificates
of licenses to such persons as may be entitled
to the same. It shall further be the duty of
said board to cause the prosecution of all per-
sons violating the provisions of this Act, and
in all such prosecutions the burden shall be
upon the defendant to show his authority.
§ 1731(19). Fees to go to fund in State
Treasury for pay and expenses of board.—
All monies paid to the secretary in fees or from
other sources shall be paid by him into the
Treasury of the State of Georgia and there
held by the State Treasurer for the payment of
the compensation and expenses by said board
and secretary; the funds arising under the pro-
visions of this Act being hereby especially al-
located under the authority of the General As-
sembly of Georgia for this purpose. After the
compensation of said board, the salary of the
secretary, and expenses of said board and sec-
retary have been paid, the board shall have the
right to establish a reserve or emergency fund
not in excess of $1,000.00, and all surplus over
and above the above-mentioned expenses and
the above-mentioned surplus shall, on the first
day of January of each year, revert to the
Treasury of Georgia, to be placed in the gen-
eral fund of the State.
§ 1731(20). Meaning of "drug-store," "phar-
macy," "apothecary."—The term "drug-store,"
"pharmacy," or "apothecary," wherever used in
this Act, shall be construed to mean a place
where drugs, medicines, or poisons are dis-
pensed, compounded, or sold at retail under the
direction and direct supervision of a person who
is duly licensed and registered by the Georgia
Board of Pharmacy to practice in Georgia.
§ 1731(21). Unlawful use of title "drug-store,"
etc.—It shall be unlawful for any person in con-
nection with any place of business or in any
manner to take, use, or exhibit the title "drug-
store," "pharmacy," "apothecary," or any com-
bination of such titles or any title or description
of like import or any synonym or other term
designated to take the place of such title, unless
such place of business is in fact and in truth a
drug-store or pharmacy as defined in this Act.
§ 1731 (22). Annual registration.—All per-
sons now lawfully engaged in compounding and
vending medicines, drugs, and poisons in this
State, shall, on or before the first day of Janu-
ary following the passage of this Act, and every
person who shall be hereafter duly licensed un-
der the provisions of this Act shall, before
engaging in any business under said license, reg-
ister in the office of the Secretary of the Geor-
gia Board of Pharmacy annually; said registra-
tion shall be entered in a book to be kept for
that purpose by said secretary, his name, na-
tionality, and credentials and date thereof under
which he is entitled to engaged in such voca-
tion at the time of filing such registration, and
a certificate of such registration, stating the
terms of the same, shall be given him by said
secretary.
§ 1731(23). Power to make rules.—The said
Georgia Board of Pharmacy herein provided
shall have the power and authority to make
rules and regulations governing the action of
the board, and to make such other rules and
regulations as they deem necessary to carry out
the intent and provisions of this Act.
§ 1731(24). Violation a misdemeanor.—Any
violation of any provision of this Act shall be
a misdemeanor, and the person so offending
shall be punished as prescribed in section 1065
of the Penal Code.
CHAPTER 17
Motor Vehicle Laws
ARTICLE 2
Acts 1915, Ex. Sess., and Amendatory Acts
§ 1770(26). Schedule of annual fees for ve-
hicles; registry and license of manufacturers
and dealers; number plates; tags for pur-
chasers ; penalty.
Constitutionality.—The act is not unconstitutional because
it undertakes to tax automobiles, for the construction of pub-
lic roads, and that there is no authority in the General As-
sembly of Georgia to tax personal property in order to raise
a fund for the construction of public roads, §§ 6358 and 6359,
or the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the
United States. Lee v. State, 163 Ga. 239, 135 S. L. 912.
The act is not unconstitutional upon the ground that it
violates the constitution, § 6554, which provides that all tax-
ation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects and
ad valorem on all property taxed. Lee v. State, 163 Ga. 239,
135 S. L- 912.
The tax is not a property tax. Lee "v. State, 163 Ga. 239,
135 S. L- 912.
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§ 1770(28). Display of number-plate.
Constitutionality.—This section is not open to attack on
the ground that it was not one of the subjects included in the
Governor's proclamation convening the legislature in ex-
traordinary session. L,ee v. State, 163 Ga. 239, 135 S. E>
912.
ARTICLE 3
Acts 1921, pp. 255 et seq.
§ 1770(50). Equipments.
Purpose of Regu3atton.—The purpose of these several
regulations of motor-vehicles is the protection of the lives
and limbs of all persons upon or using such streets and
highways, not only those who may be met, overtaken, or
passed by the driver, but as well for the protection of those
who may accompany him. Black v. State, 34 Ga. App. 449,
451, 130 S. E. 591.
Presumption as to Compliance. — With nothing appearing
to the contrary, it will be assumed that the automobile was
duly equipped with "front lamps" and that they were
"throwing strong white lights to a reasonable distance in
the direction in which such vehicle is proceeding," in ac-
cordance with the requirements of the section. Macon v.
Jones, 36 Ga. App. 799, 803, 138 S. E. 283.
Insufficient Brakes as Negligence Per Se.—The operation
of a truck along the public streets not equipped with effi-
cient and serviceable brakes, constituted negligence per se.
Orange Crush Bottling Co. v. Smith, 35 Ga. App. 92, 132
S. E- 259.
§ 1770(51). Speed limit; intersections, etc.;
pedestrians, horses, etc.; passing stationary
street cars, etc.
Insufficient Brakes Negligence Per Se.—The trial court
did not err in instructing the jury that the law requires
motor-vehicles while in use upon the public streets to be
equipped with efficient and serviceable brakes, and that
the operation of the truck along the public streets not so
equipped constituted negligence per se. Orange Crush Bot-
tling Co. v. Smith, 35 Ga. App. 92, 132 S. E. 259.
Section Applied.—A charge to the effect that whenever
the operator to any vehicle along a public highway shall
meet a vehicle approaching from an opposite direction, the
operator of the first vehicle shall turn to the right, was
held applicable to the conduct of the plaintiff. Hornbrook
v. Reed, 35 Ga. App. 425, 133 S. £. 264.
§ 1770(52). Passing moving vehicles.
Constitutionality.—So much of the section as undertakes
to make penal the failure of the operator of a motor-vehicle,
when meeting a vehicle approaching in the opposite direc-
tion, to "turn his vehicle to the right so as to give one
half of the traveled roadway, if practicable, and a fair op-
portunity to the other to pass by without unnecessary inter-
ference" is too uncertain and indefinite in its terms to be
capable of enforcement. Heath v. State, 36 Ga. App. 206,
136 S. K- 284. See also Hale v. State, 21 Ga. App. 658, 94
S. I). 823, holding the corresponding section of the Act of
1915 [§ 1770(34)] unconstitutional.
What Constitutes Meeting.—Where a motor-car travel-
ing along a public highway has been brought to a stop in
the highway, and another car is approaching it from the
front, both cars, notwithstanding one is stationary, are
meeting each other in the sense of the section. Roberts v.
Phillips, 35 Ga. App. 743, 134 S. E. 837.
Passage on Narrow Bridge. — Charges in an indictment
that the defendant failed and refused to give the deceased a
fair opportunity to pass by without unnecessary interference
is being practical to give one half to the travelled roadway,
were not sustained by the proof, where the evidence showed
that the cars collided on a temporary bridge which was
less than twelve feet wide and too narrow to permit two au-
tomobiles to pass each other thereon. Shupe v. State, 36
Ga. App. 286, 287, 136 S. E. 331.
Bridges—Sufficiency of Guard-Rails. — There is no legal
duty on a railroad company to construct the guard-rails of
a bridge sufficiently strong to withstand the impact of an
automobile going at the rate of twenty to twenty-five miles
per hour. Corley v. Cobb County, 21 Ga. App. 219, 93 S. E-
1015; Eberhart v. Seaboard Air-L,ine R. Co., 34 Ga. App. 49,
55, 129 S. E. 2.
§ 1770(53). Warning.
Sounding Horn at Intersections.—There is no statute in
this State requiring the operator of a motor -vehicle to sound
a horn or give any other warning on approaching the inter-
section of public streets or highways, unless such intersec-
tion is a "dangerous place upon such street or highway."
O'Donnelly v. Stapler, 34 Ga. App. 637, 131 S. E. 91.
An allegation that defendant failed to give any warning
whatever on approaching an intersection did not amount to
a charge of negligent violation of a statute, although it
sufficiently specified, in connection with other parts of the
petition, that the defendant was negligent in the violation
of his duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to the
plaintiff's automobile at such intersection. O'Donnelly v.
Stapler, 34 Ga. App. 637, 131 S. E. 91.
§ 1770(55). Chauffeur's license.
Roads to Which Applicable.—While it is unlawful for a
minor under sixteen years of age to operate a motor vehicle
upon the public highways, the rule is not applicable to roads
which are not public streets or highways. W. & A. R. R.
v. Reed, 35 Ga. App. 538, 544, 134 S. E- 134.
Effect of Presence of Owner—Experience. — It is unlawful
for a minor under sixteen years of age to operate a motor-
vehicle upon th£ highways of this State, whether he is ac-
companied by tne owner of the machine or not, and regard-
less of experience. Western, etc., Railroad v. Reed, 35 Ga.
App. 538, 544, 134 S. E. 134.
ARTICLE 3A.
Acts of 1927 pp. 226 et seq.
§ 177O(60a). Secretary of state, ex-officio com-
missioner of vehicles.—After the passage of this
Act the Secretary of State shall be ex-officio Com-
missioner of vehicles of this State, and shall be
charged with the execution of the Act hereafter
enacted. Acts 1927 p. 227.
§ 1770 (60b). Definitions.—For the purpose of
this Act the following definitions shall apply:
"Vehicle"—Any contrivance used for trans-
portation of persons or property on public high-
wa}^s.
"Motor-vehicle"—Any vehicle, except tractors,,
propelled by power other than muscular power,,
not operated exclusively upon tracks.
"Motorcycle" — Any motor-vehicle having but
two main wheels in contact with the ground, up-
on which the operator sits astride. A motorcycle
may carry a one wheel attachment generally known
as a side-car.
"Tractor" — Any self-propelled vehicle designed
for use as a traveling power-plant or for drawing
other vehicles, but having no provision for carry-
ing loads independently.
"Trailer"—Any vehicle without motive powei,.
designed for carrying persons or property either
partially or wholly on its own structure and for
being drawn by a self-propelled vehicle, except
those running exclusively on tracks.
"Pneumatic tires"—Tires of rubber and fabric
inflated with air.
"Solid tires"—Tires of rubber or similarly elas-
tic material that do not depend on confined air for
the support of the load.
"Metallic tires"—Tires of any metal or other
hard material.
"Manufacturer," "dealer"—Any person, firm, or
corporation engaged in the manufacture, sale, pur-
chase or leasing of motor vehicles or tractors.
"Owner"—Any person, firm, corporation or as-
sociation holding title to a vehicle or having ex-
clusive right to the use thereof for a period of more
than thirty days.
"Operator"—Any person who drives or operates,
a motor-vehicle or tractor.
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"Chauffeur"—An operator for hire.
"Local authorities"—All officers and public offi-
cials of the State, municipalities, and counties of
the State.
"Trucks".—"A motor-vehicle for the transpor-
tation of property or non-passenger carrying
motor-vehicles."
For the puroose of this Act
—
A vehicle is considered equipped with pneu-
matic tires when pneumatic tires are used on all
wheels.
A vehicle is considered equipped with solid
tires when solid tires are used on two or more
wheels.
A vehicle is considered equipped with metallic
tires when metallic tires are used on two or more
wheels.
The National Automobile Chamber o f Com-
merce horse-power rating formula is hereby
adopted as the standard for determining the
horse-power of passenger-carrying vehicles.
§ 1770 (60c). Registration. — That every owner
of a motor-vehicle, trailer, tractor (except tractors
used only for agricultural purposes) or motor-
cycle shall, on or before the first day of February
in each year, before he shall operate such motor-
vehicle, tractor, trailer or motorcycle, register
such vehicle in the office of the Commissioner of
Vehicles, and obtain a license to operate the same
for the ensuing year; and every chauffeur em-
ployed to operate motor-vehicles shall likewise
register and obtain a license as hereinafter pro-
vided.
That application for the registration of a motor-
vehicle, trailer, tractor or motorcycle shall be
made to the Commissioner of Vehicles, upon
blanks prepared by him for such purposes, by the
owner. Such application shall contain a state-
ment of the name, place of residence, and address
of the applicant, together with a brief description
of the vehicle to be registered, its name, model,
the name of the manufacturer, its motor number,
its shipping weight, carrying capacity, and such
other information as the Commissioner of Ve-
hicles may require.
Provided, that nothing in this Act shall be
construed as repealing the Act approved August
22, 1925, requiring proof of ownership, certifi-
cate of registration and money-order receipt, fif-
teen-day permit, and penalty for violation of said
Act, pages 315 to 317 inclusive of Georgia Laws
of 1925.
That application for a chauffeur's license shall
be made to the Commissioner of Vehicles upon
blanks prepared for such purpose by him, and
shall be signed and verified by oath or affirma-
tion. Such application shall be made annually on
or before the first day of February, and shall
contain a statement of the name and address of
the chauffeur, and such other information as the
Commissioner of Vehicles may require, and shall
be signed and endorsed by at least three respon-
sible owners of motor-vehicles and employers of
chauffeurs; provided that no such license shall be
issued to any person under sixteen years of age.
A fee of $2.00 shall accompany the application.
Upon receipt of such application and the payment
of the required fee, the Commissioner of Vehicles
shall file the application, register the same, assign
[
to the applicant a distinctive number, and make
the same a matter of record in his office. He
shall likewise furnish such chauffeur a badge,
which badge shall be evidence of his right to act
as chauffeur until the first day of February of the
next year following. Such badge shall be of
aluminum or some other suitable metal, oval in
form, the greater diameter not to exceed two
inches and there shall be stamped thereon the
words "Registered Chauffeur No. (Here insert
the registration number designated) State of
Georgia." The badges shall be of uniform size,
numbered consecutively, beginning with the fig-
ure 1, and shall be issued in consecutive order and
of different design each year. The chauffeur
shall at all times, while operating a motor-vehicle
upon public streets and highways, wear his badge
pinned to his clothing in a conspicuous place. No
registered chauffeur shall voluntarily or other-
wise permit any other person to wear his badge,
nor shall any person wear a chauffeur's badge be-
longing to any other person, or a fictitious badge,
while operating a motor-vehicle upon the public
streets and highways.
§ 1770(60d). Registration, licensing, and per-
mit fees.—The annual fees for licensing of the
operation of vehicles shall be as follows for each
vehicle registered:
A. Motorcycle $ 5.00
B. Motorcycle side-car 3.00
C. Passenger-carrying motor-vehicles fifty
(50) cents per one hundred (100)
pounds (or major fraction thereof)
gross weight of vehicle; minimum fee. 11.25
For each non-passenger carrying motor-
vehicle or truck of one ton capacity or
less 15.00
For each non-passenger carrying motor-
vehicle or truck of more than one and
not exceeding one and one half tons
capacity 22.50
For each non-passenger carrying motor-
vehicle or truck of one and one half
tons and not exceeding two tons capa-
city 30.00
For each non-passenger carrying motor-
vehicle or truck of more than two tons
and not exceeding two and one half
tons capacitv 37.50
For each non-passenger carrying motor-
vehicle or truck of more than two and
one half tons capacity and not exceed-
ing three tons capacity 45.00
For each non-passenger carrying motor-ve-
hicle or truck of more than three tons
capacity and not exceeding three and
one half tons capacity 52.50
For each non-passenger carrying motor-ve-
hicle or truck of more than three and
one half tons capacity and not exceed-
ing four tons capacity 75.00
For each non-passenger carrying motor-ve-
hicle or truck of more than four tons ca-
pacity and not exceeding five tons ca-
pacity 150.00
For each non-passenger carrying motor-ve-
hicle or truck of more than five tons
capacity and not exceeding six tons ca-
pacity 375.00
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For each non-passenger carrying motor-ve-
hicle or truck of more than six tons ca-
pacity and not exceeding seven tons ca-
pacity 750.00
For each non-passenger carrying motor-ve-
hicle or truck of more than seven tons
capacity 1,125.00
H. Trailers (or semi-trailers), when equip-
ped with pneumatic tires, one dollar
($1.00) per one hundred (100) pounds
(or major fraction thereof) gross
weight of vehicle.
K. Trailers (or semi-trailers), when equip-
ped with solid tires, one dollar and fifty
cents ($1.50) per one hundred (100)
pounds (or major fraction thereof)
gross weight of vehicle.
L. Trailers (or semi-trailers), when equip-
ped with metallic tires, two dollars
C$2.00) per one hundred (100) pounds
(or major traction thereof) gross weight
of vehicle.
T. Tractors when equipped with pneumatic
tires 15.00
V. Tractors equipped with solid or metallic
tires or treads 30.00
Provided, that tractors used exclusively for
agricultural purposes shall not be required to
register or to pay any fees.
Provided, that hearses and ambulances shali
pay the rates prescribed for passenger-carrying
motor-vehicles in paragraph C.
§ 1770(60e). Half-Rate fees between Aug. 1
and Jan. 1.—Where application is made for the
registration of any vehicle or tractor between the
dates of August 1st and January 1st of any year,
the fee charged for such registration shall be one
half the amount set forth in section 1770 (60d).
§ 1770(60f). Receipt for post-office order as
permit.—When application is made for the regis-
tration of any vehicle or tractor and a United
States post-office money-order is purchased for
the correct fee and forwarded with said applica-
tion, the receipt for said money-order, when
dated by the proper authority, shall serve as a fif-
teen-day permit to operate the vehicle or tractor
on the highways of the State.
§ 1770(60g). Registration of makers and deal-
ers.—Manufacturers and dealers engaged in the
manufacture, sale, or leasing of motor-vehicles or
tractors shall register with the Commissioner of
Vehicles, making application for a distinguishing
dealer's number, specifying the name and make
of motor-vehicle manufactured, sold, or leased by
them, upon blanks prepared by the Commis
sioner of Vehicles for such purposes, and pay
therefor a fee of twenty-five ($25.00) dollars,
which fee shall accompany such application, and
for which said fee the Commissioner of Vehicles
shall furnish to said dealers two number-plates to
be known as a dealer's number and to be dis-
tinguished from the number-plates herein pro-
vided for by a different and distinguishing color
to be determined by the Commissioner of Ve-
hicles, with the word "Dealer" on same; dealers
number to be for the purpose of demonstrating
or transporting dealer's vehicles for sale or lease.
No dealer or manufacturer may use or permit to
be used a dealer's number for private use or on
cars for hire, or other manner not provided for in
this section. In case dealers or manufacturers
desire more than two tags, they shall so state on
the application, and, in addition to the fee of
twenty-five (25.00) dollars hereinabove provided,
shall pay ten ($10.00) for each and every addi-
tional number-plate furnished.
§ 1770(60h). Number-Plates—description, and
how attached.—Upon receipt of the application
and the payment of the required fee, the Commis-
sioner of Vehicles shall file the application,
register the vehicle, assign to it a distinctive serial
number, and make the same a matter of record.
He shall furnish also without cost two metal num-
ber-plates showing thereon the serial number
designated to such vehicle. Number-plates shall
be of metal at least seven (7) inches wide and
not less than sixteen (16) inches in length, and
shall show in bold characters the year of registra-
tion, serial number, and abbreviation of the name
of the State, and such other distinctive markings
as in his judgment the Commissioner of Vehicles
may deem advisable, so as to indicate the class of
weight of the vehicle for which the number-plates
were issued. Duplicate number-plates, when one
of the originals have been lost, defaced, or de-
stroyed, may be obtained from the Commissioner
of Vehicles upon filing affidavit setting forth the
facts of such loss or destruction, and the payment
of a fee of one dollar. A number, when issued,
shall not be transferred from one vehicle to an-
other, and shall not be used by any person or up-
or any motor-vehicle [other than the motor-
vehicle] to which it is assigned, and any use
of said number by any person or persons in
any manner not provided for in this Act shall
be a violation of said Act; provided, however, that
where a motor-vehicle has been duly registered in
the office of the Commissioner of Vehicles, and
the number assigned to said vehicle for the yeai,
the owner of said motor-vehicle to which said
number has been assigned may, upon sale or ex-
change of said motor-vehicle, transfer and assign
the number assigned to said motor-vehicle to the
purchaser of said machine, by registering such
transfer in the office of the Commissioner of
Vehicles and the payment of fifty cents, which
shall accompany said transfer or registration, and
upon said transfer the assignee of said number
shall stand in the position of the original personal
in whose name such number is recorded.
Every motor-vehicle, tractor, trailer, or motor-
cycle, which is in use upon the highways of the
State, shall at all times display the number-
plates assigned to it, and the same shall be
fastened to both the front and rear of the ma-
chine in a position so as not to swing, and shall
be at all times plainly visible. It shall be the
duty of the operator of any motor-vehicle to keep
both number-plates legible at ail times.
§ 1770(60i). Lights and brakes.—Every motor-
vehicle, tractor, and motorcycle, while in use or
operation upon the streets or highways of this
State, shall at all times be provided and equipped
with efficient and serviceable brakes and signal-
ling device, consisting of a horn, bell, or other
suitable device for producing an abrupt warning
signal. Every motor-vehicle using the highways
[51]
1770(60j) MOTOR VEHICLE LAWS—ACT OF 1927 § 1770(601)
of this State at night shall be equipped with a
lamp or lamps clearly visible for a distance of not
less than one hundred feet from front and rear.
"Front Lamp"—Every motor-vehicle and trac
tor shall be provided with at least two lamps ot
approximately equal candle-power, mounted on
the the right and left sides thereof, and every
motorcycle shall have mounted on the front
thereof at least one lamp. The front lamps shall
throw light to a reasonable distance in the direc-
tion in which such vehicle is proceeding. Front
lamps shall be provided with a suitable device for
dimming or changing focus, so as to prevent
dangerously glaring or dazzling rays from the
lamps in the eyes of approaching drivers.
"Rear Lamps" — Every motor-vehicle, tractor,
and trailer shall have on the rear thereof, and to
the left of the axis thereof, one lamp capable of
displaying a red light visible for a distance of at
least one hundred feet behind such vehicle; pro-
vided that when a vehicle is used in conjunction
with another vehicle or vehicles, only the last of
such vehicles shall be required to carry such
lamp. Every motor-vehicle, tractor, trailer, or
motorcycle, when on highways of this State at
night, shall carry a lamp illuminating with white
lights the rear registration plate of such vehicle,
so that the characters thereon shall be visible for
a distance ot at least fifty feet.
Provided, that the provisions of this section as
to lights, horns, bells, and or other signalling de-
vices shall not apply to tractors used exclusively
for agricultural purposes when and while being
operated upon public roads between daylight and
dark only; and such lights, horns or other, signal-
ling devices shall not be required for such agricul-
tural tractors not using the public roads.
Provided, that the provisions of this Act requir-
ing front and rear lights on vehicles shall not
apply to horse or mule drawn vehicles or other
vehicles drawn by muscular power.
§ 1770(60j). Non-Residents License.—Motor
vehicles owned by non-residents of the State may
be used and operated on the public streets and
highways for a period of thirty days without hav-
ing to register and obtain a license to do so or a
chauffeur's license; provided, that the owner or
owners thereof shall have fully complied with the
laws requiring the registration of motor-vehicles
in the State or Territory of their residence, and
that the registration number and initial letter of
such State or Territory shall be displayed and
plainly visible on such vehicle or vehicles. In other
respects, however, motor-vehicles owned by non-
residents of the State and in use temporarily with-
in the State shall be subject to the provisions of
this Act; provided, no resident of this State shal'
be allowed to operate a motor-vehicle within this
State under a license issued by another State.
§ 1770(60k). Restrictions as to speed. — No
persons shall operate a motor-vehicle upon any
public street or highway at a speed greater than
is reasonable and safe, having due regard for the
width, grade, character, traffic, and common use
of street or highway, or so as to endanger life or
limb or property in any respect whatsoever; but
said speed shall not exceed those tabulated be-
low:
Total gross combined
weight of motor ve- Speed in miles per hour
hide and load in Kind of Tires
pounds. Metallic Solid Pneumatic
Less than 10,000 10 25 40
10,000 to 16,000 8 20 25
Over 16,000 5 18 20
§ 1770(601). Restrictions as to traffic—Every
person operating a vehicle upon the highways ot
this State shall observe the following traffic rules
and regulations:
a. All vehicles not in motion shall be placed witn
their right sides as near the right side of the high-
way as practicable, except on city streets where
traffic is obliged to move in one direction only.
b. Slow-moving vehicles shall at all times be
operated as close to the right-hand side of the
highway as practicable.
c. An operator meeting another vehicle coming
from the opposite direction on the same highway
shall turn to the right of the center on the high-
way, so as to pass without interference.
d. An operator of a vehicle overtaking another
vehicle going in the same direction, and desiring
to pass the same, shall pass to the left of the ve-
hicle overtaken, provided that the way ahead is
clear of approaching traffic, but if the way is not
clear he shall not pass unless the width of the
roadway is sufficient to allow his vehicle to pass
to the right of the center thereof in the direction
in which his vehicle is moving; provided further,
that no operator shall pass a vehicle from the rear
at the top of a hill or on a curve where the view
ahead is in any way obscured or while the vehicle
is crossing an intersecting highway. An operator
overtaking and desiring to pass a vehicle shall
blow his horn, and the operator of the vehicle so
overtaken shall promptly, upon such signal, turn
his vehicle as far as reasonably possible to the
right in order to allow free passage on the left of
his vehicle.
e. An operator in rounding curves shall reduce
speed and shall keep his vehicle as far to the right
on the highway as reasonably possible.
f. An operator intending to start, to stop, or to
turn his vehicle to the left or right shall extend
the hand and arm horizontally from and beyond
the left side of the vehicle.
g. An operator of a vehicle shall have the right
of way over the operator of another vehicle who
is approaching from the left in an intersecting
highway, but shall give the right of way to an
operator of a vehicle approaching from the right
on an intersecting highway.
h. An operator of a vehicle shall bring the same
to a full stop not less than five feet from the rear
of any street-car or passenger-carrying bus headed
in the same direction, which has stopped for the
purpose of taking on or discharging passengers,
and shall remain standing until such car has taken
on or discharged said passengers; provided, how-
ever, that said operator may pass such street car
where a safety zone is established by proper au-
thorities, or where said operator may pass such
car at a distance of at least eight feet therefrom,
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and provided further, that he shall have slowed
down and proceeded cautiously.
i. An operator shall reduce speed at crossing
or intersection of highways, on bridges, or sharp
curves and steep descents, and when passing any
animal being led on the highwray.
j. An operator shall not use the cut-out of a
motor-vehicle while on the highways of this State.
k. An operator of a motor-vehicle or tractor
shall sound his horn or other signalling device
wnen approaching points on the highways where
the view ahead is not clear or where the view of
the side of an intersecting highway is obstructed;
provided that in no such case shall such horn or
signalling device be used for the purpose of mak-
ing unnecessary noise.
l. All vehicles carrying poles or other objects
which project more than five feet from the rear
shall, during the period of from one half hour
after sunset to one half hour before sunrise, carry
a red light at or near the rear end of the pole or
other object so projecting. During the period of
from one half hour before sunrise to one half
hour after sunset vehicles shall carry a danger-
signal at or near the rear end of pole or other
object so projecting.
§ 177O(60m). Restriction as to operators. —
No person shall operate a motor-vehicle or
motorcycle upon any public street or highway,
whether as owner or operator of such vehicle, if
under sixteen years of age, or while under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquors or drugs; and no
person shall take, use, or operate any motor-ve-
hicle or motorcycle upon the public streets and
highways without the permission of the owner
thereof.
§ 1770 (60n). In case of accident.—In case of
accident to any person or damage to any prop-
erty upon the public street or highway, due to the
operation of a motor-vehicle, tractor, or trailer
thereon, the operator of such machine shall im-
mediately stop, and, upon request of the person
injured or sustaining damage thereby, or of any
other person present, give such person his name
and address, and if he is not the owner of such
vehicle, then in addition the name and address of
the owner thereof, and further he shall render
such assistance as may be reasonable or neces-
sary.
§ 1770 (60o). Restriction as to size. — No ve-
hicle shall be operated on the highways of this
State whose width, including load, is greater than
ninety-six (96) inches (except traction engines,
whose width shall not exceed one hundred and
eight (108) inches, a greater height than twelve
( 12) feet, six (6) inches, or a greater length than
thirty (30) feet; and no combination of vehicles
coupled together shall be so operated whose total
length, including load, shall be greater than
eighty five (85) feet; provided, that in special
cases vehicles whose dimensions exceed the fore-
going may be operated under permits granted as
hereinafter provided.
§ 1770 (60p). Restriction as to weight. — No
vehicle of four wheels or less, whose gross
weight, including load, is more than 22,000
pounds, no vehicle having a greater weight than
17,600 pounds on one axle, and no vehicle having
a load of over eight hundred (800) pounds per
inch width of tire upon any wheel concentrated
upon the surface of the highways (said width in
the case of rubber tires to be measured between
the flanges of the rim) shall be operated on the
highways of this State; provided, that in special
cases vehicles whose weight, including loads, ex-
ceed those herein prescribed may be operated
under special permits granted as hereinafter pro-
vided. Provided further, that the State High-
way Commission may designate certain roads or
sections of roads on the State-Aid Highway Sys-
cem on which the traffic requirements do not
justify heavy type of pavement at the present
time, and the said State Highway Commission
may prescribe the maximum gross weight of ve-
hicle, including load, which may be operated over
the sections thus designated.
§ 1770 (60q). Restriction on wheels.—No load
or vehicle any portion of which drags or slides on
the surface of the roadways shall be used or
transported on the highways of this State; no
vehicle shall be used or transported on the high-
ways of this State the wheels of which while be-
ing used or transported, either from construction
or otherwise, cause pounding on the road surface.
No vehicle equipped with solid rubber tires shall
be used or transported on the highways of this
State, unless every solid rubber tire on such ve-
hicle shall have rubber on its entire traction sur-
face at least one inch thick above the edge of the
flange on the entire periphery. No vehicle shall
be used or transported on the highways of this
State the wheels of which have on the surface any
wooden or metal cleets, spikes, corrugations, or
other irregularities which tend to damage the
surface of the road; provided that this section
shall not be taken to prohibit the use of tire
chains.
§ 1770 (60r). Permits for extra size or weight.
—
• The special permit required by sections
1770(60p), 1770(60xi) and 1770(60r) of this ar-
ticle, for the operation of a vehicle whose size or
weight with load1 exceeds the limits prescribed by
this Act, shall be in wrriting and be issued at the
discretion of the State Highway Engineer of this
State, or of those officials of the State's political
subdivisions who have charge of the highways
and bridges over which vehicle is to operate.
Such permit may be issued for a single trip or
for a definite period not beyond the expiration of
the vehicle registration, and may designate the
highways and bridges to be used.
§ 1770 (60s). Municipal regulations of autos.—
That nothing contained in this Act shall be con-
strued as changing or interfering with any regu
lation or ordinance which has heretofore or may
hereafter be adopted b}' any municipality of this
State, regulating the running or operation of
motor-vehicles described in this Act; and pro-
vided further, that nothing in this Act shall pre-
vent cities and towns from regulating, by reason-
able ordinance, the rate of speed except as pro-
vided hereinafter, noisy cut-outs, and glaring
headlights within said cities and towns; provided,
further that nothing herein shall prevent incor-
porated cities and towns from requiring by ordi-
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nance the owners of motor-vehicles residing
within the incorporated limits of said cities or
towns to register the number of State license
with the clerk of council or other officer to be
designated by such city or town, together with a
brief description of such motor-vehicle, and said
incorporated cities or towns shall have the power
to provide a penalty for the violation of such or-
dinance; provided, no additional license fee shall
be charged by any municipality.
§ 1770 (60t). Expense of operation.—That the
necessary expenses to carry out the provisions of
this law shall be defrayed out of the sums col
lected thereunder, and the amount thereof shall
be fixed annually in advance upon an itemized
budget-sheet submitted by the Commissioner of
Vehicles, thirty days prior to the meeting of the
General Assembly, accompanied by an itemized
report of the expenditures made for the preced-
ing year, when approved by the Governor of this
State. Said expense fund, or so much thereof as
shall be needed, shall be drawn upon the war-
rants of the Governor, supported by bills of par-
ticulars and vouchers submitted by the Commis-
sioner of Vehicles; provided said expense fund
as shown by said approved budget-sheets shall
be set aside out of the first collection made here-
under in any fiscal year, and provided the sums
used to defray said expenses shall not exceed 5
per cent, of the total revenue derived under this
Act.
§ 1770 (60-u). Disbursement of fees,—That the
full amount of the fees collected under this Act
shall be turned over to the State Treasury by the
Commissioner of Vehicles within thirty days
after collection, in such manner as the State
Treasurer may prescribe, and that it shall be the
duty of the State Treasurer to set aside from said
fees the sum authorized by the budget-sheet as
prescribed under section 21 thereof.
§ 1770(60v). Salary Commissioner of Motor
Vehicles.— The Secretary of State is hereby au-
thorized to employ a clerk whose duty it shall be
1o keep a full record of all motor-vehicle owners
in a book to be kept for that purpose. He shail
file registration alphabetically by counties, and
shall furnish each year to the county commissioner
or ordinaries, and also the tax-receivers of the
several counties, a list of all owners of motor-
vehicles of their respective counties who have
registered in this office. He shall perform any
and every duty pertinent to his office under the
direction of the Secretary of State. The salary of
said clerk shall be two hundred dollars per month,
payable out of the fees received for the registra-
tion of motor-vehicles; and the salary of the
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles shall be one hun-
dred and fifty dollars per month, payable out of
the fees received for the registration of motor
vehicles.
§ 1770(60w). Throwing things on highways.—
That every owner or operator of a machine shall
have equal rights upon the highways of this State
with all other users of such highways; and no per-
son or peisons shall throw glass, nails, tacks, or
other obstructions upon the public highways used
and traversed by automobiles, or unreasonably ob-
struct or impede the right of travel of such owner
or operator while operating, propelling, or driving
such machine; and no person or persons shall give
any signal or signs of distress or danger or call
for assistance upon a person lawfully operating
an}^ such machine on any of the public highways
of this State, maliciously and without reasonable
cause for so doing.
§ 1770(60x). Sheriff's duties defined—inspector.
—That the Commissioner of Vehicles shall at least
twice in each year call the attention of the sheriff's
constables, and marshals in this State, to the pro-
visions of this Act, and furnish once each quarter
to the sheriffs and clerks of the county commis-
sioners of each county, for file in his office, a list
of such vehicles as are registered from the county
in which said sheriff and clerk hold office; and it
shall be the duty of all local authorities in every
county to make investigation as to the violation of
the provisions of this Act, and said local authorities
shall have authority, and it is hereby made their
duty, to swear out warrant and prosecute any and
all owners of motor vehicles who violate any of
the provisions of this Act. The cost of the
sheriffs, constables, and marshals shall be paid in
the same manner as other criminal costs are paid
under the law.
§ 1770(60y). Deputies from highway depart-
ment, to enforce law.—It shall be the duty of the
Commissioner of Vehicles to deputize such em-
ployees of the State Highway Department as may
be requested by the State Highway Board, for
the purpose of enforcing the provisions of this
Act. The State Highway Board is hereby au-
thorized to select from its employees men to be
deputized by the Commissioner of Vehicles, and
such deputies are hereby given the necessary
police powers for the purpose of enforcing this
Act. There shall be a motor-vehicle license in-
spector to be appointed by the Secretary of State,
who shall have authority to swear out warrants
for violations of the motor-vehicle law, and to
perform any other duty required by the Secretary
of State. .
§ 1770(60z). Penalty for violation of this Act.—
Any person violating the provisions of this Act
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and up-
on conviction thereof shall be punished as for a
misdemeanor. It is the duty of every arresting
officer both county, municipal and State, to en-
force the provisions of this Act.
§ 1770(60aa). Civil action not abridged. — No-
thing in this Act shall be construed to curtail or
abridge the right of any person to prosecute a
civil action for damages sustained by reason oi
injury to a person or property, resulting from the
negligent use of the public streets or highways by
a motor-vehicle or motorcycle, or by its owner, his
employee, or by any other operator thereof.
§ 1770 (60bb). Constitutionality of Act.—That
should any of the provisions of this Act be heid
illegal or unconstitutional, the same shall not
vitiate the remaining provisions of said Act, but*
all such provisions not held illegal or unconstitu-
tional shall remain of full force and effect.
§ 1770(60cc). When effective.—This Act shail
not take effect until February 1st, 1928; provided,
however, that section 1770(60h) shall take
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effect on such date subsequent to February 1st,
1928, as the Commissioner of Vehicles in his di-
rection finds practicable.
ARTICLE 5
Title Registration Act
§ 1770(61). Interest rate.
Persons to Whom Applicable. — Even the criminal pro-
cedure provided in this act refers only to those who may
obtain license and qualify under the provisions of the act.
Bennett v. Bennett, 161 Ga. 936, 949, 132 S. E- 528. From
dissenting opinion.
Penalty for Violation of Section.—This act makes no pro-
vision for any penalty for a violation of this section. Wil-
liams v. Yarbrough,* 34 Ga. App. 500, 130 S. E- 361.
Equitable Relief.—There is no provision in this act giving
the superintendent of banks the power necessary to the
maintenance of a suit seeking relief in equity. The case is
controlled by the holding in Bentley v. Board, 162 Ga. 836;
Bennett v. Bennett, 161 Ga. 936, 938, 132 S. E. 528.
The borrower could set up in defense of the action of
trover by the lender the grounds of equitable relief that in
making the loan the lender did not comply with this act,
and that the loan contract was void because the lender
collected a greater sum as interest than the statute author-
ized. Calhoun v. Davis, 163 Ga. 760, 137 S. E. 236.
CHAPTER 18
Making Loans
§ 1770(76). Salary assignments.
Transactions to Which Applicable.—This act nullifies and
precludes enforcement of certain loans and salary assign-
ments given to secure the same when made in contraven-
tion of its provisions as to special licensing by the State
bank examiner and as to rates of interest or discount. Mc-
Eamb v. Phillips, 34 Ga. App. 210, 213, 129 S. E- 570.
Same— Absolute Unconditional Sale of Salary. — This act
does not cover a bona fide assignment or sale of wages or
salary. McLamb v. Phillips, 34 Ga. App. 210, 213, 129 S.
E. 570. Citing Tollison v. George, 153 Ga. 612 (1), 614, 112
S. E. 896; Atlanta Joint Terminals v. Walton Discount Co.,
29 Ga. App. 225, 227, 114 S. E. 908.
Same—Effect upon Sections 3446-3465. — Nothing in this
act or in other legislation has apparently either expressly
or by implication repealed the law of 1904, §§ 3446-3465, so
far as it relates to a business of actual and bona fide buying
of wages or salaries. That original act, to this extent, there-
fore, remains in full force. McLamb v. Phillips, 34 Ga.
App. 210, 213, 129 S. E. 570.
TITLE THIRTEENTH
Regulations for Particular Branches of Trade
Agriculture
CHAPTER 1
Inspection
ARTICLE 2
Inspection of Oils
§§ 1800 to 1814. Repealed by the Acts of 1927
pp. 279, herein codified as §§ 1814(4) et seq.
§ 1814(4). "Gasoline," "kerosene," defined. —
The word "gasoline" used in this Act shall em-
brace and include gasoline, naptha, benzol, and
other products of petroleum under whatever name
designated, used for heating or power purposes.
The word "kerosene" shall embrace and include
kerosene and other products of petroleum undei
whatever name designated, used for illuminating,
heating, or cooking purposes. Acts 1927, p. 279.
§ 1814(5). Inspection of gasoline and kerosene.
—For the purpose of the Act all gasoline and kero-
sene sold, offered or exposed for sale in this State,
shall be subject to inspection and analysis as here-
inafter provided. All manufacturers, refiners,,
wholesalers, and jobbers, before selling or offer-
ing for sale in this State any gasoline or kerosene,
or the like products, under whatever name desig-
nated, for power, illuminating, heating, or cooking
purposes, shall file with the Comptroller-General a
declaration or statement that they desire to sell
such products in this State, and shall furnish the
name, brand, or trademark of the products which
they desire to sell, together with the name and
address of the manufacturer thereof, and that all
such products are in conformity with the distilla-
tion test hereinafter provided.
§ 1814(6). Approval by State Oil Chemist and
Comptroller-General. — All materials, fluids, or
substances offered or exposed for sale, purporting
to be substitutes for, or motor-fuel improvers, or
other motor fuels to be used for power, cooking, or
heating purposes, shall, before being sold, ex-
posed, or offered for sale in this State, be sub-
mitted to the Comptroller-General for examina-
tion and inspection, and shall receive the approval
of the state Oil Chemist hereinafter provided for,
and the Comptroller-General, and then shall be
sold or offered for sale only when properly labeled
with a label, the form and contents of which has
been approved by the State Oil Chemist and
Comptroller-General.
§ 1814(7). Illegal sale; confiscation.—The sale
or offering for sale of all such gasoline and kero-
sene as hereinbefore enumerated and designated,,
used or intended to be used for power, illuminat-
ing, cooking, or heating purposes, when sold un-
der whatever name, which shall fall below the
standard hereinafter provided, is hereby declared
to be illegal, and same shall be subject to confisca-
tion and destruction by order of the Comptroller-
General.
§ 1814(8). Containers and labels.—Every per-
son, firm, corporation, or association of persons,
delivering at wholesale or retail any gasoline in
this State, shall deliver the same to the purchaser
only in tanks, barrels, casks, cans, or other con-
tainers having the word "gasoline," plainly
stenciled or labeled in vermilion red, in English.
Such dealers shall not deliver "kerosene oil" in
any barrel, cask, can, or other container which
has been stenciled or labeled, that has ever con-
tainer gasoline, unless such barrel, cask, can, or
other container shall have been thoroughly cleaned
and all traces of gasoline removed. Every pur-
chaser of gasoline for use or sale shall procure
and keep the same only in tanks, barrels, casks,
cans, or other containers stenciled or labeled as
heretofore provided; every person delivering at
wholesale or retail any "kerosene" in this State
shall deliver same to the purchaser only in tanks,
barrels, casks, cans, or other containers having the
word "kerosene" in English, plainly stenciled or
labeled in vermilion red, and every person pur-
chasing for use or sale shall procure and keep the
same only in tanks, barrels, casks, cans, or other
containers stenciled or labeled as heretofore pro-
vided. Nothing in this section shall prohibit the
delivery of gasoline by hose or pipe from a tank
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directly into the tank of any automobile or other
motor. In cases where gasoline or kerosene is
sold in bottles, cans, or other containers of not
more than one gallon, for cleaning and other
similar purposes, such bottles, cans, or other
containers shall bear label with the words, "un
safe when exposed to heat or fire."
§ 1814 (9). Notice as to shipments; samples.—
When gasoline or kerosene is shipped into the
State of Georgia in any manner whatever, the
manufacturer, refiner, or jobber shall promptly
give notice to the Comptroller-General of the date
of shipment, and shall furnish a sample of not less
than eight ounces of the gasoline or kerosene
shipped and labeled, giving the tank-car number,
truck number or other container number, with the
name and address of the person, company, firm,
or corporation and to whom it is sent, and the
number of gallons contained in the shipment made.
In each instance where gasoline or kerosene is
shipped in tank-cars, the record of the tank-car
furnished by the railroad companies as to the
capacity of each tank-car will be accepted.
§ 1814(10). Test or analysis for buyer.—Any
person purchasing any gasoline, illuminating, or
heating oils, from any manufacturer, refiner, job-
ber, or vendor in this State, for his own use, may
submit fair samples of said gasoline, illuminating,
or heating oils to the Comptroller-General to be
tested, or analyzed by the State Oil Chemist. In
order to protect the manufacturer or vendor from
the submission of spurious samples, the person
selecting the same shall do so in the presence of
two or more disinterested persons, which samples
shall not be less than one pint in quantity, and
bottled, corked, and sealed in the presence of
said witnesses, and sample shall be placed in the
hands of a disinterested person, who shall for-
ward the same at the expense of the purchaser to
the Comptroller-General; and upon the receipt by
him of any such sample he is hereby required to
have the State Oil Chemist to promptly test and
analyze the same, and he shall return to such pui-
chaser or purchasers a certificate of analysis,
which, when verified by the affidavit of the State
Oil Chemist, shall be competent evidence in any
court of law or equity in this State.
§ 1814(11). Sale without test; misdemeanor.—
It shall be a misdemeanor for any manufacturer,
refiner, vendor, jobber, or wholesaler to sell, ex-
pose, or offer for sale any gasoline for heating or
power purposes in this State, which does not
comply with the following distillation test:
1. Corrosion test. A clean copper strip shall not
be discolored when submerged in the gasoline for
3 hours at 122° F.
2. Distillation range. When the first drop falls
from end of the condenser, the thermometer shall
not read more than 55° C. (131° F.)
When 20 per cent, has been recovered in the
receiver, the thermometer shall not read more
than 10i5° C. (221° F.)
When 50 per cent, has been recovered in the re-
ceiver, the thermometer shall not read more than
140° C. (284° F.)
When 90 per cent, has been recovered in the re-
ceiver, the thermometer shall not read more than
200° C. (392° F.)
The end point shall not be higher than 225° C.
(437° F.)
At least 95 per cent, shall be recovered as distil-
late in the receiver from the distillation.
3. Sulphur. Sulphur shall not be over 0.10 per
cent.
All the foregoing tests shall be made in accord-
ance with the methods for testing gasoline con-
tained in Technical Paper 323A, United States
Government Bureau of Mines, Department of the
Interior.
It shall also be a misdemeanor for any manu-
facturer, jobber, wholesaler, or vendor to sell, of-
fer, or expose for sale any kerosene oil for use or
intended to be used for heating, cooking, or power
purposes, which does not comply fully with the
following distillation test:
1. Color. The color shall not be darker than No.
16 Saybolt.
2. Flash point. The flash point shall not be
lower than 100° F.
3. Sulphur. The sulphur shall not be more than
0.125%.
4. Flock. The flock test shall be negative.
5. Distillation. The end point shall not be
higher than 625° F.
6. Cloud point. The oil shall not show a cloud
at 5° F.
7. Burning test. The oil shall burn freely and
steadily for 16 hours, in a lamp fitted with a No.
2 hinge burner.
All of the foregoing tests for kerosene shall be
made according to the methods for testing kero-
sene contained in Technical Paper 323A, United
States Government Bureau of Mines, Depart-
ment of the Interior.
Provided, that the Comptroller-General may
from time to time change these specifications to
agree with those adopted and promulgated iby the
United States Government Bureau of Mines;
provided further, that sixty days' notice shall be
given all manufacturers, refiners, and jobbers do-
ing business in this State, before any such
changes shall become effective.
§ 1814(12). State Oil Chemist; appointment,
duties, salary.—The Comptroller-General is here-
by required to appoint a chemist who shall be an
expert oil analyst, and to be designated as the
State Oil Chemist, whose duty it shall be to ana-
lyze all samples of gasoline and kerosene, and all
fluids purporting to be substitutes for, or motor-
fuel improvers, or other like products of petro-
leum, under whatever name is designated, and
used for illuminating, heating, cooking, or power
purposes, submitted by the Comptroller-General
or any duly authorized inspector or inspectors.
Said chemist shall hold office for a period of four
years, unless sooner removed for cause, as here-
inafter provided; and he shall receive a salary of
$3,000.00 per annum, payable monthly.
§ 1814(13). Oil inspectors; number, appoint-
ment, term, salary, expenses.—The offices of
general oil inspectors, State oil inspectors, and of
all local oil inspectors are hereby abolished, and
it shall be the duty of the Comptroller-General
to appoint six oil inspectors, each of whom
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shall receive a salary of $2,400.00 per annum,
and shall be allowed an expense account not to
exceed the sum of $2,400.00 each per annum,
payable monthly. The inspectors herein provided
for shall hold office for four years, unless sooner
removed for cause, as hereinafter provided.
§ 1814(14). Unlawful interest in sale, etc.—
Any chemist or inspector who, while in office,
shall be interested directly or indirectly in the
manufacture or vending of any gasoline shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor.
§> 1814(15). Inspectors!* automobiles; daily re-
ports.—All inspectors are hereby required to
provide themselves, at their own expense, with
automobiles equipped with accurate speedome-
ters, and to make daily reports to the Comptrol-
ler-General, covering all work performed, and
monthly reports shall also be made, showing the
following information:
1. Name and number of towns visited.
2. Number of inspections in each town.
3. Number of miles traveled by rail.
4. Number of miles traveled by automobile.
5. Expenses incurred, with vouchers showing
the amount spent for hotel bills, gasoline, oil,
railroad fares, and incidentals necessary in the
performance of their duties.
6. Number of samples drawn, each kind.
7. Number pumps inspected, and the numbers
of the pumps.
8 Number pumps condemned.
9. Number of pumps in territory.
§ 1814(16). Duty to collect and test samples.—
The Comptroller-iGeneral is hereby empowered
and it is made his duty to collect, or cause to be
collected 'by his duly authorized inspectors,
samples of gasoline, kerosene, or other illuminat-
ing cooking, or heating oils sold, offered, or ex-
posed for sale in this State, and to cause samples
to be tested or analyzed by the State Oil Chemist
hereinbefore provided for, for this purpose.
And said State Oil Chemist is hereby required to
report his finding to the Comptroller-General,
together with a certificate of analysis of such
gasoline, kerosene, or other like products of
petroleum, under whatever name designated, and
used for illuminating, heating, cooking, or power
purposes. Such certificate of analysis, when
properly verified by an affidavit of said State
Oil Chemist, shall be competent evidence in any
court of law or equity in this State.
§ 1814(17). Registration of gasoline dealers.—
Each and every dealer in gasoline, before selling,
exposing, or offering for sale any gasoline in this
State, and annually thereafter, shall be required
to register and shall make known his desire to
sell gasoline to the Comptroller-General, giving
the name and manner and kind of pump or pumps
he will use, and location of same, and keep said
certificate or certificates of registration posted
in a prominent and accessible place in his place of
business where such gasoline is sold. The form
of such certificate shall be designated and issued
by the Comptroller-General.
§ 1814(18). Inspector's duty as to pumps.— It
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shall be the duty of the inspectors herein provided
for to familiarize themselves with the accuracy
and adjusting devices on the various makes of
self-measuring pumps in use in this State; they
shall carefully inspect all of such pumps located
in the territory assigned to them, at least once
every ninety days; all such pumps found to 'be
giving accurate measure with a variation of not
exceeding four ounces from the actual measures
on a measure of five gallons, he shall place a lead
and wire seal, to be provided by the Comptroller-
General, on the adjusting device or devices in
such way that the adjustment cannot be altered
without 'breaking the seal. Any pump' that is
found to be giving inaccurate measure in excess
of four ounces, the inspector shall then and there
notify the operator of the pump, whether owner
or lessee, to make the necessary adjustments, the
inspector to lend his assistance with the standard
measure provided for testing such pumps; after
the adjustments have been made, the adjusting
devices are to be sealed in the same manner as
provided for those pumps found originally ac-
curate. On all pumps that have apparently been
altered for the purpose of giving short measure
in excess of eight ounces on a measure of five
gallons, or that cannot be adjusted within a
range of eight ounces, either over or under, on a
measure of five gallons, the inspector shall no-
tify the operator of such pump, whether he be
owner or lessee, that it must be immediately ad-
justed, the inspector to lend his assistance with
the standard measure for testing such pumps.
Should the operator fail or refuse to then and
there make such adjustments as are necessary to
bring the measure within the allowed variation,
the same shall be condemned and dismantled im-
mediately by the inspector examining the same
and such pump shall not again 'be allowed oper-
ated in this State without the written consent of
the Comptroller-General. Inspectors shall be re-
quired to report to the Comptroller-General im-
mediately the name and number of all pumps con-
demned and dismantled. Any person, company,
firm, or corporation who shall reinstall and oper-
ate any pump, without the written consent of
the Comptroller-General, which has been con-
demned by a duly authorized inspector herein
provided, because of giving short measure in ex-
cess of eight ounces to a measurement of five
gallons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and upon conviction be punished as prescribed
by section 1065 of the Penal Code of Georgia of
of 1910. When any pump is condemned under
the provisions of this Act by any inspector, it
shall be the duty of the inspector to immediately
make affidavit, before the ordinary of the county
in which the pump is located, that the said pump
is being operated by the person who shall be
named in the affidavit, contrary to law; and
thereupon the ordinary shall issue an order to
the person named in the affidavit to show cause
before him on the day named in the order
not more than ten days nor less than three
days from the issuance of the order, why the said
pump should not be confiscated and dismantled.
On the day named in the order, it shall be the
duty of the said ordinary to hear the respective
parties and to determine whether or not the pump
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has been operated contrary to the provisions of
this Act; .and if the said ordinary shall find that
the said pump has been so operated, then he
shall forthwith issue an order adjudging the pump
to be forfeited and confiscated to the State of
Georgia, and direct the sheriff of the county to
dismantle the said pump and take same into his
possession, and, after ten days' notice by post-
ing or publication, as the court may direct, to
sell the pump to the highest bidder for cash; the
proceeds to said! sale, or as much therefor as is
necessary, shall be used by the sheriff, first, to
pay the cost, which shall be the same as in cases
of attachment, and thereupon pay over and de-
liver the residue, if any there be, to the person
from whose possession the pump shall have been
taken. On and after the passage of this Act, it
shall be unlawful for any self-measuring pump,
which can be secretly manipulated in such man-
ner as to give short measure, to be installed or
operated in this State. Any person, company,
firm, or corporation who shall install or operate
a self-measuring pump in this State which has a
device or other mechanical means used for the
purpose of giving short measure, shall, upon con-
viction thereof, be punished as provided in section
1065 of the Penal Code of Georgia of 1910, and
such inaccurate self-measuring pump shall be
condemned as heretofore provided in this section,
and thereafter it shall be unlawful for any person
to sell any kerosene, or gasoline from such pump
until such pump shall have been made or altered
so as to comply with the provisions of this Act,
and shall have been inspected and approved for
service by an inspector. After the passage of
this Act it shall be unlawful for any one to break
a seal applied by an inspector to a pump, with-
out first securing consent of the Comptroller-
General, which consent may be given through
one of the duly authorized inspectors.
§ 1914(19). Access for inspection.—In the per-
formance of their duties, the Comptroller-Gen-
eral, or any of his duly authorized agents, shall
have free access at all reasonable hours to any
store, warehouse, factory, storage house, or rail-
way depot, where oils are kept or otherwise
stored, for the purpose of examination or inspec-
tion and drawing samples. If such access be
refused by the owner, agent of such premises or
other persons occupying and using the same, the
Comptroller-General, or his duly authorized in-
spectors or agents, may apply for a search war-
rant, which shall be obtained in the same manner
as provided for obtaining search warrants in
other cases. Their refusal to admit an inspector
to any of the above-mentioned premises during
reasonable hours shall be construed as prima
facie evidence of a violation of this Act.
§ 1814(20). Violation of Act or of rule; pen-
alty. — Any person, or association of persons,
firm, or corporation, who shall violate any of the
provisions of this Act, or any rule or regulation
promulgated by the Comptroller-General for the
enforcement of this Act, shall upon conviction
thereof be punished as for a misdemeanor, as pre-
scribed in section 10G5, of Penal Code of Georgia
of 1910.
§ 1814(21). Removal of chemist or inspector;
charges in writing.—The State Oil Chemist, or
oil inspectors provided for herein, may be re-
moved or discharged for misfeasance or malfeas-
ance in office, incompetency, or other good cause,
by a majority vote of the Governor of the State
the Attorney-General, and Comptroller-General,
after the preferment of charges in writing served
on any one of said officials not less than ten days
prior to the date which may be set by said Comp-
troller-General, Governor, and Attorney-General,
or a majority of them. Charges may be prefer-
red by any one of the three last-named officials,
or any citizen of the State, and from the decision
of said officials or majority of them, there shall
be no appeal.
§ 1814 (22). Expense of equipment, supplies,
clerical help, etc., allowance for; limits—In ad-
dition to the salary and expenses of inspectors as
provided in section 1814(13) there shall be
allowed such further sums for the purchase of
equipment, supplies, and clerical help, and to pay
any other of the expenses incident to and neces-
sary for the enforcement of this Act, as may
hereafter be appropriated; but the total of such
expenses shall not exceed the sum of $20,000.00
annually; so that including all salaries as herein
provided, and for the enforcement of said Act,
the total appropriation shall not exceed the sum
of $51,800.00. The Comptroller-General is here-
by constituted as chief Oil Inspector of this State,
tor the purpose of the enforcement of this Act,
and his salary therefor is hereby fixed at the sum
of twelve hundred dollars ($1,200.00) per annum,
to be paid out of the aforesaid total sum of $51,-
800.00.
§ 1814(23). Salaries and expense accounts;
how paid.—The salaries of the State Oil Chemibt
and of the inspectors and all of the expenses
herein provided for shall be paid out of the treas-
ury on warrants signed by the Governor, by req-
uisition of the Comptroller-General, accompanied
by itemized statements and vouchers for said
salaries and expenses. The expense accounts of
said oil inspectors shall be verified under oath and
furnished by said Comptroller-General along with
the requisitions.
§ 1814 (24). Entire time of chemist and inspec-
tors to be given to duties; bonds.—The State OH
Chemist and the six oil inspectors herein provided
for shall devote their entire time to the duties of
their respective offices; and each shall give bond,
with some good and solvent surety company and
in such sum as may be approved by the Comp-
troller-General, for the faithful discharge of the
duties of their respective offices; the premiums on
which shall be paid out of the expense fund of
$20,000.00 in this Act provided for.
§ 1814 (25). No inspection fees. — No inspec-
tion fees of any kind or character shall hereafter
be paid for the inspection of gasoline or kerosene.
§ 1814 (26). Vacancies in offices.—The Comp-
troller-General shall be and is hereby authorized
to fill any vacancies which may occur in the
offices of State Oil Chemist and Oil Inspector, on
account of death, resignation, or other cause.
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§ 1844 REAL ESTATE BROKERS AND SALESMEN § 1896(13)
CHAPTER 3
Regulations, Agriculture, etc.
ARTICLE 1
Cotton, Rice, etc.
§ 1844. (§ 1601). Scalesmen, weigher's of cot-
ton, and others to be sworn.
Admissibility of Testimony of Unsworn Scalesman.—The
testimony of a scalesman as to the weight of a commodity
sold by him is not rendered inadmissible because he has not
subscribed to the oath required of him as a scalesman of
such a commodity under this section. Buckeye Cotton-Oil
Co. v. Murphy & Sons, 34 Ga. App. 363, 129 S. E. 553.
§ 1851. (§ 1608.) Produce not taxable by cities
or towns.
Mineral water is not a farm product within the meaning
of this section. Pratt v. Macon, 35 Ga. App. 583, 134 S. £. 191.
CHAPTER 5
Peddling
§ 1888. (§ 1S42.) Disabled soldiers to peddle
without a license.
Exemption Not Based on Certificate.—The right of a dis-
abled or indigent soldier of the late European war to con-
duct business in a town or city without paying license for
the privilege of so doing is based upon the fact that the
owner of the business is such soldier, and not on the cer-
tificate of the ordinary, which is intended to furnish suffi-
cient proof of said fact, and not as a condition precedent
to the exercise of the right. Coxwell v. Goddard, 119 Ga.
369, 46 S. E. 412; Fairburn v. Edmondson, 162 Ga. 386, 134
S. E- 51; Jones v. Macon, 36 Ga. App. 97, 98, 135 S. E. 517.
Indigency of Disability — When Cause of Exemption
Ceases.—There is nothing in this section which provides for
exemption after the indigency or cause of exemption ceases
to exist. The act provides that the said certificate, stating
the fact of his being [not having been in the past] such
indigent soldier shall constitute sufficient proof. Jones v.
Macon, 36 Ga. App. 97, 98, 135 S. E- 517.
Cannot Certify to Permanent Indigency.—While the or-
dinary might be able to certify to a patent, permanent phy-
sical disability, he necessarily could not certify that a per-
son would always be indigent. Jones v. Macon, 36 Ga. App.
97, 98, 135 S. E. 517.
When Tax Is Due Prior to Issuance of Certificate.—The fact
that the license tax had become due before the certificate
had been issued does not render such soldier liable there-
for, if in fact he was a disabled or indigent soldier of said
war and a resident of this state at the time the license tax
was imposed, especially where he had applied for such
certificate before the license tax had become due. Fair-
burn v. Edmundson, 162 Ga. 386, 134 S. E- 51.
Soldier's License Used to Avoid Tax. — Where it was
found that the defendant was running a business himself,
deriving the profits from it, and was merely attempting
to use a soldier's license, granted to a Confederate soldier,
as a shield to protect him from paying a license tax to the
City of Atlanta and the State, the action of the judge of the
superior court in refusing to sanction a certiorari was sus-
tained. Lacy v. Atlanta, 34 Ga. App. 453, 454, 130 S. E- 74.
CHAPTER 5B
Real Estate Brokers and Salesmen
§ 1896(5). "Real estate broker" and "real es-
tate salesman" defined; provisions, where inap-
plicable.—Whenever used in this article, "real es-
tate broker" means any person, firm or corpora-
tion, who, for another and for a fee, commission
or other valuable consideration, sells, exchanges,
buys, rents, or offers or attempts to negotiate a
sale, exchange, purchase, or rental, of any estate
or interest in real estate, or collects, or offers or
attempts to collect rent for the use of real estate.
The term shall include any person, firm, or cor-
poration advertising through signs, newspapers or
otherwise, as conducting a real estate office or
real estate business. Provided, however, this pro-
vision shall not be construed to include the sale or
subdivision into lots by the bona fide fee-simple
holder of any tract or parcel of land.
A "real estate salesman" means a person em-
ployed by a licensed real estate broker to sell or
offer for sale, to buy or offer to buy, to negotiate
the purchase, sale or exchange of real estate, or
to lease, rent, or offer to lease, rent or place for
rent any real estate for or on behalf of such real
estate broker. The term shall include any other
than bookkeepers and stenographers employed by
any real estate broker, as real estate broker is
defined in the preceding paragraph of this section.
The provisions of this Act shall not apply to
any person, firm or corporation, who, as owner or
lessor, shall perform any of the acts aforesaid
with reference to property owned by them. Nor
shall the provisions of this Act apply to persons,
firms, or corporations, not real estate brokers or
real estate salesmen, holding a duly executed
power of attorney from the owner for the sale,
leasing or exchanging of real estate; nor shall
said provisions be held to apply to a receiver or
trustee in bankruptcy, an administrator, or exec-
utor, or trustee, or any person selling real estate
under order of court, or pursuant to the terms of
a will, mortgage, or deed of trust, or deed to secure
a debt. Acts 1925, pp. 325, 326; 1927, p. 307.
Editor's Note.—The last two sentences of the first para-
graph and the last sentence of the second paragraph of this
section, were added by the amendment of 1927.
The 1927 Act is cumulative to the former law and repeals
it only when expressly stated. See § 25 of the Act.
§ 1896(13). Fees for licenses.—The fees for li-
censes shall be as follows: For a broker's license,
the annual fee shall be $25.00
r
If the licensee be a
corporation, the license issued to it shall entitle
one official or representative thereof to engage in
the business of a real estate broker within the
meaning of this act. For all other officers or rep-
resentatives of a licensed corporation who shall
engage in the business of a real estate broker with-
in the meaning of this, the annual fee shall be
$10.00. If the licensee be a co-partnership, the
license issued to it shall entitle one member of
said co-partnership to engage in the business of
a real estate broker within the meaning of this
Act. For every other member of such co-part-
nership, the annual fee shall be Ten Dollars.
For a salesman's license, the annual fee shall
be Five Dollars. All applications for license shall
be accompanied by the license fee as herein pro-
vided, and all licenses shall expire upon the 31st
day of December of each year. All applications
made during the year to expire December 31st of
said year. The fees required of brokers and sales-
men under this act shall be the full annual fee for
all licenses applied for by or before June 30th of
any calendar year; and one-half the annual fee
for all licenses applied for between July 1st and
December 31st of any calendar year. Provided
that this section shall not be construed to prevent
municipalities from assessing license fees. Acts
1925, pp 325, 332; 1927, p. 308.
Editor's Note.—The annual fee for salesman's license was
reduced from ten to five dollars, by the amendment of 1927.
The original last sentence which provided that the fee charged
shall be prorated on monthly basis, was stricken, and the
present last sentence was added, by the same amendment.
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§ 1963 MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS § 2047
CHAPTER 9
State Geologist
§ 1963. (§ 1712.) State geologist.
Cited in annotations to Myers v. U. S., 272 U. S. 52, 1249.
CHAPTER 12
Protection of Trademarks, and Names of Benevo-
lent Organizations
§ 1993. Name and style of benevolent and other
associations.
Presumption as to Fraud.—If the association or corpora-
tion first appropriating and using the name has a clear right
to its use, its subsequent use by another corporation know-
ing of the right is presumed to be fraudulent. Graves v.
District Grand Lodge No. 18, 161 Ga. 110, 129 S. E. 783.
Sufficiency of Proof.—In a case where it is charged that
one beneficial incorporated association is using a name
which by prior use appertains to another fraternal organi-
zation, mere proof by the plaintiff that the defendant was
using the name which it had adopted to distinguish it from
similar organizations would not entitle the plaintiff to re-
lief. Graves v. District Grand Lodge No. 18, 161 Ga. 110,
129 S. E. 783.
§ 1994. Injunction against infringement.
Enjoined In Toto.—When it is made to appear that the
name in question is being used, or indeed if it is shown that
it can be used, to mislead the public and induce the belief
that the association which is using the name which another
is justly entitled to use, the defendant should be enjoined
from the use of this name in toto, and not merely partially
enjoined. Graves v. District Grand Lodge No. 18, 161 Ga.
110, 129 S. E. 783. The addition of the suffix "incorporated"
is not sufficient relief. Id.
Same—Ritual, Passwords, etc. — In Graves v. District
Grand Lodge No. 18, 161 Ga. 110, 129 S. E- 783, it was
further stated that, "It was further error to omit or re-
fuse to enjoin the use by the defendant of the ritual, pass-
words, signs, tokens, etc., of the national order."
ARTICLE 3
Gates
§ 2034. (§ 1775.) Impounding animals, how dis-
posed of; and damages, how assessed.
Construed with Section 2082(11)
—
Quarantining and Dip-
ping.—In Gill v. Cox, 163 Ga. 618, 624, 137 S. E- 40, Mr.
Justice Hines speaking for the court, said: "Section [2082-
(11)] and [this section] when construed together, furnish
the owner of animals impounded under that section an ade-
quate remedy for contesting the amount of expense claimed
by the local inspector for quarantining and dipping such
animals.
It was the intention of the legislature to make this rem-
edy applicable to an inspector who impounds cattle under
section 2082(11). So. if such inspector and the cattle
-
owner can not agree upon the amount of expense in-
curred by the inspector in having the animals of the de-
faulting owner quarantined and dipped, then the inspector
must resort to the remedy provided in this section for the
recovery of such expense. He can not advertise and sell
them without such proceedings. If the cattle-owner wishes
to replevy his animals so impounded, and thus lessen the
expense of keeping them thereafter impounded, he can give
the bond provided for in said section. Gill v. Cox, 163
Ga. 618, 625, 137 S. E. 40.
FOURTEENTH TITLE
Inclosures and Stock
ARTICLE 6
Election for no Fences
§ 2042(2) Exemption of mountain districts from
no-fence or stock law; election as to.—In those
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several counties of the mountain region of Georgia
wherein the consent of the State of Georgia has
been given to the United States for the acquisi-
tion of land for the establishment of National
Forest Reserves, where any area composed of
three or more militia districts, in which the United
States has acquired a majority of the forest lands,
which area is isolated from other stock law or
no-fence territory by reason of natural barriers
such as mountain ranges, or which is adjacent to
non-stock law or fence-law territory, and located
in counties which heretofore or may hereafter vote
in favor of county-wide stock law or no-fence law,
may be exempted from the operation of the stock
law or no-fence law when a majority of the law-
ful voters of said area vote in favor of the same.
Acts 1927, p. 217.
§ 2042(3) Petition of freeholders.— It shall be
the duty of the ordinary of the county wherein
such area is located, when a petition is filed with
him, signed by ten or more of the freeholders of
the several militia districts located in said area, to
hear and determine said petition; and if he is
satisfied that the area described in said petition
is so isolated from other stock-law territory or
adjacent to non-stock-law territory, then it shall
be his duty to call an election, giving notice of
the same for twenty days in each of the districts
named in said petition, by posting notices at three
or more public places, and submit the question
of "Fence" or "No fence" for said area to the
qualified voters of the area described in said pe-
tition, which election shall be held in each district
embraced in the area, under the same rules and
regulations governing the holding of elections for
members of the General Assembly. If a ma-
jority of the votes polled in said area at said elec-
tion are for "Fence," then the same shall become
operative and effective in said area ninety days
from the date of said election, and said area shall
then be exempt from the operation of county-wide
stock law. Acts 1927, p. 218.
ARTICLE 7
Miscellaneous Provisions
§ 2044. Stock-law fences legalized.
Resolution by Commissioner Not Conclusive.—If there has
been no honest effort made by the citizens of the district
to build good fences and gates on or about the district line,
and said fences and gates have not in fact been erected, a
resolution of the county commissioners declaring that they
have inspected the fences and gates so erected, and recogniz-
ing and establishing such fences and gates as the boundary
fence between the district and adjoining districts and as
a legal fence within the purview of this section, is not con-
clusive that such fence and gates have been erected; and
it would be competent for the plaintiff, in a possessory-war-
rant proceeding brought to recover some of his hogs which
had been impounded by a resident of a district under the
claim that the district was a no-fence or stock-law district,
to show that no fence and gates had been erected on or
about the district line. Parish v. Hendricks, 163 Ga. 385,
136 S. IE,. 135. Such a resolution is, however, prima facie
evidence of the facts contained therein. Id.
§ 2047. (§ 1784.) Gates to be erected.
Proper Gates Are Condition Precedent.—In no event shall
the provisions of the stock law go into effect as the results
of a militia district election, unless proper gates are so es-
tablished in public and private roads. Parish v. Hendricks,
163 Ga. 385, 136 S. E. 135. See notes of this case under §
2044.
§ 2064(1) DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE § 2067(1)
ARTICLE 10
Tuberculosis in Domestic Animals
§ 2064(1) State Veterinarian's duty as to eradi-
cation of tuberculosis in animals.—It shall be the
duty of the State Veterinarian to eradicate tuber-
culosis of domestic animals within the State. To
enable the State Veterinarian to eradicate bovine
tuberculosis effectively, and to aid him in estab-
lishing within the State a modified accredited
tuberculosis-free area, in conformity with rules
and regulations promulgated by the United States
Livestock Sanitary Association and adopted by
the Bureau of Animal Industry, United States De-
partment of Agriculture, the county commission-
ers of any county in which the State and Federal
Governments jointly engage in a tuberculosis eradi-
cation campaign may ' appropriate for aiding in
said work such sums as the county commissioners
or board of roads and revenues may deem adequate
and necessary. The State Veterinarian shall have
full and complete authority and responsibility in
all livestock sanitary control work. The State
Veterinarian, or his duly authorized agent, is here-
by empowered to enter upon any premises, barn,
lot, or any other place where cattle are kept, for
the purpose of applying test with tuberculin to
ascertain whether or not the animals so tested are
affected with tuberculosis. The owners, or
keeper of such cattle shall render such reasonable
assistance as may be required to enable the State
Veterinarian or his agent to apply the test with
accuracy and dispatch. Acts 1927, p. 349.
§ 2064(2) Notice to owner of animal.—Should
the State Veterinarian receive information or have
reason to believe that tuberculosis exists in any
animal or herds of animals, he shall promptly
notify the owner or owners and shall arrange to
have such animal or animals tested by a qualified
veterinarian. That all cattle which shall here-
after react to a tuberculin test shall immediately
after such reaction be branded on the left jaw
with the letter "T," said letter to be not less than
two inches in length, and in addition said reactors
shall be tagged in the left ear with a special tag
to be adopted by the State veterinarian. All cat-
tle so identified shall be slaughtered within a pe-
riod of fourteen days immediately following such
reaction, such slaughter to be under the direction
of the State Veterinarian in an abattoir where
Federal or competent local meat inspection is
maintained. The owners of such reactors to the
tuberculin test shall be indemnified for such ani-
mals, as hereinafter provided.
§ 2064(3). Notice agreement on value.—Before
having such reacting animal o^ animals slaugh-
tered, it shall be the duty of the State Veterinarian
to notify the owner of his findings as to the con-
dition of said animal or animals; and if such ani-
mal shall have been purchased by the owner not
less than six months prior to the examination by
said veterinarian, then the owner and said veterina-
rian shall, if possible, agree on the value of such
animal or animals so condemned. If said State
Veterinarian or his agent and the owner of said
animal or animals cannot agree as to the value of
said animal or animals, then each will select a
citizen from the county in which said animal or
animals are located, to act in their place. These
two arbitrators shall fix the value of such animal
or animals, and in the event said two citizens can-
not agree, then the United States Veterinary In-
spector in charge of co-operative tuberculosis era-
dication in Georgia shall act as umpire. In no
case shall the value fixed by said owner and State
Veterinarian, or by the arbitrators, exceed the
amount at which said animal or animals were re-
turned by the owner for taxation to State and
County authorities, nor shall the value fixed in
the case of a pure-bred cow or bull exceed $150.00,
nor in case of a grade cow or bull the sum of $90.-
00. Upon the value being fixed by agreement as
hereinbefore provided, said owner shall be paid,
within the limitations hereinbefore provided,
jointly by the county commissioners out of county
appropriations and by the United States Bureau
of Animal Industry out of special Federal gov-
ernment tuberculosis eradication funds now avail-
able.
§ 2064(4) Restriction of use or sale of tuber-
culin.—No person, firm, or corporation shall ad-
minister veterinary tuberculin, except qualified
veterinarians. No person, firm or corporation
shall sell, offer for sale or distribution, or keep on
hand any veterinary tuberculin, except qualified
veterinarians, licensed druggists or others law-
fully engaged in the sale of veterinary biological
products. "Qualified veterinarians" within the
meaning of this Act shall be' veterinarians ap-
proved by the State Veterinarian and the chief of
the United States Bureau of Animal Industry for
tuberculin testing cattle intended for interstate
shipment.
§ 2064(5) Annual Appropriation. — To enforce
the provisions of this Act and to enable the State
Veterinarian to eradicate bovine tuberculosis, to
establish and maintain a modified accredited tu-
berculosis-free area, and to develop the livestock
industry within the State, the sum of twelve thou-
sand, five hundred ($12,500) dollars annually, or
as much thereof as may be necessary, be and the
same is hereby appropriated.
§ 2064(6). Penalty.—Any violation of any pro-
visions of this Act is hereby made a misdemeanor,
and shall be punishable by a fine of not less than
twenty-five ($25.00) dollars for each offense.
FIFTEENTH TITLE.
Department of Agriculture.
CHAPTER 1.
Commissioner of Agriculture.
§ 2066(1) Terms of commissioner.—Beginning
January 1, 1929, the term of office of the Commis-
sioner of Agriculture shall be for a period of
two years, or until his successor is elected and
qualified. Acts 1927, p. 207.
Editor's Note.—The act of 1927 provides that the term of
office of the commissioner shall expire December 31, 1928.
§ 2067(1) Bond of Commissioner.—The , Com-
missioner of Agriculture of the State of Georgia
is hereby required to give a bond of fifty thou-
sand ($50,000) dollars as a guaranty of the faith-
ful performance of the duties of his office, and for
the proper accounting for all monies, fees, etc.,
received bv the office, said bond to be furnished
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by a surety company authorized to do business in
Georgia by the laws of this State, provided said
premium on said bond, shall be paid by the State
of Georgia. Acts 1927, p. 206.
§ 2079. Cattle-ticks—suppression of diseases.
Quoted in Gill v. Cox, 163 Ga. 618, 622, 137 S. E. 40.
§ 2081(2). Duties.
Acceptance of Federal Regulation. — The act from which
this section was taken and § 2082(11) amounts to an accept-
ance of the regulations and methods of the Commissioners
of Agriculture of United States under Act Cong. May 29,
1884, section 3 (Comp. St. section 8691). Thornton v. United
States, 2 Fed. (2d). 561.
Cited in Gill v. Cox, 163 Ga. 618, 622, 137 S. E- 40.
§ 2082(9). Dipping-vats and chemicals; man-
damus.
Applied in Colquitt County v. Bahnsen, 162 Ga. 340, 346,
133 S. E- 871.
§ 2082(10). Inspectors.
Constitutionality—Remedy of Inspector for Expenses. —
This section when construed in connection with section
2034, furnishes the only remedy by which the local inspector
can prosecute his claim for expenses incurred by dipping and
caring for such animals, and in defense of such proceeding
by the local inspector the owner had an ample remedy for
contesting the amount of expense claimed by the local in-
spector. This being so, this section is not unconstitutional
upon the ground that it denies to the owner of animals so
impounded due process of law. Gill v. Cox, 163 Ga. 618, 137
S. E. 40.
The enforcement of this section is not unreasonable so as
to be unconstitutional upon the ground that it is a depriva-
tion of due process of law. Gill v. Cox, 163 Ga. 618, 137 S.
E- 40.
§ 2082(11). Quarantine and dipping; notice;
lien for expenses.
As to this section being an acceptance of the Federal regu-
lations, see note to § 2081(2).
Constitutionality.—Gill v. Cox, 163 Ga. 618, 626, 137 S. E.
40, conforms to the holding set out under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926.
Failure of Owner to Pay Expenses after Three Days No-
tice.—That part of the section which provides that "should
the owner fail or refuse to pay said expenses after three
days notice," does not authorize the inspector to sell the
animals after advertising them for three days. The purpose
of the notice is to afford the owner an opportunity to pay
the expense, and avoid the cost of litigation provided in the
above section of the Code. If, after the expiration of such
three days notice, the owner does not pay this expense,
the inspector must proceed as provided in this section. Gill
v. Cox, 163 Ga. 618, 625, 137 S. W. 40. See notes of this
case under § 2034.
§ 2082(13). Quarantine along border of Florida
and Alabama.
Cited in Gill v. Cox, 163 Ga. 618. 137 S. E- 40.
§ 2082(14). When reinfestation eradicated with-
out expense to county.
Entire Expense upon State.—In Colquitt County v. Bahn-
sen, 162 Ga. 340, 348, 133 S. E- 871, Mr. Justice Hines speak-
ing for the court said: "We think the true meaning of sec-
tion 2 of the act of 1924 [this section] is to place upon the
State the entire expense of eradicating any subsequent rein-
festation of a tick-free county." In support of this holding
the court refers to the caption of the Act of 1924, from
which this section was taken, and to the fact that an appro-
priation for the purpose had been made by the Legislature.
Upon a failure of the state veterinarian to perform this
duty it will be enforced by mandamus.
The State veterinarian is required to eradicate ticks in
reinfested counties without the previous determination of
the commissioner of agriculture that such eradication is
wise and best. Gill v. Cox, 163 Ga. 618, 137 S. E- 40.
CHAPTER 3.
Adulteration or Misbranding Prohibited
ARTICLE 9.
Sanitation of Food Places.
§ 2119(3). Supervision of state veterinarian over
slaughter house, dairies, etc.; report and statistical
bulletin.
Slaughter houses are subjects to sanitary regulations.
Schoen Bros. v. Pylant, 162 Ga. 565, 571, 134 S. E. 304.
ARTICLE 10.
Apples and Peaches; Grades and Marks.
§ 2119(9). Commissioner^ of Agriculture to es-
tablish grades and marking rules.—The Commis-
sioner of Agriculture is hereby directed to estab-
lish and promulgate from time to time official
standard grades for all closed packages of peaches
and apples, by which the quantity, quality, and
size may be determined, and prescribe and pro-
mulgate rules and regulations governing the
marking which shall be required upon packages
of peaches and apples for the purpose of show-
ing the name and address of the producer or
packer, the variety, quantity, quality, and size of
the product, or any of them; provided that the
Commissioner of Agriculture shall establish a
grade for immature apples, and an unclassified or
similar marking for all peaches and apples not in-
cluded in the other grades established. Acts 1927,
p. 191.
§ 2119(10). Packages to be marked; stamps.—
Whenever such standard for the grade or other
classifications of peaches or apples under this Act
becomes effective, every closed package contain-
ing peaches or apples grown and packed for sale
or transported for sale by any person, firm, com-
pany, or organization, shall bear conspicuously
upon the outside thereof, in plain words and fig-
ures, such markings as are prescribed by the Com-
missioner of Agriculture under the provisions of
this Act. Every crate or package of peaches or
apples shipped from any point within this State
shall bear an adhesive stamp showing that they
are classified under this Act, which stamp shall
be sold by the commissioner of agriculture to ap-
plicants therefor for not more than one half (%)
of one (1) cent each.
§ 2119(11). Inspection; appointment of inspec-
tors.—The Commissioner of Agriculture of the
State of Georgia shall be charged with the en-
forcement of the provisions of this article, and
for that purpose shall have the power: (a) to en-
ter and to inspect personally, or through aiiy au-
thorized agent, every place within the State of
Georgia where peaches and apples are produced,
packed, or stored for sale, shipped, delivered for
shipment, offered for sale, or sold, and to inspect
such places and all peaches and apples and con-
tainers and equipment found in any such place.
(b) to appoint, superintend, control, and discharge
such inspectors and subordinate inspectors as in
his discretion may be deemed necessary, for the
special purpose of enforcing the terms of this
Article, to prescribe their duties and fix their
compensation, (c) Personally, or through any au-
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thorized agent or any such inspector, to forbid the
movement of any closed package or packages of
peaches or apples found to be in violation of any
of the provisions of this Article, which have not
been actually accepted by a common carrier for
shipment in interstate traffic, and to require the
same to be repacked or remarked. A carload of
peaches or apples shall not be considered as ac-
tually accepted by a common carrier for shipment
until the loading is finished, the car sealed, and
the bill of lading issued, (d) To cause prosecu-
tion to be instituted for violations of this Article.
§ 2119(12). Delivery prima facie evidence of offer
to sell.—When peaches or apples in closed pack-
ages are delivered to railroad station or a common
carrier for shipment, or delivered to a storage
house for storage, such delivery shall be prima
facie evidence that the peaches or apples are of-
fered or exposed for sale.
§ 2119(13). Penalty.—Any person, firm, com-
pany, organization, or corporation, who shall vio-
late any of the provisions of this Article, shall be
punishable by a fine of not more than five hun-
dred dollars ($500.00), or imprisonment for a
period not to exceed 90 days, either or both, for
each offense.
§ 2119(14). Dealers protected by inspection, etc.
—No person, firm, or corporation shall be prose-
cuted under the provisions of this Article, when
he or it can be established that the peaches or
apples offered for sale have passed inspection by
an authorized inspector of the State of Georgia,
and bear the official Georgia State inspection
stamp, or by an inspector of the United States
Department of Agriculture, and found to be
packed and marked in accordance with the re-
quirements of the Commissioner of Agriculture
of Georgia.
§ 211915). Unfit fruit not to be shipped.—
No person in the State of Georgia shall ship any
peaches which are immature, or peaches or ap-
ples unfit for human consumption; and no apples
or peaches shall be offered for sale within the
State of Georgia which do not bear on the pack-
ages the. marks and grades prescribed in section
2119(10).
SIXTEENTH TITLE.
State Board of Game and Fish.
CHAPTER 3.
Oysters and Oyster Beds.
§ 2158(24). Owners of private oyster beds may
come under Act.
Cited in Camp v. State, 34 Ga. App. 591, 130 S, E. 606,
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THE CIVIL CODE
FIRST TITLE.
Of Persons.
CHAPTER 1.
Different Kinds of Persons, Their Rights and Du-
ties.
ARTICLE l.
Of Citizens.
§ 2159. (§ 1802.) Natural and artificial persons.
Creation of Corporation Legislative Function.—A corpora-
tion can be brought into existence only as the result of ex-
press legislation. The conference of power upon persons to
organize a corporation is legislative in character, and must
be done by direct legislation, or be founded upon legislative
or constitutional provisions. Free Gift Society v. Edwards,
163 Ga. 857, 865, 137 S. E. 382.
ARTICLE 3.
Of Persons of Color.
§ 2177. (§ 1820.) Who are persons of Color.—
All negroes, mulattoes, mestizos, and their de-
scendants, having any ascertainable trace of either
negro or African, West Indian, or Asiatic Indian
blood in their veins, and all descendants of any
person having either negro or African, West In-
dian, or Asiatic Indian blood in his or her veins,
shall be known in this State as persons of color.
Acts 1865-6, p. 239; 1927, p. 272.
Editor's Note.—This section prior to its amendment was
much less broad. It merely included negroes, mulatoas,
mestizos, and their descendants, having one-eighth negro
or African blood in their veins.
§ 2177(1). Registration as to race.—The State
§ 2177(3). Local registrar must cause each per-
son in district to execute form., etc.—Each local
registrar shall personally or by deputy, upon re-
ceipt of said forms, cause each person in his dis-
trict or jurisdiction to execute said form in dupli-
cate, furnishing all available information required
upon said form, the original of which form shall
be forwarded by the local registrar to the State
Registrar of Vital Statistics, and a duplicate de-
livered to the orq^nary of the county. Said form
shall be signed by the registrant, or, in case of
children under fourteen years of age, by a parent,
guardian, or other person standing in loco pa-
rentis. The execution of such registration certifi-
cate shall be certified to by the local registrar.
§ 2177(4). Untrue statement.—If the local regis-
trar have reason to believe that any statement
made by any registrant is not true, he shall so
write upon such certificate before forwarding the
same to the State registrar or ordinary, giving his
reason therefor.
§ 2177(5). Penalty for refusal to execute regis-
tration certificate, ei;c. — It shall be unlawful for
any person to refuse to execute said registration
certificate as provided in this Act, or to refuse to
give the information required in the execution of
the same; and any person who shall refuse to exe-
cute such certificate, or who shall refuse to give
the information required in the execution of the
same, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall
be punished as prescribed in section 1065 of the
Penal Code of Georgia of 1910. Each such re-
fusal shall constitute a separate offense.
§ 2177(6). Fee for registration 30 cents; how
divided.—The local registrar shall collect from
each registrant a registration fee of thirty cents,
Registrar of Vital Statistics, under the supervision fifteen cents of which shall go to the local regis
of the State Board of Health, shall prepare a
form for the registration of individuals, whereon
shall be given the racial composition of such in-
dividual, as Caucasian, Negro, Mongolian, West
Indian, Asiatic Indian,
t
Malay, or any mixture
thereof, or any other non-Caucasic strains, and if
there be any mixture, then the racial composition
of the parents and other ancestors in so far as
ascertainable, so as to show in what generation
such mixture occurred. Said form shall also give
the date and place of birth of the registrant,
name, race, and color of the parents of registrant,
together with their place of birth if known, name
of husband or wife of registrant, with his or her
place of birth, names of children of registrant with
their ages and place of residence, place of resi-
dence of registrant for the five years immediately
preceding registration, and such other information
as may be prescribed for identification by the
State Registrar of Vital Statistics. Acts 1927,
p. 272.
§ 2177(2). Supply of forms.—The State Regis-
trar of Vital Statistics shall supply to each local
registrar a sufficient number of such forms to
carry out the provisions of this Act.
trar and fifteen cents of which shall go to the
State Board of Health, to be used in defraying ex-
penses of the State Bureau of Vital Statistics. If
any registrant shall make affidavit that through
poverty he is unable to pay said registration fee of
thirty cents, the local registrar shall receive a reg-
istration fee of only ten cents for such registra-
tion, which sum shall be paid out of the funds of
the State Bureau of Vital Statistics, and the State
Bureau of Vital Statistics shall receive no fee for
such registration. This section shall not apply to
the registration of births or deaths, the registration
of which is otherwise provided for.
§ 2177(7). False registration, felony; punish-
ment.— It shall be a felony for any person to wil-
fully or knowingly make or cause to be made a
registration certificate false as to color or race,
and upon conviction thereof such person shall be
punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for
not less than one year and not more than two
years. In such case the State registrar is author-
ized to change the registration certificate so that
it will conform to the truth.
§ 2177(8). Form of application for marriage li-
cense.—The State Registrar of Vital Statistics
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shall prepare a form for application for marriage
license, which form shall require the following in-
formation to be given over the signature of the
prospective bride and groom; name and address;
race and color; place of birth; age; name and ad-
dress of each parent; race and color of each
parent; and whether the applicant is registered
with the Bureau of Vital Statistics of this or any
other State, and, if registered, the county in which
such registration was made. The State Registrar
of Vital Statistics shall at all times keep the ordi-
naries of each county in this State supplied with
a sufficient number of said form of application for
marriage license to care for all applications for
marriage license. Each prospective bride and
each prospective groom applying for marriage li-
cense shall fill out and execute said application in
duplicate.
§ 2177(9). Filing application for marriage li-
cense.—Upon such applications for marriage li-
cense being filed with the ordinary by the prospec-
tive bride and prospective groom, the ordinary
shall forward the original of such application to
the State Registrar of Vital Statistics, and retain
the duplicate of such application in his files.
§ 2177(10). Report by State Registrar of Vital
Statistics after examination as to registration of
applicant.—The ordinary shall withhold the issu-
ing of any marriage license until a report upon
such application has been received from the State
Registrar of Vital Statistics. Said report from the
State Registrar of Vital Statistics shall be for-
warded to the ordinary by the next return mail,
and shall state whether or not each applicant is
registered in the Bureau of Vital Statistics; if
registered, the report shall state whether the
statements made by each applicant as to race and
color are correct according to such registration
certificate. If the registration certificate in the
office of the Bureau of Vital Statistics show that
the statement of either applicant as to race or
color are untrue, the report of the State Registrar
of Vital Statistics shall so state, and in such case
it shall be illegal for the ordinary to issue a mar-
riage license to the applicants, until the truth of
such statements of the applicants shall have been
determined in a legal proceeding brought against
the ordinary to compel the issuing of such li-
cense. If the report from the State Registrar of
Vital Statistics shows that the applicants are not
registered, and if the State Bureau of Vital Sta-
tistics has no information as to the race or color
of said applicants, then the ordinary shall issue the
marriage license if he has no evidence or knowl-
edge that such marriage would be illegal. If one
of the applicants is registered with the State Bu-
reau of Vital Statistics and the other applicant is
not so registered, if the records of the Bureau of
Vital Statistics contain no information to dis-
prove the statements of either applicant as to
color or race, then the ordinary shall issue the
marriage license, if he has no evidence or knowl-
edge that such marriage would be illegal. Pro-
vided, that where each party is registered and such
registration certificate is on file in the office of
the ordinary of the county where application for
marriage license is made, it shall not be necessary
for the ordinary to obtain any information from
the State Bureau of Vital Statistics; and provided
further, that when any person who has previously
registered as required herein moves to another
county, he may file with the ordinary of the
county of his new residence a certified copy of his
registration certificate, which shall have the same
effect as if such registration had been made origi-
nally in said county.
§ 2177(11). Application for marriage license by
one not born in this State.—Where any application
for marriage license shows that such applicant
was not born in this State and is not registered
with the Bureau of Vital Statistics of this State,
the ordinary shall forward a copy of such appli-
cation to the State Registrar of Vital Statistics
of this State, and shall also forward a copy of
the application to the clerk of the superior or cir-
cuit court, as the case may be, of the county of
the applicant's birth, and another copy to the Bu-
reau of Vital Statistics, at the capitol of the State,
of the applicant's birth, with the request that the
statements therein contained be verified. If no
answer be received from such clerk or Bureau of
Vital Statistics within ten days, the ordinary shall
issue the license if he have no evidence or knowl-
edge that such marriage would be illegal. If an
answer be received within ten days, showing the
statement of such applicant to be untrue, the ordi-
nary shall withhold the issuing of the license until
the truth of such statements of the applicant shall
have been determined in a legal proceeding brought
against the ordinary to compel the issuing of such
license. In all cases where answers are received
from such clerk or Bureau of Vital Statistics, a
copy of the answer shall be forwarded to the
State Registrar of Vital Statistics of this State.
§ 2177(12). Return of license after marriage—
When a marriage license is issued by the ordinary,
it shall be returned to the ordinary by the officer
or minister solemnizing the marriage, and for-
warded by the ordinary to the State Registrar of
Vital Statistics, to be permanently retained by said
registrar.
§ 2177(13). "White person" defined.—The term
"white person" shall include only persons of the
white or Caucasian race, who have no ascertainable
trace of either Negro, African, West Indian, Asiatic
Indian, Mongolian, Japanese, or Chinese blood in
their veins. No person shall be deemed to be a
white person any one of whose ancestors has been
duly registered with the State Bureau of Vital Sta-
tistics as a colored person or person of color.
§ 2177(14). Unlawful for whites to marry other
than white; penalty.—It shall be unlawful for a
white person to marry any save a white person.
Any person, white or otherwise, who shall
marry or go through a marriage ceremony in
violation of this provision shall be guilty of a
felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment
in the penitentiary for not less than one nor
more than two years, and such marriage shall
be utterly void.
§ 2177(15). False statement in application; pen-
alty.—Any person who shall make or cause to be
made a false statement as to race or color of him-
self or parents, in any application for marriage li-
cense, shall be guilty of a felony, and shall be pun-
ished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not
less than two nor more than five years.
§ 2177(16). Ordinary's noncompliance with law—
Ga—
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Any ordinary who shall issue a marriage license
without complying with each and every provision
of this Act shall be guilty of and punished as for
a misdemeanor.
§ 2177(17. Performing marriage ceremony in vi-
olation of law.—If any civil officer, minister, or of-
ficial of any church, sect, or religion, authorized to
perform a marriage ceremony, shall wilfully or
knowingly perform any marriage ceremony in
violation of the terms of this Act, he shall be
guilty of and punished as for a misdemeanor.
§ 2177(18). Report of violation of law.—If any
case of a marriage in violation of the provisions
of this Act is reported to the State Registrar of
Vital Statistics, he shall investigate such report,
and shall turn over to the Attorney-General of the
State the information obtained through such in-
vestigation.
§ 2177(19). Birth of legitimate child of v/hite
parent, and colored parent, report of, and prosecu-
tion.—When any birth certificate is forwarded to
the Bureau of Vital Statistics, showing the birth
of a legitimate child to parents one of whom is
white and one of whom is colored, it shall be the
duty of the State Registrar of Vital Statistics to
report the same to the Attorney-General of the
State, with full information concerning the same.
Thereupon it shall be the duty of the Attorney-
General to institute criminal proceedings against
the parents of such child, for any violation of the
provisions of this Act which may have been com-
mitted.
§ 2177(20). Duty of Attorney-General and solic-
itor-General as to prosecution.—It shall be the
duty of the Attorney-General of the State, as
well as the duty of the Solicitor-General of the
Superior Court where such violation occurs, to
prosecute each violation of any of the provisions
of this Act, when the same is reported to him by
the State Registrar of Vital Statistics. If the At-
torney-General fails or refuses to prosecute any
such violation so reported to him by the State
Registrar of Vital Statistics, the same shall be
grounds for impeachment of the Attorney-Gen-
eral, and it shall be the duty of the State Regis-
trar of Vital Statistics to institute impeachment
proceedings against the Attorney-General in such
case.
CHAPTER 2
Of Domicile, and Manner of Changing the Same
§ 2181. (§ 1824.) Domicile.
Meaning of "Permanently" as Used in Section.—The word
"permanently" is used in this section in contradistinction
from the word "temporarily." Alvaton Mercantile Co. v.
Caldwell, 34 Ga. App. 151, 128 S. E- 781.
Residence and Domicile Distinguished.—The removal to an-
other county and there renting a house, did not constitute a
change of domicile, where the removal was for the purpose
of educating children, the former home was maintained,
the incidents of citizenship there discharged, and there was
at no time an intention to provide a fixed place of abode in
the place of removal, or to there establish permanent resi-
dence. Alvaton Mercantile Co. v. Caldwell, 34 Ga. App.
151, 128 S. E- 781. See § 2186 and notes thereto.
§ 2186. (§ 1829.) Change of domicile.
Involves Exercise of Volition and Choice.—As to a per-
son sui juris, the matter of making a change in domicile is
one involving the exercise of volition and choice. Stanfield
v. Hursey, 36 Ga. App. 394, 136 S. E. 826. See notes to §
2181.
§ 2187. (§ 1830.) Of persons not sui juris.
Presumption and Proof of Change. — Where a resident of
this state was adjudged insane by the courts of this state in
1910, he was at least prima facie incapable thereafter of
making a change of his domicile. Proof that, after such ad-
judication, he "went over to stay with his people in North
Carolina," and was placed in a public institution of that
state for insane persons, is insufficient to show that such
person ceased to be a resident of the state of Georgia, or
that his removal from this state was such as to suspend
the operation of the statute of limitations as to a debt
against him. Stanfield v. Hursey, 36 Ga. App. 394. Compare
Jackson v. Southern Flour, etc., Co., 146 Ga. 453, 91 S. E.
481.
Cannot Change of Own Volition.—A person who has
been adjudged insane can not, by his own act or volition, ef-
fect a change in his domicile. Stanfield v. Hursey, 36 Ga.
App. 394, 395, 136 S. E. 826.
SECOND TITLE
Corporations.
CHAPTER 3
Corporations, Their Creators, Powers, and Lia-
bilities
ARTICLE 4
Corporation Commissioner
§ 2209. Returns of corporations.
Editor's Note.—The section does not in any manner pur-
port by its terms to prohibit a corporation from doing busi-
ness in this State until it shall have filed the report. Ac-
cordingly, a corporation doing business in this State prior to
making the report does not thereby violate the terms of
the section, the terms of the statute which in such a case it
does violate being merely the requirement to file the
report, and pay the fee provided for in section 2210, which
breach renders the corporation subject, within the discretion
of the secretary of state, to the penalty imposed thereby.
See Alston v. New York Contract Purchase Corp., 36 Ga
App. 777, 138 S. E. 270.
§ 2210. Fees.
See Editor's Note under section 2209.
§ 2211. Penalty for non-compliance.
Effect of Non-Conformance upon Contracts.—The penalty
prescribed being all inclusive, and the corporation not being
prohibited by such breach of duty from doing business within
the State, its contracts are not rendered void by a failure to
comply with the requirements mentioned. Alston v. New
York Contract Purchase Corp., 36 Ga. App. 777, 138 S. E.
270. See Editor's Note under section 2209.
ARTICLE 5
Powers and Liabilities of Corporations
§ 2226. (§ 1862.) No collateral attack as to cor-
porate existence.
Editor's Note.—This section is merely a codification of the
universally accepted doctrine. Since the Dartmouth College
Case the principle then announced that a charter to a pri-
vate corporation constitutes a contract between the
/
State
and the incorporators have been controlling, and this alone
is sufficient reason why persons not parties to the contract
should not be allowed to attack its validity. That right be-
longs to the State. The State having bestowed life upon the
corporation and dictated what it can and can not do, also
has the right to waive violations of the contract on the part
of the incorporators. However, this doctrine should never
be applied in favor of the said incorporators themselves, to
the prejudice of a person who has not dealt with them as a
corporation. Hence, any person whose property is sought to
be taken under the right of eminent domain may challenge
the legality of the corporation's charter, such person not
having recognized or dealt with the corporation as such.
Rogers v. Taccoa Power Co., 161 Ga. 524, 131 S. E- 517. See
also Academy of Music v. Flanders Bros., 75 Ga. 14; 20
Harvard I,aw Review 472.
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ARTICLE 9
Corporations, How Served
§ 2258. (§ 1899.) Service of process, how per-
fected.
II. SERVICE UPON AGENT.
What Constitutes an Agent within Meaning of Section.—
Where the person upon whom a rule nisi was served exer-
cised large discretionary and supervisory powers he was held
to be an agent of the defendant company, within the mean-
ing of the section. Georgia Creosoting Co. v. Fowler, 35 Ga.
App. 372, 133 S. E. 479.
Same—Ticket Agent of Railroad Selling for Pullman Com-
pany.—Where the ticket agents of a railroad company sold
tickets furnished to them by the Pullman Company and ac-
counted therefor directly to that company from which they
received instructions under an agreement without compen-
sation, they were agents of the Pullman Company who rep-
resented it in its business and on whom service of process
might legally be made in a suit against it, under this sec-
tion. Huckabee v. Pullman Co., 8 Fed. (2d), 43.
Same—Agents Other Than One Designated for Service.—
That a foreign corporation has designated certain persons
as its agents for service in the state does not render invalid
service of process against it on others, who are in fact its
agents for that purpose under the provisions of the state
statute. Huckabee v. Pullman Co., 8 Fed. (2d), 43.
III. LEAVING COPY AT PLACE OF BUSINESS.
The essentials for a suit against a foreign corporation are
that it shall be engaged in business in the state, and under
this section, that service be made upon an agent who rep-
resents the corporation in its business or by leaving the
process at the place of transacting the usual and ordinary
public business of such corporation. Huckabee v. Pullman
Co., 8 Fed. (2d), 43.
IV. APPLIED TO FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.
As to who is agent, see II. Service upon Agent; as to place
of service, see III. Leaving Copy at Place of Business; as
to sufficiency of return, see V. The Return.
V. THE RETURN.
What Return Should Show.—A return of service of proc-
ess on a foreign corporation, by leaving a copy of the writ
"at the office and place of doing business of said corpora-
tion," but which failed to state that it was "the place of
transacting the usual and ordinary public business of such
corporation," is insufficient under this section. Huckabee
v. Pullman Co., 8 Fed. (2d), 43.
CHAPTER ?
Private Corporations
ARTICLE l
Banks
SECTION ]
Preliminary Provisions
§ 23616(1). Bank, definition of.
Constitutionality.—The banking act is not unconstitutional
because in conflict with the constitution, section 6437, which
provides that "No law or ordinance shall pass which refers
to more than one subject-matter." Felton v. Bennett, 163
Ga. 849, 137 S. "E. 264.
Nor is the act violative of the foregoing constitutional pro-
visions for the reason that there is contained in the body of
the act "matter different from what is expressed in the title
thereof." Felton v. Bennett, 163 Ga. 849, 137 S. F. 264.
Nor does it violate the constitution, section 6379. It is
within the power of the General Assembly, without violating
the constitution to impose upon a designated official the
exercise of duties essentially ministerial, though quasi-ju-
dicial, by the creation of administrative departments sub-
ject to the Governor as the head of the executive depart-
ment, and thus to create new departments which in no wise
affect the distinctness and independence of either the legis-
lative, judicial, or executive departments provided for by the
constitution. Felton v. Bennett, 163 Ga. 849, 137 S. E. 264.
§ 2366(3) Branch banks.—Branch banks, al-
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ready established under the law of this State, shall
be operated as branches, and under the name of
the parent bank, and under the control and di-
rection of the board of directors and executive
officers of said parent bank. The board of di-
rectors of the parent bank shall elect a cashier,
and such other officers that may be required to
properly conduct the business of said branch; and
a board of directors, or loan committee, shall be
responsible for the conduct and management of
said branch, but not of the parent bank or of any
other branch save that of which they are officers,
directors, or committee. By January tenth of
each tax year the board of directors of the par-
ent shall set aside for the exclusive use of said
branch such proportion of its entire capital that
the total deposits of such branch bank on January
first of each tax year bears to the grand total of
all the deposits on January first of each tax year
in all branches of such bank, or banking associa-
tion, including the parent bank, in this State.
Branch banks shall be taxed on the capital set
aside, as herein provided, to their exclusive use
in the counties, municipalities, and districts in
which they are located, and the parent banks shall
be relieved of taxation to the extent of capital so
set aside for the exclusive use of such branch;
provided, that the real estate owned or held by
branch banks shall be taxed in the county, munici-
pality, and district where located, as other real
estate situated in such county, municipality, and
district, the same to be deducted from either the
value of the capital of the parent bank or the
respective branch bank. It shall be the duty of
the board of directors of the parent bank to fur-
nish a sworn statement to the taxing authorities
of the county, municipality, and district in which
the branch bank is located, of the total amount
of deposits on January first of each tax year in
each of the branch banks, including the parent
bank, and such sworn statement shall be filed
with such taxing authorities not later than March
first of each tax year, and shall, at the same time,
furnish to such taxing authorities a sworn state-
ment of the proportionate part of the capital of
such bank, or banking association, so set aside, as
herein provided, for such county municipality, and
district for taxing purposes for that year. If the
taxing authorities in any county, municipality,
and district are not satisfied with the amount of
capital set aside for such county, municipality,
and district for taxation, such taxing authorities
shall have the right to file with the Superintendent
of Banks of this State objections to the amount
of capital so set aside, and, upon ten days written
notice to the directors of the parent bank and to
such authorities, such superintendent shall hear
evidence, at a time and place to be fixed by him
in such notice, and determine, what amount should
have been set aside to such branch bank for taxa-
tion in the county, municipality, and district in
which it is situated, as herein provided, and his de-
cision on the question shall be final, and the amount
of capital so set apart by him shall be subject to
taxation in such county, municipality, and dis-
trict in which such branch bank is situated. Cap-
ital, as used in this section, shall include surplus and
undivided profits, except real estate owned or held
by the bank. After this section takes effect, no
new or additional branch banks shall be estab-
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lished. Acts 1919, pp. 135, 136; 1920, pp. 102, 108;
1927, p. 195.
Editor's Note. — This section was so enlarged by tne
amendment of 1927 that few of its provisions were found in
the original section, while other provisions were left out
from its scope. The changes effected are too multifarious
for specific description, and may only be determined by close
comparison of the old and the new section.
SECTION 7
Taking Possession of Bank by Superintendent
§ 2366(56). Notice of taking possession. — On
taking possession of the assets and business of
any bank, as in this Act authorized, the Superin-
tendent of Banks shall forthwith give notice of
such action to all banks and other persons or cor-
porations holding or in possession of any assets
of such bank. No bank or other person or cor-
poration shall have a lien or charge for any pay-
ment, advance, or clearance thereafter made, or
liability thereafter incurred, against any of the
assets of the bank, of whose assets and business
the Superintendent shall have taken possession as
aforesaid.
The superintendent shall also file and have
recorded in the office of the clerk of the Superior
•court of the county in which the bank is located,
and if the bank has a branch or branches in an-
other or other counties, in such county or coun-
ties also, a certificate under his hand and the seal
of the Department of Banking, wherein he shall
set forth that the assets and business of the bank
have been taken charge of by him for the purpose
of liquidation, giving the date on which he took
charge. A certified cop}* of said certificate shall
be admissible in evidence without proof, as a
duly recorded deed is admitted. Acts 1919, pp.
135, 155; 1927 pp. 195, 197.
Editor's Note.—The last paragraph of this section was
added by the amendment of 1927
§ 2366(57) Business resumed, how.—After the
Superintendent of Banks has so taken possession
of any bank, the Superintendent may permit such
bank to resume business upon such conditions as
may be approved by him. When necessary, in
order to make good an impairment of capital, the
stockholders, with the approval of the superin-
tendent, may levy a voluntary assessment on the
stockholders as provided in section 7 of this
article, the amount of the assessments be fixed by
the superintendent. Acts 1919, pp. 135, 156; 1927,
pp. 195, 198.
Editor's Note.—The last sentence of this section is new
with the amendment of 1927.
§ 2366(58). Collections and sales, how made.
Confirmation of Sales.—Whether sales made under an or-
der of the superior court at the instance of the superin-
tendent of banks under this section should be confirmed is a
matter within the sound legal discretion of the court. Such
sales are never consummated until confirmed. Wingfield v.
Bennett, 36 Ga. App. 27, 134 S. E- 840.
§ 2366(66). Superintendent may reject claims
or change rank.—If the Superintendent doubts
the justice and validity of any claim or deposit or
the priority therefor as claimed in the proof filed,
he may either reject the same or change the rank
or order of paying the same and serve notice of
such rejection or change upon the claimant or
depositor, either personally or by registered mail,
and an affidavit of the service of such notice,
which shall be prima facie evidence thereof, shall
be filed in the office of the Superintendent. Any
action or suit upon such claim so rejected or
changed as to rank, whether for the purpose of
having said claim allowed or of establishing the
rank or order of payment thereof must be brought
by the claimant against the bank in the proper
court of the county in which the bank is located,
within ninety (90) days after such service, or the
same shall be barred. Notice of the filing of such
suit with a copy of the petition shall be given by
the claimant to the Superintendent of Banks by
registered mail at least ten days (10) before the
suit shall be in order for trial. The Superintend-
ent, if he so desires, may defend the suit in the
names of the bank. Suits brought under this sec-
tion shall be tried at the first term of the court.
Acts 1919, pp. 135, 158; 1927, pp. 196, 198.
Editor's Note.—The provision in case the superintendent
doubts the priority of the claim is new with 1927 amend-
ment. By the amendment the superintendent may change
the rank or order of paying the claim, and the rest of the
section is so amended as to conform it to the last referred
change. The last three sentences are also new with the
amendment.
§ 2366(67) Objections to claims. — Objections
to any claim or deposit not rejected or chanered
as to rank or order of payment by the Superin-
tendent may be made by the party interested, by
filing a copy of such objections with the Super-
intendent; and the Superintendent, after investi-
gation, shall either allow such objections and re-
ject the claims or deposit, or change the rank or
order of payment thereof, and present such ob-
jections to the Superior Court of the county in
which the bank is located, which court shall cause
an issue to be made up and tried at the first term
thereafter, as to whether or not such claim or
deposit should be allowed and as to the proper
rank or order of payment thereof. Acts 1919, pp.
135, 159; 1927, pp. 195, 199.
Editor's Note.—The reference to the charge of the ranK
or order of claims throughout this section is new with ths
amendment of 1927.
§ 2366(70). Order of paying debts.—After the
payment of the expenses of liquidation, including
compensation of agents and attorneys, and after
the payment of unremitted collections, the order
of paying off debts due by insolvent banks shall
be as follows:
(1) Debts due depositors.
(2) Debts due for taxes, State and Federal.
(3) Judgments.
(4) Contractual obligations.
(5) Unliquidated claims for damages and the
like.
Provided, that nothing herein contained shall
affect the validity of any security or lien held by
any person or corporation. Acts 1919, pp. 134,
159; 1925, pp. 119, 129; 1927, pp. 195, 199.
Editor's Note.—By the amendment of 1927 the payment of
unremitted collections are also made prior to the payment
of other classes of claims enumerated. The amendment also
changed the order of payment, and the number of the
classes of claims enumerated. The proviso is new with the
amendment.
Loan to Cashier.—The money loaned to the cashier is
not a debt entitled to priority under class 5 [now 1] of th;s
section, as a debt due by the bank as trustee or other fidu-
ciary, or as a claim of like character. Campbell v. Morgan
County Bank, 35 Ga. App. 222, 132 S. E- 648.
§ 2366(71) Assessment of stockholders.
Constitutionality.—A consideration and determination of
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the question whether the provision of this section is viola-
tive of the due-process clause of the fourteenth amendment
of the Constitution of the United States being for decision by
a full bench of six Justices, who are equally divided in opin-
ion, the judgment of the lower court upon this point is af-
firmed by operation of law. Felton v. Bennett, 163 Ga. 849,
137 S. E. 264.
Delegation of Authority.—Authority of the superintendent
of banks to determine the stockholder's liability to deposit-
ors and collection thereof under this section as amended in
1925, cannot be delegated to agent by power of attorney au-
thorized by sections 2366(60), (61), notwithstanding section
2366(74) and section 2366(16). In re Giles, 21 Fed. (2d), 536.
§ 2366(75). Unclaimed deposits and dividends.
—Where deposits or other claims against the
bank are not filed within twelve months after the
expiration of the date fixed by the superintendent
for the presentation of claims against the bank,
no dividend shall be paid thereon but dividends
accruing on said claims shall be distributed as other
assets of the bank, and where dividends are not
accepted and collected within six months after
they are declared, they shall become a part of
the general fund of the bank and be distributed
as other assets. In case of banks that were
closed and being liquidated by the Superinten-
dent before August 25, 1925, claims which were
not filed within sixty days from the date of the
approval of this act shall be forever barred, and
all funds deposited or held to meet such claims,
and any dividends which may have been de-
clared but are not collected within such period
of sixty days, shall become part of the general
funds of the bank, and shall be distributed as
other assets. Acts 1925, pp. 119, 132; 1927, 195,
200.
Editor's Note.—The provision as to the bar of claims not
presented in time in case of banks closed and in liquidation
before August 25, 1925, is new with the amendment of 1927.
SECTION 8
Incorporation of Banks
§ 2366(80). Application for charter.— Any
number of persons not less than five (5) may
form a corporation for the purpose of carrying
on the business of banking, by filing in the office
of the Secretary of State an application in writ-
ing signed by each of them, in which they shall
state.
(3) The amount of its capital stock which
shall not be less than twenty-five thousand
($25,000) dollars where located in a town or city
whose population does not exceed three thou-
sand according to the last preceding census of
the United States, and not less than fifty thou-
sand ($50,000) dollars where located in a city or
town whose population exceeds three thousand
according to said census. Provided, however,
this section shall not apply to banks whose
capital stock is now fixed, so they shall not be
required to increase the same. Acts 1927, 195,
200.
Editor's Note.—The amendment of 1927 changed the re-
quirement as to the minimum amounts of the capital stock,
and the population of places of establishment, which appear
in the third clause of this section.
§ 2366(86). Payment of capital.
Prior Law Construed.—In Pearce v. Bennett, 35 Ga. App.
415, 133 S. E- 278, construing Civil Code of 1910, section
2268, which permitted the board of directors to prescribe how
any unpaid part of the capital stock should be paid in, it
was held that where a subscriber for stock in such a bank
had paid his pro rata of the minimum amount required to
be paid in before the filing of the application for charter
and the subscription contract did not provide otherwise, the
remainder of his subscription was not due until the direc-
tors called for its payment, and the statute of limitations
did not begin to run in his favor as to the unpaid install-
ment until such condition was complied with. It will be
noted that section 2268 of the Civil Code of 1910, which Bell,
J., referred to in this case was repealed by Acts 1919, p.
135. See Editor's Note under section 2366(1) of the Code-
of 1926. Of course banks incorporated under the said sec-
tion are still governed by that law instead of sections
2366(1)
-(196) unless the right to change was reserved to
the State in the charters of the individual Banks. Dart-
mouth College case. To ascertain whether such reservation
was made in a given case recourse to the charter of the
given bank must be had. Ed. Note.
SECTION 18
Liability of Stockholders
§ 2366(140). Exception for trustees and other
fiduciaries.
Applicability to Parent of Minor.—One who buys stock in
a bank, and has it entered on the books of the bank in his
own name as guardian for his minor child, is himself, as
between him and the bank, the owner of the stock, and the
provisions of this section are not applicable. Where the
bank has been taken over by the superintendent of banks
under the authority of the banking laws, such person is in-
dividually liable for an assessment made against him a?
stockholder by the superintendent of banks. Rosenberg v
Bennett, 35 Ga. App. 86, 132 S. E. 119.
§ 2366(141). Liability of stockholder after trans-
fer of stock.
See note to § 2366(142).
§ 2366(142). Liability when bank fails.
Effect of Liability of Former Stockholder.—The present
owner of stock, against whom such an assessment is made,
can not defeat liability therefor upon the ground that under
the provisions of this and section 2366(141), a former stock-
holder from whom he purchased the stock within six months
prior to the date of the failure of the bank may be liable
for an assessment thereon. The right to enforce the assess-
ment against the former stockholder is in the superintendent
of banks, and not in the present stockholder. Rosenberg
v. Bennett, 35 Ga. App. 86, 132 S. E. 119.
Effect of Defective Title of Former Stockholder. — A
present stockholder against whom an assessment has been
made under the authority of this law, can not defend against
such assessment upon the ground that the former stock-
holder from whom he purchased the stock had no title.
Rosenberg v. Bennett, 35 Ga. App. 86, 132 S. E. 119.
SECTION 19
Regulation of the Business of Banking
§ 2366(148). Qualification of directors.—Every
director must, during his whole term of service, be
a citizen of his [this] State or reside within 25
miles of the city or town in which the bank is lo-
cated, and at least three fourths of the directors
must be residents of the city or town in which the
bank is located or within twenty-five miles there-
of, and must continue so to reside during their
continuance in office. Every director must own in
his own right and unpledged at least ten shares of
the capital stock of the bank of which he is a di-
rector, upon which all installments which are due
shall have been paid in full, unless the capital of
the bank shall not exceed twent3^-five thousand
dollars, in which case he must own at least five
shares of such stock. Any director who ceases to
be the owner of the number of shares herein re-
quired, or who pledges the same, or fails to pay
any installment thereon when the same becomes
due or who becomes in any other manner dis-
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qualified, shall vacate his place as a memiber of
the board. Provided, that this section shall not
apply to directors in office at the date this act
takes effect, and said directors shall be qualified
to succeed themselves as often as the}- may be re-
elected without reference to the provisions of this
section. Acts 1919. pp. 135, 197; 1927, pp. 195, 201.
Editor's Note.—Prior to the amendment of 1927 directors
of banks with a capital stock of between $15,000 and $50,000
and directors of banks with a capital stock of over $50,000
were required to own two and five shares of the capital
stock, respectively. All the other provisions of the section,
except the provision as to vacating the office of directors
which remains the same, are new with the amendment.
§ 2366(151). Semi-annual examinations by di-
rectors.— It shall be the duty of the board of
directors of every bank, at least once in each
six (6) months, to count the cash and examine
fully into the books, papers, and affairs of the
bank of which they are directors, and- partic-
ularly into the loans and discounts thereof,
with the special view of ascertaining the value
and security thereof, and the collateral security,
if any, given in connection therewith, and into
such other matters as the Superintendent of
Banks may require. Such directors shall con-
duct such count and examination by a com-
mittee of at least three (3) of its members;
and shall have the power to employ certified
public accountants, or other expert assistance in
making such examinations, if they deem the
same necessary. Within ten (10) days after
the completion of each of such examinations,
a report in writing thereof, sworn to by the di-
rectors making the same, shall be made to the
board of directors, which report shall be spread
upon the minutes of said board; and the orig-
inal thereof shall be placed on file in said bank,
and a duplicate thereof filed with the Superin-
tendent of Banks. Provided, however, that in
lieu of the semi-annual examination of the di-
rectors, such semi-annual examination may be
made by accountants, approved by the Super-
intendent of Banks; and provided, that any
bank which fails to transmit to the Superin-
tendent of Banks, within ten (10) days after the
completion of the same, a copy of the report
made by such board of directors or such ac-
countants shall be subject to the same penalty
as is provided by § 2366(44) for failure to make
and transmit its report in response to call of
the Superintendent of Banks. Acts 1919, pp.
135, 193; 1922, p. 67; 1927, pp. 195, 198.
Editor's Note.—The provision at the beginning of the sec-
ond sentence as to condicting the counts by a committee,
which formerly was merely permissive, was made manda-
tory by the use of word "shall'' in place of ''may," by the
Act of 1927.
§ 2366(159). Loans by bank, limit of.—No
bank shall be allowed to lend to any one per-
son, firm, or corporation more than twenty (20)
per cent of its capital, and unimpaired surplus.
And no loan shall be made in excess of ten (10)
per cent of the capital and surplus, except upon
good collateral or other ample security and
with the approval of a majority of the directors,
or of a committee of the board of directors, au-
thorized to act, which approval shall be evi-
denced by the written signature of said direc-
tors or the members of said committee. In
estimating loans to any person, all amounts
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loaned to firms and partnerships of which he
is a member shall be included: Provided, how-
ever, that a bank may buy from or discount
for any person, firm, or corporation, bills of
exchange drawn in good faith against actually
existing values, or commercial or business pa-
per actually owned by the person negotiating
the same, in addition to loans directly made to
the person, firm, or corporation selling the
same, such purchase or discount not to ex-
ceed (20) per cent of the capital and surplus,
to be approved in writing by a majority of the
directors, or by a committee of such board au-
thorized to act; and provided, that the limit
of loans herein fixed shall not apply to bona
fide loans made upon the security of agricul-
tural, manufactured, industrial products or live
stock having a market value and for which
there is ready sale in the open market, title to
which by appropriate transfer shall be taken in
the name of the bank, and which shall be se-
cured by insurance against loss by fire, with
policies made payable to the bank, where no
more than eighty (80) per cent of the market
value of such products shall be loaned or ad-
vanced thereon. In all such cases a margin of
twenty (20) per cent between the amount of
the loan and the market value of the products
shall at all times be maintained (except where
products are intended for immediate ship-
ment) ; and the bank shall have the right to
call for additional collateral when the differ-
ence between the market value and the amount
loaned shall be less than twenty (20) per cent,
and in the event of the failure to comply with
such demand, to immediately sell all or any
part of such products in the open market and
pay the amount of the loan and the expenses
of sale, and the balance to the borrower; and
provided, that the limit herein fixed shall not
apply to loans fully secured by bonds or cer-
tificates of indebtedness of the United States or
of this State, or of the several counties, dis-
tricts, or municipalities thereof which have been
duly and regularly validated as provided by
lawr . Liabilities arising to the makers and in-
dorsers of checks, drafts, bill of exchange, re-
ceived by the bank on deposit, cashed, or pur-
chased by it, shall not in any way be considered
as borrowed money or loans. It shall be the
duty of the Superintendent of Banks to order
any loans in excess charged to profit and loss,
provided in his opinion such excess is not well
secured; and if such reduction shall not be
made within thirty (30) days after such notifi-
cation, to proceed as in other cases provided
for violation of the orders of the Superintend-
ent. Acts 1919, pp. 105, 197; 1922, pp. 88, 70;
1927, p. 201.
Editor's Note.—By the amendment of 1927 the phrase "not
to exceed twenty (20) per cent of the capital and surplus"
with regard to purchases referred to in the first part of the
proviso, was substituted for the phrase "if in excess of ten
(10) per cent of the capital and surplus."
§ 2366(169). Purchase of stocks and invest-
ment securities.—No bank shall subscribe for,
purchase, or hold stock in any other bank, ex-
cept stocks in the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta, necessary to qualify for membership
therein, nor in any other corporation unless
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the same shall have been transferred to it in
satisfaction of a debt previously contracted, or
shall have been purchased at a sale under a
power contained in a note or other instrument
by which it was pledged to the bank or under
a judgment or degree in its favor, and all such
stock shall be disposed of by the bank within
six months, unless the Superintendent of Banks
shall extend the time for good cause shown.
Nor shall a bank purchase or hold any bonds
or debentures except such as are classed as in-
vestment securities, and the buying and selling
of such securities shall be limited to buying
and selling without recourse marketable obli-
gations upon which there has never been a de-
fault, evidencing indebtedness of any person,
copartnership, association, or corporation in the
form of bonds, notes and/or debentures, com-
monly known as investment securities, under
such regulations as may be prescribed by the
Superintendent of Banks. The total amount
of such investment securities shall at no time
exceed 25 per cent, of the capital and unim-
paired surplus of such bank; but this limitation
as to the amount shall not apply to obligations
of the United States, of this State, or of the
several counties, districts, or municipalities
thereof which have been validated as provided
by law. Nothing in this section is to be con-
strued as, applying to savings banks doing a
savings business only. Provided that this section
shall not apply to securities actually owned at
the date Act of 1919 became effective. Pro-
vided, further, that any bank may subscribe
for, or purchase, stock in an agricultural credit
corporation duly organized under the laws of
this State having authority to make loans to
the farmers of this State for agricultural pur-
poses and to re-discount the same with the In-
termediate Credit Bank of Columbia, but no
bank shall subscribe for or purchase stock in
more than one such corporation, nor invest
therein more than ten per centum of its cap-
ital, and no such subscription or purchase shall
be made until first approved by the Superin-
tendent of Banks. Acts 1924, p. 76; 1919, pp.
135, 201; 1927, pp. 195, 203.
Editor's Note.—Save the last proviso, all of the provisions
of the section were changed by the amendment of 1927. The
changes effected are so versatile as to render it impossible
to point them out by specific description, and calls for a
comparison of the two sections.
Payment of deposit in two§ 2366 (185).
names.
Effect upon Title to Deposit.—This section has reference
to the liability of the bank as to a joint deposit, making it
lawful for the bank to pay either party under such cir-
cumstances. It does not affect the right of the property
as between the parties; that is, between the depositor and
the third person claiming the deposit. It has no applicability
to the title to the money as between the depositor and the
third party. Clark v. Bridges, 163 Ga. 542, 546, 136 S. E. 444.
§ 2366(190). Forged or raised checks.
Applicability to Signing' by Unauthorized Agent.—The ex-
pression "forged check," as used in this section applies
only to a check created as a result of a criminal act of for-
gery, and does not apply to a check to which one's name as
maker or drawer is signed by another, who purports to act
as the agent for the maker or drawer, although no such
authority exists. Samples v. Milton County Bank, 34 Ga.
App. 248, 129 S. E- 170.
Under the undisputed facts the plaintiff is not, as a mat-
ter of law, estopped, irrespective of the provisions of this
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section, from repudiating the act of the alleged agent in
signing the plaintiff's name to the checks without authority.
Samples v. Milton Countv Bank, 34 Ga. App. 248, 129 S. E.
170.
Excuse for Failure to Give Notice.—The effect of the rul-
ing in Citizens, etc., Bank v. Ponsell, 33 Ga. App. 193, 125
S. E. 775, was that the trial court would not have been au-
thorized to hold the reasons assigned by the plaintiff in
exculpation of her failure to notify the defendant bank of
the forgeries, within 60 days, as required by this section
were not inadequate as a matter of law. That ruling did
not go to the extent of holding that the circumstances
pleaded in extenuation of such failure on the part of the
plaintiff were necessarily such as would relieve her from
the penalty prescribed. While it is true that the statute
charges the depositor with a duty of notifying, it does not
undertake to say what facts or circumstances, if any, would
be sufficient to obviate the penalty of such dereliction. S.
C, 35 Ga. App. 460, 133 S. E. 351.
It is for the jury to say whether the facts pleaded and
proved by the plaintiff, in exculpation of her dereliction,
were such as would absolve her from the penalty prescribed.
Consequently, the overruling of the demurrer to the peti-
tion does not mean that the plaintiff is absolutely entitled
to recover if she proves her case as laid; for a general de-
murrer should be overruled in an action based on facts and
circumstances justifying the plaintiff's admitted negligence
when the jury, from the facts alleged, would be authorized
to infer a justification for negligence, though they would not
be bound to do* so. See McDuffie v. Ocean Steamship Co.,
5 Ga. App. 125, 129, 62 S. E. 1008. Ponsell v. Citizens, etc.,
Bank, 35 Ga. App. 460, 133 S. E. 351.
§ 2366(194). Payment of deposit of deceased
depositor.—Upon the death of any person in-
testate, having a deposit in a bank of not more
than three hundred no/100 ($300.00) dollars,
such bank shall be authorized to pay over such
deposit: (a) to the husband or wife of the de-
positor; (b) if no husband or wife, to the chil-
dren; (c) if no children, to the father if living;
if not, to the mother of the depositor; (d) if
no children or parent, then to the brothers and
sisters of the depositor. The receipt of such
person or persons shall be a full and final ac-
quittance to the bank and relieve it of all lia-
bility to the estate of said deceased depositor or
the representative thereof should one be ap-
pointed. Such deposit shall be exempt from
the process of garnishment. Acts 1919, pp.
135, 210; 1927, pp. 195, 204.
Editor's Note.—Prior to its amendment in 1927, this sec-
tion applied to deposits not exceeding one hundred dollars.
The amendment extended its application to deposits of three
hundred dollars and less. The provision as to the exemp-
tion of the deposit from process of garnishment is new with
-the amendment.
§ 2366 (195A). Stale checks.—Where a check
or other instrument payable on demand at any
bank or trust company doing business in this
State is not presented for payment within six
months from the date thereof, the same shall be
regarded as a stale check, and the bank or trust
company upon which the same is drawn may re-
fuse payment thereof unless expressly instructed
by the drawer or maker to pay the same, and no
liability shall be incurred to the drawer or maker
for dishonoring the check or other instrument
by such non-payment. Acts 1927, pp. 195, 204.
§ 2366(195B). Stop-payment orders to be re-
newed.—No revocation, countermand, or stop-
payment order, relating to the payment of any
check or draft against an account of a depositor
in any bank or trust company doing business in
this State, shall remain in effect for more than
ninety (90) days after the service thereof on the
bank, unless the same be renewed, which re-
newals shall be in writing and shall be in effect
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for not more than ninety (90) days from the
date of the service thereof on the bank or trust
company, but such renewals may be themselves
renewed from time to time. All notices affect-
ing checks or drafts of any bank or trust com-
pany, upon which revocation, countermand, or
stop-payment orders have heretofore been made,
shall not be deemed to continue in effect for
more than ninety (90) days from the date of the
approval of this Act, unless renewed in writing,
which renewal shall not continue in effect for
more than ninety (90) days from the date of the
service thereof on the bank or trust company.
Acts 1927, pp. 195, 205.
SECTION 20
Operation and Effect of Act
§ 2366 (196A). Short title.—The Act approved
August 16, 1919, entitled "An Act to regulate
banking in the State of Georgia; to create the
Department of Banking of the State, of Georgia,
to provide for the incorporation of banks, and
the amendment, renewal, and surrender of char-
ters; to provide penalties for the violation of
laws with reference to banking and the banking
business; and for other purposes," and the sev-
eral Acts amendatory thereof, shall be referred
to collectively as "The Banking Law." Acts
1927, pp. 195, 205.
§ 2366(196B). Venue of suits; service.—All
suits against the Superintendent of Banks, aris-
ing out of the liquidation of insolvent banks,
shall be brought in the county in which such
bank had its principal place of business, and
service may be had on the Superintendent by
serving such suit and process on the liquidation
agent in charge of the affairs of the said bank,
or, if there be none, on any former officer of said
bank; provided, however, that in all such suits a
second original shall be served on the Superin-
tendent of Banks. Acts 1927, pp. 195, 206.
ARTICLE 4
Insurance Companies
SECTION 10
Fire Insurance Contracts
§ 2470. (§ 2089.) Contract of fire-insurance.
Delivery.—The rule of this section is stated in Home Ins.
Co. v. Head, 35 Ga. App. 143, 132 S. E- 238.
Where an insurance company has accepted an application
for insurance and has issued the policy, actual delivery is
not essential to the consummation of a contract of insurance,
unless expressly provided for in the application or the pol-
icy. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 104 Ga. 67,
30 S. E- 273, 42 Iv. R. A. 88, 69 Am. St. R. 134. Where both
the application and the policy are silent as respects actual
delivery of the policy being essential to a consummation of
the contract, the contract becomes consummated upon the
retention by the company of the notes and the issuance of
the policy and mailing it to its local agent for delivery to
the applicant. Tarver v. Swann, 36 Ga. App. 461, 137 S. E.
126.
Same—Parol Agreement with Agent.—Where an applica-
tion for insurance, which, upon the consummation of the
contract of insurance, became a part of the contract, pro-
vided that the company should "not be bound by any act
done or statement made by or to any agent, or other per-
son, which is not contained in this application," an agree-
ment not contained in the application or the policy, made
between the applicant and the local agent, when the appli-
cation and notes were signed, to the effect that the contract
of insurance would not be consummated until actual delivery
of the policy to the applicant, and that upon failure to make
such actual delivery the applicant would not be bound upon
the notes, did not become part of the contract. Tarver v.
Swann, 36 Ga. App. 461, 137 S. E- 126.
§ 2471. Policies must contain the entire con-
tract.
Necessity of Attaching Copy of Application.
—See Couch v.
National Life, etc., Ins. Co., 34 Ga. App. 543, 130 S. E- 596;
Interstate Life, etc., Co. v. Bess, 35 Ga. App. 723, 134 S. E.
804, citing and following the paragraph set out under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 2472. (§ 2090.) Interest of assured.
Test of Insurable Interest.—While, under the section, an
insurable interest is defined as "some interest in the prop-
erty or event insured," and a "slight or contingent inter-
est is sufficient, whether legal or equitable" such an in-
surable interest is not to be taken as synonymous with the
sole and unconditional ownership required by the terms of
the policy in the instant case. Nor does the rule as to an
insurable interest dispense with the contractual requirement
as to liens upon the property constituting the subject matter
of the risk. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 36 Ga. App.
497, 499, 137 S. E- 277.
§ 2475. (§ 2093.) Construction.
Usages and Customs.—See Macon County Ass'n v. Slap-
pey, 35 Ga. App. 737, 741, 134 S. E. 834, following the para-
graph under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 2480. (§ 2098.) Effect of misrepresentation.
Where Capable of Two Constructions.—See Macon County
Ass'n v. Slappey, 35 Ga. App. 737, 741, 134 S. E. 834; John-
son v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 154 Ga. 653, 115 S. E. 14, follow-
ing paragraph under this catchline in Georgia Code of 1926.
Misrepresentation in Application Not in Writing Attached
to Policy.—In Interstate Life, etc., Co. v. Bess, 35 Ga. App.
723, 726, 134 S. E- 804, it was said by Bell, J., "Since the
application was not in writing and attached to the policy,
the insurer could not defend upon the ground of material
misrepresentations not amounting to actual fraud. The fail-
ure to make the application a part of the contract differen-
tiates the case from such cases as Supreme Conclave Knights
v. Wood, 120 Ga. 328, 47 S. E- 940, where it was held that
a material misrepresentation will avoid the policy, whether
the statement was made in good faith or wilfully or fraud-
ulently."
Knowledge of Agent as Waiver.—In Interstate Life, etc.,
Co. v. Bess, 35 Ga. App. 723, 726, 134 S. E- 804, it was said
by Bell, J., "In a case like the present, if the agent had
actual knowledge of the facts which by a stipulation in
the contract would render it void, the insurer could not set
up such facts as a defense. But before the knowledge of
the agent could work a waiver on the part of his principal,
the knowledge must have been actual. Constructive knowl-
edge would not be sufficient for that purpose."
Section Given in Charge.—It would seem that it would
not be harmful to the insurer to give in charge a part
or all of the above Code section where the sole defense is
actual fraud. Interstate Life, etc., Co. v. Bess, 35 Ga.
App. 723, 134 S. E. 804.
§ 2482. (§ 2100.) Increasing risk.
Provisions of Section Impliedly Written into Policy. —
It would seem that the provisions of this section should
be considered as impliedly written into the policy, and
that if they are violated the company will not be liable. It
therefore becomes necessary to determine from all the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances what character of use is
contemplated by a policy. Macon County Ass'n v. Slappey,
35 Ga". App. 737, 741, 134 S. E- 834.
§ 2490 (§ 2108.) Prescribing regulations.
Section cited in Alliance Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 36 Ga.
App. 497, 137 S. E. 277.
SECTION 12
Life Insurance
§ 2499. (§ 2117.) Law of fire-insurance appli-
cable.
Section cited in McGlathin v. United States Nat. Life,
etc., Co., 36 Ga. App. 325, 136 S. E- 535.
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§ 2501(1). Medical examinations.—All persons
applying for life-insurance in a life-insurance
company writing life insurance in this State shall
submit to such reasonable rules and regulations
as may be prescribed by such insurance com-
panies; and after a policy is issued on the life of
such person, the beneficiary of such policy shall
be entitled to collect the amount of such policy
under the terms of the contract when it matures,
unless the applicant or beneficiary has been
guilty of actual fraud or has made material mis-
representations in procuring such policy, which
representations change the character and nature
of the risk as contemplated in the policy so is-
sued by the company. All statements, covenants,
and representations contained in applications for
insurance shall never be held or construed to be
warranties, but shall be held to be representa-
tions only. Acts 1912, pp. 119, 130, 1927, p. 223.
Editor's Note.—Prior to its amendment by Acts 1927, this
section at its beginning had contained a provision requiring
all insurance companies, with certain exceptions, to make
a strict medical examination of persons applying for in-
surance. The provision and the phrase "for the purpose
of making such examinations" which appeared after the
phrase "such insurance companies," were stricken by the
amendment.
§ 2507. When laws apply.
License Fees of Agents.—Because of this section, section
993(69), relating to taxation of insurance agents, is not ap-
plicable to industrial life insurance agents. Hoover v. Pate,
162 Ga. 206, 132 S. E- 763.
SECTION 16A
Mutual Companies Insuring against Loss by
Fire, etc.
§ 2549. (§ 2140.) Insurance companies shall
pay damages, when.
Demand and Refusal.—See Globe, etc., Ins. Co. v. Jewell-
Ivoudermilk Co., 36 Ga. App. 538, 137 S. E- 286, stating and
applying the principle as set out under this catchline in the
Georgia Code of 1926.
In a suit upon an insurance policy, where the only alle-
gation as to a demand upon the insurance company for
payment of the loss was contained in the allegation as to
the filing of the proof of loss, which was filed prior to De-
cember 7, 1925, on which date the insurance company
acknowledged receipt of proof of loss and denied liability
and refused payment of loss, and where the suit was filed
on January 12, 1926, the petition did not allege a failure of
the insurance company to pay the loss within sixty days
after demand. Continental Eife Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 36 Ga.
App. 540, 137 S. E- 403.
Same—When Insufficient to Support Verdict for Damages.
—In the instant case such a demand as required by the sec-
tion in order for the insured to recover damages in addi-
tion to the loss not being shown by the evidence, the ver-
dict for damages given by the section was unauthorized.
The judgment overruling the defendant's motion for a new
trial was affirmed on condition that such damages be writ-
ten off. Alliance Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 36 Ga. App. 497,
137 S. E- 277.
Bad Faith.—The "bad faith" referred to in section 299
may be of a different character from that which under cer-
tain conditions will authorize a recovery under this section.
Copeland v. Dunehoo, 36 Ga. App. 817, 823, 138 S. E. 267.
An Exception to Section 4393.—In Copeland v. Dunehoo,
36 Ga. App. 817, 821, 138 S. E- 267, Bell. J., intimates
that this section is an exception to the provision in section
4393, which provides that "exemplary damages can never
be allowed in cases arising on contracts."
SECTION 19
Suits against Insurance Companies
§ 2563. (§ 2145.) Suits against insurance
companies.
Agents in County When iPolicy Issued. — A petition
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against an insurance company, wherein it is alleged that at
the time of the issuance of the policy sued on the defendant
was represented by named agents in the county in which
the suit was filed, alleges jurisdiction in that county, as
provided in the section. Process issued thereon is valid.
Hagler v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 36 Ga. App. 530, 137 S. E.
293.
When Service Made upon Former Agent.—The fact that
no legal service could be perfected upon the defendant in-
surance company in the instant case, because at the time
of filing the petition there was no agent of the defendant
in the county upon whom service could be legally perfected,
does not affect the validity of the process, but affects only
the validity of the service perfected by serving the former
agent in the county, who, at the time of service, was not
an agent of the company and upon whom legal service could
not be perfected. The process, therefore, being valid, was
subject to amendment. This case is distinguishable from
that of Union Marine Fire Ins. Co. v. McDermott, 31 Ga.
App. 676, 121 S. E- 849. Hagler v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 36
Ga. App. 530, 137 S. E- 293.
§ 2564. (§ 2146.) Service on non-resident, as-
sessment, etc., insurance companies.
Process under Section 2563 Perfected under This Section.
—Service upon the defendant company under process issued
in accordance with section 2563 can be perfected, under
this section by leaving a copy of the petition with the com-
pany's agent in the county, if there be one. Hagler v. Pa
cific Fire Ins. Co., 36 Ga. App. 530, 137 S. E. 293.
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DIVISION 3
Corporate Powers of Railroads
§ 2585. (§ 2167.) Powers of such roads.
Use of Street.—As a general rule, a railroad company
must obtain the written consent of the municipal authori-
ties before it can lay a track on any street of a city in this
State. Tift v. Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 161 Ga. 432, 443, 131
S. E- 46.
§ 2585(1). Authority to build, relocate, etc.
Approval of Railroad Commission Required.—The right of
condemnation given by this and the following section can
not be exercised until the railroad commission of this State
shall first approve the taking of the property or right of
way designated for the public use or uses desired. Tift v.
Atlantic, etc., R. Co., 161 Ga. 432, 440, 131 S. E. 46.
SECTION 2
Georgia Public Service Commission
§ 2618. (§ 2185.) Suspension of commissioner
from office.
Cited in Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52.
§ 2663. Jurisdiction of the commission.
Regulating Baggage.—This section confers the power upon
the Public Service Commission to issue an order requiring
a terminal company to receive and check to its destination
certain properly identified baggage. Atlanta Terminal Co.
v. Georgia Pub. Service Comm., 163 Ga. 897, 137 S. E- 556.
§ 2670(1). Name changed to public service
commission,, authority, rights, etc.
Cited and applied in Atlanta Terminal Co. v. Georgia
Pub. Service Comm., 163 Ga. 897, 137 S. E- 556, holding that
the commission has power to issue order respecting, re-
ceiving and checking baggage.
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SECTION 3
Operation of Railroads
§ 2674. (§ 2221.) Extent of such crossings.
Railroad Owes No Duty to Maintain Highway.—A rail-
road company is under no duty to maintain a public high-
way, which traverses its right of way, in a condition safe
for travel at a point where the highway is not crossed by
the company's tracks or at a point not so close to such
crossing as to render the repair of the highway at this
point "necessary for a traveler to get off, and on the
crossing safely and conveniently." Hall v. Georgia South-
ern, etc., R. Co., 34 Ga. App. 786, 131 S. E. 187.
§ 2677(2). Blow-post; signal of crossing; look-
out and exercise of care.
Failure to Comply with Section as Negligence.—If the
failure to comply with the section is not the proximate
cause of the injury, for example where no post is erected
but the engineer nevertheless blew the whistle in accord-
ance with the legal requirements, the presumption of neg-
ligence is conclusively rebutted. Stanford v. Southern R.
Co., 36 Ga. App. 319, 136 S. E. 804.
§ 2677(16). Elimination of grade crossings.—
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assem-
bly of the State of Georgia, and it is hereby en-
acted by authority of the same, that from and
after the passage of this Act, when in the judg-
ment of the State Highway Department of Geor-
gia it is practicable and, in the interest of public
safety, reasonably necessary, the State Highway
Department may authorize and direct the elimi-
nation of grade-crossings on the State road sys-
tem; and that when in the judgment of the
board of commissioners of roads and revenues of
any county in the State of Georgia, or of any
other authority having jurisdiction over and con-
trol of the public roads of that county, it is prac-
ticable and, in the interest of public safety, rea-
sonably necessary, such board of commissioners
of roads and revenues, or such other authority
having jurisdiction over and control of the pub-
lic roads of the county, may authorize and direct
the elimination of grade-crossings on the public
roads of said count}^; provided, that any such
elimination of a grade crossing shall be in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this Act, and
that no elimination of a crossing at grade of a
public county road (as distinguished from a road
which constitutes a part of the State highway
system) shall be eliminated under the provisions
of this Act, upon direction or order of any such
county authority, until and unless the State
Highway Department of Georgia shall approve
any such order of any such county authority, and
shall concur therein. Acts 1927, p. 299.
§ 2677(17). Same—Definitions.—For the pur-
poses of this Act, the following definitions shall
apply:
"Grade crossing." A crossing at grade of a
public road intersecting a track or tracks of a
railroad or railroads.
"Department." The State Highway Depart-
ment of Georgia as constituted under the laws
of this State.
"Boards." The boards of commissioners of
roads and revenues of the several counties of the
State, or any other duly constituted authority
having jurisdiction over and control of the pub-
lic roads in the counties, in and for the control of
which such board or other authority is consti-
tuted under the laws of the State of Georgia.
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"Railroads." All steam-railroads and interurban
electric or gasoline railways of more than twenty
miles in length, which are operated as common
carriers, but shall not include street-railways op-
erated in whole or in part within the corporate
limits of a city or town, nor logging railroads not
operated as common carriers.
"Overpass." A bridge and approaches thereto
for carrying highway traffic over a railroad.
"Underpass." A bridge and approaches there-
to for carrying a railroad over a highway or
other public road which is within the purview of
this Act.
This Act may be cited as the "Grade-crossing
Elimination Act."
§ 2677(18). Same—Notice to railroad com-
pany; adoption of layout.—Whenever the de-
partment, with reference to State roads, or a
board, with reference to county public roads,
shall direct the elimination of any grade-cross-
ing by means of an underpass, overpass, or by re-
location, or shall direct the guarding of a grade-
crossing by an automatic signaling device,
prompt notice of the order in such regard shall
be given to the railroad company or companies
involved; and within ten (10) days thereafter
the representative of the department or board
and of the railroad or railroads involved shall
meet, and thereafter, within a reasonable time,
adopt a layout mutually satisfactory for the con-
struction of a grade separation structure or au-
tomatic signalling device. Any such layout so
adopted by or through the representatives of a
board and of a railroad shall be submitted to the
department for its approval, and no work looking
to the elimination of the grade-crossing pursuant
to the plans so adopted shall be begun until and
unless the department concur therein and ap-
prove the same, or unless the railroad or rail-
roads involved may agree that its or their por-
tion of the expense involved in the elimination of
such grade-crossing shall not be charged against
the maximum sum which any one railroad may
be required to expend in any one calendar year
under any or all of the provisions of this Act, as
hereinafter provided. Failing to agree within a
reasonable time, then the department or (as the
case may be) a board may order the railroad or
railroads involved to proceed with the construc-
tion of such grade separation structure as it may
be required, and as indicated in the plans and
specifications accompanying its order; provided,
however, that no order of a board entered in
such regard shall be binding until and unless the
same be concurred in and approved by the de-
partment. It shall be the duty of said railroad or
railroads to begin work on any such grade sepa-
ration structure within sixty (60) days after the
receipt of a binding order to that effect, and to
complete the structure within a reasonable time;
provided, however, that in no event shall the
railroad or railroads be required, without its con-
sent, to do the actual physical work in providing
approaches by fill to an overhead structure or the
excavating beneath the supporting structure of
an underpass or the approaches thereto, but the
cost of such work shall be considered a part of
the cost of the grade elimination, whether ac-
tually performed by the railroad or the depart-
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ment or board, and such cost shall be appor-
tioned as hereinafter provided.
§ 2677(19). Same—Agreement to apportion
work.—The department or board may, by agree-
ment with any railroad company, apportion the
work to be done in the construction of any grade
separation structure, between the railroad com-
pany or companies and contractors acting under
the control and supervision of the department or
of the board; provided, that whenever the de-
partment or a board, or any of its or their em-
ployees or contra [contractors] acting under the
orders of the department or board:, or of its or
their contractors, shall go upon or be upon the
right-of-way of the railroad company, they shall
be subject to any reasonable rules and regula-
tions of such railroad made for the protection of
its traffic, employees, and passengers.
§ 2677(20). Same—Space for additional track.—
When either an overpass or an underpass is con-
structed under the provisions of this Act, the
same shall be so designed and constructed as to
be sufficient to accommodate at least one rail-
road-track in addition to those existing at the
time of said construction, unless this requirement
is waived by the railroad.
§ 2677(21). Same—Division of cost.—The di-
vision of the costs of elimination of grade-cross-
ings by means of grade separation structures
shall be as follows:
(a) The total cost of surveys and of the prepa-
ration of the plans and specifications, and of the
estimates of the cost thereof, shall be paid, one
half by the department or county board, and one
half by the railroad or railroads involved.
(b) The total cost of a grade-crossing elimi-
nation by the use of an overpass or underpass,
including the establishment of drainage, shall be
paid, one half by the department or (as the case
may be) the board, and one half by the railroad
or railroads involved; provided, that the con-
struction expense in which the railroad or rail-
roads involved may be required to participate
shall be confined to the grade-separation structure
and the approaches thereto not exceeding three
hundred (300) feet on each side from the center
line of the track or tracks as measured along the
center of the highways. The approaches shall
not be regarded as extending farther than from
grade point to grade point, and the railroad shall
not be charged with any cost of paving, except
on the flooring of an overpass.
(c) In no plan providing either for an over-
pass or underpass shall the department or board
interfere with or change the grade or alignment
of the tracks of any railroad, or relocate the line
of the railroad, without its consent. Nothing
herein, however, shall prevent the department or
county board and the railroad or railroads in-
volved from mutually agreeing to the change of
the grade or alignment of any track or tracks, or
the relocation of the same, and in case of such
an agreement the expense of making such
change shall be borne equally by the department
or board and the railroad or railroads involved;
provided, that such change in the railroad-tracks
has been made at the written request of the de-
partment or county board.
§ 2677(22). Same — Automatic signaling de-
vice, required when.—Whenever in the judgment
of the department the installation of an auto-
matic signaling device may be reasonably re-
quired at a grade-crossing of a State road, and
whenever in the judgment of a board the in-
stallation of an automatic signaling device may
be reasonably required at a grade-crossing of a
county road, the department or (as the case may
be) a board may require, by written order, the
railroad or railroads involved to provide such au-
tomatic signaling device as may be appropriate.
In any such case the expense of acquiring and
installing such device shall be divided equally
between the department or county board and the
railroad or railroads involved, but the railroad or
railroads involved shall at its or their own ex-
pense maintain the same.
§ 2677(23). Same—Underpass or overpass un-
safe or inadequate; improvement.—Whenever in
the judgment of the department exercised in re-
spect of a State road, or in the judgment of a
county board exercised in respect of a county
public road, an existing underpass or overpass,
constructed prior to the approval of this Act, is
unsafe or inadequate to serve the traffic for
which it was constructed, then the department,
when State roads be involved, or the board,
when county public roads be involved, may pro-
ceed to bring about the improvement or better-
ment of the existing structure. And in any such
event the procedure and division of the cost of
construction and the cost of the maintenance of
such improvement or betterment, shall be as
herein set forth in section 2677(18), (19), (20),
(21) and (24) of this Act.
§ 2677(24). Same—Maintenance of overpass,
etc.—After the construction of an overpass or
underpass, it shall be the duty of the department
in the case of State roads, and of the county
board in the case of county public roads, to
maintain at its or their own expense the drain-
age, surface, and pavement of the highway and
bridge, as well as the approaches and guard-rails,
if any; except that when an overpass is con-
structed with a floor of wood, then the railroad
or railroads shall maintain such floor. It shall
be the duty of the railroad or railroads to main-
tain at its expense the foundations, piers, abut-
ments, and superstructures of all underpasses
and overpasses located within the limits of its
right-of-way.
§ 2677(25) Same—Selection of material.—The
railroad company or companies involved shall
have the right to select the material to be used
in the construction of the grade-separation struc-
ture, provided that such material shall not be
less durable than creosoted timber of a quality at
least equal to that required by the standard
specifications of the department for its own
bridge work. Neither the department nor any
county board shall require any railroad company
to construct an underpass of a design, specifica-
tion, or plan, the strength of which, in the judg-
ment of the railroad company, shall not be suffi-
cient to meet the requirements of its traffic
thereover. In no event shall any railroad com-
pany be required to participate in the cost of the
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construction of any overhead bridge upon a basis
or proportion in excess of the cost of a bridge
that would be suitable to carry ordinary highway
traffic according to the standards of the depart-
ment, which standards are now for a strength
sufficient to support a fifteen-ton roller.
§ 2677(26). Same—Judicial review of order,
etc., of department or board.—Any judgment,
decision, or order of the department, or of any
county board, whether entered upon any ques-
tion involving the practicability, advisability, or
necessity of eliminating any crossing at grade or
involving the apportionment of cost of construc-
tion, or any other question arising under this
Act, shall be subject to judicial review. Pending
the final determination of any proceeding at law
or in equity so instituted, the department or any
count}'" board may, without prejudice to either
party, and at its own risk, proceed with the work
of eliminating the crossing at grade involved in
such litigation, subject to final judgment of the
court as to all questions involved in such litiga-
tion.
§ 2677(27). Same—Special agreements as to re-
location, etc.—Nothing in this Act shall be con-
strued to prevent such department or county board
from reaching special agreements with railroad
companies providing for grade-crossing elimina-
tion by means of relocation of either the railroad
or highway involved, or by other means and ar-
ranging for joint participation in the cost of such
elimination on an agreed basis.
§ 2677(28). Same—Use of right of way.—In
all cases where grade-separation structures are
built hereunder, the railroad shall permit the
use, free of cost, of so much of its right-of-way
as may be necessary.
§ 2677(29). Same—Cost where different rail-
roads involved.—Where more than one railroad
is involved in the separation of crossings at grade,
that portion of the cost of construction and
maintenance which this Act provides shall be
paid by the railroad or railroads shall be
apportioned between such railroads by agree-
ment; and in case they can not agree, the same
shall be fixed by the department or (as the case
may be) by the county board, after a hearing,
subject to a judicial review as provided in section
11, 2677(26) of this Act.
§ 2677(30). Same—Crossings closed; status of
crossings in case of relocation.—All existing
grade-crossings replaced by grade-separation
structures, or avoided by relocation of highways
and no longer used by the general public, shall,
where possible, be closed, and where continued
shall be private crossings and not subject to the
provisions of the statutes of Georgia relating to
railroad-crossings.
§ 2677(31). Same—Limit of annual expendi-
ture of railroad.—No railroad shall be required
to expend in any one calendar year, under any
or all of the provisions of this Act, a sum in ex-
cess of $40,000.00; provided that no railroad
whose gross earnings from both inter and intra-
state business in the State of Georgia, as re-
ported to the Public Service Commission of
Georgia for the preceding calendar year, did not
exceed $2,000,000.00 shall be required without
its consent to expend in any one calendar year,
under the provisions of this Act, a sum in excess
of $3,000.00. In any case where the proportion-
ate part to be paid by a railroad for the elimina-
tion of a crossing at grade, when added to
amounts theretofore expended and /or for which
obligations have been incurred, would exceed the
amount which a railroad maj' be required to ex-
pend under the provisions of this section, the de-
partment may pay the excess over and above the
aggregate of payments legally permissible for
requirement of the railroad, and thereafter collect
the same with legal interest during succeeding
calendar year or years; but nothing herein con-
tained shall be construed as requiring any rail-
road company to expend in grade-elimination
costs and protection in any one calendar year
more than the applicable amount as hereinbefore
specified.
SECTION 6
Railroads as Common Carriers, and Herein of
Other Carriers
§ 2712. (§ 2264.) Common carrier.
III. DEFENSES.
Generally.
—See Central, etc., R. Co. v. Council Bros., 36
Ga. App. 573, 137 S. E- 569, stating in part the rule set out
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Act of God—Distinguished from Unavoidable Accident.—
An act of God means any act produced by physical causes
which are inevitable. In other words, unavoidable acci-
dents are the same as the acts of God. Central, etc., R.
Co. v. Council Bros., 36 Ga. App. 573, 137 S. F- 569; Fish v.
Chapman, 2 Ga. 349, 46 Am. Dec. 393. These cases seem
to conflict with Harmony Grove Tel. Co. v. Potts, 24 Ga.
App. 178, 180, 100 S. F- 236, where it wis said that a dis-
tinction exists between an act of God and an unavoidable
accident. It appears though that in the Fish case, and in
the Central of Ga. Ry. Co. case, only phenomena were with-
in the contemplation of the courts, while in the Telephone
Co. case the court was considering not only natural acci-
dents, which were appropriately classed as acts of God, but
also "accidents arising from the negligence or act of man,"
which are classed as unavoidable accidents. It is submitted
that unavoidable accidents is a broad and comprehensive
classification, including not only "the negligence or act of
man," but also "natural accidents." The so called acts of
God are as unavoidable as the acts of man.—Fd. Note.
§ 2713. (§ 2265.) Bailee must show no con-
curring negligence.
Necessary Proof When Accident Result of Vis Major.—
The rule applicable, were it alleged that the damage had
been brought about by some vis major, such as an earth-
quake, lightning, or flood, in which the human element
does not and could not enter, would seem to be that where
it is alleged that the damage was thus occasioned, it is not
necessary for the carrier to show that such an occurrence
was in a legal sense an act of God, and its defense would be
complete upon proof being made that its own negligence did
not contribute to the loss thus caused by an occurrence over
which it had no control. Southern R. Co. v. Standard
Growers Fxch., 34 Ga. App. 534, 130 S. F- 373.
§ 2730. (§ 2279.) Time of responsibility.
Ending of Responsibility as Carrier.—See Central, etc., R.
Co. v. Leverette, 34 Ga. App. 304, 129 S. E. 292, following
the principle stated in paragraph two under this catchline
in the Georgia Code of 1926.
SECTION 8
Injuries by Railroads
§ 2780. (§ 2321.) Damages by running of cars,
etc.
I. IN GENERAL.
Presumption of Proximate Cause.—Under the section there
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arises, upon proof of injury to a person by a servant of a
railroad company, not on!y a presumption of negligence of
the company, but a presumption that the company's negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the injury. Western, etc.,
Railroad v. Dobbs, 36 Ga. App. 516, 137 S. E). 407. And a
charge to the jury which amounts to an instruction to this
effect is not error. Id.
Section Modifies General Rule as to Liability of Master.—
The general rule that the master is liable for the acts of his
servants when done within the scope of their employment,
whether the act is wilful or otherwise, is modified as to
railway cases, by this section. Furney v. Tower, 36 Ga.
App. 698, 137 S. E. 850.
For What Acts Liable.—Before the presumption of negli-
gence against a railway company under this section can
arise it must be shown that the act complained of was per-
petrated by the servant in the conduct of the business of
his employment, as the section should be construed with
section 4413. Latimore v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 34 Ga.
App. 263, 129 S. F. 108. But it is immaterial whether the
act done was in the scope of the servant's particular em-
ployment. Furney v. Tower, 36 Ga. App. 698, 137 S. F- 850.
II. APPLICATION OF RULE.
Injury to Dog.—In Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v.
Buchannon, 35 Ga. App. 156, 157, 132 S. F- 253, it was said
by Luke, J., who delivered the opinion: "A prima facie
case was made for plaintiffs by proof that the dog was
killed by the defendant's locomotive, and there should have
been a recovery unless the company made it appear that its
agents exercised all ordinary and reasonable care and dil-
igence. It was the duty of the company, through its
delegated agents and employees, to keep a lookout ahead of
the train and to use ordinary and reasonable diligence to
discover the dog upon the track and to avoid injuring it."
III. PRACTICE AND PLEADING.
Charge Improperly Construing Section.—Where the trial
judge charged the jury as follows: "I charge you that the
burden of proof in this case rests upon the plaintiff, that is
the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to satisfy the minds
of the jury by the preponderance of the testimony of all the
material allegations set out in the original petition in this
case and the amendments that have been made and al-
lowed by the court in the trial of this case," it was held
that this excerpt deprived the plaintiff of the benefit of the
presumption arising in proper cases under the section and
was erroneous. Central, etc., R. Co. v. Bridwell, 34 Ga.
App. 77, 84, 128 S. F. 238.
§ 2781. (§ 2322.) Consent of negligence.
Comparative Negligence Law.—Where a trial judge charged
the jury in substance that where both parties were negli-
gent, but the plaintiff could not have avoided injury by the
exercise of ordinary care, and the defendant's was greater
than that of the plaintiff, that the rule of comparative neg-
ligence and consequent diminution of damages was appli-
cable, it was held upon appeal, that this instruction did not
contravene the rule laid down in Americus, etc., R. Co. v
Luckie, 87 Ga. 6, 13 S. F- 105, nor did it exclude the de-
fense that the plaintiff's injury was brought about by his
own failure to exercise ordinary care. Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. v. Anderson, 35 Ga. App. 292, 133 S. F- 63.
Duty to Charge on Request.—Where the evidence author-
ized the inference that the plaintiff was negligent, it was
error prejudicial to the defendants not to comply with a
written request to charge in effect the rule of this section.
Southern R. Co. v. Bottoms, 35 Ga. App. 804, 134 S. F- 824.
And a charge that the damage which the plaintiff would
be entitled to recover should "be reduced as you may find
their negligence to be" is not a full and clear statement of
the rule. Southern R. Co. v. Bottoms, 35 Ga. App. 804, 134
S. F. 824.
§ 2782. Injury by coemployee.
Conclusiveness of Presumption.—The presumption of neg-
ligence against the employer, arising under this section,
from death of a railroad employee, is not conclusive, and, if
rebutted by, uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence, the
court should direct the verdict for the defendant. Walker
v. Charleston, etc., R. Co., 8 Fed. (2d), 725.
In an action for death of a railroad employee, supposedly
killed when handle of alleged defective jack under freight
car flew violently up and struck him under the chin, the
presumption of negligence, arising under this section, was
conclusively rebutted, and the verdict for the defendant was
properly directed. Walker v. Charleston, etc., R. Co., 8
Fed. (2d), 725.
§ 2788. (§ 2324.) Receiver's liability to em-
ployees.
Consent of Appointing Court Not Requisite to Suit.—This
section and the following section (section 2789) are excep-
tions to the general rule that before a suit can be main-
tained against a receiver appointed by the courts of this
State it is necessary for the consent of the appointing court
to be obtained. Bugg v. Lang, 35 Ga. App. 704, 134 S. F.
623. And no consent is necessary by the express terms of
the Judicial Code (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1916, section 1048)
when the appointment is by a Federal Court. Id.
Effect upon Federal Receivers.—The authority extended
under the Federal statute for suits in the State courts
against Federal receivers is paramount, and is in no wise
affected by this section. Bugg v. Lang, 35 Ga. App. 704, 134
S. F. 623. See also Fddy v. Lafayette, 49 Fed. 807, 1 C. C.
A. 441.
SECTION 11
Suits Against Railroads and Electric Companies.
§ 2798. (§ 2334.) Must be sued where action
originates; definition of "electric companies."
Venue of Continuous Tort to (Passenger.—This law is ap-
plicable in a case where a passenger brings suit in tort
against a railroad company for negligence in carrying her
beyond her destination in a particular county and through
that county into another state, where further damages re-
sult from the continued wrong; and where the railroad com-
pany has an agent in the county where the tort originated,
the venue of a suit for such injury is exclusively in that
county. Southern R. Co. v. Clark, 162 Ga. 616, 134 S. F^
605.
ARTICLE 8
Trust Companies
SECTION 5
Act of 1927
§ 2821(15). Definitions. — The term "trust
company" shall r^e construed to mean a corpora-
tion having power to execute trusts, and to act
in any fiduciary capacity, whether such corpora-
tion has been heretofore organized under the pre-
vious acts of the General Assembly of this State
or as hereafter organized under this act or any
amendment thereto. The term "person" as used
in this act shall be construed to mean an individ-
ual, a partnership, or an incorporated association.
The word "superintendent," as used in this Act
refers to and shall mean the Superintendent of
banks. Acts 1927, p. 344.
§ 2821(16). Unauthorized use of the word
trust company.—No corporation or person, ex-
cept a corporation duly authorized to do a trust
business in this State, shall as a designation or
name or part of a designation or name, under
wThich business is or may be conducted make use
of the word "trust" in any corporate, artificial,
or business name or title, or make use of any of-
fice sign at the place where such business is
transacted having thereon any word or words
indicating that such is the place or office of a
trust company. And the use or circulation of any
letterheads, billheads, blank forms, notes, receipts,
certificates, circulars, or any written or printed
or partly written and partly printed paper what-
ever having thereon any word or words indicat-
ing that such business is the business of a trust
company, is prohibited to any corporation or per-
son except those duly authorized under the laws
of this State to do a trust business. Except as
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herein otherwise indicated, the provisions of this
Act shall apply to all trust companies heretofore
incorporated or doing business at the date of the
approval of this Act as well as those hereafter
incorporated or established. Provided, however,
that any corporation regularly chartered and or-
ganized and engaged in business on the date of
the approval of this Act may continue to use its
corporate name, but where the words "trust" or
"trust company" are a part of such corporate
name, the corporation shall on all signs, adver-
tisements, letterheads, billheads, and other printed
forms, use in connection with its corporate name
the words, "Not under State Supervision."
§ 2821(17). Duties and powers of the superin-
tendent of banks.—Except as may hereafter be
prescribed by law, the Superintendent of Banks,
in addition to the duties and powers prescribed
in this Act, shall have, possess, and exercise all
that jurisdiction, control, supervision, and author-
ity over trust companies organized or doing busi-
ness under this Act, which he now has or may
hereafter be given by the laws of this State over
State banks. He shall require reports and make
examinations of said trust companies in like man-
ner as is now required of State banks. Trust
companies for this examination, supervision, and
control shall pay to the Superintendent of Banks
the same fees that State banks are now or may
[hereafter be required to pay. The funds derived
from this source shall be used to defray the ex-
penses of the Department of Banking.
§ 2821(18). Guaranty.—That no trust company
shall engage in or guarantee the payment of bonds
and notes secured by mortgage or deed to real
estate within the State of Georgia, or secured by
pledge of any choses in action, unless it shall first
set apart an amount of its assets, the same to be
fixed by the Superintendent of Banks, but in no
event to be less than ten thousand ($10<000,00)
dollars, as a guaranty fund, which said guaranty
fund shall be maintained, unimpaired, or invested
in bonds of the United States, or of this State, or
of any political subdivision of this State, when
and as required to do so by the said superintend-
ent, so long as any guaranty is outstanding. The
superintendent shall have the right to designate
the place where said guaranty fund shall be de-
posited. This restriction shall be in addition to
the restrictions now imposed by law on trust com-
panies doing business in this State.
§ 2821(19). Trust companies receiving depos-
its.—That no trust company shall be allowed to
receive deposits of any character unless and un-
til its charter shall have been amended so as to
confer upon it banking powers and privileges;
and when such amendments shall have been ob-
tained and the Superintendent of Banks shall have
issued his permit for said company to receive de-
posits and do business as a bank, it shall be sub-
ject to all the provisions of the law relating to
banks. Provided, that trust companies heretofore
incorporated under the laws of Georgia, wTith
power in their original or amended charters to
receive deposits, and that are now conducting
their business and reporting to the Superintend-
ent of Banks, shall not be required to further
amend their charters in order to continue con-
ducting such business, but they shall be subject
to all the provisions of banking laws of this
State, subjecting them to the inspection and su-
pervision of the Superintendent of Banks, and
their dealing in stocks, bonds, and other securi-
ties shall be subject to inspection and approval
of the Superintendent of Banks.
§ 2821(20). Dealing in stocks and bonds.—
Trust companies operating as investment bank-
ers, and maintaining departments for the pur-
pose [purchase?] and sale of securities, may pur-
chase for resale whole issues ©r parts of issues
of stocks, and debentures of industrial, railroad,
and public-service corporations, and other invest-
ment securities, and may resell and deal in the
same under such regulations as may be prescribed
by the Superintendent of Banks.
§ 2821(21). Amendment to charters.—That the
method of obtaining an amendment to the char-
ter of trust company, so as to confer upon it
Danking powers and privileges, and authorize it
to receive deposits, shall be the same as that pro-
vided for the amendment of the charter of a bank
by sections 1 to 7, inclusive, of article 19 of the
Banking Act of 1919, except that the amendment
must be authorized by the vote of two-thirds of
the outstanding capital stock. When the charter
shall have been amended, the stockholders shall
be liable to depositors to the same extent as are
the stockholders of a bank under article 18 of
the Banking Act.
§ 2821(22). Surrender of authority to receive
deposits, etc.—Any trust company that has here-
tofore or may hereafter acquire the right to re-
ceive deposits, and thereby become subject to the
provisions of this Act, shall have the right to sur-
render to the Secretary of State its authority to
receive deposits and to do a banking business,
without impairing in any respect its charter rights
to conduct a trust company business, and there-
upon shall cease to have the right to receive de-
posits, but may conduct business as a trust com-
pany as though it had never had the right to re-
ceive deposits or to do a banking business.
§ 2821(23). Time in which amendment ob-
tained.—Trust companies which have not acquired
banking powers, but are receiving savings or
other deposits, shall be allowed twelve months
from the date of the approval of this Act to se-
cure amendments to their respective charters,
conferring such powers, or to pay off and settle
with their depositors.
§ 2821(24). Penalty.—Any person who as an
officer of any corporation or in his individual ca-
pacity shall violate the provisions of this Act, or
who shall knowingly permit the violation thereof
by any corporation with which he is connected,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
§ 2821(25). Certain corporations not affected
by this Act.—Nothing in this Act shall be con-
strued to affect, embrace, or include, or to bring
wTithin the operation of this Act any corporation
chartered by the Superior Court, having trust
company powers and without banking powers,
and which does not receive deposits subject to
check, and which invests its funds in loans on real
estate.
Approved August 25, 1927.
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ARTICLE 9
Corporations Created by Superior Court
SECTION 1
How Incorporated and Dissolved.
§ 2823. (§ 2350.) Superior courts may create
what corporations.
Constitutional Provision.—In 1912 the constitution was
amended so as to provide that the General Assembly "may
confer this authority to grant corporate powers and privi-
leges to private companies to the judges of the superior
court in vacation." It will be noted that at present the su-
perior courts receive their power to create corporations by
virtue of the constitution. This power, however, "shall be"
exercised in the manner which the legislature "shall pre-
scribe by law." Free Gift Society v. Fdwards, 163 Ga. 857,
864, 137 S. F- 382.
Courts May Not Delegate Power.—There is no provision
of our constitution or statute law authorizing the superior
court to commit its delegated powers to a corporation which
the court creates by virtue of the power given it by the con-
stitution and law, so as to authorize the corporation thus
created to itself charter other corporations without regard
to the provisions of our law concerning the acts necessary
to be done before the court itself can create such corpo-
rations. Free Gift Society v. Edwards, 163 Ga. 857, 864, 137
S. E. 382.
§ 2823(1). Charters granted in vacation.
Amendment after Publication. — The order of incorpora-
tion is not void where an amendment of the petition, chang-
ing the period of incorporation from thirty to twenty years,
is permitted after publication, on the ground that such an
order was not based upon an application that had been pub-
lished as required by law. Rogers v. Toccoa Fleet. Power
Co., 163 Ga. 919, 137 S. F- 272.
Act Changed Rule.—Prior to the passage and approval of
this act the judge of the superior court was without juris-
diction to grant a charter to a private corporation in vaca-
tion in a county other than where the application was pend-
ing. An order purporting to grant a charter in vacation and
in another county is a mere nullity. Rogers v. Toccoa
Power Co., 161 Ga. 524, 131 S. F. 517.
SECTION 2
Schools, Churches, Societies, etc.
§ 2830. (§ 2357.) Societies incorporated.
Name, Style and Objects of Association.—Where a plain-
tiff in its petition designates itself as Tremont Temple Bap-
tist Church, and alleges that it is "a duly organized religious
society, and that a certificate of said society has been duly
filed and recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior
court" of the county in which the church is located, this
shows a sufficient compliance with the provisions of the sec-
tion. Hartsfield v. Tremont Temple Baptist Church, 163
Ga. 557, 136 S. F. 550.
ARTICLE 10
Co-operative Marketing Associations
SECTION 1
Under Acts of 1920
§ 2928(1). Organization; capital stock; appli-
cation; title; dividends; reserve, profits.
Individual Liability of Members.—Individual liability for
debts of a corporation can not be imposed upon all its mem-
bers by a , by-law adopted by vote of a majority of the
members where no provision for such liability is made by
statute or charter. Corporations without capital stock are
within this rule. Mitcham v. Citizens Bank, 34 Ga. App.
707, 131 S. F. 181.
Where an action is against the corporation and all its
members, the petition should be dismissed on demurrer on
the ground of misjoinder of parties. Mitcham v. Citizens
Bank, 34 Ga. App. 707, 131 S. F. 181.
CHAPTER 3
Sale of Stocks, Bonds, etc. "Blue Sky Laws"
§ 2928(47). License necessary.
Persons to Whom Applicable—In Action for Commission.
—The defendant, being the issuer, was not required to
obtain a permit from the securities commission before put-
ting the stock on the market. Fven if the agent or solicitor
was required to do this before proceeding to sell the stock,
there being nothing to show that when entering into the
contract sued on the parties anticipated that the plaintiff
would not comply with the law, the defendant can not es-
cape liability for commissions merely because the agent,
after the making of the contract, may have violated the
criminal law in selling the stock without a license. Floding
Inc. v. Gunter, 36 Ga. App. 450, 136 S. F- 798.
§ 2928(50). Class "B" defined; act not applica-
ble.
Sale of Class "A" No Offense.—Taylor v. State, 34 Ga.
App. 4, 128 S. F. 228.
THIRD TITLE
Of Domestic Relations
CHAPTER 1
Of Husband and Wife
ARTICLE 1
Of Marriage and Divorce
SECTION 1
Marriage, How and by Whom Contracted
§ 2931 (§ 2412) Who is able to contract.
Previous Marriage.—If a man who had a living wife un-
divorced entered into a ceremonial marriage with another
woman who was not shown to have known of the former
marriage, and they cohabited as husband and wife from the
time of such marriage and continued to do so after the
death of the first wife, they will be considered thereafter as
lawfully married. Hamilton v. Bell, 161 Ga. 739, 132 S.
F. 83.
§ 2938. Notice of application to be posted; con-
sent of parent or guardian.—Immediately upon
receiving application for a license the ordinary
or his deputy shall post in the ordinary's office a
notice giving the names and residents of the par-
ties applying therefor, and the date of application.
No license shall be issued earlier than five days
following the date of application for such license,
within which period of five days objections to the
proposed marriage may be entered; provided the
foregoing provisions shall not apply to persons
who have arrived at the age of twenty-one years;
and upon application for license being made, and
the applicant therein claims the party to be twenty-
one years of age, or over, it shall be the duty of
the ordinary to whom application for license is
made to satisfy himself that the applicant's con-
tention as to age is true. If said ordinary does
not know of his own knowledge that both par-
ties for whom a marriage license is sought are
twenty-one years of age, or over, shall require
applicants to furnish birth certificates, or, in lieu
thereof, affidavits from at least two persons show-
ing the ages of both parties to be twenty-one years
of age, or over; and upon the failure of applicant
to convince the ordinary in the foregoing way,
shall be required to post notice of said applica-
tion for the period of five days, as is provided in
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Georgia Laws 1924, page 53; provided that in case
of emergency or extraordinary circumstance the
judge of the court having probate jurisdiction may
authorize the license to be issued at any time be-
fore the expiration of said five days. It shall be the
duty of the ordinary and his deputy to inquire as to
ages of all persons for whom marriage license are
asked; and if there be any grounds of suspicion
that the female is a minor under the age of
eighteen years, such ordinary and his deputy shall
refuse to grant the license until the written con-
sent of the parents or guardian, if any, controlling
such minor, shall be produced and filed in his
office; and any ordinary who, himself or deputy,
shall fail to post in his office facts pertaining to
the application, or who shall issue a license in vio-
lation of the time provision, shall knowingly grant
such license without such consent, or without
proper precaution in inquiring into the fact of
minority, or for the marriage of a female to his
knowledge domiciled in another county, shall for-
feit the sum of $500.00 for every such Act, to be
recovered at the suit of the clerk of the Superior
Court, and added to the educational fund of the
count}^. The posting of said notice may be dis-
pensed with in the case the parents or guardian
of the female appears in person before the ordi-
nary and consents in writing to the issuance of
said license. Acts 1924, pp. 53, 54; 1927, p. 224.
Editor's Note.—The first proviso and all that follows it
down to the second proviso was inserted by the amendment
of 1927. The amendment also effected certain minor changes
of phraseology not affecting the substance.
§ 2938(1). Application for license; information
as to impediments, etc.—Marriage license shall be
issued under the rules prescribed by the preced-
ing section on written application made by the
person seeking license therefor, verified by oath
of applicant, which application shall state that
there is no legal impediment to marriage, and
shall give the full name of the proposed husband,
with date of birth, present address, and name of
father and mother, if known, and if unknown shall
so state, with present name of proposed wife with
date of her birth and present address, with name
of father and mother, if known, and if unknown
shall so state, and shall be supported by affidavits
of two reputable citizens of the United States of
America as to truth of recitals in said applica-
tion, which application shall be filed in the office
of ordinary before marriage license shall be is-
sued upon such application, and such application
shall remain in the permanent files in the office
of the ordinary, and may be used as evidence in
any court of law under the rules of evidence made
and provided in similar cases. Acts 1927, p. 226.
SECTION 2
Of Divorces, and How Obtained
§ 2945. (§ 2426.) Grounds for total divorce.
See annotations to section 2951.
§ 2951. (§ 2432.) Proceedings.
Right to Expressly Waive Certain Rights.—None of the
provisions of this section or sections 2945, 2952 and 2975 af-
fect the general principle which allows a litigant to ex-
pressly waive rights accorded him upon which he may
either insist or relinquish at his option. Don v. Don, 162
Ga. 240, 243, 133 S. E. 242.
§ 2954. (§ 2435.) Schedule.
Filing in Case of Separation.—Where the parties have sep-
arated it is error to order the schedule to be filed as of the
date of filing petition for divorce. Smith v. Smith, 162
Ga. 349, 133 S. E. 842.
Cited in Meadows v. Meadows, 161 Ga. 90, 129 S. E. 659.
§ 2955. (§ 2436.) Transfer pending suit.
Section Not Applicable in Suit for Alimony without Di-
vorce.—In a suit by a wife against her husband for alimony
when no suit for divorce is pending, and no schedule of the
husband's property is filed, it is not error on the trial, when
an ancillary proceeding has been filed subsequently to the
filing of the alimony suit, to cancel a deed executed by the
husband to his sister, to refuse to give this section in charge.
Chandler v. Chandler, 161 Ga. 350, 130 S. E- 685.
Same—Bona Fides a Question for Jury.—In such a suit it
was error for the court to charge that a certain deed which
purported to convey to a third person, a large portion of the
respondent's realty which was alleged in the petition was his
property, did not have the effect to pass title to the grantee;
it being a question of fact for the jury to decide whether it
had been executed bona fide in payment of a pre-existing
debt. Mathews v. Mathews, 162 Ga. 233, 133 S. E. 254.
§ 2956. (§ 2437.) Verdict of jury.
When Section Applicable.—This section only refers to cases
where a divorce proceeding is pending. Chandler v. Chandler,
161 Ga. 350, 130 S. E- 685.
§ 2971. (§ 2452.) Custody of children.
Award to Maternal Grandparents.—Conflicting evidence as
to the fitness of either the father or the mother to have
custody of the child, the judge does not abuse his discretion
in awarding such custody to the maternal grandparents of
the child. Phillips v. Phillips, 161 Ga. 79, 129 S. E- 644.
(§ 2453.) Habeas corpus for wife or§ 2972.
child.
Procedure Same as for Habeas Corpus Generally.—No dif-
ferent procedure is provided for obtaining a trial of the writ
of habeas corpus under this section of the code from the pro-
visions for the trial of habeas corpus generally, but it is
contemplated that the writ shall issue and be tried under this
section as provided in the sections relating to habeas corpus
generally. Collard v. McCormick, 162 Ga. 116, 120, 132 S. E.
757.
SECTION 3
Of Alimony
§ 2975. (§ 2456.) Permanent and temporary.
When Contention Macfe That Husband Has no "Estate."—
Ifl the instant case the trial judge did not err in awarding
temporary alimony and attorney's fees over the contention
that the husband had no "estate" out of which the allowance
could be made. Lundy v. Lundy, 162 Ga. 42, 132 S. E- 389.
§ 2981.
trial.
(§ 2462.) Alimony for children on final
Failure to Specify Amount Minor Child Entitled to, etc.—
A verdict and decree in a divorce case are not void on the
ground that the verdict allowing a stated sum as alimony for
the support of the wife and child do not specify what amount
the minor child should be entitled to for its support, nor
in what manner, how often, nor to whom it should be paid.
Cunningham v. Faulkner, 163 Ga. 19, 135 S. E. 403.
When Charge Corrects Previous Error.—When the trial
judge, in his charge, instructs the jury to specify "how
often, to whom, and until when" the alimony for the child
is to be paid, a previous statement that the father is liable
for the support of his minor child until it arrives at the age
of 21 years, is not thereby rendered harmless. Barlow v.
Barlow, 161 Ga. 202, 129 S. E- 860.
§ 2986. (§ 2467.) Proceeding for alimony be-
fore the judge.
For Express Use of Minor Child.—Under the circumstances
of the instant case the trial judge did not err in entering a
judgment awarding attorney's fees and alimony to the wife
for the express use of the minor child. Waller v. Waller, 163
Ga. 377, 136 S. E. 149.
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ARTICLE 2
Of Rights and Liabilities of Husband and Wife
§ 2996. (§ 2477.) Agency of wife in respect
to necessaries.
Presumption of Husband's Duty of Support.—Cohabitation
raises a presumption of the wife's authority to purchase
necessaries on the credit of her husband; and where the
husband seeks to avoid liability on account of purchases
so made, he has the burden of "showing that the goods
were supplied under such circumstances that he is not
bound to pay for them." Shaw v. Allen & Co., 34 Ga.
App. Ill, 113, 128 S. F. 699. It is submitted that this is not
a case of agency proper, but rather has reference to the hus-
band's legal duty to support his wife. So long as he owes
her the duty of support he is bound for her necessaries.
When this duty ceases to exist, the husband is no longer
bound. This is to be distinguished from cases where the
husband has held his wife out, by a course of dealing, as
his agent. In the instant case the cohabitation merely
raises the presumption of the husband's continued duty of
support, and placing upon him the duty of showing that the
wife has forfeited the right to his support. This is the gen-
eral rule.
—
Ed. Note.
Same—Agreement with Wife's Mother.—An agreement be-
tween the mother and the husband, for the mother to take
the wife to her home and bear the expense of her support and
maintenance, was held not to relieve the husband from his
obligation to support and maintain his wife. Akin v. Akin,
163 Ga. 18, 135 S. F. 402.
ARTICLE 3
Of Marriage Contracts and Settlements
§ 3007. (§ 2488.) Wife feme sole as to her
separate estate.
II. CONTRACTS OF SURETYSHIP.
A. Generally.
Applies to All Contracts
—
Question of Fraud. — Whether
the lender could be defrauded into believing that a married
woman could enter into a contract of suretyship, the mere
tact that the defendant wife, together with her husband,
may have known at the time of the transaction that her
promise as a surety was not binding would not operate to
change the rule and to render her liable on the contract
where otherwise she was not. Rhodes v. Gunn, 34 Ga. App.
115, 128 S. F. 213.
Tests as to What Constitutes Suretyship Contract. — A
wife can not bind her separate estate by any contract of
suretyship nor by any assumption of the debts of her hus-
band, and "No superficial appearance will be permitted to
lead the court away from the true inwardness of the trans-
action." Rhodes v. Gunn, 34 Ga. App. 115, 128 S. F. 213,
citing Gross v. Smith, 31 Ga. App. 95, 119 S. F. 541.
B. Conveyance to Secure Husband's Debt.
In General.—A deed given by a married woman, in pur-
suance of a scheme by which she pledges her individual
property as security for the debt of another, is void in toto.
Lee v. Johnston, 162 Ga. 560, 134 S. F. 166.
To Secure Partnership Debt.—A note and deed given by
a defendant is not binding upon her as a married woman,
where it is given as security for a debt of a partnership of
which her husband was a member, and it is immaterial
whether the debt is assumed as security or paid as her
husband's debt at the insistence of the creditor who knew
all the circumstances upon which the payment was being
made. Boykin v. Bohler, 163 Ga. 807, 137 S'. F. 45.
III. ASSUMPTION OF HUSBAND'S DEBTS.
A. In General.
Validity of Indirect Method of Assuming Husband's
Debts.—Where, by a scheme or device to which her hus-
band's creditor is a party, a wife is induced to make a gift
to her husband of her separate estate for the purpose of
being used by the husband in the payment of his debt to
the creditor, and the husband conveys the property to the
creditor in extinguishment of the debt, such transaction
may, at the instance of the wife, be treated as void and as
passing no title from the wife. Calhoun v. Hill, 35 Ga. App.
18, 131 S. F. 918.
C. Loan to Wife to Pay Debts of Husband.
Lender Husband's Creditor.
—See Jackson v. Jackson, 161
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Ga. 837, 132 S. F- 79, citing and following the paragraph set
out under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 3009. (§ 2490.) Sale to husband or trustees.
Who May Attack.—See McArthur v. Ryles, 162 Ga. 413,
134 S. F. 76, following and applying the paragraph set out
under this paragraph in the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 3011. (§ 2492.) A married woman may con-
tract; presumptions.
Where Husband Wife's Agent.—Where a husband clothed
by a written power of attorney, cancelled a certificate of
stock standing in the name of his wife, and had a new cer-
tificate issued to himself, even though the legal title passed
to the husband, the shares were impressed with a trust, and
they were in equity still the property of the wife, as were
likewise all income or profits arising or derived from said
stock. Bacon v. Bacon, 161 Ga. 978, 133 S. F. 512.
Applied in Davis v. Barrett, 163 Ga. 666, 136 S. F. 904.
CHAPTER 2
Of Parent and Child
ARTICLE l
Legitimate Children
§ 3016. (§ 2497.) Mode of adopting child—
Any person desirous of adopting a child, so as
to render it capable of inheriting his estate, may
present a petition to the superior court of the
county in which said child may be domiciled,
setting forth the name of the father, or, if he be
dead or has abandoned his family, the mother,
and the consent of such father or mother to the
act of adoption; if the child has neither father
nor mother, the consent of no person shall be
necessary to said adoption. The court, upon be-
ing satisfied with the truth of the facts stated in
the petition, and of the fact that such father or
mother has notice of such application (which
notice may be by publication, as required in eq-
uity cases for non-resident defendants), or if the
father or mother has abandoned the child, and
being further satisfied that such adoption would
be to the interest of the child, shall declare said
child to be the adopted child of such person and
capable of inheriting his estate, and also what
shall be the name of such child; thenceforward
the relation between such person and the adopted
child shall be. as to their legal rights and liabili-
ties, the relation of parent and child, except that
the adopted father shall never inherit from the
child. To all other persons the adopted child
shall stand as if no such act of adoption had
been taken.
(a) Provided, that no person may adopt a
child under this Act unless such person is (1) at
least twenty-five years of age, or (2) married and
living with husband or wife. The petitioner must
be at least ten years older than the child, a resi-
dent of this State, and financially able and morally
fit to have the care of the child. If the child is
14 years of age or over, his consent shall be nec-
essary to the adoption.
(b) The petition
be filed jointly by
person desiring to
contain the name
dress and age of
which the child is
ents are living or
the living parents
]
,
duly verified in duplicate, shall
husband and wife, unless the
adopt is unmarried, and shall
and age of the child, the ad-
the petitioner, the name by
to be known, whether the par-
not, names and addresses of
or guardians, if known to the
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petitioner, and a description of any property be-
longing to said child.
(c) Upon the filing of the petition the court
shall issue summons to the next of kin, parents
or guardians, brothers and sisters, if living within
the State, and legal notice if a non-resident by
service if possible, otherwise by publication once
a week for four weeks in the official organ of the
county where such proceedings are pending.
After the expiration of thirty days from the date
of filing of the petition, the case shall be placed
upon the regular calendar of the court for a hear-
ing before the judge without a jury, and the court
shall hear evidence from witnesses as to the good
character, moral fitness, and financial ability of
the petitioner to care for the child, as well as all
other allegations in the petition. When a child
has been awarded by court order, or otherwise
legally and permanently surrendered, to the cus-
tody of a licensed child-placing agency for perma-
nent placing in a foster home, such agency shall
be served with summons in lieu of parents and
relatives, and the written consent of such agency
shall be filed with the court before adoption can
be granted.
(d) Upon the first hearing the court may pass
an order only granting temporary custody of the
child to the petitioner. Final adoption shall be
granted only upon a second hearing after the
child shall have been in the custody and care of
the petitioner for a period of six months.
(e) A copy of the decree of adoption shall be
filed with the State Registrar of Vital Statistics.
Acts 1855-6, p. 260; 1859, p. 36; 1882-3, p. 59;
1889, p. 69; 1927, p. 142.
Editor's Note.—The clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) of
this section were added by the amendment of 1927.
Presumrrtion That Proceedings Regular.
—
Every presump-
tion is to be indulged to sustain a proceeding of adoption by
a court of competent jurisdiction. Harper v. Lindsey, 162
Ga. 44, 132 S. E. 639.
Estoppel of Parents.—Where adoptive parents seek and
obtain the decree they ask for in a court of their selection,
and take the child or children so adopted into the family
and treat them as their own, they and their heirs and per-
sonal representatives are estopped from asserting that the
child is not legally adopted. Harper v. Lindsey, 162 Ga.
44, 132 S. E. 639.
§ 3020. (§ 2501.) Parent's obligation.
No Application to Alimony Proceedings.—This section has
no application to proceedings for alimony. Barlow v.
Barlow, 161 Ga. 202, 129 S. E. 860.
When Mother Must Support Children.—See note under
section 554.
§ 3021. (§ 2502.) Parental power, how lost.
In General.—The right to the services of children and the
obligation to maintain them go together. Whatever de-
prives the parent of the right to the custody and services
of the child, without fault on his part, relieves him from the
Huty to support the child. Thompson v. Georgia Ry. & P.
Co., 163 Ga. 598, 603, 136 S. E. 895.
Right to Earnings. — Where a minor child labors and
earns money, the presumption is that the proceeds of his
labor belongs to his father, if living; and where it is
claimed that such in fact belongs to the minor, that pre-
sumption must be overcome by proof of the fact that the
father has, either expressly or impliedly, manumitted the
minor so as to allow the proceeds of the labor to go to the
minor. Jones v. McCowen, 34 Ga. App. 801, 131 S. E- 290.
A father may give to a minor child the right to the pro-
ducts of his labor which products cannot be levied on as
property of the father. See Ehrlich & Co. v. King, 34 Ga.
App. 787, 131 S. E. 524.
Paragraph 5—Effect of Marriage.—The child who mar-
ries assumes inconsistent responsibilities which entitle him
to the proceeds of his own labor. He becomes the head of
a new family, and is no longer a member of the family of
his parent. This being so, the parent is under no legal ob-
ligation to support him. Thompson v. Georgia Ry. & P.
Co., 163 Ga. 598, 604, 136 S. E. 895.
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CHAPTER 3
Of Guardian and Ward
ARTICLE 1
Their Appointment, Powers, Duties, Liabilities,
Settlements, Resignation, etc.
§ 3047. (§ 2528.) Bond and oath.
As to suit on guardian's bond in ward's name, see note
under section 3054.
§ 3054. (§ 2535.) Suit on guardian's bond.
Suit by Ward in Own Name. — Although the statutory
bond required of a guardian under section 3047 is payable
to the ordinary, suit thereon may be maintained by the
ward in his own name after becoming of age, and need not
be maintained by the ordinary suing for the use of the
ward. Sheppard v. Clark, 35 Ga. App. 503, 134 S. E- 125.
Guardian Need Not Be Joined. — It is not mandatory,
under this section, that the guardian be sued in the same
action with the surety. It is merely permissible. Shep-
pard v. Clark, 162 Ga. 143, 132 S. E. 755.
Petition in Action against Guardian and Sureties.—In a
suit against the guardian and his surety, it is not necessary
to allege that the plaintiff has obtained a judgment against
the guardian in his representative capacity, in order to show
a cause of action against the surety. American Surety Co.
v. Macon Savings Bank, 162 Ga. 143, 132 S. E. 636. In
this case the history of this section and section 3974, in re-
gard to suits upon administrator's bonds, is reviewed and
the two sections are held to be analogous.
—
Ed. Note.
Petition in Action against Sureties Alone. — In a suit
against the sureties upon a guardian's bond by the ward
after becoming of age, where the guardian was not made a
party defendant, the petition, which recited that a personal
judgment had been obtained against the guardian in a suit
by the ward and which recited a return of nulla bona upon
an execution issued thereon and that the execution had not
oeen paid, set out a cause of action and was not subject to
general demurrer, nor to special demurrer upon the ground
of non-joinder of parties. Sheppard v. Clark, 35 Ga. App.
503, 134 S. E. 125.
Same—Amendment. — In a suit upon a guardian's bond
against the sureties on it, the guardian not being joined as
a party defendant either in his representative capacity or
in his individual capacity, the petition is subject to amend-
ment by alleging judgments rendered against the guardian
in his representative capacity and in his individual capacity.
Sheppard v. Clark, 162 Ga. 143, 132 S. E. 755.
ARTICLE 2
Master's Liability to Servant
§ 3129. (§ 2610.) Injuries to coemployees.
Definition of Fellow Servants. — In determining whether
certain servants are fellow servants it is necessary to decide
whether the servants, the nature of their duties being con-
sidered, were "about the same business," or were "engaged
in the common pursuit,"—a phrase which is occasionally
found in the decisions, which means the same thing as being
"about the same business." Holliday v. Merchants, etc.,
Transp. Co., 161 Ga. 949, 953, 132 S. E. 210.
Same—Editor's Note. — See in Holliday v. Merchants &
Miners Transp. Co., 161 Ga. 949, 132 S. E. 210, following the
statement made under this catchline in the Georgia Code
of 1926.
§ 3130. (§ 2611.) Duty of master.
IV. DUTY TO PROVIDE SAFE PLACE TO WORK.
A. In General.
Degree of Care.—It is the master's duty to exercise ordi-
nary and reasonable care to furnish the servant with a safe
place to work, under this and the following section. White-
hurst v. Standard Oil Co., 8 Fed. (2d), 728.
C. Application of Rule.
1. In General.
Places to Which Rule Relates. — See Flippin v. Central
etc., Ry. Co., 35 Ga. App. 243, 132 S. E. 918, affirming the
statement made under this catchline in the Georgia Code
nf 1926.
§ 3131 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT § 3154(2)
VI. DUTY IN REGARD TO INSPECTION AND
REPAIR
When a Question for Jury.—In servant's action for in-
juries from ladder's breaking, whether in exercise of reason-
able care in making- inspection defendant would not have
ascertained that rung of ladder was decayed was for the
jury, although the ladder had been recently painted, con-
cealing the defect; it not appearing that examination be-
fore the ladder was painted would not have disclosed the
defect. Whitehurst v. Standard Oil Co., 8 Fed. (2d), 728.
§ 3131. (§ 2612.) Duty of servant.
II. ASSUMPTION OF RISKS BY SERVANTS.
B. Risks Ordinarily Incidental to Service.
1. In General.
Where a servant has equal means with his master of
•knowing of the defect or danger which brought about his
Injury, this is an assumed risk. Threlkeld v. Anthony, 36
Ga. App. 227, 136 S. F. 285.
III. ACTIONS FOR INJURIES TO SERVANTS.
A. In General.
Burden of Proof.—The burden is on the plaintiff to show
not only negligence on the part of the master, but due care
on his own part; and it must appear that the plaintiff did
not know, and had not equal means of knowing, all that
which is charged as negligence, and that by the exercise of
ordinary care he could not have known thereof. Flippin v.
Central, etc., Ry. Co., 35 Ga. App. 243, 132 S. F. 918.
ARTICLE 4
Child Labor Regulated
§ 3149(1). Employment of children under 14
in mills, etc., prohibited.
Provision in Insurance Policy. — A provision in an em-
ployer's liability policy of insurance to the effect that the
policy shall not apply to injuries sustained by any person
employed by the insured "in violation of law as to age, or
under the age of fourteen years if there is no legal age
limit," contemplates a violation of this section. Savannah
Kaolin Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 35 Ga. App. 24, 131 S. F-
919.
It does not contemplate merely a criminal violation of the
act, which occurs only where the employer knowingly em-
ploys a person under the prohibited age. Savannah
Kaolin Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 35 Ga. App. 24, 131 S. F-
•919.
ARTICLE 6
Workmen's Compensation Act.
§ 3154(1). Titles.
Purpose of the Act.—In Goelitz v. Industrial Board, 278
111. 164, 115 N. F. 855, the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
^'The fundamental basis of workmen's compensation laws
is that there is a large element of public interest in
accidents ^occurring from modern industrial conditions, and
that the economic loss caused by such accidents should not
necessarily rest upon the public, but that the industry in
which an accident occurred shall pay, in the first instance,
for the accident." Globe Indemnity Co. v. Lankford, 35 Ga.
App. 599, 603, 134 S. E. 357.
§ 3154(2). Definition of terms; compensation
on basis of wage.
Policeman of County.—The term "employee," in this sec-
tion does not apply to a county policeman elected or
appointed by the county, since it is not the relation of em-
ployer and employee which exists between a county and
such a county policeman, but such a county policeman is a
public officer. Goss v. Gordon County, 35 Ga. App. 325, 133
S. F. 68. See also section 3154(8) and annotations thereto.
County Treasurer and Clerk of Board of Roads.—Where
the treasurer" of a certain county became ex-officio clerk
of the board of roads and revenues of that county, he was
beld to be an officer and not an employee within the meaning
of this act. U. S. Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Watts, 35 Ga.
App. 447, 133 S'. F. 476.
II. ACCIDENT IN EMPLOYMENT.
See annotations to section 3154(14), as to what constitutes
injuries arising "out of the employment."
When Injury Arises in Course of Employment.—An injury
is received "in the course of" the employment when it
comes while the workman is doing the duty which he is
employed to perform. It "arises out of" the employment,
when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon considera-
tion of all the circumstances, a causal connection between
the conditions under which the work is required to be per-
formed and the resulting injury. The causative danger
must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neigh-
borhood. It must be incidental to the character of the
business and not independent of the relation of the master
and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected,
but after the event it must appear to have had its origin in
a risk connected with the employment, and to have flowed
from that source as a rational consequence. Georgia Rail-
way, etc., Co. v. Clore, 34 Ga. App. 409, 410, 129 S. F. 779.
An Accident Arises "Out of" the Employment.—See
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. -557, 559, 127
S. F. 121, citing and following the statement under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Necessity of Concurrence.
—See Refining Co. v. Sheffield,
162 Ga. 656, 134 S. F. 761, citing and following the paragraphs
set out under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Violation of Rule Not Approved by Commission.—An act
done in violation of the rule against the use of the elevator
by employees is not necessarily one out of the scope of the
employment, to the extent of excluding the master and
servant relation; and, where there is nothing to show that
the rule had been approved by the industrial commission, its
violation would not bar compensation. American, etc., Ins.
Co. v. Hardy, 36 Ga. App. 487, 491, 137 S. F- 113.
Temporary Suspension of Employment.—Where a mem-
ber of a crew on a vessel then lying at the docks, a part of
the terminals of the defendant, obtained shore-leave and,
after two hours spent ashore returned to the terminals and
demanded entrance at a gate, even if the relationship of
master and servant existing between the member of the
crew and the transportation company had been suspended
that relationship came immediately into existence again as
soon as the servant returned to the gate and demanded ad-
mittance. Holliday v. Merchants, etc., Transp. Co., 161
Ga. 949, 132 S. F. 210.
Replacing Belts at Ginnery.—An injury received in replac-
ing the belts at a ginnery, from which they had been bor-
rowed for use in the sawmill of the lumber company, arose
"out of and in the course of" the injured person's em-
ployment with that company. Zurich General Accident, etc.,
Co. v Ellington, 34 Ga. App. 490, 130 S. F- 220.
'Evidence.—In Norwick Union Indemnity Co. v. Johnson,
36 Ga. App. 186, 136 S. F- 335, it was held that the evidence
did not authorize the finding that injury arose out of and in
the cause of employment. Conversely, in Accident Corp. v.
Martin, 35 Ga. App. 504, 134 S. F. 174; Guarantee Corp. v.
Wallace, 35 Ga. App. 571, 134 S. F- 334, and American, etc.,
Ins. Co. v. Hardy, 36 Ga. App. 487, 137 S. F- 113. It
was held that the evidence authorized the finding that in-
jury did arise out of and in the cause of the employment.
Findings of Fact Conclusive.—It is not enough for the com-
mission to state, merely as a conclusion, in the language of
the statute, that the injury is found to have arisen out of
and in the course of the employment. This does not mean,
however, that it is improper for the commission to give
its conclusion in the language of the statute, where the
findings of fact as stated are sufficient to justify such con-
clusion. What the court meant in Southeastern Express
Co. v. Fdmondson, 30 Ga. App. 697, 119 S. F. 39, was that
a mere statement that the commission finds that the in-
jury arose out of and in the course of the employment is
not such a finding of fact as would justify an award, when
it stands unsupported by any other findings of fact to
justify it as a conclusion. American, etc., Ins. Co. v.
Hardy, 36 Ga. App. 487, 490, 137 S. F- 113.
III. DISEASE ARISING FROM ACCIDENT.
When Disease Results Naturally and Unavoidably.—See
Casualty Co. v. Smith, 34 Ga. App. 363, 374, 129 S. F. 880,
quoting and following the paragraph set out under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Statements after Occurrence of Injury. — The statements
of the emoloyee tending to show that he had suffered an
injury and that the injury resulted in hernia, having been
made some time after the alleged injury, and being merely
narrative and descriptive of something which had fully taken
nlace and become a thing of the past, had no probative
value in establishing the fact that he was injured. Bolton
v. Columbia Casualty Co., 34 Ga. App. 658, 130 S. F. o35.
IV. WILFUL INJURY BY THIRD PERSON.
Assaults for Reasons Not Personal to Employee.—Where
one in the discharge of his duties, is required to travel upon
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a train, his exposure to an unprovoked assault by a pas-
senger, who jumps up from his seat and begins shooting at
the passengers, is not a risk incident to the employment,
and the death of the employee as a result of such an assault
is not an injury which arises out of the employment, and
therefore is not compensable. Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557, 137 S. F. 121.
V. COMPENSATION FROM EMPLOYER AND THIRD
PERSON—SUBROGATION.
Applied.—For the application of the provision as to sub-
rogation, see Western Atlantic Railroad v. Henderson, 35
Ga. App. 363, 133 S'. F. 645.
§ 3154(4). Exemption; notices to reject.
As to presumption where there are less number of em-
ployees than ten, see note to section 3154(15).
§ 3154(7). Relief from obligations.
See annotations to section 3154(45).
Employee Not Precluded Notwithstanding Agreement. —
An employee can not be deprived of the compensation to
which he is entitled thereunder by any agreement between
himself and his employer, notwithstanding its approval by
the industrial commission. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Lank-
ford, 35 Ga. App. 599, 600, 134 S. F- 357.
§ 3154(8). Provisions not applicable to public
employees.
Policeman as Employee—Insurance Expressly Covering
Lien. — Although a city policeman may not be an "em-
ployee" within the meaning of that term as used in this act,
yet where an insurance company insures a city under the
workmen's compensation act and the policy expressly covers
policemen employed by the city and the salaries of the
policemen are taken into consideration in fixing the pre-
mium, the policemen, in so far as the insurance company is
concerned, are employees of the city and entitled to com-
pensation under the policy. Frankfort General Ins. Co. v.
Conduitt, 74 Ind. App. 584 (127 N. F. 212); Kennedy v.
Kennedy Mfg. Co., 177 App. Div. 56 (163 N. Y. Supp. 944);
Maryland Casualty' Co. v. Wells, 35 Ga. App. 759, 134 S. F.
788. See notes to section 3154(2).
§ 3154(15). Common carriers.
Presumption of Operating under This Act. — There is no
presumption that an employer and an employee are oper-
ating under the provisions of the workmen's compensation
act where it does not appear that the employer regularly
had in service as many as ten employees in the same busi-
ness within this State. Bussell v. Dannenberg Co., 34 Ga.
App. 792, 132 S. F. 230.
§ 3154(16). Action against exempted employer.
Applied in Fulton Bakery Incorporated v. Williams, 35
Ga. App. 681, 134 S. F. 621.
§ 3154(20). Contractor, when liable; recovery.
Employees of Independent Contractor. — See Zurich Gen-
eral Accident, etc., Ins. Co. v. Lee, 36 Ga. App. 248, 136 S.
F. 173, citing and following the paragraph set out under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Relation at the Time of Injury Governs.—Whatever may
have been the previous relation of the deceased employee to
the defendant, where the evidence authorizes the finding
that at the time of the accident which resulted in his death
he was an employee of the defendant, and not the employee
of an independent contractor, the authorized finding of the
industrial commission upon this issue can not be disturbed.
See, in this connection, Ocean Accident, etc., Corp. v.
Council, 35 Ga. App. 632, 134 S. F. 331; Ocean Accident &
Guarantee Corp. v. Wilson, 36 Ga. App. 784, 138 S. F. 246.
Institution of Claim against Immediate Employer Pre-
requisite.—Whatever may be the state of evidence as to the
existence of the relation of master and servant between the
defendant and the plaintiff, where that part of this section
which provides that every claim for compensation under this
section shall be in the first instance presented to and insti-
tuted against the immediate employer, has not been complied
with, no recovery can be had against the principal em-
ployer who is not the immediate employer. Zurich General
Accident, etc., Ins. Co. v. Lee, 36 Ga. App. 248, 136 S. F- 173.
§ 3154(23). Notice of accident or injury by em-
ployee.
Notice to Immediate Superior. — The evidence authorized
the inference that the representative of the injured em-
ployee immediately gave notice of the injury to the im-
mediate superior of the injured employee, and therefore a
written notice to the employer was not necessary. Ocean
Accident, etc., Corp. v. Martin, 35 Ga. App. 504, 134 S. E-
174.
§ 3154(27). Liability for medical attention
limited.
No Liability over One Hundred Dollars.—Under the pro-
visions of this section the Industrial Commission has no au-
thority to award more than the limit prescribed by
this section where the insurance carrier made no agreement
that it would be liable for more than the statutory amount.
Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Chandler, 162 Ga.
244, 133 S. F. 237; Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v.
Chandler, 35 Ga. App. 464, 134 S. F. 122.
§ 3154(34). Injuries not specified in section
3154(32).
Rate of Compensation for Injury to Already Injured Part.
—Where an employee who in childhood had lost a foot and
a part of one leg to within three inches of the knee, suffered
a compensable injury to the remaining portion of his leg,
as a result of which he sustained a 50 per cent, loss of the
use of that portion, he was entitled to compensation for such
partial loss of use at the rate of 50 per cent, of the amount
which he should have received for the loss of a leg or for
the loss of use of a leg, irrespective of the previous dis-
ability or injury. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v.
Brock, 35 Ga. App. 772, 135 S. F. 103.
§ 3154(39). List of dependents; termination of
dependence.
Conclusive Presumption as to Dependency of Child under
18
—Construction of Stepfather Clause.
—Under this section
a child under eighteen years of age is conclusively presumed
to be wholly dependent on the parent, and is therefore en-
citied to compensation for the homicide of the parent in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the statute. The clause of
the act providing that the term "child" as thus used shall
include "stepchild" and that the term "parent" shall include
"step-parents" ;s to be liberally construed as enlarging the
sphere of conclusive dependency in favor of such a child,
so as to include a right which would not otherwise* con-
clusively exist. The provision is not to be construed as
intended to exclude by unnecessary implication a plainly
established claim for the homicide of an actual parent.
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 35 Ga. App. 214, 132 S. E.
265.
A child under eighteen is conclusively presumed to be de-
pendent upon his father. Hence if his mother is divorced
and marries another man who becomes his stepfather, this
section establishes a principle of double dependency, and the
stepfather clause of trie section does not preclude him from
recovering for the homicide of his actual father. Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 35 Ga. App. 214, 220, 132 S. F. 265.
Finding as to Desertion Conclusive When Supported by
Any Evidence.—The findings of the industrial commission
on questions of fact, which would include any issue upon
the question of voluntary desertion by a claimant wife, if
supported by any evidence, are conclusive. United States
Casualty Co. v. Matthews, 35 Ga. App. 526, 133 S. F. 875;
Maryland Casualty Co. v. England, 160 Ga. 810, 812, 129 S.
F. 75; Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp. v. Council, 35 Ga.
App. 632, 134 S. F. 331.
Admission of Desertion Amounting to Conclusion of Law.
—The finding: of the commissioner before whom the case
was originally tried, that the claimant was not entitled to-
compensation on account of her admission "that she had vol-
untarily left her husband," was a conclusion of law, based
upon her own testimony; and hence reversible. Ocean Ac-
cident & Guaranty Corp. v. Council, 35 Ga. App. 632, 134
S. F. 331.
§ 3154(45). Review of awards.
See annotations to section 3154(58).
Waiver of Right by Contract.—See Globe Indemnity Com-
pany v. Lankford, 35 Ga. App. 599, 134 S. F. 357, citing and
following the paragraph set out under this catchline in
Georgia Code of 1926. See notes of this case under section
3154(50).
§ 3154(50). Industrial Commission created.
Administrative Body—Jurisdiction.—The Industrial Com-
mission is not a court of general jurisdiction, nor even of
limited common law jurisdiction,- but it is an industrial
commission, made so by express terms of the act of the leg-
islature to administer its provisions as provided therein;
as such administrative commission it possesses only such
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jurisdiction, powers, and authority as are conferred upon it
by the legislature, or such as arise therefrom by necessai']-
implication to carry out the full and complete exercise of
the powers srranted. Gravitt v. Ga. Casualty Co., 158 Ga.
613, 123 S. E. 897; Globe Indemnity Co. v. Lankford, 35
Ga. App. 599, 601, 134 S. E. 357.
§ 3154(55). Agreements.
Finality of Award upon the Agreement of Parties. —
Where the employer and the claimant reach an agreement
in regard to compensation, and a memorandum of the agree-
ment is filed with, and approved by, the industrial com-
mission, and thereupon the commission makes an award to
the claimant, and notice of the award is given to the in-
terested parties, the award is final and cannot be set aside,
diminished, or increased, unless the parties disagree as to
the continuance of any weekly payment under the agree-
ment. Lattimore v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 35
Ga. App. 250, 133 S. E- 291.
§ 3154(57). Conduct of hearings.
Award Directed against Both Employer and Insurer. —
The award of the industrial commission should be directed
against both the employer and the insurance carrier instead
of against the insurance carrier only. Hartford Accident,
etc., Co. v. Hall, 36 Ga. App. 574, 576, 137 S. E. 415.
§ 3154(58). Review.
Discretion of Commission as to Rule 26.—Rule 26 of the
industrial commission, laying down the conditions upon
which the full commission will hear evidence on review, is
to be enforced or relaxed in the discretion of the commission,
without interference by the courts. American, etc., Ins. Co.
v. Hardy, 36 Ga. App. 487, 137 S. E. 113.
§ 3154(59). Appeals to Superior Court; writ of
error.
Exception Must Point out Error.—An exception on appeal
from an award of the industrial committee, on the ground oi
insufficiency of evidence must point out the particular evi-
dence objected to on the ground of objections. Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Wells, 35 Ga. App. 759, 134 S. E- 788.
Raising New Point on Appeal. — See Fidelity Co. v.
Christian, 35 Ga. App. 326, 133 S. E- 639, and Ocean Accident,
etc., Corp. v. Martin, 35 Ga. App. 504, 134 S. E- 174, citing
and following the statement made under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926.
Findings of Fact Conclusive.—See Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 35
Ga. App. 182, 132 S. E- 240. Fidelity Co. v. Christian, 35 Ga.
App. 326, 133 S. E. 639; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Miller, 36
Ga. App. 631, 137 S. E- 788, following the statement made
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
But the judgment of the superior court affirming the
award of the industrial commission in a case where the evi-
dence fails to show that the death of the deceased arose out
of and in the course of his employment, will be reversed
upon appeal to the court of appeals. Georgia Casualty Co.
v. Kilburn, 36 Ga. App. 761, 138 S. E. 257.
Sufficiency of Evidence Equivalent to Verdict, etc.—See
Fidelity Co. v. Christian, 35 Ga. App. 326, 133 S. E- 639,
following the statement made under this catchline in the
Georgia Code of 1926.
Correct Order Not Affected by Erroneous Finding as to
Notice.—Where the order of the commission denying com-
pensation is not erroneous upon a given ground and was not
affected by an erroneous finding as to lack of notice, it will
be sustained irrespective of any error affecting a finding
that there was a lack of notice. Maryland Casualty Co.
v. England, 34 Ga. App. 354, 129 S. E- 446.
Court Authorised to Enter Proper Judgment.—On the
appeal of the claimant from an award made on an erroneous
basis the superior court is authorized to enter the proper
final judgment upon the findings as made. American, etc.,
Ins. Co. v. Brock, 35 Ga. App. 772, 135 S. E- 103.
FOURTH TITLE
Of Relations Arising from Other Contracts
CHAPTER l
Of Partnerships
ARTICLE 1
General Principals
§ 3155. (§ 2626.) How Created.
This Section Not Exhaustive. — As between themselves.
"the intent of the parties is the true test of a partnership,
which may be created by a contract giving rights or im-
posing liabilities differing from those from which the law
ordinarily infers a partnership." Allgood v. Feckoury, 36 Ga.
App. 42, 43, 135 S. E. 314, citing Huggins v. Huggins, 117
Ga. 151, 43 S. E- 759.
§ 3158. (§ 2629.) What constitutes a partner-
ship.
In General.—Whenever a joint enterprise, a joint risk, a
joint sharing of expenses, and a joint interest in the profits
and losses concur, a partnership exists. Smith v. Hancock,
163 Ga. 222, 231, 136 S. E. 52.
Joint and Common Interest Distinguished.—A joint in-
terest in partnership property is another and a very distinct
thing from a common interest in the profits alone. The
former interest is that of an owner, who has a right to dis-
pose of the profits, and that makes him a partner; but a
common interest in the profits confers no title jointly with
the other and gives no power to control and dispose of the
profits as owner. Smith v. Hancock, 163 Ga. 222, 231, 136
S. E- 52.
No partnership was created by an agreement that the
plaintiff should conduct in the defendant's name a store
which was to be owned and supplied with goods by the de-
fendant, and should receive an equal share of the net profits.
Allgood v. Feckoury, 36 Ga. App. 42, 135 S. E. 314. For a
case where the contract between the parties was held to
constitute a partnership, see Smith v. Hancock, 163 Ga. 222,
136 S. E. 52. See also Barrow v. Georgia Chemical Works,
34 Ga. App. 31. 128 S'. E- 14; Nellis & Co. v. Green, 36 Ga.
App. 684, 137 S. E- 843.
§ 3164. (§ 2635.) Effect of dissolution.
Notice to Creditor.—The fact that a creditor may have
had no sufficient notice of the dissolution of the partnership
does not affect the actual right of one of the erstwhile mem-
bers to contract on behalf of the partnership. Citizens Nat.
Bank v. Jennings, 35 Ga. App. 553, 555, 134 S. E- 114.
§ 3166. (§ 2637.) Denial by defendant.
Sufficiency of Denial.—A plea of no partnership in which
it was set up that at the time of the execution of a note
there was in fact no such partnership, for the reason that
the partnership had a short time before been dissolved, is
demurrable where it fails to allege that notice of such dis-
solution had been given as required by law, or that both the
original payee and the present holder of the note, at the
time of the accrual of their respective rights in it, had ac-
tual knowledge of such dissolution. Cooke v. Faucett, 35
Ga. App. 209, 132 S. E. 268.
ARTICLE 2
Rights and Liabilities of Partners among
Themselves
§ 3172. (§ 2643.) Power of each partner.
Negotiable Paper.—One of the defenses which may be
maintained against the suit of a bona fide holder upon a
negotiable instrument is a plea of non est factum. But "if
a partnership, under any circumstances, has the implied
right and power to execute notes, one to whom they are
offered in the market has a right to presume that they were
issued under the circumstances which gave the requisite
authority." 8 Corpus Juris, 522. Cooke v. Faucett, 35 Ga.
App. 209, 132 S. E- 268.
§ 3176. (§ 2647.) Surviving partner.
Statute of Limitations.—After the dissolution of a partner-
ship by death of one of the partners, the statute of limita-
tions does not commence to run in favor of the surviving
partner against the estate of the deceased partner as long
as there are debts due by the partnership to be paid, or debts
due it to be collected, or until a sufficient time has elapsed
since the dissolution of the firm to raise the presumption
that all debts due from the partnership have been paid, and
that all debts due to it have been collected. Purvis v. John-
son, 163 Ga. 698, 137 S. E. 50.
It will be presumed that, before the expiration of a period
of nine years, all debts due by the firm had been paid and
those due to the firm had been collected; and tolling from
the statute of limitations the five years allowed for the
taking out of administration upon the estate of the deceased
partner, the suit as to an accounting for the personal assets
of the partnership, which was not brought within four years
of the expiration of the five-year period, was barred. Purvis
v. Johnson, 163 Ga. 698, 137 S. E- 50.
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ARTICLE 3
Rights and Liabilities of Partners to Third
Persons
§ 3188. (§ 2659.) Power after dissolution.
See under section 3164 note "Notice to Creditor."
CHAPTER 2
Debtor and Creditor
ARTICLE 1
General Principles
SECTION 1
Relation Defined, etc.
§ 3217. (§ 2688.) Equitable assets.
Insurance Policy.—The cash surrender and cash loan value
of a policy of life insurance accruing- at the end of a specified
tontine period is not subject to garnishment by creditors of
the insured; nor will such value be made available to the
judgment creditor of the insured by a court of equity in pro-
ceedings instituted for the purpose of obtaining equitable
relief analogous to a process of garnishment at law. Farm-
ers, etc.. Bank v. National Life Ins. Co., 161 Ga. 793, 131 S.
E- 902.
SECTION 2
Statute of Frauds
§ 3222. (§ 2693.) Obligations which must be
in writing.
Statute Makes Contract Unenforceable Merely.—A parol
contract unenforceable by reason of the statute of frauds
is nevertheless a valid, subsisting contract as between per-
sons other than the contracting parties, for purposes other
than a recovery upon it. Waynesboro Planing Mill v. Per-
kins Mfg. Co., 35 Ga. App. 767, 134 S. E- 831. And therefore
the fact that a contract may be required by the statute of
frauds to be in writing will not preclude the establishment
of its contents by parol, where it has not in fact been re-
duced to writing. Id.
Presumption That Contract Is Written.—See Beasley v.
Howard, 34 Ga. App. 102, 128 S. E. 203, citing Riser Com-
pany v. Padrick, 30 Ga. App. 642, 118 S. E- 791. Bank v.
IvOvvorn Grocery Co., 34 Ga. App. 772, 131 S. E- 301, citing
Ansley v. Hightower, 120 Ga. 719, 48 S. E- 197, following
statement made under this catchline in Georgia Code of 1926.
Promise Not within Provision—Promise to Pay Physician.
—Where a physician renders professional services to a minor
child of a tenant, solely upon the credit of the landlord's
promise to pay for such services, the promise is an original
and not a collateral undertaking, and is not within the stat-
ute of frauds. Pope v. Ellis, 34 Ga. App. 185, 129 S. E- 1J.
Same—Agreement to Collect or "Guarantee" Loan.—Neither
an agent's promise to collect a loan nor an agreement, as a
part of a contract of agency, to "guarantee" it, constitutes
a promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage
of another, and the statute of frauds is not applicable. Ben-
ton v. Roberts, 35 Ga. App. 749, 134 S. E. 846.
Contract Partly in Writing.—A contract for the sale of
land, which is partly in writing and partly in parol, is not
enforceable, by reason of the statute of frauds. Thompson
v. Colonial Trust Co., 35 Ga. App. 12, 131 S. E- 921.
Contract for Resale of Land.—A contract to resell land
to the original seller is a contract for the sale of land which
comes under the statute of frauds. Amerson v. Cox, 35
Ga. App. 83, 132 S. E. 105.
Optional Contract Included.—An option to purchase rented
premises is a contract required by the statute of frauds
to be in writing by this section. Robinson v. Odom, 35 Ga.
App. 262, 133 S. E- 53. See also Rennington v. Small, 36
Ga. App. 176, 136 S. E- 326.
Joint Adventure in, Lands Not within Section.—An
agreement to enter a joint adventure for the purpose of deal-
ing in lands into which one is to put property and another
his service, and which does not contemplate a transfer of
title is not within the statute, notwithstanding it may be
intended that as an incident of the enterprise one of the
parties may take title to lands for the benefit of both.
Manget v. Cariton, 34 Ga. App. 556, 130 S. E. 604.
Contract of Resale.—See Singer Company v. Gray & Son,.
34 Ga, App. 345, 129 S. E- 555, following the principle stated
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Sufficiency of Writing Letters Acknowledging Terms.—
See Edison v. Plant Bros. & Co., 35 Ga. App. 683, 134 S.
E- 627, following the principle stated under this catchline
in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Correspondence between opposing counsel was properly
admitted as tending to prove the existence of the contract
sued on and that such contracts Mere consequently not
within the statute. Garrard v. Oil Co., 35 Ga. App. 137,.
132 S. E. 234.
Stated in Beasely v. Howard, 34 Ga. App. 102, 128 S. E-
203.
§ 3223. (§ 2694.) Exceptions.
Agreement Not to Levy on Crop.—An oral agreement,,
based on a consideration, not to levy on a crop is enforce-
able where there has been performance and acceptance. Arm-
strong v. Reynolds, 36 Ga. App. 594, 137 S. E. 637.
When Whole Performance Necessary to Prevent Fraud.—
See Bank v. Winter Inc., 161 Ga. 898, 905, 132 S. E- 422,
following the principle stated under this catchline in the
Georgia Code of 1926.
Contracts for the Sale of Goods, etc.—Performance by a
creditor making delivery, and acceptance by the debtor of
such delivery, of goods in accordance with the terms of an
oral contract will take the same without the statute. Paf-
ford v. Hinson & Co., 34 Ga. App. 73, 128 S. E. 207.
Fruit Packed and Shipped.
—See Nellis & Co. v. Houser,
35 Ga. App. 33, 132 S. E. 142, following the principle stated
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Goods Specially Made. — The special manufacturing of
goods done in compliance with the intent and purpose of the
order, and within the time specified, amounts to such part
performance of the contract on the part of the vendor as
would render it a fraud on the part of the vendee to refuse
acceptance. Edison v. Plant Bros. & Co., 35 Ga. App. 683 y
134 S. E. 627.
Applied in Rennington v. Small, 36 Ga. App. 176, 136 S.
E. 326.
§ 3224. (§ 2695.) Void acts.
III. CHARACTER OF TRANSACTION AND BADGES
OF FRAUD.
Conveyance to Oneself as Trustee.—The making of a deed
by a person as an individual to himself in his representative
capacity, the deed being for land in which he has a contin-
gent remainder, is, on insolvency, sufficient evidence on
which to base a verdict that the deed was executed with the
intent to hinder and delay collection of the grantor's other
debts. Eberhardt v. Bennett, 163 Ga. 796, 806, 137 S. E- 64.
Evidences of Fraud.—"Failure to produce testimony is a
badge of fraud, where the bona fides of the transaction is
in issue, and witnesses who ought to be able to explain it
are in reach." Eberhardt v. Bennett, 163 Ga. 796, 806, 137
S. E- 64.
Same—Disposing of Entire Property.—See Eberhardt v.
Bennett, 163 Ga. 796, 806, 137 S. E. 64, citing and following
the statement in the first paragraph under this catchline
in the Georgia Code of 1926.
ARTICLE 2
Acts Void as against Creditors
§ 3226. Merchandise, how sold in bulk.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Purpose of Sections.—This section is for protection of then
existing creditors, who are to be notified, and in absence of
fraud such sale cannot be attacked by subsequent credi-
tors for noncompliance with this act. Dodd v. Raines, 1
Fed. (2d), 658.
Sufficiency of Presumption of Fraud to Avoid Transfer in
Bankruptcy.—To entitle a trustee to recover property as
transferred by bankrupt within four months with intent
to defraud creditors, under Bankruptcy Act, section 67e
(Comp. St. section 9651), there must be proof of actual in-
tent to defraud, and a presumption of fraud raised by this
statute is not sufficient. Dodd v. Raines, 1 Fed. (2d). 658.
II. APPLICATION OF SECTION.
No Distinction between Creditor.—This section draws no
distinction between those creditors whose debts may have
arisen from sales of merchandise and such creditors as
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sustain that relation by reason of indebtedness created by
the debtor for other independent and disassociated reasons.
It applies as well to a sale of a stock of goods in bulk by a
debtor to a creditor in extinguishment of his debt as to a
sale for cash or on credit. Anderson v. Merchants, etc.,
Bank, 161 Ga. 12, 129 S. E. 650.
CHAPTER 3
Preferences and Assignments for Benefit of
Creditors
§ 3230. (§ 2697.) Legal preference.
Methods of Preferring Creditors—Good Faith.—See Bank
v. Ellison, 162 Ga. 657, 134 S. E- 751, citing and following the
statement in the second paragraph under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926.
Bankrupt Debtor.—A voluntary bankrupt having an assign-
able interest in the property claimed by him in his petition
as exempt under the constitution and homestead laws of this
state can transfer this interest in good faith to his creditor
either in extinguishment of, or to secure, a pre-existing
debt, before the property is set aside by the trustee in
bankruptcy, and before the same is confirmed by the bank-
rupt court. Silver v. Chapman, 163 Ga. 604, 136 S. E- 914.
When Right to Prefer Extinguished. — The right of the
debtor to prefer one creditor to another in a bona fide trans-
action continues up to the date when a judgment or lien is
obtained against- him. The mere pendency of a suit does
not extinguish that right to prefer. Bank v. Ellison, 162
Ga. 657, 134 S. E- 751.
CHAPTER 5
Mortgages
ARTICLE 1
General Principles
§ 3256. (§ 2723.) What is a mortgage, and
what it may embrace.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
Distinguished from Security Deed.—A statutory mortgage
in this State does not convey title, but only creates a lien
on property. A statutory security deed conveys title to
property as security, and is expressly declared to be "not a
mortgage." The latter has been declared to be in effect an
equitable mortgage, but vastly different rights arise from
the effect of the two classes of security. Carmichael v.
Citizens, etc., Bank, 162 Ga. 735, 134 S. E- 771; Bank v.
Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 449, 134 S. E- 107.
The objects of a mortgage and security deed and a bill of
sale to personalty under the provisions of the Code are
identical—security for debt. While recognizing the techni-
cal difference between a mortgage and security deed and as
hereinbefore pointed out, the court has treated deeds to se-
cure debts and bills of sale to secure debts as equitable
mortgages. Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 449, 134 S. E- 107.
See also Hill v. Smith, 163 Ga. 71, 135 S. E- 423.
III. AFTER ACQUIRED INTEREST AND INCREASE.
General Rule.—See Dunson Co. v. Cotton Mills, 34 Ga.
App. 768, 131 S. E- 186, citing and following the statement
in the last paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
Same—Bill of Sale to Secure Debt.—The object of the
statute was to devise a practical means to enable owners
of such class of property to use it as a security. The stat-
ute should be construed in this light; and when so con-
strued, giving due effect to substance as compared to form,
the provision as to after acquired property is sufficient to
include bills of sale to secure debt, though not expressly
named therein. Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 449, 134 S. E.
107. See note of this Case under § 3306.
§ 3258. (§ 2725.) Reducing deed to mortgage.
Possession—Effect of Possession in Vendor.—See Sims v.
Sims, 162 Ga. 523, 527, 134 S. E- 308, citing and following
the law as stated under this catchline in the Georgia Code
of 1926.
§ 3262. (§ 2729.) Defective record.
See notes to § 3307.
§ 3270. (§ 2737.) Cancellation of mortgage.
Stated in Ellis v. Ellis, 161 Ga. 360, 362, 130 S. E- 681.
ARTICLE 2
Mortgages on Real Estate, How Enforced
SECTION 1
Application to Foreclose; When, Where, and
How Made, and Proceedings Thereon
(§ 2745.) Transferee may foreclose,§ 3278.
how.
Evidence Justifying Recovery.—In a suit upon a mortgage
note, instituted by the payee for the use of an assignee,
where it appears that the assignee is the holder of the legal
title, the assignee is the real party at interest. Although
the petition may not be amended by striking the name of
the nominal party plaintiff and substituting therefor the
name of the assignee as plaintiff, there may nevertheless be
a recovery for the plaintiff upon evidence which sustains
only the right of the assignee to recover, where such evi-
dence has been admitted without objection. Carden v. Hall,
34 Ga. App. 806, 131 S. E. 296.
ARTICLE 3
Of Mortgages on Personal Property, and Bills
of Sale to Secure Debts, How Foreclosed
SECTION 1
Application to Foreclose, by Whom and
How Made
§ 3292. (§ 2759.) Mortgaged property, when
sold without foreclosure.
Estoppel to Deny Consent.—Where the holder of the sub-
sequent mortgage failed to question the legal right of the
other holder to intervene in a proceeding for distribution of
process from a foreclosure without foreclosing her mort-
gage, and where the jury found against the holder of the
subsequent mortgage, and judgment was entered in favor
of the other holder, the holder of the subsequent mortgage
will not be heard to insist for the first time that it is illegal
because the earlier mortgage had not been foreclosed and no
equitable reason for claiming the fund derived from a sale
under the subsequent mortgage was set out in the interven-
tion. Bank v. Goolsby, 34 Ga. App. 217, 129 S. E. 8.
SECTION 2
Of Defenses, When and How Made
§ 3301. (§ 2766.) Replevy bond.
Failure to Give Proper Bond or Affidavit.—See Bridges v.
Melton, 34 Ga. App. 480, 129 S. E. 913, citing and following
the statements made under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
CHAPTER 6
Sales to Secure Debts
§ 3306. (§ 2771.) Absolute deeds and not
mortgages.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
Distinguished from Mortgage.—See notes to § 3256.
Applies to Both Realty and Personalty.—A bill of sale of
personalty to secure a debt stands on the same footing as a
deed to realty to secure a debt. The status of each is pro-
vided for in this section. Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 448,
134 S. E. 107.
Attaches to After-Acquired Property.—Where a bill of sale
on an ordinary stock of merchandise changing in specifics :s
executed merely to secure a debt, the bill of sale will attach
to after-acquired portions of the stock as in case of mort-
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gages, whether or not the bill of sale makes express refer-
ence to such after-acquired property. Bank v. Beard, 162
Ga. 446, 134 S. E- 107. See note of this case under § 3256.
II. DETERMINING WHETHER INSTRUMENT IS
MORTGAGE OR DEED TO SECURE DEBT.
Distinctions.—See notes to § 3256.
IV. LIEN OF SECURITY DEED, FI. FA. AND
PRIORITIES.
Priorities.—See Bank v. Ins. Co., 163 Ga. 718. 721, 137 S.
E. 53, following the statement made under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926.
VI. TRANSFER OR ASSIGNMENTS.
Rights of Transferee.—A transferee of the grantee named
in the security deed occupies the position of such grantee as
against the grantor and those claiming under him. Gilliard
v. Johnston, 161 Ga. 17, 129 S. E- 434.
§ 3307. (§ 2772.) Record of such deeds.
Necessity for Record.—A "bill of sale" as contemplated by
this section is a "deed" to personalty, and is included in the
meaning of the word "deeds" as employed in section 3320;
and consequently under that law bills of sale to secure debt
are required to be recorded. Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 451,
134 S. E. 107.
Defective Record.—Construing section 3262 with the section
a defective record of security deed will be equivalent to no
record, and, in the language of this section, it will "remain
valid against the persons executing" it, but will be "post-
poned to all liens created or obtained, or purchases made,
prior to" a legal record of the security deed. Bank v. Ins.
Co., 163 Ga. 718, 722, 137 S. E- 53.
The words "liens created or obtained," as employed in
the section, have been held to refer to liens arising by con-
tract, and not by operation of law. Donovan v. Simmons,
96 Ga. 340, 22 S. E- 966; Griffeth v. Posey. 98 Ga. 475, 25
S. E. 515; Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 450, 134 S. E- 107.
Where Recorded.—A retention-of-title contract attested by
a person described as a commercial notary public of L.
county, although the caption of the instrument indicates
that it was executed in a town in W. county is presumably
officially executed in L. county. It nevertheless is legally
executed to record in W. county, the residence of the maker.
Smith v. Simmons, 35 Ga. App. 427, 133 S. E- 312.
No Prior Lien for Money Judgment unless Execution
Entered. — Applying this section, as modified by sections
3320 and 3321, a money judgment against the grantor or
maker of a bill of sale to secure a debt would not have a lien
as against third parties or those claiming under the bill of
sale, unless an execution issuing on the judgment should be
entered on the execution docket. Consequent!}' a junior
money judgment upon which no execution was issued and
placed on the execution docket would not create a lien with-
in the meaning of this section, to which the bill of sale there-
in referred to could be postponed. Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga.
446, 452, 134 S. E- 107.
Priority between Bill of Sale and General Execution.—
Where a bill of sale to secure a debt as provided in this
section, is executed and subsequently recorded, whether
or not such recording should occur within thirty days after
the date of the execution of the paper, such bill of sale is
superior in dignity to a subsequently obtained unrecorded
general execution. Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446 453, 134 S.
E- 107.
The status of a recorded bill of sale to secure a debt,
which was not recorded until after the time provided by
law, is inferior in dignity to a subsequently obtained exe-
cution which was recorded prior to the record of the bill of
sale. Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 454, 134 S. E- 107.
Same—Record from Time of Filing.—In a contest between
a bill of sale to secure a debt and a lien of a subsequently
recorded general execution, the record of the bill of sale
dates back from the time of its filing for record in the
office of the clerk of the superior court. Bank v. Beard, 162
Ga. 446, 455, 134 S. E- 107.
Same—Same—Fractions of a Day.—Where a priority as
between a bill of sale to secure a debt and the lien of a sub-
sequently recorded general execution depends upon whether
the bill of sale was recorded first or the general execution
was entered upon the execution docket first, such recording
and such entry upon the execution docket having occurred
on the same day, in determining such priority fractions of a
day are to be considered. Bank v. Beard, 162 Ga. 446, 134
S. E. 107.
§ 3309. (§ 2774.) To reconvey title of prop-
erty conveyed to secure debts.
As to the distinction between a security deed and a mort-
gage, see note under section 3256.
Effect of Failure to Record Cancellation.—If record of can-
cellation is not effected according to this section, the se-
curity deed appearing of record to be valid, a purchaser with-
out notice acquires title. Ellis v. Ellis, 161 Ga. 360, 362,
130 S. E- 681.
§ 3310. (§ 2775.) Liens against vendee do not
attach to the property.
In General.—The right of the mortgagee under this section,
will be defeated by the payment of the secured debt, either
by the vendor or his assignee. Gilliard v. Johnston & Miller,
161 Ga. 17, 129 S. E. 434.
CHAPTER 8
Conditional Sales
§ 3318. (§ 2776.) Conditional sales, how exe-
cuted.
I. IN GENERAL.
Object of Section.—This section is in the nature of a stat-
ute of frauds and outlaws all reservations of title as against
third persons where the contract is not written. The words
"'third parties" include creditors, but are not restricted to
them, and are to be construed literally. Flemming v. Drake,
163 Ga. 872, 137 S. E- 268.
II. FORM AND REQUISITES.
A. Writing, Execution, etc.
Description of Property.—The rights of a third party, ac-
quiring title in good faith from the vendee, are protected,
where the record of the alleged conditional sale shows on
its face that not only was no particular property described,
but that at the time the instrument was signed no particular
property was in the minds of the parties, and that conse-
quently no attempt was or could have been made by the in-
strument to specify or even refer to any particular property.
Stevens Hdw. Co. v. Bank, 34 Ga. App. 268, 129 S. E. 172.
Must Be in Writing.—Under this and the following section
whenever personal property is sold and delivered with a con-
dition that title shall remain in the vendor until the pur-
chase price is paid, to be valid as against third parties, the
contract must be in writing and recorded within thirty days
after delivery of the property sold, which is the time when
the sale becomes effective tinder the terms of the statute.
Anglo-American Mill Co. v. Dingier, 8 Fed. (2d), 493.
B. PARTICULAR INSTRUMENTS.
Stipulations for Paying Rent or Hire.—Where a written
contract provides that the bailee may at any time before the
expiration of the period of rental become the purchaser of
the property upon the payment of the aggregate rental value,
upon which payment he shall receive credit for the payments
previously made as rental, the contract constitutes a condi-
tional sale. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Tidwell & Co., 36
Ga. App. 525, 137 S. E. 128.
§ 3319. (§ 2777.) How recorded.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Necessity of Recordation—Record Necessary Only as against
Third Parties.—See II, A, Writing Execution, etc., under
the preceding section.
III. PRIORITIES.
A. In General.
Necessity for Recordation.—See Sewing Machine Co. V.
Tidwell & Co., 36 Ga. App. 525, confirming the matter set
out under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
CHAPTER 10
Liens Other than Mortgages
ARTICLE 1
To Whom Granted, Rank and Priority
§ 3333. (§ 2791.) Rank of liens for taxes.
In General.—Taxes due the State are not only against the
owner but against the property also, regardless of judg-
ments, mortgages, sales, transfers, or incumbrances of
any kind. Bibb Nat'l Bank v." Colson, 162 Ga. 471, 134 S.
E- 85.
Lien for Paving Streets.—A lien against property owners
[88]
§ 3335 FORECLOSURE OF LIENS ON PERSONAL PROPERTY § 3366
for the proportionate costs of paving streets has the rank
of a tax lien and its dignity takes rank under this section,
and consequently takes priority over a prior mortgage.
Brunswick v. Gordon Realty Co., 163 Ga. 636, 642, 136 S.
E. 898.
§ 3335. (§ 2793.) Special lien of laborers.
To What Property Applicable.—The special lien given by
this section to laborers, on the product of their labor, at-
taches to the property of their employers only. Jones v.
Central Georgia Lumber Co., 35 Ga. App. 172, 132 S. E). 236.
§ 3348. (§ 2800). Liens for supplies, etc., fur-
nished.
As to penalty for giving false information regarding liens
under this section see section 713 of the Penal Code.
I. BY AND TO WHOM SUPPLIES FURNISHED.
Landlord As Surety.—See O'Quinn v. Carter, 34 Ga. App.
310, 129 S. E. 296, citing and following the statement made
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
III. CHARACTERISTICS OF LIEN.
Not Affected by Bankruptcy.—See Sitton v. Turner, 34
Ga. App. 12, 128 S. E. 77, citing and following the state-
ments under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Similar to Claim for Purchase Money.—Under this sec-
tion, landlords furnishing supplies to their tenants for the
purpose of making crops on the rented premises have a
lien, by operation of law, on the crops there made in the
year for which the supplies were furnished and such a
lien is in the nature of a claim for purchase-money. Mutual
Fertilizer Co. v. Moultrie Bkg Co., 36 Ga. App. 322, 136
S. F- 803.
Execution Against Supplies.—Quaere : After supplies have
been furnished but before they are utilized by the tenant
for the purpose intended, are they subject to levy and sale
under executions against the tenant held by third persons?
Mutual Fertilizer Co. v. Moultrie Bkg. Co., 36 Ga. App.
322, 136 S. F. 803.
§ 3353. (§ 2804.) Mechanics' liens, how de-
clared and created.
Waiver of Right to Object to Lien.—An owner who re-
sists foreclosure upon the ground that the material was
not such as provided for by the contract may waive the
right to assert this defense, and thereby be estopped to
dispute evidence on the part of the materialman to the
contrary. Acceptance and use of such material without ob-
jection or complaint, and payment therefor to another in-
stead of to the materialman, will authorize the conclusion
that the owner waived his right and estopped himself.
Rylander v. Koppe, 162 Ga. 300, 301, 133 S. F- 236.
§ 3354. (§ 2805.) Mechanic's lien on per-
sonalty.
Enforcement.—See Young v. Alford, 36 Ga. App. 708, 137
S. E. 914, citing and following the statement made under
this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 3356. (§ 2807.) Liens in favor of planing-
mills, etc.
Applied in Young v. Alford, 36 Ga. App. 708, 137 S. E.
914.
§ 3364(1). Jeweler's liens for repair.—It shall
be lawful for any jeweler, or other person, firm,
or corporation engaged in the business of repair-
ing watches, clocks, jewelry and other articles of
similar character, to sell such articles upon which
charges for repairs, including work done and ma-
terials furnished, have not been paid, which have
remained in the possession of such jeweler, per-
son, firm, or corporation, for a period of one year
after the completion of said repairs, for the pur-
pose of enforcing the lien of such jeweler, per-
son, firm, or corporation for materials furnished
and work done in repairing such article or arti-
cles. Acts 1927, p. 218.
§ 3364(2). Notice before sale.—Before any
sale shall be made as provided in section 3364(1),
the person, firm, or corporation making such sale
shall give thirty days' notice thereof by posting
a notice of such sale before the court-house door
of the county in which such repairs were made,
giving the name of the owner of the article or
articles so repaired, if known, and if not known,
the name of the person from whom such article
or articles were received, a description of the ar-
ticle or articles to be sold, and the name of the
person, firm, or corporation making such repaiis
and proposing to make such sale; and shall also
give written notice thereof by sending a registered
letter to the last known address of the owner of
such article or articles, or the person who left
such article or articles for repairs, advising such
persons of the time and place of sale, the descrip-
tion of the article or articles to be sold, and the
amount claimed by said person, firm, or corpo-
ration for such repairs, including work done and
materials furnished, and the said amount so
claimed for such repairs shall also be stated in
the notice posted before the court-house door as
hereinbefore stated.
§ 3364(3). Sale at public outcry before court-
house.—All sales made under the provisions of
this Act shall be made at public outcry, before
the court-house door of the county where the per-
son, firm, or corporation making such sale had
his place of business at the time of receiving the
article or articles to be sold, and during the hours
provided by law for holding sheriff's sales.
§ 3364(4). Application of proceeds.—The pro-
ceeds of any sale made under the provisions of
this Act shall be applied first to the payment of
the lien for services rendered by the person, firm,
or corporation making such sale, for work done
and materials furnished in repairing such article
or articles sold, including the cost of the regis-
tered notice hereinbefore provided for, and the
residue, if any, shall be paid to the ordinary of
the county wherein such sale shall have taken
place, who shall hold said sum for a period of
one year, during which time the owner or own-
ers of the article or articles so sold may claim said
residue; but at the end of said period of one year,
if said residue shall not have been claimed by the
owner or owners of the article or articles, so sold,
then and in that event said residue shall by the
said ordinary be placed in the common-school
fund of the county wherein said sale was made.
§ 3364(5). Display of sign as to intention to
sell.—Any jeweler, person, firm, or corporation
desiring to avail himself of the provisions of this
Act shall display a sign in his place of business
notifying the public that all articles left for re-
pairs will be sold for charges at the expiration
of one year from completion of such repairs.
ARTICLE 3
Foreclosure of Liens on Personal Property.
§ 3366. (§ 2816.) Enforcement of liens on per-
sonalty.
What Counter-Affidavit Must Contain.—Only defensive
matter to a foreclosure of a lien on personalty being re-
quired in a counter-affidavit filed by the defendant under
this section such an affidavit, when made by the defend-
ant's agent, as provided in section 3607, need not contain
a sworn averment that the affiant is agent for the de-
fendant. It is sufficient if such affidavit is in fact made by
the defendant's duly authorized agent, and where the af-
fidavit purports on its face to be executed by such agent,
the agency is presumed and the affidavit is prima facie
valid. Georgia Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 34 Ga. App. 281,
129 S. E. 303.
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ARTICLE 4
Miscellaneous Provisions
§ 3374. (§ 2834.) Attorney's rights in claim
cases.
Cfted in Porter v. Stewart, 163 Ga. 655, 660, 137 S. E. 28.
CHAPTER li
Homestead
ARTICLE 1
Exemptions
SECTION 4
Surveyors Return; Approval of Plat and Appli-
cation
§ 3386. (§ 2836.) Objections, how and when
made.
Effect in Bankruptcy of Failure to Set Aside Exemption.
—The fact that the bankrupts, as residents of Georgia,
did not set apart exemptions in the manner provided by
either Const. Ga. art. 9, sec. 1, or sections 3416, 3378, et
seq., did not preclude the allowance of exemptions under
such law in bankruptcy proceedings. Clark v. Nirenbaum,
8 Fed. (2d). 451.
The purpose of an objection to the schedule for want of
sufficiency and fullness is to prevent the allowance of the
homestead (section 3378 paragraph 3), and it does not fail as
an objection under this section merely because it may be
described as an "objection to the homestead." Aldav v.
Spooner, 35 Ga. App. 614, 617, 134 S. F- 343.
When Appeal Lies.—Where a creditor filed objections, one
of which was to the schedule for want of sufficiency and
fullness in that the applicant had omitted certain per-
sonalty, appeal to the superior court lies from an adverse
judgment of the ordinary. Alday v. Spooner, 35 Ga. App.
614, 134 S. F- 343. See note of this case under § 3388.
§ 3388. (§ 2838.) Appraisers and appeals.
Objections Not Limited to Schedule.—This section does not
provide exclusively for objections to the schedule. The
creditor is not required to object to the schedule, if he de-
sires to dispute "the propriety of the survey, or the value
of the premises so platted as the homestead." Aldav v.
Spooner, 35 Ga. App. 614, 616, 134 S. F- 343.
ARTICLE 2
Statutory or Short Homestead
SECTION l
Property Exempt from Sale
§ 3416. (§ 2866.) Property exempt from sale.
As to effect in bankruptcy of failure- to set aside home-
stead exemption, see note to § 3378. See annotations under
1 6582.
I. GENERAL NOTE.
Exemption as Homestead—Waiver after Setting Apart.—
There is no true homestead in Georgia, but under this sec-
tion there is a direct exemption of property without regard
to residence or home, realty or personalty, and though such
exemption may be waived before setting apart (Const. Ga.
art. 9, sections 3, 5), after setting apart of exempt property
it cannot be aliened or incumbered by debtor. In re Tram-
mell, 5 Fed. (2d), 326.
Increase of Exemption.—Debtor's right of exemption under
Const. Ga. art. 9, section 1, and this section, affects debtor's
whole property as an inchoate incumbrance created by law,
and cannot be increased as to debts in existence without vio-
lating contract clause of Federal Constitution. In re Tram-
mell, 5 Fed. (2d), 326.
Setting Aside in Bankruptcy Court.—"Setting apart" of
debtor's exempt property is a mere identification of the
property to which the exemption is applied, the burden of
securing which is put on debtor and is a proper function
of bankruptcy court, whose action is equivalent to action by
the state court in effectuating exemption. In re Trammell,
5 Fed. (2d), 326.
Alienage as Affecting Right. — Alienage of resident of
state is no bar to claim of exemption provided by this sec-
tion. In re Trammell, 5 Fed. (2d), 326.
Same—Where Family Resident Out of State.—Alien resi-
dent of Georgia having no family within State, but hav-
ing mother in Poland and sister in other state to whom he
regularly sends money, is not the head of a family entitled
to exemption provided bv this section. In re Trammell, 5
Fed. (2d), 326.
When Property Set Aside to Defeat Sale.—Setting apart
of property exempt under this section, though necessary to
defeat sale, is timely, when not had before levy, if made
before sale. In re Trammell, 5 Fed. (2d), 326.
After Acquired Property.—Property not owned by a debt-
or, when filing his schedule of property exempted under this
section but which is afterwards acquired by him, is not sub-
ject to exemption under the schedule, although described
therein. Smith v. Fckles, 65 Ga. 326; Fuller v. Doyal, 34
Ga. App. 245, 129 S. F- 117.
SECTION 2
How Set Apart
§ 3421. (§ 2871.) Sale subject to incumbrance.
Pending Application.—See Rogers v. Kimsey, 163 Ga. 146,
135 S. F- 497, citing and following the statement under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
CHAPTER 12
Interest and Usury
ARTICLE 1
General Principles
§ 3431. (§ 2881.) Interest only from demand,
when.
Provision That Obligation Bear No Interest.—A stipu-
lation in a contract for the sale of goods, to be delivered
within a reasonable time in the future and to be paid for
on delivery, to the effect that the obligation of the purchaser
was to bear no interest, did not mean that the purchaser
would not be required to pay interest in case of and after
his default, but was merely a provision against the payment
of interest prior to the maturity of the purchase-money.
Morgan v. Colt Co., 34 Ga. App. 630, 130 S. F. 600.
§ 3434. (§ 2884.) Interest on liquidated demands.
I. WHEN INTEREST ALLOWED.
When Recovery Exceeds Amount Stated in Bond. — The
defendant may be liable, though the aggregate amount of
the plaintiff's recovery, both for principal and interest, wilt
exceed the maximum amount of the defendant's liability
as stated in a bond. United States Fidelity, etc., Co. v.
Koehler, 36 Ga. App. 396, 137 S. E. 85.
On Damages Recovered for Breach of Sale Contract.—Un-
der this section interest is recoverable on damages recovered
for breach of a contract of sale by the buyer from the time
the amount of damages became fixed by a resale. Bell v.
Lamborn, 2 Fed. (2d), 205.
II. LIQUIDATED DEMANDS.
A. Particular Instances of Liquidated Demands.
Breach of a Contract of Sale.—Where a purchaser breached
a contract by a failure to pay the purchase -money on the
delivery of the goods, the seller was entitled to recover the
agreed purchase-price as liquidated damages, with interest
thereon from the time the purchaser was liable and bound to
pay. Morgan v. Colt Co., 34 Ga. App.. 630, 130 S. F- 600.
§ 3436. (§ 2886.) Beyond eight per cent, interest
forbidden.
What Constitutes Usury. — There are four requisites of
every usurious transaction: (1) A loan or forbearance of
money, either express or implied. (2) Upon an under-
standing that the principal shall or may be returned. (3)
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And that for such loan or forbearance a greater profit than
is authorized by law shall be paid or is agreed to be paid.
(4) That the contract was made with an intent to violate
the law. The fourth element may be implied if all the others
are expressed upon the face of the contract. Bank v. Farm-
ers State Bank, 161 Ga. 801, 810, 132 S. E- 221.
Court Will Look at Substance of Transaction.—-The inge-
nuity of man has not devised a contrivance by which usury
can be legalized, if it appears that the purpose of the scheme
was to exact a larger profit for the use of the money act-
ually advanced than eight per cent, per annum. In deter-
mining whether the contract is usurious the substance of
the transaction will be critically inspected and analyzed; for
the name by which the transaction is denominated is al-
together immaterial if it appears that a loan of money was
the foundation and basis of agreement which is under con-
sideration. Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 161 Ga. 801, 132
S. E- 221.
If an agreement is a mere device or subterfuge by which
one party was permitted to charge a higher than the law-
ful rate of interest allowed in this State for a loan of money,
the agreement would be usurious, and the company could
collect no interest at all. Stewart v. Miller & Company, 161
Ga. 919, 925, 132 S. E- 535.
"Underwriting" Not within Section.—An 'underwriting,"
is not an agreement to loan money and under the circum-
stances of the case this section does not applv. Stewart
v. Miller & Co., 161 Ga. 919, 132 S. E. 535.
Transaction with underwriter of bond issue, who received
discount of 15 per cent from face value of bonds and other
specific allowances, is not usurious, under this section, in
view of necessity for resale of bonds. G. L. Miller & Co. v.
Claridge Manor Co., 14 Fed. (2d), 859.
Allowance of Expenses—Burden of Proof.—The party al-
leging that a transaction with an underwriter of a bond
issue was usurious by reason of an allowance for expenses
has the burden of proving that the amount was so extravagant
as to show bad faith. G. L. Miller & Co. v. Claridge Manor
Co., 14 Fed. (2d), 859.
Charging Interest on Interest Due.—A contract to pay
eight per cent, per annum semi-annually, with interest on
the semi-annual payments of interest after due, does not
constitute usury under this section. Pendergrass v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 163 Ga. 671, 137 S. E- 36.
Question for Jury.—The question as to whether one in-
tends to exact usury by a contrivance or device or whether
the alleged charge is bona fide for actual services is for the
determination of the jury. Bank v. Farmers State Bank,
161 Ga. 801, 132 S. E. 221.
§ 3438 (1). All interest forfeited for usury.
Constitutionality.
—See Mitchell v. Loan & Investment
Co., 161 Ga. 215, 130 S. E. 565, approving the statement un-
der this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Forfeiture of Interest Is Sole Forfeit.—Under the laws of
Georgia the exaction of a higher rate of interest for the use
of money than eight per centum per annum is unlawful,
and prevents the collection of any interest whatever. Bank
v. Farmers State Bank, 161 Ga. 801, 132 S. E- 221; but no
other forfeit shall be occasioned. Stewart v. Miller & Co.,
161 Ga. 919, 132 S. E- 535; Padgett v. Jones, 34 Ga. App.
244, 129 S. E. 109.
Thus an assignment of salary to secure a usurious debt
would be valid as to the principal. Flood v. Empire Invest-
ment Co., 35 Ga. App. 266, 271, 133 S. E. 50.
ARTICLE 2
Business of Loans on Personal Property
§ 3446. License required.
See note to § 1770(61).
Purpose of Article.—As the only provision in this article
for raising revenue is that contained in § 3447 it is mani-
fest that its purpose is not the raising of revenue, but is
the protection of those who are compelled to borrow from
improper lenders who have failed to comply with the stat-
utes for such protection. McLamb v. Phillips, 34 Ga. App.
210, 129 S. E. 570.
Effect of Noncompliance on Contract.—Therefore a contract
made without a compliance with and in violation of the
statute is void and unenforceable. McLamb v. Phillips,
34 Ga. App. 210, 129 S. E. 570.
CHAPTER 13
Of Bailments
ARTICLE l
General Principles
§ 3472. (§ 2899.) Extraordinary.
Scope of Section.—See Peavy v. Peavy, 36 Ga. App. 202,
204, 136 S. E- 96, citing and following the statement under
this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 3473. (§ 2900.) Gross neglect.
When Violation of Speed Law Not Gross Negligence.—
Conceding, but not deciding, that the State law, prohibiting
the driving of automobiles at a greater rate of speed than
ten miles an hour while approaching and traversing inter-
sections of public highways, applies to intersections of
streets in a city, the violation of this law would not con-
stitute gross negligence. Southern Ry. Co. v. Davis, 132
Ga. 812, 817, 65 S. E. 131; Peavy v. Peavy, 36 Ga. App.
202, 204, 136 S. E- 96.
§ 3474. (§ 2901.) Due care in child.
No Invariable Rule.—The care and diligence required of
an infant of tender years is not fixed by any invariable rule
with reference to the age of the infant or otherwise. It
depends upon the capacity of the particular infant, taking
into consideration his age as well as other matters. Mc-
Larty v. Southern Ry. Co. 127 Ga. 161, 56 S. E- 297; Mac-
Dougald Construction Co. v. Mewborn, 34 Ga. App. 333,
337, 129 S. E. 917.
Infants under Fourteen.—Infants under fourteen years of
age are chargeable with contributory negligence resulting
from a want of such care as their mental and physical ca-
pacity fits them for exercising, and assume the risk of those
patent, obvious and known dangers which they are able to
appreciate and avoid. Evans v. Josephine Mills, 119 Ga. 448.
46 S. E. 674; MacDougald Construction Co. v. Mewborn,
34 Ga. App. 333, 337, 129 S. E- 917.
Question of Capacity for Jury.—See Western & Atlantic
R. R. v. Reed, 35 Ga. App. 538, 134 S. E- 134.
§ 3475. (§ 2802.) Imputable negligence.
Negligence of Husband Not Imputed to Wife.—Where a
husband, not acting as agent of his wife, operates an au-
tomobile not belonging to the wife, but under her command,
his negligence is not imputable to the wife. Holloway v.
Mayor, 35 Ga. App. 87, 132 S. E. 106.
Instructions to Jury.—For a case where it was not error
to instruct the jury, as a matter of law, that the negligence
of the driver of the vehicle was not imputable to the per-
son for whose homicide the action was brought. See West-
ern & Atlantic Railroad v. Reed, 35 Ga. App. 538, 134 S. E-
134.
ARTICLE 5
Pledges and Pawns
§ 3533. (§ 2961.) Transfer.
Transferee Stands in Transferor's Shoes.—The transferee
of a pledge is a purchaser of the thing pledged. Continental
Trust Co. v. Bank, 162 Ga. 758, 761, 134 S. E. 775.
CHAPTER 14
Of Principal and Surety
ARTICLE 1
The Contract
Williams, 36 Ga.
§ 3540. (§ 2968.) Stricti juris.
Section cited in Southern Surety Co. v.
App. 692, 137 S. E. 861.
§ 3541. (§ 2969.) Form immaterial.
Cited in Mulling v. Bank. 35 Ga. App. 55. 135 S. E. 222;
Federal Reserve Bank v. Lane, 35 Ga. App. 177, 132 S. E- 247.
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ARTICLE 2
Relative Rights of Creditor and Surety.
§ 3544. (§ 2972.) Of risk.
See notes to § 4294(120).
ARTICLE 3
Rights of Surety against Principal
§ 3556. (§ 2984.) Proof of suretyship.
Apparent Joint Principals.—See Nunnally v. Colt Co., 34
Ga. App. 247, 129 S. E. 119, following the principle stated in
the first paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia Code
of 1926.
Same—Married Women.—Where a married woman signs a
note ostensibly as a maker jointly with her husband, when
in fact she is a surety only, before she can establish the
fact of her suretyship as against the payee of the note it must
be made to appear, despite her apparent relationship as
principal, that the payee, with knowledge of the facts
which would constitute her a surety, contracted with her
as a surety. Bennett v. Danforth, 36 Ga. App. 466, 137
S. E- 285.
ARTICLE 5
Rights of Sureties as to Third Persons
§ 3567. (§ 2995.) Subrogation.
Applied in McWhorter v. Bank, 162 Ga. 627, 134 S. E. 606.
Section Cited in Reid v. Whisenant, 161 Ga. 503, 131 S. E-
904.
CHAPTER 15
Of Principal and Agent
ARTICLE l
Relations of Principal and Agents Among Them-
selves
§ 3571. (§ 2999.) What may be done by agent.
Delegation of Power by Agent in General.—For a case
holding" substantially with the doctrine laid down in the case
in paragraph three under this catchline in the Georgia Code
of 1926, see Mathis v. Western, etc., Railroad, 35 Ga. App.
672, 680, 134 S. E. 793.
§ 3575. (§ 3003.) Revocation.
Unreasonable Instructions/—Bona Fide Disregard.—Where
an agency is coupled with an interest, and the principal
gives to the agent unreasonable instructions detrimental to
the agent's interest, the agent may disregard the instruc-
tions and act for himself, provided he acts in good faith;
and the principal would be bound thereby. Southern Trad-
ing Corp. v. Benchley Bros., 34 Ga. App. 625, 130 S. E- 691.
§ 3576. (§ 3004.) Agent limited by his authority.
Section Applied in Benton v. Roberts, 35 Ga. App. 749, 134
S. E. 846.
§ 3577. (§ 3005.) Money deposited by agent.
Section Quoted in Oslin v. State, 161 Ga. 967, 132 S. E- 542.
§ 3578. (§ 3006.) Payment to agent failing to
produce obligation.
Section Quoted in Oslin v. State, 161 Ga. 967, 132 S. E- 542.
§ 3579. (§ 3007.) Agents and fiduciaries to keep
accounts.
Section Quoted in Oslin v. State, 161 Ga. 967, 132 S. E. 542.
§ 3581. (§ 3009.) Diligence of an agent.
Section Cited in Benton v. Roberts, 35 Ga. App. 749, 134
S. E- 846.
§ 3584, (§ 3012.) Estoppel.
Sub-Agent May Deny Title in Employing Agent and in
Corporation.—In Paschal v. Godley, 34 Ga. App. 321, 322, 129
S. E- 565, it was said: "While an agent can not dispute his
principal's title except in certain instances not present in
this case, yet if * * * in possession of the cattle merely
by virtue of an employment by * * * an officer of the
corporation, * * * he would not because of these facts be
estopped from defending upon the ground that the title was
* * * in the company."
§ 3587. (§ 3015.) Brokers right to commission.
II. COMPENSATION.
B. Sale by Principal.
Before Broker Procures Purchasers—Exclusive Authority
and Exclusive Right.—A distinction has been raised between
an exclusive agency to sell and an exclusive right to sell.
Several cases in which there was merely an exclusive agency
have called attention to the fact that an exclusive right was
not conferred, without stating what the effect of conferring
such right would be, and when that question has come
squarely before the courts they have held that conferring
the exclusive right to sell excluded sales by the owners them-
selves. 10 A. L. R. 818. See dissenting opinion of Luke, J.,
in Barrington v. Dunwody, 35 Ga. App. 517, 520, 134 S. E.
130.
Same—Same—Result as to Owners Right to Sell.—"Ob-
viously if the broker is given an exclusive right to sell, it
precludes his employer from selling in any manner other than
through that particular broker's agency. The grant of
merely an exclusive agency, however, does not have the ef-
fect of preventing the owner from selling independently
through his own personal efforts, as it simply secures to
the broker an exclusive 'agency,' that is, the employer can
not sell through the medium of another broker without vio-
lating the terms of his agreement and rendering himself li-
able therefor." 4 R. C. L. 260, section 12. Quoted in the dis-
senting opinion of Luke, J., in Barrington v. Dunwody, 35
Ga. App. 517, 520, 134 S. E. 130.
D. Modification of Effects of Section by Contract—Sales
Agents—Necessity for Consummation of Sale.
Modification by Agreement.—An owner may stipulate in
the contract of listment that he is not to be subject to the
payment of brokerage commissioners until the actual accept-
ance of title by the officer. Kiser Real Estate Co. v. Ship
pen Hardwood Lumber Co., 34 Ga. App. 308, 129 S. E- 294.
ARTICLE 2
Rights and Liabilities of Principal as to Third
Persons
§ 3595. (§ 3023.) Extent of authority.
III. SPECIAL AGENTS.
Duty to Investigate Authority.—For a case which adheres
to the rule laid down in the first paragraph under this catch-
line in Georgia Code of 1926, see Quillion & Bros. v. Wales
Adding Machine Co., 34 Ga. App. 135, 136, 128 S. E- 698.
How Far Principal Bound.—One who deals with a special
agent, knowing at the time the limits within which the
agent, under the terms of his appointment, has authority to
bind his principal, is bound to act with reference to this
knowledge, and can not hold the principal liable for loss
occasioned by acts of the agent in excess of, or contrary to,
the latter's authority in the premises. See Littleton v. Loan
etc., Asso., 97 Ga. 172, 25 S. E. 826; Quillian & Bros. v.
Wales Adding Machine Co., 34 Ga. App. 135, 136, 128 S. E-
698.
Authority to Collect.—In Quillan & Bros. v. Wales Adding
Machine Co., 34 Ga. App. 135, 137, 128 S. E- 698, is quoted
the following statement taken from an opinion delivered by
Mr. Justice Lewis, in Walton Guano Co. v. McCall, 111 Ga.
114, 116, 36 S. E- 469: "As a general rule a special agent or
attorney to collect a debt is not authorized to receive any-
thing as a payment thereon except actual cash." In the
same case it was added that an agency does not necessarily
include an agency to collect.
§ 3G06. (§ 3034.) Agent is a competent witness.
I. IN GENERAL.
Cited in George v. Rath stein, 35 Ga. App. 126, 132 S. E-
414.
ARTICLE 3
Rights and Liabilities of Agent as to Third
Persons
§ 3607. (§ 3035.) Agent may act under this Code,
for principal.
See notes to § 3366 par. 6.
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§ 3621 LANDLORD AND TENANT § 3692
FIFTH TITLE
Of Property and the Tenure by Which it is Held
CHAPTER l
Of Realty
§ 3621. (§ 3049). Fixtures.
Particular Fixtures Considered and Principles Illustrated
—
Machinery.—Boilers, smokestacks, etc., installed in creamery
plant, removal of which would incapacitate plant, is, under
this section, fixtures included within a prior mortgage of
after-acquired property, which became superior to vendor's
reservation of title. In re Moultrie Creamery & Produce Co.,
2 Fed. (2d), 129.
However heavy mill machinery not attached to the build-
ing, but held in place by its own weight, does not pass under
a mortgage of the realty and appurtenances, which did not
mention the machinery. Anglo-American Mill Co. v. Ding-
ier, 8 Fed. (2d), 493.
§ 3630. (§ 3058.) Streams boundary lines.
Constitutionality. — The provisions in this section as to
change of currents and gradual accretions are not uncon-
stitutional as a violation of the due-process clause of the
State and Federal Constitutions. Johnson v. Hume, 163 Ga.
867, 137 S. F. 56.
signor and the assignee, but show that the parties con-
templated an immediate change of ownership with respect
to the particular fund in question, not a change of owner-
ship when the fund should be collected or realized, but at
the time of the transaction relied upon to constitute the as-
signment. Brown Guano Co. v. Bridges, 34 Ga. App. 632,
656, 130 S. F- 695.
SIXTH TITLE
Estates and Rights Attached Thereto
CHAPTER 1
Of Absolute Estates or in Fee Simple
§ 3659. (§ 3083.) What words create.
Intention of Maker Cardinal Rule of Construction.—For
cases holding substantially with cases cited under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926, see Banks v. Mor-
gan, 163 Ga. 468, 470, 136 S. F- 434, and cases there cited.
CHAPTER 3
Of Personalty
§ 3651(1). Crops; liens, how attested and re-
corded; levies on unmatured crops.
Effect of Sale of Land with Growing Crops.—Since the
passage of this section the purchaser of lands upon which
crops are growing, at a sale by the trustee in bankruptcy
of the owner of the land, does not acquire any interest in
or title to such crops. Such purchaser under such sale only
acquires tit'.e to the land so purchased, and the right to the
rents, issues, and profits thereof after the date of his pur-
chase. Chatham Chemical Co. v. Vidalia Chemical Co., 163
Ga. 276, 136 S. E. 62.
Effect of Land Mortgage upon Crop Mortgage.—Want of
valid title in the mortgagor to the premises on which mort-
gaged crops are grown, and outstanding title in a third
person who is no party to the suit, does not bar an action
brought by the mortgagee to foreclose and enforce his mort-
gage on such crops. Chatham Chemical Co. v. Vidalia
Chemical Co., 163 Ga. 276, 136 S'. E. 62.
Title to Crops on Land Encumbered before but Sold
after Section..—Notwithstanding this section, the purchaser
of lands under a power of sale in a security deed of older
date than the section acquired title to crops grown after
the passage of this section at the time of the sale if they
were grown and owned by the grantor in such deed;
but if the grantor had in fact, prior to such sale, rented in
good faith these lands to others, who raised such crops,
such purchaser did not acquire title to them, but only the
interest of the grantor in such deed in these crops. Chason
v. O'Neal, 158 Ga. 725, 124 S. F. 519; Brooks v. Causey, 36
Ga. App. 233, 136 S. F. 28Z.
§ 3652. (§ 3076.) Rights and remedies.
There Can Be No Right of Action until There Has Been
a Wrong.
—See Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hazlip-Hood Co.,
161 Ga. 480, 131 S. F- 283, which quotes with approval the
doctrine of the cases under this catchline in Georgia Code
of 1924.
§ 3653 (§ 3077.) Assignment of choses in action,
III. WHAT IS ASSIGNABLE.
B. Under This Section.
2. Particular Choses Considered.
Funds in Potential Existence.—It is not necessary that
the fund attempted to be assigned shall be in actual exist-
ence at the time, for it is well settled that it is sufficient if
it "exists potentially." Brown Guano Co. v. Bridges, 34 Ga.
App. 652, 656, 130 S. F. 695.
VI. EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENT.
Immediate Change of Ownership.—In order to infer an
equitable assignment, such facts and circumstances must
appear, as would not only raise an equity between the as-
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CHAPTER 3
Of Estates in Remainder and Reversion
§ 3676. (§ 3100.) Vested or contingent.
What Uncertainties Make Contingency.—There is a dis-
tinction between the uncertainty which makes a remainder
contingent and the uncertainty of the estate ever taking
effect in possession, which is incidental to even a vested
remainder. In a vested remainder the time of possession
and the enjoyment being deferred, there is always an un-
certainty as to whether the estate will ever be enjoyed in
possession. Walters v. Walters, 163 Ga. 884, 890, 137 S. F.
386. See also, 23 R. C. L. 500, sec. 33.
Same—Vested Subject to Be Divested.—Where remain-
ders are subject to be divested, in whole or in part, by the
disposition of the whole or some part of the property left
by the testator, this contingency does not deprive the re-
mainder of its character as vested. Walters v. Walters, 163
Ga. 884, 890, 137 S. F. 386. See also Melton v. Camp, 121
Ga. 693, 49 S. F- 690.
Illustrations of Vested Remainders.—For a case holding
substantially with McDonald v. Taylor, 107 Ga. 43, 32 S. F.
879, cited under this catchline in Georgia Code of 1926, see
Walters v. Walters, 163 Ga. 884, 890, 137 S. F. 386.
§ 3678. (§ 3102.) Perpetuities.
Cases Not within Rule.—Clearly the limitation of an es-
tate to plaintiff for life, and at her death to her children
born and to be born, does not create a perpetuity. Palmer
v. Neely, 162 Ga. 767, 135 S. F- 90.
§ 3681. (§ 3105.) Assent of the executor.
General Rule.—The first sentence of this section merely
states the general rule. David v. David, 162 Ga. 528, 134 S.
E. 301.
CHAPTER 4
Of Estates for Years
§ 3685. (§ 3109.) Definition.
Leasehold as Realty.—The plaintiff had a written lease
from the owner of the premises in question, for a term of
five years. This created an estate in realty in the lessee as
an estate for years, if it be in lands, passes as realty in
this State. Anderson v. Kokomo Rubber Co., 161 Ga. 842,
846, 132 S. F- 76.
CHAPTER 5
Of Landlord and Tenant
§ 3692. (§ 3116.) Implied contract to pay rent.
Security Deed Given but Possession Retained.—One who
makes to a creditor for the purpose of securing a debt, a
deed to land, but retains possession of the land, does not
thereby become the "tenant" either of such creditor or of
his vendee. Finn v. Reese, 36 Ga. App. 591, 592, 137 S. F.
574. See also, Ray v. Boyd, 96 Ga. 808, 22 S. F- 916.
]
3694 CREATION AND NATURE OF TRUST ESTATES § 3736
§ 3694 (§ 3118.) Landlord not liable for negli-
gence of tenant.
Duty and Liability of Landlord for Repairs.—It would
seem that the degree of diligence required under the sec-
tion in keeping the premises safe does not consist in either
slight diligence or of extraordinary diligence, but rather
consists of ordinary care, such as a prudent householder
might reasonably be expected to exercise. See Cuthbert v.
Schofiekl, 35 Ga. App. 443, 133 S. E. 303.
§ 3698. (§ 3122.) Estoppel.
Section cited in Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 664, 135 S. E-
195.
§ 3699. (§ 31213.) Repairs and improvements.
II. DUTY AND LIABILITY OF LANDLORD.
Extent of Landlord's Duty to Repair—Premises Suited for
Purpose.
—
Except as provided by this section there is in
this State, as at common law, no implied covenant that the
premises are suitable for the purpose for which they are
leased, or for the particular use for which they are in-
tended by the tenant. Cox v. Lowney Co., 35 Ga. App. 51,
132 S. E. 257. And an instruction that it is the duty of the
landlord to make the premises suitable for the purpose in-
tended is erroneous. Id.
In this case the court cites the decisions appearing under
this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926 and admits that
they would seem to support a holding to the contrary. A
nice distinction, however, is drawn between the duty to
keep in repair and the duty to make repairs, and, on reason
and principle, it appears that such a distinction is justifiable
because if the property leased is inherently unfitted for
purposes intended, irrespective of repairs, (in the principle
case a basement as a candy storeroom) the tenant should
be charged with notice of the inadequacies. The situation
is analogous to that which exists when premises are leased
which contain patent defects under which circumstances
the landlord is not held accountable for repairs.
—
Ed. Note.
§ 3705. (§ 3129.) Title to cropper's crop in
landlord.
Title to Crop—When Goes to Cropper.—For a case hold-
ing substantially with cases cited under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926, see Folds v. Harris, 34 Ga. App.
445, 446, 129 S. E- 664.
Same—After Settlement and before Division.—Where there
has been no division of the crop between the landlord and
the cropper and where the cropper's portion of the crop has
not been set aside, and thus the cropper has not received
his part of the crop, no title to the crop passes into him,
although he may have settled with the landlord for all ad-
vances made. Atlanta Trust Co. v. Oliver- McDonald Com-
pany, 36 Ga. App. 360, 136 S. E. 824.
Same—Interest of Landlord.—A landlord's interest in the
title to crops grown by his cropper is only to the extent of
the value of the landlord's portion of the crops, as well as
of any indebtedness for advances made to the cropper.
Franklin v. Tanner, 34 Ga. App. 254, 129 S. E. 114.
Trover against Third Person.—A landlord, who has not
settled with his cropper but has received only a part of the
crops to which he is entitled and whose interest in the re-
maining crops is in an amount less than their value, can,
in a trover suit for their conversion against a third person,
who has acquired them by purchase from the cropper, re-
cover only to the extent of the amount of his claim against
the cropper. Franklin v. Tanner, 34 Ga. App. 254, 129 S.
E. 114.
§ 3711. (§ 3135.) Casualties no abatement of
rent.
What Amounts to Eviction.—Where a landlord enters
upon the rented premises for the ostensible purpose of
making repairs, irrespective of whether it is in conformity
with a legal obligation due to his tenant, or whether it is
for the purpose of protecting his own property, if his con-
duct consists of negligent acts of such grave and permanent
character as would render the premises unfit for tenancy,
and is such as would legally import the intent to deprive
the tenant of their enjoyment, it amounts in law to an evic-
tion of the tenant, and the landlord can not thereafter re-
cover subsequently accruing rent. Feinberg v. Sutker, 35
Ga. App. 505, 134 S. E- 173.
§ 3712. Interfering with certain relations.
Section Compared with Section 125 of Penal Code.—This
section and the following section (section 3713) make it un-
lawful to do the things therein specified, even though there
would be no conflict with the employee's duty under his
contract of employment, which is something quite different
from enticing, persuading, or decoying the servant to desert
his employer during his term of service, as prohibited by
section 125 of the Penal Code. Therefore, the ruling as to
the Constitutional invalidity of this section and the follow-
ing section is not to be applied to that section of the Penal
Code. Rhoden v. State, 161 Ga. 73, 78, 129 S. E. 640.
CHAPTER 6
Of Estates on Condition
§ 3717. (§ 3137.) Precedent and subsequent.
Section cited in Grantham v. Royal Insurance Co., 34 Ga.
App. 415, 130 S. E. 589.
§ 3721. (3141.) Effect of breach of condition.
Necessity of Entry to Revest Estate.—The grantor in a
deed containing a condition subsequent, upon a breach
thereof, is not revested with the title until there has been
an entry. Barnesville v. Stafford. 161 Ga. 588, 592, 131 S.
E. 487.
CHAPTER 7
Of Tenancy in Common
§ 3723. (§ 3143). Definition of tenancy in com-
mon.
Rule Stated—Trustee and Cestui Que Trust.—If a trustee
acquires title to specific realty for his individual use and
also for the use of his cestui que trust, the entire estate
will be an estate in common, and the trustee and the cestui
que trust will be tenants in common. Carmichael v. Citi-
zens & Southern Bank, 162 Ga. 735, 134 S. E- 771.
§3724. (§ 3144). Rights and liabilities of co-
tenants.
Action by Adverse Claimant against Cotenant.—Proof of
title of tenants in common to land from which timber has
been cut and removed by one of them, superior to the title
of an adverse claimant, will entitle the tenant so cutting
and removing the timber to its proceeds, as against such
adverse claimant, notwithstanding the fact that the tenant
cutting and removing the timber in such proceeding alleges-
ownership of the land and timber in severalty. Horn v.
Towson, 163 Ga. 37, 135 S. E. 487.
§ 3727- (§ 3147). Accounting between coten-
ants.
Encumbrance of Estate—Cotenant's Superior Lien.—This
section does not make the claim for indebtedness superior
to a security deed made by the tenant in common individ-
ually, purporting to convey his undivided interest in the
realty to a third person as security for his personal obliga-
tion. Carmichael v. Citizens & Southern Bank, 162 Ga..
735, 134 S. E. 771.
CHAPTER 8
Of Trust Estates, Trusts and Trustees, and
Deeds to Interests in Property for its Im-
provement
ARTICLE 1
Of Their Creation and Nature
§ 3728, (§ 3148). Definition.
Stated in Macy v. Hays, 163 Ga. 478, 485, 136 S. E- 517.
§ 3733. (§ 3153). Express, etc.
There can be no expressed trust unless it is created in;
writing. Macy v. Hays, 163 Ga. 478, 485, 136 S. E- 517.
Examples of application will be found in Macy v. Hays,.
163 Ga. 478, 136 S. E. 517.
§ 3736, (§ 3156). Execution of trusts.
Illustration of Executory Trusts.—The following case is an
example of an executory trust. Burton v. Patton, 162 Ga»
610, 134 S. E- 603.
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§ 3739 PROCESSIONING § 3823
§ 3739. (§ 3159). Implied trusts.
Money Must Be Paiid at or before Purchase.—For a case
reiterating the principle declared in the cases under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926, see McDonald v.
Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 132 S. F. 547.
When Member of Firm Holds Land for Other Members.
—Where land is bought in whole or in part with money con-
tributed by one of the members of a firm, and the legal title
is taken in' the name of the other members, under an agree-
ment that the latter is to hold the land for the use of
the firm, an implied trust arises in favor of the partnership,
and the members become equitable owners and equitable
tenants in common of the land. McDonald v. Dabney, 161
Ga. 711, 132 S. F- 547.
Pleading—Sufficiency of Allegation.—For case wherein the
allegations of the petition as amended, construed most
strongly against the pleader, were held not to raise an im-
plied trust upon the principles of this section, see Drake v.
Drake, 161 Ga. 87, 129 S. F- 635.
Evidence.—To engraft an implied trust upon an absolute
deed by parol evidence, such evidence ought to be clear and
satisfactory. McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 132 S. F-
547.
Proof.—Ordinarily, where one person seeks to enforce an
implied trust in land because it was paid for in part by his
money and title thereto was taken in the name of another,
he must prove the amount of his money so used; but where
real estate is purchased with funds of a partnership, con-
tributed by both members, and title is taken in the name of
one of the members under an agreement that he is to hold
the same for the use of the firm, this rule does not apply.
The partner seeking to enforce the implied trust arising
under these circumstances will not be required to show the
specific amount of the funds contributed by him to the
partnership capital which went into the purchase thereof.
McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 732, 132 S. F- 547.
Paragraph Applied in Stonecypher v. Coleman, 161 Ga.
403, 410, 131 S. F. 75; Manget v. Carlton, 34 Ga. App. 556,
559, 130 S. F- 604; Carmichael v. Citizens, etc., Bank, 162
Ga. 735, 134 S. F. 771.
§ 3762. (§ 3179). Purchaser with notice.
Notice of Trust Relationship—What Instrument Notice of.
—A purchaser of land is charged with notice of recitals in
the deed to his vendor, to the effect that the land was pur-
chased with proceeds of the sale of trust funds. Carmichael
v. Citizens, etc., Bank, 162 Ga. 736, 134 S. F- 771. Citing
Cheney v. Rodgers, 54 Ga. 168; Hancock v. Gumm, 151
Ga. 667, 107 S. F- 872, 16 A. L. R. 1003; Rosen v. Wolff,
152 Ga. 578, 585, 110 S. F- 877. But he is not charged with
notice of such recitals when contained in a deed by the
vendor to another person, even though the deed purports to
convey a part of the same general tract. The recital, in
order to charge notice to the purchaser, must be in an in-
strument constituting a link in his chain of title. Carmichael
v. Citizens, etc., Bank, supra, citing. Hancock v. Gumm,
supra.
Innocent Purchaser from Purchaser with Notice. — If a
grantee in the security deed, with notice of the equity of the
claimants in the hands therein conveyed, transferred for
value a note thereby secured to another without notice of
such equity and who took the same in good faith, the latter
acquired at least an equitable interest in such land as a
purchaser, and holds such interest free from the secret
equity of the claimants and the implied trust set up. First
Nat. Bank v. Pounds, 163 Ga. 551, 136 S. F. 528.
§ 3773. (§ 3189). Lien on estates for trust funds.
When Funds of Estate Loaned.—When an administrator
deposits with, or lends to, a firm of which he is a partner the
funds of the estate which he represents, and the same are
mingled with the funds of the firm and used in its business,
upon the dissolution of the firm by the death of such partner
(the administrator) the beneficiary of the trust fund thus mis-
applied has a lien upon the assets of the firm in the hands
of the surviving partner, superior to those of the firm's un-
secured creditors. Miller & Co. v. Gibbs, 161 Ga. 698, 132 S.
F. 626.
ARTICLE 2
Of Trusts and Trustees
§ 3780. (§ 3196). When court will declare one a
trustee.
Section Quoted in McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 731,
132 S. E. 547.
§ 3781. (§ 3197). Want of trustee.
Appointment by Court for Educational and Religious
Trusts.—For a case following, in a material manner, the
principle enunciated in the first paragraph under this catch-
line in the Georgia Code of 1926, see Dominy v. Stanley, 162
Ga. 211, 133 S. E. 245.
§ 3785. (§ 3201). Tracing assets.
When Traceable May Always Follow.—The beneficiary of
a trust may always follow the trust funds wherever they can
be traced. Miller & Co. v. Gibbs, 161 Ga. 698, 707, 132 S.
F. 626.
Need Not Show Investment in Specific Property.—It is
not indispensably necessary for the beneficiary, in order
to trace trust funds, to show that they have been invested
in specific property by the trustee or the person aiding the
trustee in the misapplication of the funds. Miller & Co. v.
Gibbs, 161 Ga. 698, 708, 132 S. F- 626. But it is necessary
that they should be clearly traced and identified either in
original or substitute form. Id.
Same—Ober v. Cochran Reconciled.—In Ober & Sons Co.
v. Cochran, 118 Ga. 396, 45 S. F- 382, 98 Am. St. Rep. 118,
Mr. Presiding Justice Fish used some language which at
first blush might seem to conflict with the rule as an-
nounced by the Georgia Courts. That language is: "In or-
der to recover a trust fund which has been misapplied by
the trustee or person holding it in a fiduciary character, it
must be clearly identified or distinctly traced into the
property, fund, or chose in action which is to be made sub-
ject to replace it." This does not mean that the trust fund
can not be traced into the general property or funds of
such trustee or person holding it in a fiduciary capacity. If
the funds can be traced into the general property or funds
of such trustee or person, the trust will be enforced. Mil-
ler & Co. v. Gibbs, 161 Ga. 698, 709, 132 S. F. 626.
SEVENTH TITLE
Of Title and Mode of Conveyance
CHAPTER l
Of Title by Grant
ARTICLE 3
Processioning
§ 3820- (§ 3246). Rules in disputed lines.
When Construction Most Favorable to Grantee Prevails.—
Where all other means of ascertaining the true construction
of a deed fails, and a doubt still remains, that construction
is rather to be preferred which is most favorable to the
grantee. Holder v. Jordan Realty Co., 163 Ga. 645, 650, 136
S. F. 907, citing Tyler on Boundaries, 119, 120; Harris v.
Hull, 70 Ga. 831.
Section Given in Charge.—As to a case sustaining a trial
judge's charge to the jury involving a substantial portion
of the section, see Cherokee Ochre Co. v. Georgia Ochre
Co., 162 Ga. 620, 134 S. F. 616.
§ 3821. (§ 3247). General reputation, when evi-
dence.
Binding on Grantees.—See Booker v. Booker, 36 Ga. App.
738, 138 S. F- 251, for a case following the cases cited under
this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 3823. (§ 3249). Protest and appeal to superior
court.
Discrepancies in Dower Plat and Processioners.—Where it
appeared conclusively that the surveyor for the procession-
ers followed the line between the lands of the litigants as
shown by the dower plat, any errors made upon the lines
between other landowners, or any discrepancies in the
dower plat and the plat made by the processioners, were
immaterial and harmless. Groover v. Durrence, 36 Ga. App.
543, 137 S. F. 299.
Survey of Other Boundaries.—Where the only dispute is
over the dividing line between two tracts of land, a survey
of other boundaries is unnecessary. Groover v. Durrence,
36 Ga. App. 543, 137 S. F- 299.
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§ 3832 NUNCUPATIVE WILLS § 3926
CHAPTER 2
Of Title by Will
ARTICLE l
Of the Nature of Wills, by Whom and How Ex-
ecuted
§ 3832. (§ 3258). Power of testators.
Providing for Creation of Corporation.—A testator under
the laws of this State can provide by his will for the crea-
tion by his executors of a corporation to which the executors
shall convey the residue of his estate for the purpose of
carrying on his general business. Palmer v. Neely, 162 Ga.
767, 135 S. E- 90.
§ 3840. (§ 3266). Insane persons.
Monomania under This Section—Particular Type of Mania.
—Mania is a form of insanity accompanied by more or less
excitement, which sometimes amounts to fury. The person
so affected is subject to hallucinations and delusions, and
is impressed with the reality of events which have never oc-
curred and things which do not exist, and his actions are
more or less in conformity with his belief in these particu-
lars. Hall v. Unger, 11 Fed. Cas. 261, 263 (No. 5949). This
mania may extend to all objects; or it may be confined to one
or a few objects, in which latter case it is called monomania.
Dyar v. Dyar, 161 Ga. 615, 628, 131 S. E. 535.
§ 3841. (§ 3267). Eccentricity, imbecility, etc.
Rule of Evidence.—The section is a rule of evidence, and
may be given in charge on an issue of devisavit vel non,
without specially pleading such rule, where there is evi-
dence to authorize such charge. Dyar v. Dyar, 161 Ga. 615,
623, 131 S. E- 535.
§ 3842. (§ 3268). Amount of capacity neces-
sary.
Standard of Mental Capacity—Charges.—In his charge to
the jury the judge gave certain instructions which would
probably lead the jury to conclude that the capacity to
contract was identical with the capacity to make a valid
will; and this identity does not exist. Such instructions
were erroneous. Tarlton v. Richardson, 163 Ga. 553, 136 S. E-
526.
§ 3846. (§ 3272). Formalities of execution.
II. SIGNATURE OF TESTATOR.
Testator's Name Signed by Another.—Where a person's
name is signed for him, at his direction and in his presence,
by another, the signature becomes his own. The relation-
ship of principal and agent is not thereby created, nor does
the doctrine of such a relationship become involved. Neal
v. Harber, 35 Ga. App. 628, 134 S. E- 347.
Acknowledgment of Signature.—It is absolutely neces-
sary that the attesting witnesses either actually see the tes-
tator sign the instrument, or that the testator acknowledge
his signature thereto either expressly or impliedly. Wood
v. Davis, 161 Ga. 690, 693, 131 S. E- 885.
§ 3851. (§ 3277.) Charitable devises.
Execution within Ninety Days of Death.—Under this sec-
tion a bequest to an educational institution by will which
was executed less than 90 days before death is void. South-
ern Industrial Inst. v. Marsh, lo Fed. (2d), 347.
ARTICLE 2
Of Probate and Its Effect
§ 3864. (§ 3290.) Original will to remain in
office.
Section Cited in Young v. Certainteed Products Corp., 35
Ga. App. 419, 133 S. E. 279.
§ 3870. (§ 3296.) Admission of executor, etc.
Origin.—This section had its origin in codification, and
not in statute. Brown v. Kendrick, 163 Ga. 149, 154, 135 S. E.
721.
General Rule Stated.—It has been held that declarations
made before its execution, by parties who afterwards become
legatees under the will, are not admissible against the valid-
ity of the will. Brown v. Kendrick, 163 Ga. 149, 154, 135 S.
E. 721, citing 2 Schouler on Wills (6th ed), section 809; In
re Ames, 51 Iowa, 596 (2 N. W. 408); Burton v. Scott, 3
Rand. 399, 407; Thompson v. Thompson, 13 Ohio St. 356, 363.
Executor Who Is Propounder and Legatee.—See Brown v.
Kendrick, 163 Ga. 149, 154, 135 S. E- 721, which upholds the
doctrine of the case under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
ARTICLE 3
Probate of Foreign Wills
(§ 3299.) What requisite if land de-§ 3873.
vised.
Sections 3873-3880 Explained.—Under sections 3873-3880 a
foreign will can be probated, and Georgia property willed
thereunder can be administered, only by such resident ex-
ecutor as may be named therein, or, if none, by a resident
administrator with the will annexed, appointed at the in-
stance of any heir, legatee, distributee, devisee, or creditor
of the testator. The purpose and effect of the act of 1894,
now incorporated in these sections, is not only to require
the domestic probate of foreign wills before Georgia prop-
erty can be administered thereunder, but also to prohibit
such probate and the administration of Georgia property
willed thereunder by any person other than a resident exec-
utor or a resident administrator with the will annexed,
selected and appointed as therein provided, to the exclusion
of the executor therein named or any administrator with the
will annexed appointed elsewhere. League v. Churchill, 36
Ga. App. 681, 137 S. E- 800.
ARTICLE 5
Of Devises and Legacies
§ 3896. (§ 3320.) Effect of assent.
Effect of Assent Where Debts Made Permanent to Will.—
Where executors, directed to carry out business ventures
of testator, incurred debts pursuant to will, they could not
thereafter interfere with rights of creditors by assenting to
devises or legacies. Holt v. Daniel Sons & Palmer Co.,
8 Fed. (2d), 700.
§ 3900. (§ 3324.) Intention of testator.
I. IN GENERAL.
When May Have Effect as It Stands.—In the instant case
the trial judge did not err in rejecting parol evidence tend-
ing to show that the testator instructed the scrivener to so
draw the will as to give to his brother and sister an es-
tate in remainder in the property real and personal given
his wife for life or widowhood under his will, when the will,
as it stands, may have effect. Hill v. Hill, 161 Ga. 356, 359,
130 S. E. 575.
§ 3906. (§ 3330.) Lapsed legacies.
"Execute" Synonymous with "Made."—The word "exe-
cuted" in the phrase "when the will is executed," as used
in the section is synonymous with the word "made." Mac-
Intyre v. McLean, 162 Ga. 280, 133 S. E. 471.
§ 3910. (§ 3334.) Election.
Renouncing Inconsistent Rights.—For a case following the
doctrine embodied in the note under this catchline in the
Georgia Code of 1926, see Robinson v. Ramsey, 161 Ga. 1,
10, 129 S. E. 837.
§ 3913. (§ 3337.) Devise changed from real
to personal property, and vice versa.
Proceeds of Realty Treated as Personalty.—On the theory
of equitable conversion, the proceeds of real estate sold un-
der a power of sale conferred by the will of a decedent are
usually regarded as personal assets of the estate. Brown
Guano Co. v. Bridges, 34 Ga. App. 652, 655, 130 S. E. 695,
citing 11 R. C. L. 120.
ARTICLE 7
Of Nuncupative Wills
§ 3925. (§ 3349.) Nuncupative wills, when
good.
Cited and partially stated in Felker v. Taylor, 162 Ga.
433, 134 S. E- 52.
§ 3926. (§ 3350.) When proved.
Partially Stated in Felker v. Taylor, 162 Ga. 433, 134 S.
E. 52.
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CHAPTER 3
Of Title by Descent and Administration
ARTICLE 1
Of Inheritable Property and the Relative Rights
of the Heirs and Administrator
§ 3929. (§ 3353.) Descent to heirs.
Realty—Equitable Estate Therein.—When the father of
the plaintiffs died intestate, holding possession of lands
under bonds for title with a part of the purchase-money
paid, he had a beneficial interest or equitable estate therein.
Upon his death this interest or estate descended to his heirs
at law. Stonecypher v. Coleman, 161 Ga. 403, 409, 131 S.
E. 75.
§ 3931. (§ 3355.) Rules of inheritance.
Wife "Heir" of Husband.—The widow of a deceased per-
son is not, strictly speaking, an heir at law of her husband.
Haddock v. Callahan Grocery Co., 163 Ga. 204, 135 S. E- 747.
ARTICLE 2
Of Administration
SECTION l
Different Kinds of Administrators and Rules for
Granting Letters
§ 3943. (§ 3367.) Rules for granting letters.
Sister's Rights Prior to Nieces and Nephews.—Where a
man died intestate leaving no wife nor any relatives except
one sister and the children and grandchildren of four de-
ceased sisters and one .deceased brother, all said relatives
being sui juris and qualified to administer on the estate, the
person selected in writing by the sister of the intestate
was entitled to letters of administration in preference to
the person selected in writing by a majority of the children
of the intestate's deceased sisters and brother, although these
constituted a majority both numerically and in point of in-
terest. Dawson v. Shave, 162 Ga. 126, 132 S. E. 912.
SECTION 3
The Appointment of Administrators, Their Bond
and Removal
§ 3972. (§ 3396.) Bond of administrator.
Liability of Administrator and Sureties.—The condition
requires the administrator to account for all the money and
property belonging to the estate he administers and coming
into his hands as such administrators, and to distribute
such money and the proceeds of such property in accordance
with law. The sureties on the bond of such an admin-
istrator are liable for any breach of the condition of the
bond, including any failure of the administrator to discharge
faithfully his duty in collecting and preserving and distribut-
ing the assets of the estate. Ellis v. Geer, 36 Ga. App. 519,
137 S. E. 290.
§ 3974. (§ 3398.) Suit on bonds.
Liability Joint and Several.—The obligation of an admin-
istrator and the sureties on his bond is joint and several.
Ellis v. Geer, 36 Ga. App. 519, 137 S. E. 290.
Suits against Sureties Alone.—For a case following cases
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926, see Ameri-
can Surety Co. v. Macon Savings Bank, 162 Ga. 143, 147, 132
S. E. 636.
Compared with Section 3054.—In American Surety Co. v.
Macon Savings Bank, 162 Ga. 143, 147, 132 S. E. 636, it was
said to be manifest, by a comparison of the two sections
[this section and section 3054] that while the language used
in each is somewhat different, the purpose of the codifiers
was the same.
SECTION 5
Of Managing the Estate and Paying the Debts
§ 4004. (§ 3428.) Compromises by adminis-
trator.
Provisions Must Be Followed.—An agreement by a guard-
ian to compromise an indebtedness due to the ward is in-
valid in the absence of a compliance by the guardian with
any of the provisions of this and the two following sections.
Nix v. Monroe, 36 Ga. App. 356, 136 S. E- 806.
§ 4005. (§ 3429.) May make compromise.
Provisions Must Be Followed.—See same catchline under
section 4004.
(§ 3430.) Trustee may compromise§ 4006.
claims.
Requirements of Section Requisite to Compromise.—See
note "Provisions Must Be Followed" under section 4004.
SECTION 7
Of Administrator's Sale
§ 4033. (§ 3457.) Property held adversely.
Exception to General Rule.—Where an administratrix and
her attorney knew that certain land was being held adversely
to the estate and that the heir in possession had actually
filed his claim thereto on the very day of the sale and just
before the sale, and they concealed this fact, then such pos-
session held adversely to the estate by a third person and
his filing of a claim would constitute such fraud as would be
relievable in equity, and would prevent the application of
the doctrine of caveat emptor. Dukes v. Bashlor, 162 Ga. 403,
407, 134 S. E. 98.
SECTION 8
Of Distribution, Advancements, and Year's
Support
§ 4041. (§ 3465.) Year's support of family.
EDITOR'S NOTE AND GENERAL CONSIDERA-
TIONS.
I.
Effect of Prior Deed to Defraud Creditors.—A deed made
to defraud creditors, though void as to them, is good be-
tween the grantor and the grantee, and the former after
executing such deed has no title to the property thereby con-
veyed; and thereafter the same can not be set apart as a
year's support for his widow. McDowell v. McMurria, 107
Ga. 812, 33 S. E. 709; Bank v. Powell, 163 Ga. 291, 135 S.
E- 922.
VI. NATURE AND AMOUNT OF PROPERTY.
Kind of Property Assignable.—The year's support provided
for under this section must be set apart "from the estate"
of the deceased husband or father. Summerford v. Gilbert,
37 Ga. 59; Bank v. Powell, 163 Ga. 291, 135 S. E. 922.
§ 4042. (§ 3466.) Support continued, when.
Where Executor Has Made Advances.—Where a widow
consumed property of the estate of her deceased husband as
a support and accepted advances from the executor for that
purpose, and where these transactions occurred prior to the
grant of a first year's support and might have been pleaded
in defense thereto, they can not be shown in defense to an
application by her for a second year's support. Hill v. Hill,
36 Ga. App. 327, 136 S. E- 480, citing Fulghum v. Fulghum,
111 Ga. 635, 36 S. E. 602, 37 S. E- 774; Wood v. Brown, 121
Ga. 471, 49 S. E- 295.
Pending Litigation.—Where an estate being administered
under a will is kept together for a longer period than twelve
months by a suit of the executor for the construction of the
will (Hill v. Hill, 161 Ga. 356, 130 S. E- 575), and not by
any fault of the testator's widow, the widow, if there are
no debts, will ordinarily be entitled to support from the es-
tate for each year that it is thus kept together.
.
Hill v.
Hill, 36 Ga. App. 327, 136 S. E- 480.
§ 4052. (§ 3474.) Advancements.
Advancements Claimed Only in Cases of Intestacy.—In this
State it is only in cases of intestacy that parties can claim
advancements or be compelled to account for them. Robin-
son v. Ramsey, 161 Ga. 1, 4, 129 S. E- 837, citing Huggins
v. Huggins, 71 Ga. 66.
Advancements Distinguished from Debts.—An advancement
differs from a debt in that there is no enforceable liability
on the part of the child to repay during the lifetime of the
donor or after his death, except in the way of suffering a
deduction in his portion of the estate. Robinson v. Ramsey,
161 Ga. 1, 6, 129 S. E- 837.
Same—Example.—In a will the term used by the testator,
Ga—
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that each of certain children "owes the estate" a named
sum of money, without any direction that this debt shall be
treated as an advancement, fixes the status of the transac-
tion as one of debts, and "debt" is not synonymous with
"advancement." Robinson v. Ramsey, 161 Ga. 1, 129 S. F.
837.
SECTION 9
Of Commissions and Extra Compensation, and
Expense of Giving Bond
§ 4067. (§ 3489.) Extra compensation.
Executor Must Show Nature of Services.—Where an exec-
utor claims compensation for extra services, the nature,
character, extent, and value of such services must be satis-
factorily proved by him; and in the absence of such show-
ing, the refusal of the lower court to approve an exception
to the auditor's finding of fact that the executor rendered
no extra services will not be reversed where it appears that
another finding of the auditor allows the executor compen-
sation for all extra services so proved by the evidence.
Clements v. Fletcher, 161 Ga. 21, 129 S. F- 846.
Order Presumably Valid.—The order of the ordinary, al-
though not conclusive on the parties in interest, furnishes
at least prima facie evidence that the executor was entitled
to the amount. Clements v. Fletcher, 161 Ga. 21, 47, 129 S.
F- 846.
§ 4069. (§ 3491.) Forfeiture of commissions.
In General.—It can not be said as a matter of law that an
executor forfeits all compensation by reason of his neglect
or misconduct in the administration of an estate. Under
the evidence and facts of the case, it was a question of fact
to be determined in the first instance by the auditor, and in
the second instance upon exception to such finding by the
judge. Clements v. Fletcher, 161 Ga. 21, 51, 129 S. F. 846,
citing Adair v. St. Araand, 136 Ga. 1, 70 S. F. 578.
Relief from Forfeit—When Will Provides Compensation.—
Where the will provided for reasonable compensation to the
executor instead of commissions, the order of the ordinary
would relieve the executor from forfeiture of such compen-
sation by reason of such failure to make returns. Clements
v. Fletcher, 161 Ga. 21, 129 S. F- 846.
CHAPTER 4
Of Title by Contract
ARTICLE 1
Of Private Sales
§ 4106. (§ 3526.) Essentials of a sale.
Consent of Parties—Double Agency.—In a suit in trover,
it indisputably appearing that when the property sued for
was turned over by the agent of the plaintiff to himself as
the agent of the defendant it was without the knowledge or
consent of either principal, and with no further purpose or
intent than that the principals might thereafter agree upon
a sale and the terms of a sale as between themselves, the
transaction did not meet the requirements of a sale. Wil-
lingham Stone Co. v. Whitestone Marble Co., 36 Ga. App.
230, 136 S. F. 180.
Completed Sale.—See Hatchett v. State, 34 Ga. App. 134,
128 S. F- 687, affirming the second paragraph under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 4113. (§ 3533.) What is fraud.
Misrepresentation.—In the forum of conscience a misrepre-
sentation of the first kind mentioned in this section is of
deeper dye than one of the latter kind; but in the forum of
law both constitute fraud, the former positive fraud, and
the latter legal fraud. Gibson v. Alford, 161 Ga. 672, 683, 132
S. F- 442.
§ 4117. (§ 3537.) Possibility can not be sold.
Futures.—See catchline "Cotton Futures" under section
4256.
§ 4119. (§ 3539.) Agent in possession and
with apparent right to sell.
Illustrations.
—See Pilcher v. Enterprise Mfg. Co., 36 Ga.
App. 760, 138 S. F- 272, holding substantially the same as
[9
the second paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
§ 4120. (§ 3540.) Purchaser without notice,
protected.
Purchaser from Fraudulent Grantee.—Where property was
conveyed to defraud creditors and the grantee sold to a bona
fide purchaser, the latter is protected under this section and
section 4535 although the grantee is not a "vendee" as the
word is used in this section. Bank v. Wheeler, 162 Ga. 635,
134 S. F. 753.
Quoted in Pilcher v. Enterprise Mfg. Co., 36 Ga. App. 760,
138 S. F. 272.
§ 4122. (§ 3542.) Deficiency in sale of lands.
III. SALE BY TRACT OR ENTIRE BODY.
Number of Acres Descriptive Merely.—See Holliday v.
Ashford, 163 Ga. 505, 136 S. F- 524, holding substantially the
same as the paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
§ 4124. (§ 3544.) Purchaser losing land,
rights of.
Quoted in Holliday v. Ashford, 163 Ga. 505, 136 S. F- 524.
§ 4125.
rial.
(§ 3545.) Delivery of goods essen-
III. CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERY.
B. Delivery of Bill of Lading and Warehouse Receipts.
Warehouse Receipts.—See Continental Trust Co. v. Bank,
162 Ga. 758, 134 S. F. 775, quoting the second paragraph un-
der this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 4130. (§ 3550.) Purchase-price, when due*
Cash Sale Presumed.—See Freeman v. Stedham, 34 Ga.
App. 143, 128 S. F. 702, affirming the first sentence in this
paragraph under the same catchline in the Georgia Code
of 1926.
§ 4131. (§ 3551.) Remedy of seller on de-
fault of buyer.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Action on Open Account.—A suit "on open account" can
not by amendment be changed into a suit under this section.
Butler v. Crown Cork, etc., Co., 34 Ga. App. 28, 128 S. F. 15.
Objection as to Time of Shipment.—In a suit brought by
the seller after he has sold the goods for the buyer under
this section the buyer will not be heard then to raise for the
first time the issue that the shipment was not made in strict
compliance with the contract as to time. Cobb Lumber Co.
v. Sunny South Grain Co., 36 Ga. App. 140, 135 S. F- 759.
IV. STORING GOODS FOR VENDEE.
Waiver.—Where a purchaser notifies the seller to cancel
the order, but the seller, refusing to accept such tender of
breach, thereafter delivers the goods to a carrier, and the
purchaser, after their arrival, refuses acceptance, and the
seller proceeds to store them for the purchaser and brings
suit on the contract for the purchase price, such a mere
ineffective tender of delivery on the part of the seller would
not amount to a waiver on his part of his right to such a
procedure under this section, but he is still entitled to sue
not on open account for goods sold and delivered, but upon
the contract for the purchase price of the goods thus re-
tained by the purchaser. Fdison v. Plant Bros. & Co., 35
Ga. App. 683, 134 S. F. 627.
§ 4135. (§ 3555.) Implied warranty.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION AND WARRANTY
OF TITLE.
Stipulation against Parol Alteration.—Because a written
contract of sale stipulates that it covers all the agreements
between the purchaser and seller, and that it can not be al-
tered or modified in any manner except by agreement in
writing of its "officers, such stipulation does not prevent the
purchaser from setting up the implied warranty of the law.
Colt Co. v. Bridges, 162 Ga. 154, 132 S. F- 889.
III. EXPRESS WARRANTY AS EFFECTING IM-
PLIED WARRANTY.
Express Warranty Excludes Implied One—Scope of Express
Warranty Important.—An express warranty may or may
not exclude the implied warranty which the law attaches to
all contracts of sale, the exclusion of this implied warranty
being dependent upon the scope and terms of the express
warranty. Colt Co. v. Bridges, 162 Ga. 154, 132 S. F- 889.
Exclusion Not in Every Feature of Contract.
—
See Colt
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Co. v. Bridges, 162 Ga. 154, 132 S. E. 889, affirming the
holding of the first paragraph of this section in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
§ 4136. (§ 3556.) Effect of breach.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
Partial Failure of Consideration.—An action for damages
for a breach of the implied warranty under subsection 2,
section 4135 lies where there is a partial failure of considera-
tion. Boone v. Lewis, 35 Ga. App. 478, 133 S. E- 653.
III. DAMAGES.
Measure of Damages.—The measure of damages is the
difference between the price paid for the goods and their
actual value as reduced by their defective condition. Boone
v. Lewis, 35 Ga. App. 478, 133 S. E- 653.
See Colt Co. v. Mallory, 35 Ga. App. 289, 133 S. E- 55,
affirming the holding of the first sentence in paragraph 4
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Same—Travelling Expenses.—Expense properly and reason-
ably incurred by the plaintiff in travelling in order to
lessen the loss was a proper item of damages. Boone v.
Lewis, 35 Ga. App. 478, 133 S. E. 653.
Same—Testimony of Vendee as to Value of Goods.—Where
a defendant testified that goods were of no value to him in
the condition they were in, this did not show that they were
not of some value. Colt Co. v. Mallory, 35 Ga. App. 289,
291, 133 S. E. 55.
§ 4144. (§ 3564.) Essentials of gift.
Present Intention.—See Clark v. Bridges, 163 Ga. 542, 136
S. E- 444, quoting the sentence in the paragraph under the
same catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Transfer of Stock.—Under sections 4144-4147, transfer of
stock to educational institution, without delivery of certifi-
cates, did not constitute a gift; transfer being only prima
facie evidence of delivery. Southern Industrial Inst. v.
Marsh, 15 Fed. (2d), 347.
§ 4147. (§ 3567.) Delivery.
Delivery between Members of Same Family.—The rule as
to delivery is not so strictly applied to transactions be-
tween members of a family living in the same house, the
law in such cases accepting as delivery acts which would
not be so regarded if the transaction were between stran-
gers living in different places. Harrell v. Nicholson, 119
Ga. 458, 460, 46 S. E. 623; Williams v. McElroy, 35 Ga. App.
420, 133 S. E- 297.
Deposit Subject to Checking Account.—A deposit made in
a bank by a parent for the benefit of a child but subject to
be drawn out at any time by either is not a gift under this
and the other sections of this chapter. Clark v. Bridges,
163 Ga. 542, 136 S. E. 444.
Renunciation of Dominion
—
Question for Jury.—Where a
husband as donor had parted absolutely with his title in
favor of his wife, and the subject-matter of the gift (cer-
tain promissory notes) remained in a box to which the wife
carried the key, but which contained articles belonging to
each, and to which each continued to have the right of ac-
cess, it became a question of fact for the jury to determine
whether, under the circumstances, the donor had in fact re-
linquished control by the gift. Williams v. McElroy, 35 Ga.
App. 420, 133 S. E- 297.
§ 4150. (§ 3570.) Presumption of gifts [of
personal property]
.
Question for Jury.—Gross v. Higginbotham, 34 Ga. App.
549, 130 S. E- 371, affirms the holding under this catchline
in the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 4154. (§ 3574.) Donatio causa mortis.
Essentials.—Under this section, a gift causa mortis must
be intended to be absolute only in the event of death.
Southern Industrial Tnst. v. Marsh, 15 Fed. (2d), 347.
CHAPTER 5
Of Title by Escheat and Forfeiture
§ 4155. (§ 3575.) Escheat.
Interest of State.—Where it is alleged that a deceased left
no heirs and that the will made by him was false and
fraudulent it was held that the State had sufficient interest
in the property to file a petition demanding probate of the
will and to caveat the probate since otherwise the State
would have no way of declaring the property escheated.
Oslin v. State, 161 Ga. 967, 132 S. E- 542. The dissenting
opinion to this case by Russell, C. J., contains a discussion
of the history of escheats.—Ed. Note.
CHAPTER 6
Of Title by Prescription
§ 4164. (§ 3584.) Adverse possession.
When Possession Adverse.—Where a vendor sold property
to his wife and continued in possession without making her
a deed thereto as he promised, he does not hold adversely
to her. McArthur v. Ryals, 162 Ga. 413, 134 S. E- 76.
(§ 3587.) Possession extends to what§ 4167.
bounds.
Meaning of "Contiguous."—The word "contiguous," as used
in this section means to touch. Standard Dictionary; Web-
ster's New International Dictionary. Accordingly, tracts of
land which corner with one another are contiguous. Morris
v. Gibson, 35 Ga. App. 689, 134 S. E- 796.
When One Deed Conveys Several Tracts.—The same deed
may make independent conveyances of two or more separate
and non-contiguous tracts of land. In such a case actual
possession of one or more of such distinct entities as thus
conveyed will not be extended by construction to include
them all. But where the several tracts designated as being
included by the terms of the conveyance actually adjoin or
corner, so as to in fact constitute a single parcel, actual
possession of a portion of the premises thus conveyed will
be extended by construction to include the entire premises.
Morris v. Gibson, 35 Ga. App. 689, 134 S. E. 796.
§ 4168. (§ 3588.) Possession for twenty years
gives title.
Other Titles Extinguished.—"When an adverse possessor
has held for the requisite period and his prescriptive title
ripens, it extinguishes all other inconsistent titles and it-
self becomes the true title." Powell on Actions for Eand,
459, sec. 349. Danielly v. Eowe, 161 Ga. 279, 130 S. E. 687.
§ 4175. (§ 3595.) Other exceptions.
Period of Non-Representation—No Deduction after Five
Years.—"If the estate remains unrepresented for more than
five years, no deduction at all from the adverse possessor's
term will be allowed in favor of the personal representative."
Powell's Actions for Eand, 448. Danielly v. Lowe, 161 Ga.
279. 130 S. E- 687.
CHAPTER 7
Of Conveyances of Titles
ARTICLE 1
Generally
§ 4179. (§ 3599.) Requisites of a deed.
Consideration—Inquiry into—When Permissible.—See Sikes
v. Sikes, 162 Ga. 302, 133 S. E. 239, affirming the holding in
the first paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia Code
of 1926.
§ 4182. (§ 3602.) Form of deed.
From sufficient in Crider v. Woodward, 162 Ga. 743, 135 S.
E. 95.
§ 4187. (§ 3607.) Inconsistent clauses in
deed.
In General.—The holding of Thompson v. Hill, 137 Ga. 308,
73 S. E. 640, as set out under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926, is affirmed in Clark v. Robinson, 162 Ga. 395,
134 S. E- 72, and Holder v. Jordan Realty Co., 163 Ga. 645,
136 S. E. 907.
§ 4190. (§ 3610.) Ancient deed.
Jury to Pass on Genuineness.—Where such a deed as de-
scribed in this section is apparently genuine, has come from
the proper custody, and is shown not to be inconsistent with
possession, or if other corroboration appears, it should be
admitted in evidence as prima facie established. But the
jury has the right to finally pass on its genuineness, after
hearing all the testimony pro and con. Gaskins v. Guthrie,
162 Ga. 103, 132 S. E- 764.
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ARTICLE 3
Of Registration
§ 4198. (§ 3818.) Deeds, when and where re-
corded.
Applied in Dorsey v. Clower, 162 Ga 299, 133 S. E- 249.
§ 4212. (§ 3630.) Copy when evidence.
Proof of Inquiry as to Loss of Original Deed Requisite.—
In order to admit in evidence a certified copy of a registered
deed, it must be shown that the original has been de-
stroyed, or that it was lost or inaccessible, or that due dili-
gence has been exercised in endeavoring by proper search
and inquiry to ascertain in whose custody it is. Beall v.
Francis, 163 Ga.i 894, 896, 137 S, E. 251.Law
., EIGHTH TITLE
On
Of Contracts
HAPTER 1
m
rgia
§ 4219. (§ 3634.) Specialty.
An insurance policy under seal constituted a "'specialty,*'
~Under sections 4219, 4359, such that there could be no re-
covery of money paid under it, on ground of false repre-
sentations, as long as it remained uncanceled, and suit to
• cancel and to recover such payment was not barred on
: ground that complainant had adequate and complete remedy
^at law. Massachusetts Protective Ass'n v. Kittles, 2 Fed.
(2d), 211.
§ 4222. (§ 3637.) Essentials of a contract.
Subject Matter Not in Existence.—If a contract amounts
to an executory agreement for a bona fide sale of property
of a character such as under the circumstances and under
the law can be legally made the subject matter of a sale,
and is not merely speculative in character, the parties may
be bound, although the subject matter of the sale has no
existence at the time the agreement is entered upon, and
the seller expects to comply with his contract by subse-
quently acquiring the property thus agreed to be conveyed.
Parks v. Washington, etc., R. Co., 35 Ga. App. 635, 133 S.
E. 634. Citing Forsyth Mfg. Co. v. Castlen, 112 Ga. 199, 201,
37 S. E. 485, 81 Am. St. R. 28; Jones v. Fuller, 27 Ga. App.
84, 107 S. E- 544; Gilbert v. Copeland, 22 Ga. App. 753, 97 S.
E. 251.
§ 4224. (§ 3639.) Conditions precedent and
subsequent.
Example of Condition Subsequent.—Where the commis-
sioners of a drainage district, enter into a collateral agree-
ment with a contractor by the terms of which such com-
missioners agree "to be personally responsible for the money
of the district until money can be secured by the issuing
and sale of bonds of said district or until the district se-
cures money from other sources," such collateral agreement
is based upon a condition subsequent; and upon the fulfil-
ment of the condition subsequent all liability under such
agreement, ipso facto, ceases. Board v. Williams, 34 Ga.
App. 731, 753, 131 S. E. 911.
§ 4230. (§ 3645.) Assent is essential to contract.
Mutual Assent—Bank and Depositor.—Where a bank de-
livered to a depositor, money, neither he nor the bank in-
tending that it should be accepted by him in payment of
the amount due to him, but with the expectation on the
part of the bank that he should deliver the money to a third
party, the depositor was not paid and the bank continued
to be his debtor. Davis v. Farmers, etc., Bank, 36 Ga. App.
415, 419, 136 S. E. 816.
Unilateral Contracts.—An agreement by one of the parties
to a controversy to accept a certain sum of money in settle-
ment, without any promise by the other to pay it, does not
render the latter liable therefor, although the agreement is
in writing and signed by both of the parties. Manget v.
Carlton, 34 Ga. App. 556, 130 S. E. 604.
Illustrations—Note Accompanying Application for Insur-
ance Polity.—An application for a policy of insurance must
be accepted within a reasonable time, or else it may be
treated by the applicant as having been rejected. Home
tns. Co. v. Swann, 34 Ga. App. 19, 128 S. E. 70.
Same
— Same—Reasonable Time.—While the period consti-
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tuting such a reasonable time may, as a general rule, be a
matter for determination by the jury under all the evidence,
yet where the insurance company appears to have remained
silent for approximately six months after receipt of the ap-
Dlication, the presumption that it was rejected becomes
conclusive. Home Ins. Co. v. Swan, 34 Ga. App. 19, 128 S.
E. 70.
CHAPTER 3
Of the Consideration
§ 4241. (§ 3656.) Nudum pactum.
Time for Acceptance—Insurance Policy.—Where a person
applies for a policy of insurance, accompany his applica-
tion with a note to cover the premium, yet no policy of in-
surance was ever delivered or tendered to him by or for
the company and was a nudum pactum, the note was with-
out any consideration to support it. Home Ins. Co. v.
Swann, 34 Ga. App. 19, 128 S. E. 70.
§ 4242. (§ 3657.) Valid consideration.
Concurrence of Benefit and Injury.—A consideration need
not be a benefit accruing to the promisor. Porter Fertilizer
Co. v. Brewer, 36 Ga. App. 329, 136 S. E. 477.
Past and Future Support.—A deed in consideration of one
dollar actually paid, and of past support of the grantors by
the grantees, and an agreement on the part of the grantees
for the future support of the grantors, is not a voluntary
conveyance, but one based upon a valuable consideration.
Dorsey v. Clower, 162 Ga. 299, 131 S. E. 249.
§ 4243. (§ 3658.) Good and valuable considera-
tions.
Caring for Parents.—See note Past and Future Support
under section 4242.
§ 4250. (§ 3665.) Failure of consideration.
Notes—When Receipt of Consideration Acknowledged. —
Where a promissory note has been made, acknowledging re-
ceipt of the consideration the receipt of part of considera-
tion cannot be denied unless the admission and promise
resulted from the mutual mistake of the parties or unlesi
brought about by the mistake of one party knowingly taken
advantage of by the other. Spells v. Swift & Co., 34 Ga.
A.pp. 620, 130 S. E. 593, citing Bonds v. Bonds, 102 Ga.
163, 29 S. E. 218 and Shelton & Co. v. Ellis, 70 Ga. 297, 301.
CHAPTER 4
Of Illegal and Void Contracts
§ 4251. (§ 3666). Void contracts.
Negotiable Instruments Given for Illegal Purpose. — See
Editor's Note under section 4294(57).
§ 4252. (§ 3667.) Attorney's fees in notes.
II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
Need Not Be in Writing.—There is no law requiring that
a promise to pay attorney's fees shall be in writing in order
to be enforceable under this section. Forsyth Mercantile Co.
v. Williams, 36 Ga. App. 130, 135 S. E- 755.
Waiver of Right.—See Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 35
Ga. App. 340, 133 S. E- 307, quoting the holding under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Amount of Fees Collectible.—Where a note provided for
10 per cent attorney's fees the defendant can not lessen his
liability by setting up the fact that plaintiff actually con-
tracted with his attorney for a less sum. Bank v. Farmers
State Bank, 35 Ga. App. 340, 133 S. E. 307.
III." NOTICE.
B. Sufficiency of Notice.
Notice naming a term preceding the term to which the
suit is finally made returnable will not suffice. Russell v.
Life Ins. Co., 134 Ga. App. 640, 130 S. E. 689.
IV. THE RETURN DAY, PAYMENT AND
FILING OF SUIT.
Under the Federal equity rule 12, which requires the clerk
of a federal court on the. filing of a bill to issue subpoena,
returnable 20 days from the issuing thereof, such day is
"return day" of such bill, within the meaning of this sec-
tion. Perry v. Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 2 Fed. (2d),
250.
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V. TRIAL.
B. Evidence.
Necessity of Proof—Implied Where Case in Default.—See
State Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jacobs, 36 Ga. App. 731, 137 S.
E. 905; affirming the holding given under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 4256. (§ 3671.) Gaming contracts.
Cotton Futures.—A cotton futures contract, though it is
condemned by section 4258, as unlawful, is not a gaming con-
tract in the sense and meaning of this section, and the
money paid upon such consideration may not be recovered
back. Lasseter v. O'Neill, 162 Ga. 826, 135 S. E- 78. The
history of these sections is thoroughly discussed in the
opinion to this case. It should be noted that this decision
practically overrules the cases cited under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926. The dissenting opinion of Hines,
J., is based upon this and other considerations. Ed. Note.
§ 4257. Dealing in futures prohibited.
See note "Cotton Futures" under preceding section.
In General.—In general a state Legislature may prescribe
rules of evidence and may create presumptions of the ex-
istence of a fact or fault from given facts, if there is really
some connection between them in reason or experience,
provided there is a fair opportunity for rebuttal allowed;
but it may not enact that facts which it could not declare
to be a crime, shall be sufficient, though only prima facie,
evidence of one. This statute belongs to the former class,
but even if such provisions are invalid they do not invali-
date the body of the act. Fenner v. Boykin, 3 Fed. (2d),
674, affirmed in 271 U. S. 240, 46 S. Ct. 492.
Within Police Power of State.—A state statute prohibit-
ing contracts for future delivery in all cases where margins
are deposited is not unconstitutional as a deprivation of
liberty or property without due process of law, but is with-
in the police power of the state. Fenner v. Boykin, 3 Fed.
(2d), 674, affirmed in 271 U. S. 240, 46 S. Ct. 492.
Intent to Gamble Required.—This and the following sec-
tions do not apply to contracts for future delivery, where
there is an intent that the commodity bought shall actually
be delivered, but only to transactions where it is the in-
tent to gamble on the fluctuation of the market. Fenner v.
Boykin, 3 Fed. (2d), 674, affirmed in 271 U. S. 240, 46 S. Ct.
492.
§ 4258. Contracts that are illegal.
As to cotton futures contracts, see note under section
4256.
In General.—This section does not apply to gaming as re-
ferred to in section 4256, and as defined in Dyer v. Benson,
69 Ga. 609. Nor does it authorize suits to recover money or
property after it has been paid over in transactions such as
are described in the act. Lasseter v. O'Neill, 162 Ga. 826,
833, 135 S. F- 78. Same case 36 Ga. App. 55, 135 S. F. 224.
In accordance with the general rule where persons are in
pari delicto in the violation of a positive law, this section
-contemplates leaving the parties where it found them. Lasse-
ter v. O'Neill, 162 Ga. 826, 833, 135 S. E- 78.
CHAPTER 5
Of Construction of Contracts
§ 4266. (§ 3673.) Intention of parties must be
sought.
Deeds. See Hill v. Smith, 163 Ga. 71, 135 S. F- 423, hold-
ing substantially the same as the cases in the first para-
graph under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Section applied in Lanier v. Register, 163 Ga. 236, 135 S.
F- 719; Miller v. First Nat. Bank, 35 Ga. App. 334, 132 S. F.
783.
§ 4267. (§ 3674.) Intention of one party known
to the other.
Section Applied in Slade v. Raines, 161 Ga. 859, 132 S. E.
58.
§ 4268. (§ 3675.) Rules of interpretation.
Where Contract Ambiguous. — Where the description of
land applies equally to several tracts, a latent ambiguity
results, which may be explained by showing which one of
the several tracts was claimed by the grantor. 2 Delvin
on Real Fstate (3d ed.), 2026, section 1043. Petretes v. At-
lanta Loan, etc., Co., 161 Ga. 468, 473, 131 S. E- 510.
Section Applied.—Rogers-Morgan Co. v. Webb, 34 Ga.
App. 424, 130 S. E. 78.
Section Applied in Miller v. First Nat. Bank, 35 Ga. App.
334, 335, 132 S. F- 783.
Insurance Policy.—In accordance with this section, where
an insurance policy required an inventory to be taken it was
held that a list showing the cost price of the articles was
sufficient and that the actual value was not required. Gold-
man v. Aetna Ins. Co., 162 Ga. 313, 133 S. F- 741.
Determined by Intention—Example.—In a contract where
the date named was not fixed as a final and definite date
for delivery, but the time of shipment could be accelerated or
deferred at the will of the vendee, it could not reasonably
be said that shipment on the particular date mentioned
in the agreement was intended by the parties to be of the
very essence of the contract. Cobb Lumber Co. v. Sunny
South Grain Co., 36 Ga. App. 140, 135 S. E. 759.
Contract of Employment.—Where an agency was estab-
lished in order that the agent or servant might take a car
to a certain place for the purpose of sale, provided that if
he failed to sell it, he would have it back that night before
the employer's garage was closed, time was of the very es-
sence of the conditional employment; and the servant's au-
thority and the master's liability were limited accordingly.
Palmer v. Heinzerling, 34 Ga. App. 544, 130 S. E- 537.
CHAPTER 6
Negotiable Instruments
ARTICLE 1
Of Negotiable Papers and How Transferred
§ 4276. (§ 3684.) Transfer of secured note car-
ries security.
Applicability to Security Deed.—See First Nat. Bank v.
Pounds, 163 Ga. 551, 136 S. E. 528, quoting the second para-
graph under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
ARTICLE 3
Of the Rights of Holders
§ 4294(30). What constitutes negotiation.
Effect of Transfer for Affection upon Necessity for In-
dorsement.—See Moore v. Moore, 35 Ga. App. 39, 131 S. E.
922, quoting the holding under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
ARTICLE 4
Negotiable Instrument in General
SECTION 3 •
Negotiation
§ 4294(49). Transfer without indorsement; ef-
fect of.
Transfer for Love and Affection.—Neither under the N. I.
L. nor under the law as it previously existed, does the
legal title to a negotiable promissory note, payable to or-
der, pass to a transferee for a consideration of love and
affection only and not for value, except by indorsement
upon the instrument itself or upon a paper attached to it.
Such a transferee, therefore, acquires no legal title to the
note by a separate transfer to him in writing executed by
the payee but unattached to the note. Moore v. Moore, 35
Ga. App. 39, 131 S. E- 922.
§ 4294(57). Rights of holder in due course.
Editor's Note.—In Commercial Bank v. Cohen, 34 Ga.
App. 756, 131 S. E- 117, the court held that "a check given
for whisky, being for an illegal consideration is void and
therefore not enforceable even by an innocent purchaser of
the check." This decision was based upon section 4286, which
has now been superseded by the provisions of the N. I. L.
It seems probable that the cause of action in the case re-
ferred to arose prior to the adoption of the N. I. L. since
by that law illegal consideration is not a valid defense
against a holder in due course.
And also in Howard v. Caldwell, 35 Ga. App. 366, 133 S.
E- 284, it is stated that under section 4286 the only de-
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fenses permissible against a bona fide holder of a promis-
sory note are non est factum, gambling or immoral or il-
legal consideration and fraud in the procurement. The
court does not mention this section under which all but the
first of these are no longer defenses against a holder in due
course.
Defense of Non Est Factum by Partner.—As against a
bona fide holder the defense of non est factum set up by a
member of a partnership in a suit upon a note signed by
the firm amounts only to a denial of the factum of the
partnership's execution of the note and cannot concern
itself with restrictions upon the authority of the other part-
ner. See Cooke v. Faucett, 35 Ga. App. 209, 132 S. E.
268. This case was decided under section 4286 but it seems
to apply equally to this section as the defense of non est
factum is still available as against a holder in due course.
The holder of an instrument as collateral is a holder in
due course only to the extent of the debt secured. Wyche
v. Bank, 161 Ga. 329, 130 S. F. 566.
SECTION 5
Liabilities of Parties
§ 4294(65). Warranty where negotiation by
delivery, etc.
Warehouse Receipt.—In the recent case of Continental
Trust Co. v. Bank, 162 Ga. 758, 764, 134 S. E. 775, constru-
ing section 4277, it was held that the transferor of a cotton
warehouse receipt impliedly warrants that the cotton repre-
sented by such receipt is in existence at the time the re-
ceipt is transferred.
SECTION 8
Discharge of Negotiable Instruments
§ 4294(120). When persons secondarily liable
on; discharged.
Necessity for Consideration to Discharge. — See Gay v,
Carpenter, 35 Ga. App. 768, 134 S. E- 803, affirming the hold-
ing stated under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Retaking of Property by Seller.—A retaking of property
by the seller, for the purpose of holding it until the pur-
chaser, who is the maker of a note for it, has paid part of
the purchase money, and a release of the property then to
the purchaser, when such retaking in no wise increases the
surety's risk, does not release the surety. Gay v. Car-
penter, 35 Ga. App. 768, 134 S. F- 803.
ARTICLE o
Promissory Notes and Checks
§ 4294(184). Promissory note defined.
Agreement to Pay in Specifics.—All agreements to pay
in specifics are presumed to be made in favor of the debtor,
and he has the option of paying the debt either in specifics
or in money amounting to the value of the specifics. Mob-
ley v. Tufts, 36 Ga. App. 764, 765, 138 S. F- 272.
CHAPTER 7
Of Defenses to Contracts
ARTICLE l
Denial of the Contract
§ 4296. (§ 3702.) Effect of alteration.
Applied in Blaylock v. Walker County Rank. 36 Ga. App.
377, 136 S. E. 924.
§ 4299. (§ 3705.) Indorsement, etc., not to be
proved.
Stated in Pope v. Woolford Realty Co., 35 Ga. App. 284,
134 S. F. 174.
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ARTICLE 2
Denial of the Obligation of a Contract, Either
Originally or by a Subsequent Act of the
Opposite Party
§ 4301. (§ 3707.) Conditions.
Applied in Rogers v. Southern Fertilizer, etc.
Ga. App. 229, 136 S. E. 106.
Co., 36
§ 4304. (§ 3710.) Rescission.
When Rescission Complete.—If, while an option to pur-
chase rented premises was in force, it was, by mutual agree-
ment between the parties, surrendered to the maker in full
satisfaction and discharge of the several rent notes due him,
the rent contract was effectually rescinded. Robinson v.
Odom, 35 Ga. App. 262, 133 S. E- 53.
§ 4305. (§ 3711.) Rescission for fraud.
Opportunity of Party to Redress Wrong.—See Henderson
v. Lott, 163 Ga. 326, 335, 136 S. E- 403, quoting the holding
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Contract Not Void.—See Henderson v. Lott, 163 Ga. 326,
335, 136 S. E- 403, quoting the holding under this catchline
in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Time of Restoration.—See Henderson v. Lott, 163 Ga. 326,
335, 136 S. E- 403; Gibson v. Alford, 161 Ga. 672, 132 S. E.
442, stating substantially the holding under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926.
Restitution—When Unnecessary.—Where an ex- husband
fraudulently induced his ex- wife to accept a much less
amount of alimony than she was entitled to under her judg-
ments, it was not necessary to restore or affer to restore the
amount of alimony which she received under the contract.
Ellis v. Ellis, 161 Ga. 360, 365, 130 S. F. 681, citing *Farnell v.
Brady, 159 Ga. 209, 125 S. E- 57.
Effect of Recognition after Knowledge.—Where one is en-
titled to rescind a contract on ground of fraud or false rep-
resentations, and who has full knowledge of the material
circumstances of the case, freely and advisedly does any-
thing which amounts to a recognition of the transaction, or
acts in a manner inconsistent with a repudiation of the
contract, such conduct amounts to acquiescence, and, though
originally impeachable, the contract becomes unimpeachable
in equity. Gibson v. Alford, 161 Ga. 672, 132 S. E- 142. See
also Home Ins. Co. v. Swann, 34 Ga. App. 19, 26, 128 S. E- 70.
§ 4306. (§ 3712.) Without consent.
Effect of Recognition after Knowledge.—See same catch-
line under section 4305.
Stated in Home Ins. Co. v. Swann, 34 Ga. App. 19, 26,
128 S. E- 70.
ARTICLE 3
Of Payment, and Herein of Appropiration of
Payments
§ 4314. (§ 3720.) Bank-bills, checks, and notes,
payment in.
General Effect of Giving Check or Note—Acceptance of
Offer.—The mailing of a check to the plaintiff on March
27, including rent through March 31, in compliance with
the express offer contained in the bill for rent presented by
the plaintiff on March 27, would not of itself amount to an
acceptance of the offer by noon of Mai-ch 30, as required by
the terms of the offer. Williams-Thompson Co. v. Louis-
ville, etc., R. Co., 35 Ga. App. 556, 558, 133 S. F. 633.
§ 4316. (§ 3722.) Appropriation of payments.
Direction by Wife of Debtor.—Directions as to the appli-
cation of payments by the wife of the debtor, she not being
the agent of the debtor, do not bind the creditor. Neal v.
Harber, 35 Ga. App. 628, 134 S. E- 347.
§ 4317. (§ 3723). Voluntary payments.
Taxes—Recovery.—Where a corporation pays an alleged
illegal occupation tax and it does not appear from the peti-
tion that there was a provision for any penalty by arrest, fine,
or imprisonment, or by seizure of property, or by molesta-
tion of business, for failure to pay the license tax assessed
the payment cannot be said to come under the exceptions in
this section. Savannah v. Southern Stevedoring Co., 36
Ga. App. 526, 137 S. F- 123.
§ 4318 PERIODS OF LIMITATION § 4369
ARTICLE 4
Of Performance, and Herein of Tender
§ 4318. (§ 3724.) Performance of contracts.
Substantial Compliance.—Where an entire lighting plant,
with the exception of a certain valve designated as "one
iron, free gratis," was delivered within the time allowed
under the contract and the seller notified the purchaser
that such valve was not then in stock but would be subse-
quently forwarded, and "it was shipped later by express,"
the jury were authorized to find that the seller had substan-
tially complied with his obligation to deliver the entire
plant within a reasonable time. Morgan v. Colt Co., 34 Ga.
App. 630, 130 S. E. 600.
§ 4322. (§ 3728.) Tender.
Incomplete Tender Not within Section.—See Jeanes v.
Atlanta, etc., Nat. Bank, 34 Ga. App. 568, 570, 130 S. E.
353, holding the same as the second paragraph under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
ARTICLE 5
Accord and Satisfaction
§ 4326. (§ 3732.) What is accord and satisfac-
tion.
Promise in Executory Agreement.—See Messenger Pub.
Co. v. Overstreet, 36 Ga. App. 458, 137 S. E- 125, holding
substantially the same as the first sentence under this catch-
line in the Georgia Code of 1926.
ARTICLE 6
Of Pendency of Another Action, and Former
Recovery
§ 4335. (§ 3741.) Former judgment.
I. IN GENERAL.
Applied in Chastain v. Chastain, 163 Ga. 69, 135 S. E. 439.
II. PARTIES.
Third Parties Not Barred by Findings.—Since "in cases
of attachment the claim may be interposed either before or
after judgment" (§ 5120), where a claimant, in response to
a levy of the execution in attachment, files his claim to
property in the hands of a garnishee, he is not estopped by
the previous judgment in favor of the plaintiff in attach-
ment against the garnishee on the issue tried, on a traverse
of his answer, to which such claimant was not a party nor
is he bound merely by reason of the fact that during the
trial of the traverse to the garnishee's answer, he was
physically present at the trial, but took no part therein.
Tarver v. Jones, 34 Ga. App. 716, 131 S. E- 102.
IV. JUDGMENT AS ESTOPPEL.
Estoppel Generally.—The doctrine of estoppel by judg-
ment has reference to previous litigation between the same
parties based upon a different cause of action, and there is
such an estoppel only as to such matters as were neces-
sarily or actually adjudicated in the former litigation.
Farmer v. Baird, 35 Ga. App. 208, 132 S. E- 260.
Where Motion to Set Aside Overruled.—The previous
judgment of the trial court overruling a motion to set aside
amounts to an adjudication that the original judgment
could not be set aside for any reason that was or which
might have been assigned, and that judgment renders a
subsequent motion in arrest subject to the application of
the doctrine of res judicata. Farmer v. Baird, 35 Ga. App.
208, 209, 132 S. E- 260.
§ 4338. (§ 3744.) Effect of sustaining demur-
rer.
Applied in Cox v. Cox, 163 Ga. 93, 135 S. E- 504.
ARTICLE 7
Of Set-Off and Recoupment
§ 4339. (§ 3745.) Set-off.
See catchline "Plea of Usury" under section 4348.
Agreements in More Than One Contract.—Where a plain-
tiff agreed to sell and also to install a lighting plant, set-off
for improper installation- will be allowed whether the con-
tract to install was part of the contract of sale or was a
separate contract. Colt Co. v. Hiland, 35 Ga. App. 550, 134
S. E- 142.
§ 4344. (§ 3750.) Set-off against negotiable
note.
Editor's Note.—In Fulton Nat. Bank v. Redmond, 161 Ga.
204, 130 S. E. 568, the holdings of Tinsley v. Beall, 2 Ga.
134 and Polk v. Stewart, 144 Ga. 335, 336, 87 S. E- 21, as set
out under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926, are
quoted and approved.
Essential Elements of Plea.—See Fulton Nat. Bank v.
Redmond, 161 Ga. 204, 130 S. E- 568, quoting the paragraph
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Applied in Pullen v. Powell, 35 Ga. App. 333, 132 S. E.
922.
§ 4348. (§ 3754.) Effect of dismissal after set-
off filed.
Plea of Usury.—Where in an action on a note the de-
fendant pleaded that because of usury the plaintiff was en-
titled to recover only the sum which the defendant had ob-
tained, the plea went merely to the justice in part of the
plaintiff's demand, and was not a plea of set-off, within the
meaning of this section. Pape v. Woolford Realty Co., 35
Ga. App. 284, 134 S. E- 174.
§ 4350. (§ 3756.) Recoupment.
Editor's Note—When Recoupment Allowed.—It is the
recognized rule that, under a contractual relationship, the
injured party may, where the rules of pleading permit,
waive his rights under the contract, and recoup in tort,
except where the breach complained of is simply the neg-
lect of a duty expressly provided for by the contract itself.
Porter v. Davey Tree- Expert Co., 34 Ga. App. 355, 359, 129
S. E. 557.
But a cross-action based on a tort can not be so amended
as to base it on a contract. Tench v. Downey Hospital, 36
Ga. App. 20, 135 S. E- 106.
For recoupment to lie, the plaintiff should be liable to the
defendant under the contract sued upon. Tench v. Downey
Hospital, 36 Ga. App. 20, 135 S. E- 106.
Persons Who May Recoup Damages.—See Tennessee
Chemical Co. v. George, 161 Ga. 563, 131 S. E. 493, holding
substantially the same as the first two sentences under this
catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Burden of Proof.—See Porter v. Davey Tree-Expert Co.,
34 Ga. App. 355, 356, 129 S. E. 557 holding the same as the
paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926
and citing additional cases.
§ 4352. (§ 3758.) For what it lies.
Necessary Allegations.—A plea in the nature of a recoup-
ment for alleged overpayments which nowhere alleges upon
what terms or conditions, if any, the alleged overpayments
were made, fails to set out any right in the defendant to
recover against the plaintiff. Risener v. Kidd, 35 Ga. App.
38, 132 S. E- 112.
ARTICLE 8
Of Limitation of Actions on Contracts
SECTION l
Periods of Limitations
§ 4362. (§ 3768.) Open accounts.
Instances Where Section Not Applied.—This section does
not apply to the right of a road commissioner to collect
salary that is due him. Sammons v. Glascock County, 161
Ga. 893, 131 S. E. 881.
Applied in Stanfield v.* Hursey, 36 Ga. App. 394, 136 S. E-
826.
§ 4369. (§ 3775.) Limitations in equity.
Injunction against Paving Ordinance.—Where the owner
of property stood by and allowed street improvements to be
carried to completion, and received the benefits of the work
and enjoyed them for several years, without taking any
legal proceedings to prevent the expenditure of the money
when the work was being carried on; he is estopped from
enjoining a sale of his property to pay assessments. Raines
v. Clay, 161 Ga. 574, 578, 131 S. E- 499.
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SECTION 2
Exceptions and Disabilities
§ 4374. (§ 3779.) Persons excepted.
Applied in Stonecypher v. Coleman, 161 Ga. 403, 131 S. F.
75.
§ 4378. (§ 3783.) Absence from state of de-
fendant.
The Removal of a Debtor.—In order for the removal of a
debtor from this State to suspend the operation of the stat-
ute of limitations, it must be accompanied by an intention
to change his legal residence or domicile. Stanfield v.
Hursey, 36 Ga. App. 394, 136 S. F- 826.
Ownership of Property within State.—The fact that the
defendant might have owned property within the State
during the period of his nonresidence does not operate to
prevent the tolling of the statute. Kimball v. Kimball. 35
Ga. App. 462, 133 S. F. 295.
CHAPTER 8
Of Breach and Damage
§ 4390. (§ 3794.) Liquidated damages.
In Absence of Agreement Fixing Damages.—Where no
agreement fixing the amount of damages in case of the
breach of a contract is embraced in the contract itself, the
damages accruing to either party by reason of a breach are
such as will compensate him for the injury sustained.
Spalding Constr. Co. v. Simon, 36 Ga. App. 723, 725, 137 S.
F- 901.
Applied in Colt Co. v. Hiland, 35 Ga. App. 550, 134 S. F.
142; Standard Motors Finance Co. v. O'Neal, 35 Ga. App.
727, 134 S. F. 843.
§ 4391. (§ 3795.) Penalties.
Cited in Standard Motors Finance Co. v. O'Neal, 35 Ga.
App. 727, 134 S. F. 843.
§ 4393. (§ 3797.) Exemplary damages.
Strict Construction.—In Copeland v. Dunehoo, 36 Ga. App.
817, 821, 138 S. F. 267, it was said: "A strong word is 'never',
yet we must construe this section in the light of all others
relating to the same subject, and, on so construing it, we
think that while the rule stated therein is a very strict and
well-nigh universal one, it is still not a rule without any
exception whatever. It seems that at least one exception is
found in the provision for smart-money as contained in
section 299."
§ 4394. (§ 3798.) Remote damages.
Applied in Bank v. Riehle, 36 Ga. App. 470, 137 S. F- 642;
Courier-Herald Pub. Co. v. American Type Founders Co.,
34 Ga. App. 473, 130 S. E. 80.
§ 4395. (§ 3799.) Damages contemplated by
parties.
Applied in Colt Co. v. Hiland, 35 Ga. App. 550, 134 S. F-
142.
Stated
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NINTH TITLE
Of Torts, or Injuries to Persons or Property
Neal v. Medlin, 36 Ga. App. 796, 797, 138 S. F.
§ 4396. (§ 3800.) Interest.
Question of Interest within Discretion of Jury.—Whether
interest from the time of the breach shall be added to the
damages is within the discretion of the jury. Black v.
Automatic Sprinkler Co., 35 Ga. App. 8, 131 S. F- 543.
§ 4398. (§ 3802,) Plaintiff bound to lessen
damage.
This section is applicable only where the damages can be
lessened by reasonable efforts and expense. Reid v. Whise-
nant, 161 Ga. 503, 510, 131 S. E. 904.
Applied in Pullman Co. v. Strang, 35 Ga. App. 59, 80. 132
S. F- 399.
Quoted in part in Western, etc.. Railroad v. Townsend,
35 Ga. App. 70, 135 S. F. 439.
§ 4400. (§ 3804.) On covenants of warranty to
land.
Stated in Neal v. Medlin, 36 Ga. App. 796. 138 S. F- 254.
CHAPTER 1
General Principles, and Herein of Fraud and
Deceit
§ 4403. (§ 3807.) What are torts.
Section Quoted and applied in Strachan Shipping Co. v.
Hazlip-Hood Cotton Co., 35 Ga. App. 94, 132 S. F. 454.
§ 4407. (§ 3811.) Cases of election.
Stated in Tennessee Chemical Co. v. George, 161 Ga. 563,
564, 131 S. F. 493.
§ 4408. (§ 3812.) Privity.
Applied in Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hazlip-Hood Cotton
Co., 35 Ga. App. 94, 98, 132 S. E. 454.
§ 4410. (§ 3814.) Deceit.
Actionable Misrepresentation—When Vendee Need Only
Believe.—Where the basis upon which the contract was en-
tered upon lies in the existence or nonexistence of certain
material facts, the verity of which needs must be ascer-
tained from the statement of one acquainted with such
facts, each of the contracting parties has a right to rely
upon the truth of the other's statements with reference
thereto, when such statements relate to matters apparently
within the knowledge of the party asserting them; and to
do this without checking up the statements with the dec-
larations of other and different persons, in order, by such
an investigation, to test their probable truth. Deibert v.
McWhorter, 34 Ga. App. 803, 804, 132 S. F. HO.
Mere Concealment Provision Charged.—Where the plain-
tiff is proceeding ex delicto for deceit, it is not cause for a
new trial to the defendant that the judge in his charge to
the jury, which included this section, gave that part of the
section dealing with "mere concealment." Deibert v. Mc-
Whorter, 34 Ga. App. 803, 132 S. F- HO.
§ 4413, (§ 3817.) By wife, servant, etc.
Purely Personal Quarrels.—Where it appeared that the
real purpose of the person assaulted in approaching the agent
of a railroad company at his place of business was solely to
renew a mere personal quarrel between the plaintiff and the
agent, the plaintiff bring under notice that the agent was
acting according to his instructions, the railroad company
had no concern in what passed between them, and the trial
judge did not err in granting a nonsuit. Dugger v. Central,
etc., R. Co., 36 Ga. App. 782, 783, 138 S. F- 266. But see the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Hines in Holliday v. Mer-
chants, etc., Transp. Co., 161 Ga. 949, 964, 132 S. F. 210.
Application of Section to Railway Cases.—While this
code section has been applied in numerous railway cases, it
appears that the rule of liability on the part of railway
companies is not wholly fixed and determined by the pro-
vision of law quoted, but is enlarged or modified by the
provisions of section 2780. Moore v. DeKalb Supply Co., 34
Ga. App. 375, 377, 129 S. F. 899.
Cited in Fisher v. Georgia Northern R. Co., 35 Ga. App.
733, 134 S. F- 827.
§ 4414. (§ 3818.) By employee.
In General.—Where one "contract's with an individual ex-
ercising an independent employment, for him to do a work
not in itself unlawful or attended with danger to others,
such work to be done according to the contractor's own
methods and not subject to the employer's control or orders
except as to results to be obtained, the employer is not li-
able for the wrongful or negligent acts of such independent
contractor or his servants." Zurich General Acci., etc., Ins. Co.
v. Fee, 36 Ga. App. 248, 136 S. F. 173, quoting from Quinan
v. Standard Fuel Supply Co.. 25 Ga. App. 47, 102 S. F- 543.
Same—Test for Determining Relationship.—Under the sec-
tion and the decisions relating thereto, the test to be ap-
plied, in determining the relationship of the parties under
a contract, lies in whether it gives, or the employer as-
sumes, the right to control the time and manner of exe-
cuting the work, as distinguished from the right merely to
require results in conformity to the contract. Zurich Gen-
eral Acci., etc., Ins. Co. v. Fee, 36. Ga. App. 248, 136 S. F-
173, citing 39 C. T. p. 1322, section 1525; 42 A. F. R. 616,
III a.
§ 4419. (§ 3823.) Frauds by acts or silence.
Applied in May v. Yearty, 34 Ga. App. 29, 128 S. F. 67.
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§ 4420 MALICIOUS PROSECUTION § 4440
§ 4420. (§ 3824.) Owner bound to keep prem-
ises safe, when.
Editor's Note.—It would seem that the degree of diligence
required, under the section, in keeping the premises safe,
does not consist in either slight diligence or of extraordi-
nary diligence, but rather consists of ordinary care, such as
a prudent householder might reasonably be expected to
exercise. See Cuthbert v. Schofield, 35 Ga. App. 443, 133
S. E. 303. This rule is not in conflict with those cases, of
which the case of Fulton Ice, etc., Co. v. Pece, 29 Ga. App.
507, 116 S. F. 57, is typical, in which the owner or occupier
of land is required, under this section, to exercise extra-
ordinary diligence towards an invitee, in discovering and
repairing defects in the premises entered upon. In the Pece
case, supra, the object causing the injury was not alleged
to have been "apparently sound and in safe condition," but
was shown to be old and worn. In the Cultbert case the
owner was without actual knowledge of the defect, and there
was nothing to indicate the propriety or necessity of mak-
ing an inspection. Ordinary diligence would certainly not
require an inspection where there is no reason to think
an inspection necessary. See 29 Corpus Juris 427(2). Be-
sides the rule of inspection might be applied with a much
greater degree of rigidity in cases like the Pece case, supra,
relating to dangerous instrumentalities.
Erroneous Charge as to Duty to Invitee.—A charge to the
jury to the effect that such a landowner is under the duty
to see that the premises are "in such condition that the
person invited may approach and remain thereon in safety,"
was error, in that the court, instead of charging, according
to the true rule, that the duty of the landowner is to keep
his premises safe, placed upon the landowner the heavier
burden of seeing that the person on the premises remained
there in safety. Southern R. Co. v. Bottoms, 35 Ga. App.
804, 134 S. E. 824.
Applied in Bussell v. Dannenberg Co., 34 Ga. App. 792, 132
S. F- 230; Hickman v. Toole, 35 Ga. App. 697, 134 S. F. 635.
CHAPTER 2
Of Injuries to the Person
ARTICLE 1
Physical Injuries
§ 4422. (§ 3826.) Physical injuries,
Charge When Suit Based upon Negligence Alone.—In a
suit for personal injuries based upon negligence alone, it
is inapt to give in charge this section. Georgia R. etc., Co.
v. Bryans, 35 Ga. App. 713, 134 S. F- 787; Hirsch v. Pl>w-
den, 35 Ga. App. 763, 134 S. E- 833.
§ 4424. (§ 3828.) Recovery for homicide, when.
Recovery for Death of Child—Dependency of Mother. —
In order for a mother to recover under the provisions of this
section for the homicide of her child, it must appear not
only that the child contributed substantially or materially to
her support, but also that she was dependent upon it to an
appreciable or material degree therefor. Owens v. Anchor
Duck Mills, 34 Ga. App. 315, 129 S. F. 301. When mother
was inmate of Georgia State Sanitarium, as an insane per-
son long prior to, and at the time of homicide, she was not
dependent upon the said child. Id.
Same—Measure of Damages—Where the defendant is li-
able and there is no reason to reduce the damages, the
plaintiff is entitled to recover the value of the decedent's
life. Western, etc., Railroad v. Reed, 35 Ga. App. 538, 546,
134 S. F. 134.
1924 Amendment—Constitutionality. — The amendment of
1924 adding the words "minor or sui juris" after the words
"child or children" is constitutional. Peeler v. Central, etc.,
R. Co., 163 Ga. 784, 137 S. F- 24.
Same—Purpose.—It was the purpose of the General Assem-
bly in the passage of this act to exclude dependency as a pre-
requisite essential to a child's right to recover for the homi-
cide of a parent;- and the provision of the act entitling a
child, whether minor or sui juris, to recover damages for
the homicide of its parent, properly construed, makes the
question whether the child is dependent upon such parent
in any respect wholly immaterial. Peeler v. Central, etc.,
R. Co., 163 Ga. 784, 137 S. F- 24.
Same—Action by Adult Child under Section Prior to
Amendment.—An adult child cannot recover for the homicide
of his widowed mother, where such homicide occurred prior
to the amendment of August 18, 1924. Thompson v. Georgia
R., etc Co., 163 Ga. 598, 136 S. E- 89S. See also Peeler v.
Central, etc., R. Co., 163 Ga. 784, 137 S. F- 24.
§ 4425. (§ 3829.) Definition of terms in pre-
ceding section.
Section controlling principle in Leslie v. Macon, 35 Ga.
App. 484, 133 S. E. 638. See also fairly complete list of
cases there cited as applying the section.
§ 4426. (§ 3830.) Diligence of plaintiff.
Charge of Section.—A charge embodying, substantially,
the language of the section, was not erroneous as impressing
the jury that the plaintiff was under a duty to avoid the
consequences of the defendant's negligence, though such
negligence was not known or apparent to her, or was rea-
sonably to be apprehended by her, and that if she didn't
avoid it she could not recover. Howard v. Georgia, Ry.,
etc., Co., 35 Ga. App. 273, 133 S. F- 57. In this connection,
see also, Central, etc., Ry. Co. v. Barnett, 35 Ga. App.
528, 134 S. F. 126.
Same—When Judge Must Give.—Where the pleadings and
the evidence make an issue as to the plaintiff's diligence and
the defendant's negligence, it is error for the court to omit
an instruction to the jury embodying the principle expressed
in the code section, even in the absence of any request to do
so. Georgia R., etc., Co. v. McFlroy, 36 Ga. App. 143, 144,
136 S. F. 85.
Contributory Negligence.—Where by the exercise of or-
dinary care the deceased could have avoided the consequence
to himself caused by the defendant's negligence, a nonsuit
was properly ordered. Little v. Rome R., etc., Co., 35 Ga.
App. 482, 483, 133 S. F. 643; as to the plaintiff's duty gen-
erally in this connection, see Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.
v. Anderson, 35 Ga. App. 292, 133 S. F- 63.
Same — Instruction to Jury. — It is improper to instruct
the jury that the plaintiff must have been free from
negligence before it can recover. Lime- Cola Bottling Co. v.
Atlanta, etc., R. Co., 34 Ga. App. 103, 128 S. F. 226.
Same—Same—Rule as to Contributory Negligence and
Diminution of Damages Confused. — An instruction to the
jury, in which the rule expressed in the section which pre-
cludes a recovery where the plaintiff has failed to exercise
ordinary care, is confused with the rule as to comparative
negligence and diminution or apportionment of damages, is
erroneous. Brown v. Meikleham, 34 Ga. App. 207, 128 S. E.
918.
ARTICLE 2
Injuries to Reputation
§ 4429. (§ 3833.) Malice.
In General.—It is slanderous per se to falsely utter and
publish a statement, with reference to a married woman, to
the effect that she is the common wife of her husband and
another man. Malice and damage will be inferred. Barker
v. Green, 34 Ga. App. 574, 130 S. F- 599.
Words Spoken in Jest and Retraction as Defense.—Malice
is an "aggravating circumstance." The existence of malice
would not be conclusively rebutted by proof of a retraxit,
accompanied by an explanation that the words were spoken
merely in jest, and only for the purpose of "teasing" the
person to whom they were addressed. Barker v. Green, 34
Ga. App. 574, 130 S. F. 599.
Erroneously Charged—Corrected in Time.—It was not cause
for a new trial to the losing party that the presiding judge
gave in charge to the jury all of the section, when immedi-
ately thereafter he expressly informed them that a part of
the section was not applicable, and correctly instructed them
as to which part was applicable. Barker v. Green, 34 Ga.
App. 574, 130 S. F. 599.
§ 4433. (§ 3837.) Slander.
In General—Prima Facie Case.—Where the statements
tended to show affliction with a contagious disease, and
calculated to injure the plaintiff in her profession, and the
evidence did not affirmatively show that the alleged slan-
derous statements were privileged; a prima facie case for the
plaintiff was made out, and the court erred in granting a
nonsuit. Brown v. McCann, 36 Ga. App. 812, 138 S. F- 247.
SECTION 2
Malicious Prosecution
§ 4440. (§ 3844.) Probable cause.
Cited in Norman v. Young, 35 Ga. App. 221, 132 S. F- 414.
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§ 4446 DAMAGES § 4505
§ 4446. (§ 3850.) When the right accrues.
Abandonment of Prosecution.—While the procuring from
the committing court of an order discharging the defendant
in a warrant amounts to a termination of the prosecution
when no further action is taken, the mere allegation of such
discharge, without at least showing in general terms that
the prosecution has been terminated, does not meet the re-
quirements of this section. Rogers Co. v. Murray, 35 Ga.
App. 49, 50, 132 S. E. 139.
ARTICLE 3
Other Torts to the Person
SECTION 3
Nuisances and Other Injuries to Health
§ 4460. (§ 3864.) Sale of unwholesome provi-
sions.
Pleadings.—For a case substantially following the case
cited under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926, see
Copeland v. Curtis, 36 Ga. App. 255, 136 S. E. 324.
Liability of Original Vendor.—The general rule is that
where personal property sold by A to B is resold by B to
C. there is no implied warranty. Young v. Certainteed Prod-
ucts Corp., 35 Ga. App. 419, 133 S. E. 279. Whether the
rule is applicable under this section
—
Quaere.
CHAPTER 3
Of Injuries to Property
ARTICLE 1
To Real Estate
§ 4471. (§ 3875.) Right or possession.
Liability of Lessee to Subsequent Lessee.—Where the
owner of certain realty leased the same to a tenant, and be-
fore the expiration of the term of the tenancy executed a
lease of the same premises to a second lessee, the latter,
upon the expiration of the time of the former tenancy, was
vested with the right of possession of the property; and
where the former tenant refused to surrender possession, the
second tenant could maintain an action for damages against
the former tenant for withholding the right of possession.
Anderson v. Kokomo Rubber Co., 161 Ga. 842, 132 S. E. 76.
The Supreme Court, in this case, reversed the Court of
Appeals holding in the same case, Kokomo Rubber Co. v.
Anderson, 33 Ga. App. 241, 125 S. E. 783. See under catch-
line "Lessee Not Liable to Subsequent Lessee," Georgia
Code of 1926.
§ 4479. (§ 3883.) Slander of title.
When Right of Action Accrues.—In an action for false,
slanderous, and malicious words impugning the title to the
plaintiff's lands, the right of action accrues to the plaintiff
upon the doing of the act complained of, just as in injuries
to personal reputation. King v. Miller, 35 Ga. App. 427,
133 S. E. 302.
ARTICLE 3
Injuries to Personalty Generally
§ 4485. (§ 3888.) Trespass.
Trespass by Domestic Animals. — If domestic animals,
such as oxen and horses, injure any one in person or prop-
erty when they are rightfully in the place where they do
the mischief, the owner of such animals is not liable for such
injury unless he knows they are accustomed to do mischief;
and such knowledge must be alleged and proved. But if they
are wrongfully in the place where they do the mischief, the
owner is liable, though he had no notice that they were ac-
customed to do so before. Wright v. Turner, 35 Ga. App.
241, 132 S. E. 650, citing Clark v. State, 35 Ga. App. 241,
132 S. E. 650; Cooley on Torts, 341, 342 (2d ed. 402); Reed
v. Southern Exp. Co., 95 Ga. 108, 22 S. E. 133.
CHAPTER 4
Of Defenses
ARTICLE 1
Of Justification
§ 4489. (§ 3892.) Extenuation.
Jury to Consider Testimony.—When the defendant has in-
troduced testimony tending to sustain a plea of justifica-
tion, though it fails to make it out, the jury may take such
testimony into consideration in mitigation of damages. Hut-
cheson v. Browning, 34 Ga. App. 276, 129 S. E. 125, citing
Henderson v. Fox, 80 Ga. 479, 6 S. E- 164; Ransone v. Christ-
ian, 49 Ga. 491; Ivester v. Coe, 33 Ga. App. 620, 127 S. E.
790, 792; 5 Corpus Juris, 674 (section 112).
ARTICLE 2
Of Satisfaction, and Herein of Tender
§ 4493, (§ 3896.) Tender of damages.
Refers to iPlea of Tender.—The right and privilege given
to the defendant by the provisions of the section contemplates
and has reference to a plea of tender filed in response to the
plaintiff's suit, and not to a mere oral offer or proposal to
settle the suit by a future delivery of the property involved.
Downs Motor Co. v. Colbert, 34 Ga. App. 542, 130 S. E.
592.
§ 4494. (§ 3897.) Tender in trover.
Applied in Downs Motor Co. v. Colbert, 34 Ga. App. 542,
130 S. E. 592.
ARTICLE 3
Limitation of Actions
§ 4495. (§ 3898.) For damages to realty.
Quoted in King v. Miller, 35 Ga. App. 427, 133 S. E- 302.
§ 4497. (§ 3900.) To the person.
Applied in Mansor v. Wilcox, 35 Ga. App. 213, 132 S. E.
251.
CHAPTER 5
Of Damages
§ 4503. (§ 3906.) Aggravation.
Charge of Section in Slander Case.—In a case of slander
where the words were spoken merely in jest, and only for
the purpose of "teasing" the person to whom they were ad-
dressed,—where the evidence showed that the utterance was
made and published as alleged, a charge to the jury in the
language of this section was not error on the ground that
there was no evidence of "aggravating circumstances."
Barker v. Green, 34 Ga. App. 574, 130 S. E- 599.
Whether this section cannot be applicable at all in a
slander case is not presented in and is not passed by Barker
v. Green, 34 Ga. App. 574, 130 N. C. 599.
§ 4504. (§ 3907.) Vindictive damages.
See annotations to the preceding section.
Instruction as to Present Worth of Pain.—A jury in a
personal injury suit, where damages for future pain and
suffering are sued for, should not be instructed that the
amount representing the monetary compensation for future
pain and suffering should be reduced to its present worth.
Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Maffett, 36 Ga. App. 513, 137 S.
E. 404.
It would be proper, however, in such a case to instruct the
jury that in awarding damages for future pain and suffering
they should give consideration to the fact that the plaintiff
is receiving a present cash consideration for damage not yet
sustained. Southern R. Co. v. Bottoms, 35 Ga. App. 804, 134
S. E. 824.
§ 4505. (§ 3908.) Necessary expenses.
Instruction as to Reasonable Expenses for Medical Atten-
tion.—An instruction to the jury that the plaintiff would be
entitled to recover the reasonable expenses that were in-
curred for medical attention "on account of injuries" was
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§ 4509 GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 4560
equivalent to an instruction that the plaintiff could recover
the "necessary expenses consequent upon the injury," as
provided in this section. Orange Crush Bottling Co. v.
Smith, 35 Ga. App. 92, 132 S. E- 259.
§ 4509. (§ 3912.) Damages too remote, when.
Presence of Other Hypotheses as to Cause of Injury.—
Where there were several reasonable hypotheses as to the
cause of the injury with which the evidence was not less
consistent than which the conclusion sought to be estab-
lished, the evidence was insufficient to authorize a finding
that the injury was the proximate result of the defendant's
negligence. Pullman Co. v. Strang, 35 Ga. App. 59, #0, 132
S. E- 399.
§ 4510. (§ 3913.) Rule to ascertain.
A result intended by a wrongdoer cannot, under this and
the following section, be too remote for recovery of dam-
ages. Richards v. International Agricultural Corp., 10 Fed.
(2d), 218.
TENTH TITLE
Of Equity
CHAPTER 1
General Principles
§ 4518. (§ 3921.) Equity jurisdiction.
The Municipal Court of the City of Atlanta Has No Equity
Jurisdiction.—See Ahlgren v. Walton, 34 Ga. App. 42, 128 S.
E\ 585.
§ 4521. (§ 3924.) Complaint must do equity.
Applicable Where Both Legal and Equitable Relief Sought.
—The principle established by this section is as well appli-
cable where one in an equity suit seeks both legal and equit-
able relief, as where he seeks a purely equitable right.
Montgomery v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 534, 550, 134 S. E- 152.
Favorite Maxim.—The equitable maxim which is embodied
in this section is a favorite maxim in equity. Duke v.
Ayers, 163 Ga. 444, 454, 136 S. E- 410.
§ 4522. (§ 3925.) Complete justice.
Effect of Dismissal of Petition upon Cross Bill.—The dis-
missal of the plaintiff's petition will not have the effect of
dismissing a cross-bill of the defendant, although the relief
prayed is not equitable in character and is cognizable in a
court of law, in view of the uniform procedure act.
.
Jackson
v. Mathis, 35 Ga. App. 178, 132 S. E. 410.
Favorite Maxim.—The maxim embodied in this section is a
favorite maxim of equity. Henderson v. Lott, 163 Ga. 326,
331, 136 S. E. 403.
§ 4528. (§ 3931.) Possession notice of title.
Reference for Review of Cases.—For an exhaustive review
of cases decided upon the principle inculcated by this sec-
tion, see McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 132 S. E- 547.
Notice of Whose Rights.—Possession is not only notice of
the rights of the possessor, but of those under whom he
claims. Walker v. Neil, 117 Ga. 733, 745, 45 S. E- 387; Austin
v. Southern Home Bldg., etc., Assn., 122 Ga. 439, 50 S. E.
382; McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 724, 132 S. E- 547.
Exclusiveness of Occupancy.—The possession of land
which will be notice of the occupant's title must have some
element in it indicative that the occupancy is exclusive in
its nature. McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 132 S. E- 547.
Possession Open, Visible, etc.—In order for the possession
to have the effect of notice it must be actual, open, visible,
exclusive and unambiguous. McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga.
711, 132 S. E. 547.
§ 4529. (§ 3832.) Notice.
Applied in Waynesboro Planing Mill v. Augusta Veneer
Co., 35 Ga. App. 686, 134 S. E- 790.
Notice Received in Representative Capacity.—Notice re-
ceived in representative capacity affects act transacted in
personal capacity. Puckett v. Jones, 36 Ga. App. 253, 136
S. E. 462.
§ 4530. (§ 3933.) Notice extends to facts dis-
covered.
Description of Stock of Goods.—Under this section descrip-
tion of property in a chattel mortgage as "our stock of mer-
chandise consisting of dry goods, shoes, clothing, groceries,
and hardware," is sufficient where it is shown that the
mortgagor was a well-known firm and had only one stock
of goods, which was located in the town where the mort-
gage was executed. In re Coleman, 2 Fed. (2d), 254.
Applied in Waynesboro Planing Mill v. Augusta Veneer
Co., 35 Ga. App. 686, 134 S. E- 790.
Charge of Section Upheld.—The charge of the court in
substance as this section was upheld under the evidence
and circumstances of the case. Darden v. Washington, 35
Ga. App. 777, 134 S. E- 813.
Cited in North Georgia Trust, etc., Co. v. Hulme, 35 Ga.
App. 627, 134 S. E. 200.
§ 4531. (§ 3934.) Bona fide purchaser.
See annotations to § 3762.
Evidence as to Bona Fides Conflicting—Injunction De-
nied.—Injunction against exercising power of sale will be
denied where there is conflict of evidence that the creditor
had knowledge that the land was paid for by the debtor
with trust fund. Johnson v. Southern States Phosphate,,
etc., Co., 163 Ga. 98, 135 S. E- 435.
Right of Bona Fide Purchaser Unqualified.—The purchaser
is entitled to his bargain, if made in good faith, and can
not be disturbed in his possession, no matter what equitable
arrangement the holder of the secret equity proposes as
affording protection to all the parties concerned, and a court
of equity has no jurisdiction to interfere with such vested
legal right and title. Johnson v. Southern States Phosphate,,
etc., Co., 163 Ga. 98, 105, 135 S. E- 435.
A bona fide mortgagee stands precisely in the attitude of
a bona fide purchaser, and is entitled to the same protec-
tion. Johnson v. Southern States Phosphate, etc., Co., 163
Ga. 98, 105, 135 S. E- 435.
§ 4533. (§ 3936.) Lis pendens, notice by.
Bankruptcy against H., Notice to W's Mortgagee.—The
pendency of bankruptcy proceedings against the husband is
general notice to the mortgagee of the wife who claims title
under the husband. Chatham Chemical Co. v. Vidalia
Chemical Co., 163 Ga. 276, 278, 136 S. E- 62.
§ 4335. (§ 3938.) Purchaser without notice
from one with notice, and vice versa.
Principle Applied.—See Bank v. Wheeler, 162 Ga. 635, 134
S. E. 753.
Applied to bona fide holder of note from a mala- fide
grantee in a security deed. First Nat. Bank v. Pounds, 163
Ga. 551, 136 S. E- 528.
The reason is that otherwise a bona fide purchaser might
be deprived of selling his property for full value. North
Georgia Trust, etc., Co. v. Hulme, 35 Ga. App. 627, 134 S.
E- 200.
§ 4537. (§ 3940.) Which of two innocent per-
sons to bear loss.
Instance of Application.—Undisclosed principal subject to
same defenses as are available against the agent. Truluck
v. Carolina Portland Cement Co., 34 Ga. App. 501, 130 S.
E. 356.
§ 4538. (§ 3941.) Common-law remedy.
Prayer for Discovery, etc., Immaterial—When.—Notwith-
standing the prayer for "discovery," "accounting," and re-
lief in equity, where the petition alleges no cause showing
inadequacy at law, equity has no jurisdiction. Decatur
County v. Praytor, etc., Co., 36 Ga. App. 611, 137 S. E- 918.
Partition Proceedings.—In proceedings for partition where
no peculiar circumstances are shown for equitable jurisdic-
tion, equity will not interfere; the remedy prescribed at law
in § 5355 being sufficient for partition purposes. Saffold v.
Anderson, 162 Ga. 408, 410, 134 S. E- 81.
Cancelling Policy after Loss on Ground of Fraud.—The
question whether equity will cancel a policy and enjoin
proceedings at law thereon, on the ground of fraud, that
defense being available at law, was raised but not decided in
Davis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 161 Ga. 568, 573, 131 S.
E- 490.
§ 4560. (§ 3963.) Application and order.
Effect of Failure to Bring Suit against All Parties Named.
—
-Where an application is made naming several parties as
possible defendants, it is not necessary that a suit be in-
stituted against all persons named in order to use the testi-
mony against one of them. Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 664,
135 S. E. 195.
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§ 4567 SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE § 4637
CHAPTER 3
Of Perpetuation of Testimony
ARTICLE 4
Of Accident and Mistake
§ 4567. (§ 3907.) Error in form.
Relief Notwithstanding Set off at Law.—The equitable re-
lief prescribed by this section will be given notwithstanding
the existence of a defense by way of set off in favor of the
defendant which he might be availed of at law. Gibson v.
Alford, 161 Ga. 672, 682, 132 S. E- 442.
Mistake on One Side, Fraud on the Other.—In addition to
reforming a contract when, from mutual mistake or mistake
common to both parties, an instrument does not express
the true agreement of the parties, a court of equity will also
reform an instrument where there is ignorance or mistake
on one side, and fraud or inequitable conduct on the other.
Gibson v. Alford, 161 Ga. 672, 682, 132 S. E- 442.
Correcting Misdescription to Conform to Agreement.—
Where it is made to appear that an agreement was made
"with reference to a certain designated piece of land, reforma-
tion of the contract made to evidence the agreement will be
decreed if the misdescription in the contract or deed includes
more land than ought to be included, or contains less than
the parties agreed upon. Gibson v. Alford, 161 Ga. 672, 682,
132 S. E- 442.
§ 4568. (§ 3071). Rule of construction as to
conditions.
Cited in Grantham v. Royal Ins. Co., 34 Ga. App. 415, 130
S. E- 589.
§ 4580. (§ 3983.) Mistake of fact.
Laches Repelled by Other Circumstances.—While the suit
was brought many years after the' making of the deed, the
original purchaser, and the other two parties plaintiff had
been in continual possession of the land, and the plaintiffs
were not aware of the mistake in the deed until a short
time before the suit was brought. This fact, and where there
had been no assertion of a claim adverse to the rights of
the plaintiffs, as set up in the petition, and no fact or cir-
cumstance to put plaintiffs on notice of such claim, and
the further fact that no rights of third parties had inter-
vened, warrants the finding that the plaintiffs were not bar-
red bv laches. Sweetman v. Dailey, 162 Ga. 295, 133 S. E.
257.
CHAPTER 5
Of Account and Set-Off
§ 4586. (§ 3989.) Account.
Accounting between Parties.—A court of equity has ju-
risdiction in all cases of an accounting and settlement be-
tween partners. Smith v. Hancock, 163 Ga. 222, 229, 136 S.
E- 52.
§ 4587. (§ 3990.) Mingling of goods.
Applied against a sheriff as to fund procured from execu-
tion sale. Finance Co. v. Eowry, 36 Ga. App. 337, 136 S.
E- 475.
CHAPTER 6
Of Administration of Assets
§ 4596. (§ 3999.) Interfering with administra-
tion.
Cited in Nash v. Cowart, 162 Ga. 236, 133 S. E- 263.
§ 4597. (§ 4000.) Petitions for direction.
Only Representative Can Ask Relief.—Under this section
only the representative of the estate may ask for the di-
rection of a court. Palmer v. Neely, 162 Ga. 767, 135 S.
E. 90.
Cash Surrender Value of Policy.—The cash surrender and
cash loan value of a policy of life insurance accruing at the
end of a specified tontine period is not subject to garnishment
by creditors of the insured; nor will such value be made
available to the judgment creditor of the insured by a court
of equity in proceedings instituted for the purpose of ob-
taining equitable relief analogous to a process of garnish-
ment at law. Farmers, etc., Bank v. National L,ife Ins.
Co., 161 Ga. 793, 131 S. E- 902.
Cited in Cooper v. Reeves, 161 Ga. 232, 131 S. E- 63.
CHAPTER 8
Of Election
§ 4609. (§ 4012.) Election.
Cited in Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 664, 135 S. E- 195,
which case was distinguished from L,amar v. McEaren, 107
Ga. 591
t
34 S. E- 116 decided under this section.
§ 4610. (§ 4013.) By a legatee.
Cited in Robinson v. Ramsey, 161 Ga. 1, 10, 129 S. E.
837.
CHAPTER 9
Of Execution of Powers
§ 4620. (§ 4023.) Power of sale in deeds of
trust, etc.
Sale of Part of Land Not Authorized.—The holder of a se-
curity deed, which conveys a single tract of land, can not
under a power of sale contained in said deed which author-
izes such holder to sell the same upon default of the grantor
in paying the debt secured thereby, sell a part of said tract,
but must sell the whole. Doyle v. Moultrie Bkg. Co., 163
Ga. 140, 142, 135 S. E- 501.
CHAPTER 10
Of Fraud
§ 4623. (§ 4026.) Misrepresentation.
Applied in Nix v. Citizens Bank, 35 Ga. App. 546, 130 S.
E. 597.
§ 4626. (§ 4029). Slight evidence sometimes
sufficient.
Cited in Eberhardt v. Bennett, 163 Ga. 796, 803, 137 S. E.
64.
CHAPTER 11
Of Specific Performance
§ 4634. (§ 4037.) Parol contract for land.
Parol Evidence Is Admissible.—In an action for specific
performance of a contract, not in writing, for the exchange
of lands, parol evidence is necessarily admissible for the
purpose of proving such contract. Hattaway v. Dickens, 163
Ga. 755, 137 S. E- 57.
Payment of Full Purchase Price—Erroneous Instruction.
—In a dispute between two claimants as to the ownership of
land, where it appeared that one of them bought the land un-
der a parol contract and paid the full purchase price with-
out receiving a deed, an instruction to the jury that "the
only question to be considered by them is who has the su-
perior title, the legal written title, to the land in question."
is erroneous as excluding from the jury the right of the
claimant under this section. Franklin v. Womack, 162 Ga.
715, 134 S. E- 758.
§ 4637. (§ 4040.) Inadequacy of price.
Applied in Chan v. Judge, 36 Ga. App. 13, 134 S. E- 925.
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THE CODE OF PRACTICE
FIRST TITLE
Courts of Original Jurisdiction, Their Officers,
Organizations, and Practice
CHAPTER l
General Provisions
§ 4642. (§ 4045.) When judicial officer is dis-
qualified.
Grounds Enumerated Exhaustive. — The statutory grounds
of the disqualification of a judge are set forth in this sec-
tion, and are exhaustive of the subject. It follows that
basis or prejudice on the part of a judge is no ground for
his disqualification. Hendricks v. State, 34 Ga. App. 508,
130 S. F- 539.
Former Counsel.—The rule as to disqualification when the
judge has served as counsel in the case, applied in Faulk-
ner v. Walker, 36 Ga. App. 636, 137 S. F- 909.
Disqualification to Forfeit Bond.—A presiding judge who
is disqualified to try a criminal case is also disqualified to
forfeit a bond in such case, or to grant a rule nisi on the
forfeiture. Faulkner v. Walker, 36 Ga. App. 636, 137 S. F-
909.
§ 4643. (§ 4046.) Powers of courts to punish
for contempt.
Trial by Jury—Violation of Mandamus.
—
Fvery court has
power to compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and
processes; and in a proceeding for contempt growing out of
the alleged violation by the defendant therein of a manda-
mus absolute, the judge can determine all questions of fact
without the intervention of a jury, except in the cases pro-
vided for in this section. Gaston v. Shunk Plow Co., 161
Ga. 287, 130 S. F- 580.
Cited in Smith v. State, 36 Ga. App. 37, 39, 135 S. F. 102.
§ 4644. (§ 4047.) Powers of courts enumer-
ated.
General Consideration:—Interference with Receivers Posses-
sion.—One who dispossesses the receiver of property consigned
to him by the court dispossesses the court, and of course be-
comes in contempt of court; and he may be punished for
contempt, and the property may be restored. A contempt of
court being complete by dispossessing the receiver, the fact
that no injunctive order has been passed does not affect the
case. Coker v. Norman, 162 Ga. 351, 133 S. F- 740.
Paragraph 4
—
(Power to Secure Attendance of Witness.—
Where it is necessary in order to secure the attendance of
a witness at court to make him testify, the court has ample
authority to secure his attendance by requiring him to give
bail, or, in default thereof, to go to jail. Pullen v. Cleckler,
162 Ga. Ill, 114, 132 S. E. 761.
Cited in Smith v. State, 36 Ga. App. 37, 39, 135 S. F- 102.
CHAPTER 2
Justices' Courts, Their Officers, and Practice
ARTICLE 5
Commencement of Suits, Services, etc.
§ 4715. (§ 4116.) Suits, how commenced.
Liberal Construction.—Niceties in pleading are not required
in a justice's court. Accordingly, a liberal construction has
been given to this section. If the defendant is informed of
the nature of the plaintiff's demand against him, the re-
quirement of this section is met. Ladd Lime, etc., Co. v.
Case, 34 Ga. App. 190, 129 S. F- 6.
§ 4717. (§ 4118.) Summons, how served.
The statutory method of service is exclusive, and such a
defendant can not be served by leaving a copy "at his of-
fice" unless his office is also his most notorious place of
abode, or residence. Bennett v. Taylor, 36 Ga. App. 752, 754,
138 S. F. 273.
§ 4726. (§ 4127.) Defendant may plead as in
superior court.
Cited in Owen v. Moseley, 161 Ga. 62, 71, 129 S. F. 787.
ARTICLE 9
Appeals and Juries
§ 4742. (§ 4142.) Appeals to the superior
court.
Jurisdictional Amount as Affected by Counterclaim.—Al-
though the plaintiff's claim be less than $50, where a count-
er-claim is filed for more than $50 but not exceeding the
maximum jurisdictional amount of $100, the defendant may
appeal to the superior court. Owens v. College Park Supply
Co., 35 Ga. App. 618, 134 S. F. 179.
CHAPTER 3
Ordinaries
ARTICLE 1
Ordinaries and Their Courts
§ 4786. (§ 4228.) Eligibility and disability of
ordinary.
Extent of Prohibition upon Acting as Guardian.—The code
provisions which prohibit an ordinary from acting as guard-
ian of a minor do not prevent an ordinary from recovering
in behalf of a minor money derived from benefit insurance
where the act of 1918 authorizes an ordinary to receive and
collect such money. Foster v. Wood, 36 Ga. App. 734, 137.
S. F. 847.
ARTICLE 4
Other Authority of Ordinary
§ 4804(1). Custody and distribution when no
legal guardian.—The ordinaries of the several
counties of this State be and they are hereby
made and constituted the legal custodians and
distributors of all moneys due and owing to any
minor child or children, idiots, lunatics, insane
persons, and persons non compos mentis, who
have no legal and qualified guardian, to receive
and collect all such moneys due or owing to
such minor or minors, idiots, lunatics, insane
persons, and persons non compos mentis, aris-
ing from such insurance policies, benefit soci-
eties, legacies, inheritances, or from any other
source; provided, that the amount due such
minor or minors, idiots, lunatics, insane persons,
and persons non compos mentis from all sources
does not exceed the amount of five hundred
dollars, without any appointment or qualifying
order, he is authorized to take charge of such
money or funds for such minor or minors,
idiots, lunatics, and insane persons and persons
non compos mentis, by virtue of his office as
ordinary in the county of the residence of such
minor or minors, idiots, lunatics, insane persons,
and persons non compos mentis, and the cer-
tificate of such ordinary, that no legally quali-
fied guardian has been so appointed and that the
estate of such minor or minors, idiots, lunatics,,
insane persons, and persons non compos mentis,
from all sources, does not exceed the amount of
five hundred dollars ($500.00), shall be con-
clusive, and shall be sufficient authority to jus-
tify any debtor or debtors in making payment
of monies due as aforesaid, claims therefor hav-
ing been made by such ordinary. Acts 1918,
pp. 198, 199; 1927, p. 257.
Editor's Note.—The amendment of 1927 constituted the or-
dinaries custodian and distributor of moneys due and owing
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to idiots, lunatics, insane persons and persons non compos
mentis.
Collection of Benefit Insurance.—The code provisions which
prohibit an ordinary from acting as guardian of a minor do
not prevent an ordinary from recovering in behalf of a minor
money derived from benefit insurance where this act au-
thorizes an ordinary to receive and collect such money. Fos-
ter v. Wood, 36 Ga. App. 734, 137 S. E- 847.
§ 4804(2). Employment of counsel.—The or-
dinary of the county of the residence of such
(minor or minors), idiots, lunatics, insane persons,
and persons non compos mentis is hereby au-
thorized and permitted, in his discretion, to em-
ploy counsel to bring suit to recover any amount
due such minor or minors, idiots, lunatics, in-
sane persons, and persons non compos mentis,
in the name of such ordinary as guardian for
such minor or minors, idiots, lunatics, insane
persons and persons non compos mentis, in any
court having jurisdiction thereof, and such or-
dinary shall have authority to pay such counsel
•.so employed a reasonable fee for his services in
such matters, which is necessary to enforce the
right of such minor or minors, idiots, lunatics,
insane persons, and persons non compos mentis,
out of the funds so collected. Acts 1918, pp.
198, 199; 1927, p. 258.
Editor's Note.—The ordinary of the county of residence of
"'idiots, lunatics, insane persons and persons non-compos
mentis" was brought within the operation of this section by
"the amendment of 1927. In amending the section the words
"minor and minors," which appeared immediately before the
above referred insertion, were inadvertantly, it is believed,
left out. The preliminary statement of the amendatory act
directs no such omission, and from a reading of the section
as a whole it becomes evident that it was not the intention
of the legislature to leave out those words. Hence they are in-
serted parenthetically at the place where they originally
appeared.
§ 4804(4). Record open to inspection.— It
shall be the duty of such ordinaries to keep a
well-bound book properly indexed, in which a
complete record shall be kept of all money re-
ceived by him for such minor or minors, idiot,
lunatic, insane persons, and persons non com-
pos mentis; said record shall show from what
source said funds were derived, and to show to
whom and for what such money was paid,
which book shall be open for inspection of the
public at all times, as other records in his office.
Acts 1918, pp. 198, 199; 1927, p. 257.
Editor's Note.—By the amendment of 1927, the ordinary is
required to keep record of moneys received for idiots, luna-
tics, insane persons and persons non compos mentis.
§ 4804(6). Payment authorized.—The ordi-
nary receiving such funds is hereby authorized
and directed to pay out said funds so received
by him, or whatever amount he may think nec-
essary, for the support, education, and main-
tenance of such minor or minors, idiots, lunatics,
and insane persons and persons non compos
mentis, as he may think in his judgment proper
and right, and when so expended shall be final,
and no liability shall attach to such ordinary or
his bondsmen by reason of such expenditures
when properly done. Acts 1918, pp. 198, 199;
1927, p. 257.
Editor's Note.—The provision as to the payment for the
support, education, etc., of idiots, lunatics, insane persons
and persons non compos mentis, was introduced by the
amendment of 1927.
§ 4804(7). Deposit of funds.—When any such
funds shall come into the hands of the ordinary
[1
of any county, belonging to such minor or
minors, idiots, lunatics, insane persons, and per-
sons non compos mentis, and there shall be no
cause or necessity arising for the payment out
of said funds for support, education, and main-
tenance of such minor or minors, idiots, luna-
tics, insane persons, and persons non compos
mentis, then in that event it shall be the duty
of such ordinary to place said funds in some
good and solvent bank, in the savings depart-
ment of such bank at the then current rate of
interest allowed on saving deposits, and when
so deposited there shall be no further liability
against such ordinary or his bondsmen when
such deposit is made in good faith. Acts 1918,
pp. 198, 199; 1927, p. 257.
Editor's Note.—The amendment of 1927 extended the opera-
tion of this section to funds of idiots, lunatics, insane per-
sons and persons non compos mentis.
CHAPTER 6
The Superior Courts and Their Officers
ARTICLE 1
The Superior Court and Its Judges
§ 4839. (§ 4315.) Must hold courts as pre-
scribed by law.
Reference. — As to terms in McDuffie, Bryan, Bacon,
Dougherty, Echols, Forsyth, Jeff Davis, Jenkins, Lamar
Building, Pulaski, Robin, Tift, Turner, see acts of 1927 pp.
175, et seq.
Effect of Sitting in Wrong County.—A charter, granted by
a court sitting in a county other than the one prescribed by
law, is void. Rogers v. Toccoa Power Co., 161 Ga. 524, 131
S. E. 517.
(§ 4320.) Jurisdiction of superior§ 4849.
courts.
To Compel Attendance of Witness. — This section is not
applicable to a situation where a witness having been sub-
poenaed to attend the superior court, fails to do so, and
the court proceeds by attachment to compel his attendance
and punish him by a fine not exceeding three hundred dol-
lars; this being governed by section 5852. Pullen v. Cleckler,
162 Ga. Ill, 132 S. E. 761.
§ 4850. (§ 4321.) Judges may grant writs
of certiorari, etc.
Cross Reference.—As to the enforcement by the judge of
delivery of property to receiver, see annotations to section
5475.
§ 4863. (§ 4334.) Judge expressing opinion
on facts, error.
II. WHAT CONSTITUTES.
Contentions of the Parties.—Instructing the jury as to what
the court understood to be the contentions of the parties, is
not an expression of opinion. McArthur v. Ryals, 162 Ga.
413, 418, 134 S. E. 76.
Instruction as to Circumstantial Evidence, Held as Error
as Expression of Opinion.—Cook v. State, 36 Ga. App. 582, 137
S. E. 640.
Assumption of Commission of Crime.—There being nothing
in the evidence or in the defendant's statement to dispute
the facts that the alleged crime was committed, and his de-
fense resting solely upon the contention that he did not
participate in the offense, the court, in charging the jury,
did not violate the provisions of this section in assuming that
a crime had been committed. Pruitt v. State, 36 Ga. App
736, 138 S. E. 251.
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.
"You Seem to Be Fishing Anyhow' r Not Expressive of
Opinion.—The use of the sentence by the court "well go ahead
and use him (the witness) ; you seem to be fishing anyhow,"
was, under the circumstances of the case, held not to be an
intimation of opinion by the judge. Richardson v. State, 161
Ga. 640, 131 S. E. 682.
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§ 4864. Within what time judges shall decide
motions.
Provision Directory.—The provision as to the duty of the
judge to notify counsel of the overruling of a motion for a
new trial, is directory only, and will not suffice, when con*
sidered in connection with section 6152, to extend the time
prescribed therein for presenting bills of exception for
approval. Burnett v. McDaniel & Co., 35 Ga. App. 367, 133
S. E. 268.
ARTICLE 2
Judicial Districts and Circuits
§ 4870. (§ 4339.) Thirty-three judicial cir-
cuits.—The entire state is divided into thirty-
three judicial circuits, in reference to the juris-
diction and sessions of the superior court, as fol-
lows, to wit:
Augusta Circuit, composed of the counties of
Burke, Columbia, and Richmond. Acts 1807, p.
38; 1927, p. 175.
Toombs Circuit, composed of the counties of
Glascock, Lincoln, McDuffie, Taliaferro, Warren,
and Wilkes. Acts 1910, p. 63; 1927, p. 175.
Editor's Note.—The county of McDuffie was added to
Toombs Circuit by the amendment of 1927. The paragraphs
here set out were the only ones affected. This act makes
provisions so as not to affect the rights of solicitor general
during the present time.
ARTICLE 3
Sessions and Adjournments of Superior Courts
§ 4877. (§ 4346.) Terms adjourned five days
before next term.
Motion for New Trial Goes to Next Term.—The preced-
ing term of the court stands adjourned by operation of law
five days prior to the commencement of the succeeding term
;
and a motion for new trial made in one term automatically
goes over to the next regular term, and the judge is without
jurisdiction to dismiss it in vacation. Marshall v. State, 34
Ga. App. 434, 129 S. E. 665.
ARTICLE 4
Clerks of Superior Courts
§ 4897. (§ 4366.) May be removed.
Pleading—Particularity of Charges.—Where the petition
alleges that the acts of misconduct which are grounds for
removal are illustrated in detail by a certain auditor's re-
port on file in the office of the clerk of the superior court
(who is the defendant), and which is referred to in the peti-
tion as an exhibit, the charges are alleged with a degree of
particularity sufficient to put the defendant on notice. Wal-
lace v. State, 34 Ga. App. 281, 129 S. E- 299.
Part of Default in Other Capacity than Clerk of Superior
Court.—Although it may appear from the petition and ex-
hibits that a certain part of the money collected was col-
lected by the clerk in his capacity of clerk of the city court,
and that certain of the records alleged to have been im-
properly kept were improperly kept by him as clerk of the
city court, the petition sets out sufficient grounds for his
removal as clerk of the superior court. Wallace v. State, 34
Ga. App. 281, 129 S. E- 299.
But he can not, by reason of any misconduct on his part
in the discharge of the duties devolving on him as ex-of-
ficio clerk of a city court, be removed from office by the
judge of the superior court, as is provided in this section.
Wallace v. State, 34 Ga. App. 281, 129 S. E- 299.
§ 4901(6). Endorsement of plat for laying out
street or highway; report of city planning com-
mission.—In any county having a population of
60,000 or more inhabitants by the last United
States Census, it shall be unlawful to record or
receive for record in the office of the clerk of the
superior court any map or plat for the laying out
of any street or highway unless it bears the en-
dorsement thereon of the commissioners of
roads and revenues, provided that if the land to
be platted is located within a city having a city
planning commission established by charter, or
outside of such city within six (6) miles of the
limits thereof, such endorsement shall be by the
mayor and general council of such city. Before
approving a plan or plat of such subdivision of
land, the commissioners of roads and revenues or
the mayor and general council, shall consider
the location, widths and grades of the proposed
streets or highways within or adjacent to such
subdivision. Each such subdivision of land
shall have adequate means of access to the lots
therein from the public streets or highways and
shall be so laid out as to provide for the con-
tinuation of existing streets and highways and
for the proposed highway widenings deemed
necessary in the public interest by such commis-
sioners of roads and revenues or such mayor and
general council and shall be so laid out as to per-
mit of an appropriate subdivision of adjoining
properties; provided that such commissioners or
such mayor and general council may waive or
modify any of the above conditions or require-
ments wherever owing to the peculiar shape or
location of the land such condition or require-
ment cannot in the judgment of such commis-
sioners or of such mayor and general council
reasonably be demanded with due regard to the
appropriate development of the land to be sub-
divided. Any such map must first be submitted
to the city planning commission for considera-
tion and report to the mayor and general council
provided the property thus platted jis located
within such city or within six miles of the limits
thereof. The foregoing provisions shall likewise
apply when any person in said territory desires
to construct sewers or disposal plants or similar
construction for the disposal of sewerage. In
such event the provisions of this section apply, so
that the plans for the construction of said sew-
erage and disposal plants must be approved in
the same manner as is provided for the approval
of plats and the penalty provided in section
4901(7) shall apply to all improvements and
any subdivisions wherein sewers or disposal
plants as herein provided are constructed; the
same penalty concerning same shall apply for
failure to have the plans for the same approved
before being installed as applies to selling land
as herein provided with reference to recording
plats. Acts 1921, pp. 216, 219; 1923, p. Ill; 1927,
p. 318.
Editor's Note.—The last two- sentences of this section are
new with the amendment of 1927.
The Act of 1927 makes no reference to the Act of 1923
which reduced the required population from 200,000 to 60,-
000 but amends the original act, enacted in 1921. Although
the Act of 1927 fixes the required population at 200,000 or
more in view of the Act of 1923 it would seem that 60,000 is
the intended minimum.
CHAPTER 7
Attorneys at Law
ARTICLE 10
General Principles
e*
§ 4954. (§ 4416); -Liability of attorneys to be
ruled. ' *'"
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§ 4956 AUDITORS—DISPOSITION OF CASE § 5141
Relationship Necessary.—Certain facts held not to consti-
tute the relation of attorney and client, and application of
section denied. Smith v. International Lawyers, 35 Ga.
App. 158, 132 S. E- 245.
§ 4956. (§ 4418.) Limitation on authority.
Applied in Rawls v. Heath. 36 Ga. App. 372, 376, 136 S. E.
822.
Burden of Proof.—Where the defendant to a suit contends
that he settled the claim by paying the plaintiff's attorney
less than the full amount thereof, the burden is upon the
defendant to show affirmatively that the plaintiff's attorney
had special authority from his client to make the settle-
ment. High v. Hollis, 35 Ga. App. 195, 132 S. E- 260.
§ 4957. (§ 4419.) Improper conduct by counsel.
IV. MISTRIAL.
B. Instructions Remedying Improper Remarks.
See Furney v. Tower, 36 Ga. App. 698, applying the prin-
ciple staled under this analysis line in the Code.
CHAPTER 8
Stenographers
§ 4985. (§ 4447). Compensation in civil cases
Assessment of Costs' against Public Treasury.—The court
cannot assess the cost of stenographic reports against the
public treasury in a civil case between private parties.
Macris v. Tsipourses, 35 Ga. App. 671, 134 S. E- 621.
SECOND TITLE
Special Rights, Remedies, and Proceedings
CHAPTER l
Appeals
ARTICLE l
In What Cases Allowed
§ 4998. (§ 4453). Appeals lie in what cases.
Cross Reference.—See annotations to § 4742.
§ 5000. (§ 4455). Appeal when to be entered.
When Section Applicable.—Unless there are provisions
made where a greater or less time is fixed for entering ap-
peals in particular cases, the general provision of this sec-
tion will control. Hughes v. State Board, 162 Ga. 246. 253,
134 S. E. 42.
ARTICLE 3
Effect of Appeals
§ 5015. (§ 4470.) Effects of appeal.
Applied to Judgment of Justice's Court.—Upon appeal the
judgment of justice's court remains operative with all of
its incidents, save in so far as it is incapable of enforce-
ment pending the appeal. Haygood v. King, 161 Ga. 732,
132 S. E. 62.
§ 5022. (§ 4477.) Arbitrators limited by sub-
mission.
Cited in United States Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Corbett. 35 Ga.
App. 606, 612, 134 S. E. 336.
CHAPTER 3
Of Attachments
ARTICLE 1
Of i&suing Attachments
§ 5056. (§ 4511.) By whom affidavit may be
made.
Cross Reference.—For affidavit as to garnishment, see §
5269.
§| 5094. (§ 4549). Garnishment^ how obtained.
Cited in Owen v. Moseley, 161 Ga. 62, 64, 129 S. E- 787.
ARTICLE 5
Of Pleading and Defenses in Attachment
§ 5107. (§ 4561.) No traverse shall delay plain-
tiff.
Disposal of Traverse.—Notwithstanding this section, a trav-
erse to the grounds of attachment should be first disposed
of, unless it be continued for cause. This provision of the
Code simply means that nothing that works a continuance
of the traverse only shall postpone the main case. Alvaton
Mercantile Co. v. Caldwell, 34 Ga. App. 151, 128 S. E. 781.
Effect of Finding Issue in Defendant's Favor.—When an
issue on a traverse is found in favor of the defendant, all he
gains is that the levy falls, and if a judgment is obtained on
the merits it does not date from the time of the levy as
provided by § 5124, but it would take lien on the property
attached as well as on other property, from the date of the
judgment only. Blakely Milling, etc., Co. v. Thompson, 34
Ga. App. 129, 128 S. E- 688.
ARTICLE 7
Replevy and Disposition of Property Attached
§ 5113. (§ 4567.) Defendant may replevy prop-
erty, officer's duty.
Cited in Blakely Milling, etc., Co. v. Thompson, 34 Ga.
App. 129. 128 S. E- 688.
ARTICLE 9
Of Lien of Attachments, Judgment and Execution
§ 5124. (§ 45780 Lien of attachments.
Cross Reference.—See annotations to § 5107.
CHAPTER 4
Auditors
ARTICLE 1
Appointment and Powers
§ 5127. (§ 4581.) Auditor instead of master.
Applied as to reference to auditor by the judge of his own
motion. Darien Bank v. Clifton, 162 Ga. 625, 134 S. E. 619.
§ 5128. (§ 4582,) Auditor at law.
Cited in Holston Box, etc., Co. v. Vonberg, 34 Ga. App.
298, 129 S. E. 562.
§ 5129. (§ 4583.) Powers of auditor.
Cited in Ellis v. Geer, 36 Ga. App. 519, 520, 137 S. E- 290.
§ 5139. (§ 4583.) Report may be recommitted.
Cited in Holston Box, etc., Co. v. Vonberg, 34 Ga. App.
298, 300, 129 S. E- 562.
ARTICLE 4
Hearing of Exceptions and Final Disposition of
Case
§ 5141. (§ 4595.) Jury trial, when.
Right to Jury Trial without Demand in City Court.—This
section is a general law, but must be construed with refer-
ence to the local statute creating the city court of Lexing-
ton, provided how a jury trial in causes pending therein may
be dispensed with. It seems that the local statute would ap-
ply to trials of exceptions of fact to an auditor's report;
that is, there must be a demand for jury trial. Shehane v.
Wimbish, 34 Ga. App. 608, 612, 131 S. E- 104.
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§ 5146 JUDGMENT AND COSTS § 5216
§ 5146. (§ 4600.) What evidence to be read
to jury, and of verdict.
Presumption and Burden of Proof.—Auditor's findings are
prima facie true, and the burden of overcoming them is on
the exceptor. McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 712, 132 S.
E). 547.
CHAPTER ;>
Bail in Actions for Personalty
§ 5153. (§ 4607.) Perishable property, how sold.
Applied as to amount of recovery in action of trover. Stand-
ard Motors Finance Co. v. O'Neal, 35 Ga. App. 727, 134 S.
E- 843.
§ 5154. (§ 4608). Release of defendant without
security, when.
Time of Giving Notice.—The giving of "five days notice
of the time and place of hearing," required by this section
is not complied with by serving the plaintiff, on the first day
of May, with notice of hearing on the fifth day of May fol-
lowing. From the first day of May to the fifth day of May
is only four days. Hardin v. Mutual Clothing Co., 34 Ga
App. 466, 129 S. E. 907.
Failure to Answer No Waiver.—Where a defendant peti-
tions the court for a discharge, and the respondent fails to
file a written answer to the petition, the respondent is not
to be considered as in default, but may appear and introduce
evidence in rebuttal of that offered by the petitioner. Har-
ris v. Hines, 35 Ga. App. 414, 133 S. E- 294.
CHAPTER 6
Of Qlaims to Property in Execution
ARTICLE 2
When, Where, and How Tried
§ 5170. (§ 4624.) Burden of proof on plaintiff.
Applied in Peterson v. Wilbanks, 163 Ga. 742, 753, 137 S.
E. 69; Blount v. Dunlap, 34 Ga. App. 666, 130 S. E. 693.
Burden is on claimant, when defendant in fi. fa. is in pos-
session to show his title to the property in defendant's pos-
session. Jones Motor Co. v. Finch Motor Co., 34 Ga. App.
399, 129 S. E. 915.
Burden on Plaintiff in Fi. Fa. When Possession Unknown.
—Where it does not appear in whose possession the property
was found, the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff in fi. fa.
Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Crawford, 34 Ga. App. 719, 131
S. E. 103.
CHAPTER 8
Of the Writ of Certiorari
ARTICLE 2
How Obtained, and Proceedings Thereon
§ 5181. (§ 4635.) From the court of ordinary.
Noncompliance Ground of Dismissal.—Noncompliance with
the requirements of setting forth "plainly and distinctly
the error complained of," and failure to set forth the
grounds of the motion for a new trial or attach them to the
petition as an exhibit, is a ground for dismissal. East River
Nat. Bank v. EHman, 36 Ga. App. 263, 136 S. E. 799.
§ 5185. (§ 4639.) Bond and security to be given.
IV. PAYMENT OF COSTS.
Certificate—Sufficiency of.—A certificate made by the judge
whose judgment is the subject matter of complaint, that
"the petitioner has paid all accrued costs to this date in the
sum of $9.25" is sufficient as a compliance with this section.
Whitley v. Jackson, 34 Ga. App. 286, 129 S. E- 662.
§ 5187. (§ 4641.) Affidavit in lieu of bond.
What Must Affidavit State.—The affidavit should allege
that owing to his poverty the affiant is unable to give the
required security; merely stating that the affiant "is unable
[1
to give the security, as required by law," is not sufficient,
and the affidavit not being amendable, the certiorari is void.
Roberts v. Selman, 34 Ga. App. 171, 128 S. E- 694.
§ 5188. (§ 4642.) Must be applied for in thirty
days.
Judgment Sustaining Demurrer Not Final Determination.
—A judgment sustaining a demurrer to a petition, which
grants leave to the plaintiff to amend on pain of dismissing
the suit, is not a final judgment, and certiorari does not lie
thereto. Messengale v. Colonial Hill Co., 34 Ga. App. 807,
131 S. E. 299.
§ 5190. (§ 4644.) Ten days notice to the ad-
verse party.
Immaterial Variance between Process and Record.—A de-
fendant in certiorari being entitled only to written notice of
the sanction of the writ of certiorari and the time and place
of hearing, and not to service of a copy of any of the pro-
ceedings, it is immaterial that a copy of the proceedings
served, showed as surety upon the certiorari bond a name
different from that appearing as surety upon such bond as it
appeared of record. Whitley v. Jackson, 34 Ga. App. 286,
129 S. E. 662.
§ 5181. (§ 4645). Shall operate as a supersedeas.
Cited in Hargett v. Columbus, 36 Ga. App. 628, 629, 137 S.
E. 911.
§ 5195. (§ 4646.) Answer filed five days before
the first day of term.
Applied in Heinz v. Backus, 34 Ga. App. 203, 205, 128 S.
E. 915.
ARTICLE 3
Of the Answer, Hearing, Judgment and Costs
§ 5196. (§ 4647.) Exceptions to answer.
Certainty and Definilteness of Exceptions.
—
Exceptions must
specify the defects. They must be so definite, apt, and cer-
tain that the magistrate may be able to understand the ex-
act nature of the deficiency. Maoris v. Tsipourses, 35 Ga.
App. 671, 134 S. E. 621.
Method Prescribed by Section Exclusive.—An incomplete
answer to a writ of certiorari can be perfected only by ex-
ceptions taken thereto in the manner prescribed by this sec-
tion. Macris v. Tsipourses, 35 Ga. App. 671, 134 S. E- 621.
SECTION 3
Of the Judgment and Costs
§ 5201. (§ 4652). Certiorari may be dismissed
or returned.
Returning Case—Verdict Contrary to Evidence.—In a case
when the only error alleged is that the verdict is contrary
to the law and the evidence, it is erroneous to render a final
judgment in petitioner's favor; for the reason that in such
a case the error complained of is not "an error in law which
must finally govern the case." Tuten v. Towles, 36 Ga. App.
328, 136 S. E. 537.
Applied as to entering final decision where there is ques-
tion of fact to be decided in the lower court. Strickland v.
American Nat. Bank, 34 Ga. App. 549, 130 S. E. 598.
Cited in Shehane v. Wimbish, 34 Ga. App. 608, 613, 131 S.
E. 104; Flood v. Empire Inv. Co., 35 Ga. App. 266, 270, 133
S. E- 60.
§ 5203. (§ 4654.) Damage may be awarded.
Cited in Flood v. Empire Inv. Co., 35 Ga. App. 266, 270,
133 S. E. 60.
§ 5209. (§ 4660.) Notice to owner.
Time for Appointment of Assessor.—Construing together
this section and sections 5218, 5216, and 5219, the landowner
has until the day fixed for the hearing in the notice in which
to appoint his assessors, which hearing shall not be less than
fifteen days from the time of serving the notice. A different
ruling is not required by the decision in City of Elberton v.
Adams, 130 Ga. 501, 61 S. E. 18, decided by five Justices.
Sheppard v. Edison, 161 Ga. 907, 132 S. E- 218.
§ 5216. (§ 4667.) How service effected.
See note to § 5209.
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§ 5218. (§ 4669.) Direction and contents of
notice.
See note to § 5209.
§ 52 19. (§ 4670.) When assessor to be ap-
pointed by ordinary.
See note to § 5209.
§ 5229. (§ 4679). Appeal not to delay, when.
Cited in Gaston Shunk Plow Co., 161 Ga. 287, 304, 130 S.
E. 580.
CHAPTER 9
Condemnation of Private Property
ARTICLE 4
To What Condemnations Applicable,
Appeal, Final Judgment, etc.
§ 5240. Water-power owners may condemn.
Editor's Note and General Consideration.—The question
of the constitutionality of this section was suggested by
counsel but not raised in Rogers v. Toccoa Elect. Power Co.,
163 Ga. 919, 137 S. E- 272.
Effect of Furnishing Power in Another State.—A corpora-
tion having the power of eminent domain under this section
would not lose such power because it also furnished electric
power in Tennessee. Rogers v. Toccoa Elect. Power Co., 163
Ga. 919, 137 S. E- 272.
Injunction—(Proper Remedy to Determine Power of Emi-
nent Domain.—In a proceeding under this section the sole
question to be passed upon by the assessors is the amount of
compensation to be paid. In such proceedings the assessors
can not pass upon the legal power of the company to institute
such proceedings. The remedy of the landowner is to apply
to a court of equity to enjoin the condemnation proceedings
if they are unauthorized. Rogers v. Toccoa Power Co., 161
Ga. 524, 526, 131 S. E- 517.
What Determines "Public Use."—Whether a purpose is a
public or private purpose within the meaning of the law
relating to eminent domain does not depend on use or the
amount of use by the public, but upon the right of the pub-
lic to such use. Rogers v. Toccoa Elect. Power Co., 163 Ga.
919, 137 S. E. 272.
Applied in the case of electric power company. Rogers
Toccoa Elect. Power Co., 163 Ga. 919, 137 S. E. 272.
§ 5240(1). Condemnation of road or highway
for power plant generating electricity.—Where
any proceeding to condemn a public road or
highway is instituted, if the same is a part of the
State highway system, or jurisdiction or control
thereof has been taken over or assumed by the
State Highway Board or other State authority,
the notice of intention to condemn shall be ad-
dressed to and served upon the chairman of the
State Highway Board or such other officer as
may hereafter be vested with the supervision and
control of said State highway system; and if
said road or highway is under the supervision or
control of county authorities, the notice of in-
tention to condemn shall be addressed to and
served upon the ordinary, chairman of the board of
commissioners of roads and revenues, commis-
sioner of roads and revenues, or such other
officer as is by law vested with jurisdiction over
and control of the public roads of the county in
which said road to he condemned is located. The
procedure in such condemnation of public roads
and highways shall be the same as provided by
the general laws of the State, as now embodied
in section 5206 et seq. of the Code of Georgia and
as the same may hereafter be amended, in so far
as the same is not in conflict with the provisions
of this section; and the public officer or officers
to be notified and served as aforesaid shall act
for and in behalf of the State or county, as the
case may be, in the appointment of an assessor
and in all other respects as provided in said gen-
eral law of the State with respect to the owner
or owners of property sought to be condemned.
Provided, however, before any public road con-
demned under the provisions of this section can
be used by the 'condemnor, the new road, includ-
ing any and all bridges and culverts that may be
necessary as a part thereof, shall be laid out and
constructed by the condemnor and by the con-
demnor made ready for use by the public, all of
which new construction shall be approved by the
authorities having control of the road con-
demned; and provided further that the terms
"public road" or "public highway," whenever used
in this section or section 5240 shall include not
only highways and roads proper, but bridges,
culverts, and appurtenances as well. Acts 19>27,
p. 373.
§ 5243. Condemnation for public roads.
Additional Land for Road.—Whenever a public road is al-
ready established, and it becomes necessary to condemn land
for the purpose of grading, improving, turnpiking, paving,
widening, or macadamizing the same, for the use and con-
venience of the public, the county authorities must pursue
the method laid down in this section. But when the State
highway department wishes to condemn land for rights of
way for State-aid roads, it is not required to, and can not,
pursue this method. Cook v. State Highway Board, 162 Ga.
84, 98, 132 S. E- 902.
ARTICLE 5
Condemnation on Petition of State or Federal
Government
§ 5246(1)| When petition authorized; proce-
dure in case of doubt as to title.
Proceeding in Rem—Parties.—Under this section the State
Highway Board can, in one proceeding, condemn a right of
way over two tracts of land, one owned by one of the plain-
tiffs and the other owned by both plaintiffs, such proceeding
being one in rem and not against individuals. In such a pro-
ceeding all persons interested will be allotted the damages
to which they are respectively entitled. Cook v. State High-
way Board, 162 Ga. 84, 132 S. E. 902.
The venue is in the county in which the land lies; but if
the tract of land lies in two conties, such proceeding can
be brought in the superior court of either county. Cook v.
State Highway Board, 162 Ga. 84, 132 S. E. 902.
Necessity of Condemning All of Defendant's Land in One
Proceeding.—In a proceeding to condemn a right of way and
approaches to a public bridge on one side of the river, it
is not a good objection to said proceeding that the plaintiffs
would be entitled to recover damages for their lands lying
on the opposite bank of said stream, the proceeding not be-
ing instituted to condemn a right of way over said lands.
Cook v. State Highway Board, 162 Ga. 84, 132 S. E- 902.
Recovery for Injury to Ferry Right.—If this proceeding
damages the plaintiffs by destroying any rights of ferry
which they might have over said river, such damages can
be assessed in the present proceeding. Cook v. State High-
way Board, 162 Ga. 84, 132 S. E. 902.
CHAPTER H
Garnishments
ARTICLE 1
How Issued and Served; Answer; and What Is
Subject to
§ 5265. (§ 4705). Garnishment.
Suit Pending—When.—A suit is pending, within the mean-
ing of this section, although a judgment may in fact have
been rendered in the suit, when there still remains a legal
[114]
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possibility that the judgment may be reversed, as when a
bill of exceptions to the judgment has been tendered and cer-
tified by the trial judge and has been filed with the clerk of
the Court of Appeals. Carrollton Bank v. Glass, 35 Ga. App.
89, 132 S. F. 238.
§ 5268. (§ 4708). Garnishment, how obtained.
Cross References.—See annotations to succeeding section,
and annotations under section 4392.
§ 5269. (§ 4709). How and by whom issued,
etc.
Time of Filing Answer.—Where the garnishee fails to an-
swer at the first and the second terms of court, but files
an answer on the first day of the third term before the gar-
nishment case has been called on the docket and before a
motion has been made by the plaintiff to enter a judgment
obtained during the second term, such answer is not too
late. Owen v. Moseley, 161 Ga. 62, 129 S. F,. 787.
§ 5272. (§ 4712). What is subject to garnish-
ment.
Proceeds of Realty Sold by Execution.—Ifl executors, em-
powered by will to sell lands of the decedent, sell them for
the purpose of division, the proceeds are personalty, unin-
pressed with the character of real estate, and therefore are
subject to garnishment. Brown Guano Co. v. Bridges, 34 Ga.
App. 652, 130 S. E. 695.
such. The language of this section seems to admit of no
other construction. Fairview Cemetery Co. v. Wood, 36 Ga.
App. 709, 719, 138 S. F- 88.
§ 5337(2). House of prostitution; house and
contents a nuisance.
Amendment Showing Abatement Pending Suit.—It was
error to refuse to allow a verified amendment to the defend-
ant's answer to a petition to enjoin him from conducting
a nuisance in violation of this statute; the allegations of the
amendment showing that the nuisance had been absolutely
discontinued a few days after the beginning of the proceeding
for injunction, and several weeks before the trial, and that
all issues in the proceeding had become moot. (Two JJ. dis-
sent.) Yancey v. State, 161 Ga. 138, 129 S. F. 642.
ARTICLE 4
Answer, Traverse, Claim, and Judgment
§ 5281. (§ 4719.) Answer or garnishee and
judgment.
When Judgment May Be Entered on Dissolution Bond.—
Where a garnishment is sued out pendente lite by the plain-
tiff and dissolved by the defendant, there can be no judg-
ment rendered on the bond given to dissolve the garnishment
until after judgment is rendered in the main action in favor
of the plaintiff against the defendant therein. Cone v. Glid-
den Stores Co., 36 Ga. App. 246, 136 S. F- 170.
Default Judgment against Garnishee.—Where a garnish-
ment has been dissolved by the defendant in the main case,
if the garnishee fails or refuses to answer, judgment by de-
fault may Be rendered against him for such amount as may
have been obtained by judgment against the defendant; and
upon such judgment against the garnishee being entered,
judgment may be had for the amount thereof against the
defendant and the sureties on the bond to dissolve the gar-
nishment. Carpenter v. Bryson, 35 Ga. App. 622, 134 S. F- 180.
§ 5282. (§ 4720). Claimants may dissolve
garnishment.
Cited in Tarver v. Jones, 34 Ga. App. 716, 131 S. E. 102;
Johnson v. Planters Bank, 34 Ga. App. 241, 129 S. F. 125.
CHAPTER 15
Officers of Court, Rules Against
§ 5346. (§ 4774). Rules nisi against officers.
Cited in Gaston v. Shunk Plow Co., 161 Ga. 287, 297, 'l30
S. F. 580.
§ 5347. (§ 4775). Answer to rule nisi, and sub-
sequent proceedings.
Traverse of Answer.—Traverse of answer to remedial pro-
ceeding for contempt is not necessary, and the court can
hear, without such traverse, the evidence «to determine
whether the defendant has or has not violated the order of
the court. Gaston v. Shunk Plow Co., 161 Ga. 287, 297, 130 S.
F. 580.
CHAPTER 16
Of Partition
CHAPTER 12
Of the Illegality of Executions
§ 5306. (§ 4737). No illegality until after levy.
Applied in Carter v. Alma State Bank, 34 Ga. App. 766, 131
S. F. 184.
§ 5308. (§ 4739). Damages for delay only.
Damages Assessed When Portion of Affidavit Dismissed.—
Where a portion of an affidavit of illegality has been dismissed
on demurrer for insufficiency, and the remainder is admitted
to be incorrect, 'the jury may be authorized to infer from
this that it was filed for delay only, and a verdict assessing
damages in favor of the plaintiff in execution, at less than
25% of the principal debt, will not be disturbed, where'
there is any evidence to support it, unless for some material
error of law. Felker v. Still, 35 Ga. App. 236, 133 S. F- 519.
ARTICLE l
General Principles
§ 5355. (§ 4783). Partition,
Necessity of Peculilar Circumstances.—Where no peculiar
circumstances are shown, equity will not take cognizance
of a partition suit. Safford v. Anderson, 162 Ga. 408, 134
S. F- 81.
CHAPTER 18
Tresspassers on Land and Tenants Holding
Over
ARTICLE l
Proceedings Against Intruders on Land and
Tenants Holding Over
CHAPTER 14
Nuisances and Their Abatement
§ 5329. (§ 4760) May be removed, and how.
Necessity of Actual Existence of Nuisance.—This and the
following sections were not intended to afford a remedy
against that which is not an actually existing nuisance, as
distinguished from that which may or probably will become
[1
SECTION 1
Proceedings Against Intruders
§ 5380- (§ 4808). Intruders, how ejected.
Bona Fide Claim to Possession Good Defense.—That the
alleged intruder claims the legal right to possession of the
land in good faith is a legal defense against eviction under
such process. Hill v. Security Loan, etc., Co., 35 Ga. App.
93, 132 S. F. 107.
Necessity of Process and Returni.—Under this section, no
process or return of service is ' required. Hill v. Security
Loan, etc., Co., 35 Ga. App. 93, 132 S. F- 107.
§ 5382. (§ 4810). Return of affidavit and trial-
Trial at What Term.—The proceeding under section 5380
being strictly summary and there being no provision as to
when an issue formed upon a counter-affidavit to such a
proceeding under this section may be tried, the trial of such
an issue may be held at the term of court during which the
counter-affidavit is filed. Hill v. Security Loan, etc., Co.,
35 Ga. App. 93, 132 S. F. 107.
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SECTION 2
Proceedings Against Tenants Holding Over
§ 5389. (§ 4817). Double rent and writ of
possession, when.
Denjand for Rent.—It is not essential that the plaintiff
should prove a demand for payment of the rent prior to the
institution of the proceeding. Moore v. Collins, 36 Ga. App.
701, 138 S. E- 81, and cases cited.
Time from Which Rent Runs.—Where the tenant files a
counter-affidavit and bond, he may be charged with double
rent, or double the rental value of the property, as the case
may be (see Stanley v. Stembridge, 140 Ga. 750, 79 S. E.
842), from the date of the demand for the premises, or, if
such date is not shown, from the date of the issuance of the
dispossessory warrant, provided the plaintiff is entitled to
prevail in such case. Moore v. Collins, 36 Ga. App. 701, 138
S. E- 81, and cases cited.
Effect of Receivership of the Property upon Payment of
Double Rent.—Whether or not double rent is uncollectioie
for a period during which the rented premises are in posses-
sion of a receiver, the pendency of the receivership will pre-
vent the collection of double rent only when the control and
possession of the property by the receiver prevented the
tenant from moving out and surrendering the rented premises
to the landlord. Graf v. Shiver, 36 Ga. App. 532, 137 S. E.
283.
• THIRD TITLE
Extraordinary and Equitable Remedies and
Pleadings
CHAPTER l
Joinder of Legal and Equitable Causes
§ 5406. (§ 4833). Equitable or legal rights,
remedies applied.
III. OPERATION UPON SUBJECT MATTER.
Petition Not Demurrable on Certain Grounds.—Since the
passage of this section a petition which sets forth a legal
cause of action, though using terms appropriate to an equit-
able proceeding, is not demurrable on the grounds (a) that
it sets forth no cause of action (b) that there is no equity
in the petition, and (c) that the plaintiff has an adequate
remedy at law. Smith v. Hancock, 165 Ga. 222, 136 S. E- 52.
§ 5407. (§ 4834). Equitable relief from the
court.
Amendment seeking equitable relief in common law suit
allowed. Moon v. First Nat. Bank, 163 Ga. 489, 136 S. E. 433.
§ 5411. (§ 4838). New parties and extraordinary
remedies for defendant.
Amendment of Bill of Exceptions Filed by New Party, Al-
lowed.—McMillian v. Spencer, 162 Ga. 659, 134 S. E- 92L
Maker's Rights in Action upon the Note by Transferee.—
In an action upon a note by the transferee thereof against
the maker, the latter can set up his defenses against the
payee, and also can make the payee a party to the suit. Mc-
Millan v. Spencer, 162 Ga. 659, 134 S. E- 921.
CHAPTER 2
Parties in Equitable Proceedings
§ 5417. (§ 4844). Parties.
Judgment Creditor as Party Defendant.—In Swift & Co. v.
First Nat. Bank, 161 Ga. 543, 549, 132 S. E- 99, it was held
that the judgment creditor was properly joined as defendant,
in a suit for injunction by mortgagee to prevent the sale of
the property under levy.
CHAPTER 3
Trial and Its Incidents
§ 5423. (§ 4850). Special verdicts and costs.
Costs in chancery do not always follow the event of the suit,
[1
but are awarded according to the justice of the cause. They
rest in the sound discretion of the court, to be exercised
upon full view of the merits and circumstances of the case.
Peninsular Naval Stores Co. v. Culbreth, 162 Ga. 474, 134 S.
E. 608.
(a) In an equity case it is the province of the judge to
determine upon whom the costs shall fall, (b) Auditor's fees
may, in the discretion of the court, be apportioned between
the parties, (c) The stenographer's fee for reporting the
evidence in a case shall be paid upon such terms as the
parties may agree upon; and if no agreement is entered into
as to the payment thereof, then in such manner as may be
prescribed by the presiding judge. McDonald v. Dabney,
161 Ga. 711, 132 S. E- 547.
CHAPTER 4
Decrees
§ 5426. (§ 4853). Decrees and remedies.
Cited in Swift & Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 161 Ga. 543, 550,
132 S. E- 99: Gore v. Humphries, 163 Ga. 106, 114, 135 S. E
481.
§ 5429. (§ 4856). Confirmation of sale under
decree.
Applied.—Wingfield v. Bennett, 36 Ga. App. 27, 134 S. E-
840.
CHAPTER 6
Of Extraordinary Remedies
ARTICLE l
Mandamus, Quo Warranto, and Prohibition
§ 5443. (§ 4870). When not granted.
Proper Remedy Should Be Resorted to in Lieu of Manda-
mus.—Where it appears that the applicant had a remedy for
any error of the ordinary, he can not neglect the remedy and
afterwards resort to mandamus proceedings. Sharp v. Mc-
Alpin, 162 Ga. 159, 161, 132 S. E- 891.
§ 5445. (§ 4872). Facts in issue, how and
when tried.
Applied.—Browne v. Benson, 163 Ga. 707, 137 S. E- 626.
ARTICLE 4
Receivers
4900). Receiver, when an officer§ 5475. (§
of the court.
Enforcement of Delivery of Property to Receiver.—A judge
may, in vacation, enforce the delivery of fund or property
to the receiver, by attaching and imprisoning any party
refusing obedience to his order. Coker v. Norman, 162 Ga.
351, 133 S. E- 740.
§ 5477. (§ 4902). Power of appointment to be
cautiously exercised.
Receiver in Divorce and Alimony Case.—In a suit for di-
vorce and alimony, under the circumstances of the case, the
prayer for appointment of receiver of the husband's property
was denied in view of this section. Reeve v. Reeve, 163 Ga.
95, 135 S. E. 434.
General Creditor May Not Enjoin Debtor.—In view of this
section and section 5495 creditors without lien cannot, as a
general rule, enjoin their debtors from disposing of property,
or obtain injunction or other extraordinary reiief in equity.
Dixie Metal Products Co. v. Jones, 163 Ga. 70, 135 S. E. 406.
§ 5479. (§ 4904). Receivers, when appointed.
Appointment without Hearing.—The grant of a temporary
injunction and the appointment of a receiver, without a
hearing and without sufficient grounds is erroneous. Board
v. Municipal Securities Corp., 161 Ga. 634, 131 S. E- 495.
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CHAPTER 7
Injunctions
ARTICLE l
When Granted
§ 5491. (§ 4914). Administration of criminal
laws, no interference by equity.
Proceedings under Ordinances.—Notwithstanding this sec-
tion where an ordinance illegal and unreasonable in itself is
"being enforced by prosecution which would deprive a man of
his property, or destroy the carrying on of his lawful busi-
ness, a court of equity will interfere, specially where the au-
thorities are giving to it an interpretation not authorized by
its language. Lilburn v. Alford Bros., 163 Ga. 282, 284, 136 S.
E- 65.
§ 5495. (§ 4918). Creditors without liens.
Cross Reference.—See annotations to § 5477.
A creditor having a justice's court judgment from which
ah appeal has been taken, and who is otherwise entitled to
injunctive relief, does not come within the provisions of this
section. Haygood v. King, 161 Ga. 732, 132 S. E- 62.
§ 5499. (§ 4022). Injunction can not compel.
Mandatory Injunction. — An injunction dispossessing one
party and admitting another to possession is equivalent to a
mandatory injunction, which is not within the proper scope
•of injunction. Injunction is not available for the purpose of
accomplishing an eviction, or to prevent interference with
realty by one already in possession. Beck v. Kah, 163 Ga.
365, 136 S. E- 160; Burns v. Hale, 162 Ga. 336, 133 S. E- 857.
ARTICLE 2
Procedure in Injunction Cases
§ 5501. (§ 4924). Injunctions, in what manner
granted.
As to temporary injunction without hearing, see annota-
tions to sec. 5479.
§ 5502. (§ 4925). The hearing, writ of error,
judge's order.
Application to Interlocutory Injunction.—A bill of exceptions
will lie to the grant of an interlocutory injunction under this
section, and there is no merit in the motion to dismiss the
bill of exceptions on the ground that it "does not except to
any judgment or ruling upon any issue that is final in the
case." Brindle v. Goswick, 162 Ga. 432, 134 S. E. 83.
Extent to Which Supersedeas Operates.—One method of ob-
taining a supersedeas is that provided in this section. This
method is applicable in cases in which injunctions are
granted or dissolved. In such a case either party may sue
out a writ of error to the Supreme Court from a decision
against him, upon complying with the law applicable to the
same; but no such writ of error shall have the effect to
establish or deny any injunction independently of the order
of the judge. Tift v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 161 Ga.
432, 447, 131 S. E. 46.
§ 5504. (§ 4927). In application to enjoin cut-
ting timber.
Cited in Chappie v. Hight, 161 Ga. 629, 632, 131 S. E. 505.
FOURTH TITLE
Of Actions
CHAPTER 1
General Principles
§ 5513. (§ 4936). Implied obligations to pay.
Advancement or Loan.—Where the person making an ad-
vancement to a husband is a brother of the dead wife,
the advancement, if made voluntarily by him and without
a request from the husband, is inferably a gift, and there
does not arise as a matter of law any implied promise on
the part of the husband to repay the money thus advanced.
But where the advancement is made at the request of the
husband, either express or implied, although there is no
express promise to repay, an implied promise by the hus-
band to repay is inferable. Lovett v. Allen, 34 Ga. App.
385, 129 S. E. 897.
§ 5514 (§ 4937). Joinder of legal and equitable
actions.
Editor's Note and General Consideration. — Jackson v.
Mathis, 35 Ga. App. 178, 132 S. E. 410, following the state-
ment in the Code of 1926 taken from Lacher v. Manley, 139
Ga. 80, 78 S. E- 188.
§ 5516. (§ 4939). Parties to actions on con-
tracts.
See annotation to sees. 4460 and 5689.
Exceptions to Section.—To this general rule there are ex-
ceptions. Where' the purchaser of the assets of a firm agree
to pay their debts, a creditor of the firm can by bill, to
which the partners and purchasers are parties, enforce this
agreement for his benefit. Bell v. McGrady, 32 Ga. 257. So
where a married woman, having separate property, and be-
ing indebted to another by note, conveyed her separate es-
tate absolutely to others in consideration of their agree-
ment to pay her an annuity for life and all debts against her
separate property, the agreement may in equity be enforced
by her creditors. Reid v. Whienant, 161 Ga. 503, 507, 131
S. E- 904.
Ownership.—The assignee of a mortgage may enforce it
against the purchaser of the property who assumes payment.
Reid v. Whisenant, 161 Ga. 503, 507, 131 S'. E. 904.
Cited in Young v. Certainteed Prod. Corp., 35 Ga. App.
419, 133 S. E. 279.
§ 5520. (§ 4943). Consolidation of cases.
Creditor Suits against Administratrix.—Where after sev-
eral suits are separately filed by judgment creditors of the
estate of a decedent against the administratrix and the
sureties on her bond, a receiver is appointed, under another
proceeding, to take charge of the estate, and where, after
his appointment the court, by consent of parties, passes an
order consolidating all the cases pending against the ad-
ministratrix and the sureties on her bond, directing that
they shall all proceed in the name of the receiver as plain-
tiff, there is but one case for trial. Ellis v. Geer, 36 Ga.
App. 519, 137 S. E- 290.
Cited in Don v. Don, 162 Ga. 240, 243, 133 S. E- 242.
§ 5521. (§ 4844). Different claims may be
joined.
Actions Which May Be Joined.—A count against a former
employer refusing to return an account book to the plain-
tiff, is one in tort, and hence properly joined with a count
for conversion of the book, under this section. Richards v.
International Agri. Corp., 10 Fed. (2d), 218.
Exception to Section.—The exception to this rule is where
equitable principles are involved, such as insolvency or non-
residence of the plaintiff. In such cases, where the court
has equitable jurisdiction, the general rule does not obtain,
and it is permissible to set up a defense founded either in
tort or on contract in response to a suit of either nature.
But where the court has not equitable jurisdiction, and the
suit is filed, for example, in a city court, such a court has
jurisdiction of such a dissimilar and equitable plea only
when it is purely defensive in its nature, and, if sustained,
would result in a verdict finding generally in favor of the
defendant. Porter v. Davey Tree-Expert Co., 34 Ga. App.
355, 357, 129 S. E- 557.
§ 5522. (§ 4945). Concurrent suits.
Cited and applied in Nix v. Citizens Bank, 35 Ga. App. 55,
56, 132 S. E- 249; Chappie v. Hight, 161 Ga. 629, 630, 31 S.
E. 505.
CHAPTER 2.
Actions, Where and How Brought.
ARTICLE l
Of the Venue
§ 5527. (§ 4950.) Equitable proceedings, venue.
Instances Where General Rule of Section Applied.—Suit to
recover possession of land and damages for cutting timber,
and for equitable relief relating to land and timber. Brindle
v. Goswick, 162 Ga. 432, 134 S. E. 83.
117 ]
§ 5539 DEFENSES, PLEAS, ETC. § 5627
But an equitable action jointly against the vendee, in an
invalid reservation contract, and his transferee, brought in
the county of the transferee's residence, to recover as in
trover the article sold, and to reform the contract so as to
make it include a description of that article, did not lie for
lack of jurisdiction. Flemming v. Drake, 163 Ga. 872, 137 S.
E- 268.
ARTICLE 3
Suits, How Commenced
SECTION 1
The Petition
§ 5539. (§ 4961). Petition to be pragraphed.
Cited in Pape v. Woolford Realty Co., 35 Ga. App. 284,
134 S. E. 174, and Cochran v. Carter, 35 Ga. App. 286, 132
S. E. 921.
SECTION 2
Exhibits
§ 5541. (§ 4963). Copies, exhibits, etc.
Editor's Note and General Consideration.—A contract re-
ferred to in note need not be set out where the note and
not the contract constitutes the cause of action. Reed v.
Colonial Hill Co., 34 Ga. App. 48, 128 S. E. 201.
There is full compliance with this section where the peti-
tion sets forth, as to each of the notes sued on, the date,
amount, maturity, rate of interest, and date from which
it runs, and attaches a specimen copy, with the further
statement that each of the notes sued on is otherwise identi-
cal in form. Reed v. Colonial Hill Co., 34 Ga. App. 48, 49,
128 S. E. 201.
In Heyward v. Ramsey, 35 Ga. App. 472, 473, 134 S. E.
119, the court said: "Though the petition alleges that the
amount due the plaintiff was for services rendered 'as per
contract,' it was not necessary to attach a copy of the
contract."
tion it is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead estoppel.
Every fact pleaded in an answer as true is treated as de-
nied by the plaintiff, and evidence may be introduced in be-
half of the plaintiff to rebut, controvert, or otherwise show
that for any reason the defense pleaded is not good against
the plaintiff's claim. But in a case where the defendant
relies upon estoppel as a defense, it must be pleaded because
other sections of this act require that the defense be plainly
and clearly presented. Brown v. Globe, etc., Fire Ins. Co.,
161 Ga. 849, 854, 133 S. E. 260.
SECTION 5
Dismissal of Petitions
§ 5548. (§ 4970). Dismissal of petition.
Exception to Section.—A petition for habeas corpus is an
exception to the operation of this section. Hence, a peti-
tioner in a habeas corpus proceeding has no right to deprive
the court of jurisdiction, after jurisdiction has once at-
tached, by a voluntary dismissal. Collard v. McCormick,
162 Ga. 116, 124, 132 S. E- 757.
(§ 4985). Service of process, how
ARTICLE 5
In Ejectment
§ 5576. (§ 4998). Mesne profits, no separate
suit for.
Cited in Treadway v. Harris, 34 Ga. App. 583, 585, 130 S.
E- 827.
§ 5579. (§ 5001.) True claimant made defendant.
Defendant Not Bound by Judgment When Not Made a
Party.—A judgment in a former suit for land in which the
defendant was not a party and was not notified or made a
party under this section, is not admissible in evidence'
against the defendant in a later suit for the land. Harrison
v. Hester, 163 Ga. 250, 251, 135 S. E. 845.
§ 5585. (§ 5007.) The consent rule.
Actions to Which Limited.—The consent rule set out in
this section is applicable only to actions of ejectment brought
in the fictitious form. Horn v. Tow son, 163 Ga. 37, 135 S.
E. 487.
ARTICLE 6
Against Joint, and Joint and Several Contractors
ARTICLE 4
Filing, Process, and Service.
§ 5557. (§ 4979). Copy of publication to be
filed.
Generally.—See Faughnan v. Bashlor, 163 Ga. 525, 136 S.
E- 545, following the note in the Georgia Code of 1926.
§ 5563.
made.
See annotations to section 4717.
§ 5566. (§ 4988). Entry of sheriff may be trav-
ersed.
Pleading—Affidavit of Illegality.—Where an affidavit of
illegality is based upon the ground that the affiant was not
served in the suit, and where the affidavit sets forth a re-
turn of service by the sheriff and a traverse of such return
by the affiant, and it is not alleged in the traverse that
the traverse was made at the next term of the court after
the affiant had notice of the sheriff's return, the affidavit
of illegality is subject to dismissal on demurrer. Knight v.
Jones, 63 Ga. 481; Clements v. Haskins, 35 Ga. App. 484, 134
S. E- 125.
§ 5573. (§ 4995). Special pleading not admitted.
Effect of Section upon Pleading Estoppel.—Under this sec- I
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CHAPTER 3
Making Parties Pending Action
§ 5601. (§ 5019.) Parties made in term or va-
cation.
Time at Which Rule Returnable.—No time is prescribed
at which the rule shall be returnable. That time is left to
the discretion of the court. Upon return of the rule the
judge can do no more than allow or refuse to allow the re-
spondent to be made a party. McMillan v. Spencer, 162 Ga.
659, 663, 134 S. E. 921.
§ 5602. (§ 5020.) Time of trial where parties
made.
Applied in McMillan v. Spencer, 162 Ga. 659, 663, 134 S.
E- 921.
CHAPTER 4
Abatement, Retraxit, Dismissal, and Removal of
Actions
§ 5623. (§ 5041). Death of one of several de-
fendants.
Death after Reference to Auditor.—Under this section the
death of one of the defendant sureties after the filing of a
suit against principal and sureties on an adminitrator's
bond, and after a reference of the case to an auditor,
^
but
before the hearing by the auditor, does not abate the suit or
deprive the auditor of jurisdiction. Ellis v. Geer, 36 Ga. App.
519, 137 S. E- 290.
§ 5627. (§ 5044.) Actions may be dismissed at
any time.
See annotations to section 5548.
FIFTH TITLE
Of Defenses and Proceedings Pending Action
CHAPTER l
Defenses, Pleas, Etc.
18]
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ARTICLE l
.General Provisions
§ 5628. (§ 5045.) Sufficiency of petitions and
pleas determined at first term.
Effect of Order Allowing Time for Amendment.—An order
declaring that the petition would be dismissed unless
amended within a given time could not operate as a final
judgment of dismissal, and upon the amendment of the
petition the merits of the case could be determined. Smith
v. Bugg, 35 Ga. App. 317, 133 S. E- 49.
§ 5631. (§ 5048.) Demurrer, grounds of.
When Proper—Grounds for Special Demurrer.—While mul-
tifariousness is a ground of demurrer under this section it
is not favored by the courts. Smith v. Hancock, 163 Ga.
222, 233, 136 S. E. 52.
§ 5633. (§ 5050.) Demurrer to pleas.
See annotations to sec. 5573.
§ 5638. (§ 5055.) Verified petition requires veri-
fied plea.
Authority of Corporate Officer.—Sworn averments as to
agency or authority of corporate officer, to make the affida-
vit, is not required. Georgia Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 34
Ga. App. 281, 129 S. E. 303.
§ 5647. (§ 5063.) Replication and order for trial.
See annotations to section 5573.
§ 5649. (§ 5065.) No part to be stricken out.
Applied in Home Ins. Co. v. Swann, 34 Ga. App. 19, 26,
128 S. E. 70.
§ 5650. (§ 5066.) Pleas of non est factum must
be sworn to.
Applied in Wier v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 34 Ga. App.
461, 129 S. E- 915.
§ 5651. (§ 5067.) Petition and answer make is-
sue.
See annotations to § 5573.
§ 5652. (§ 5068.) Effect of amendment.
Immaterial Amendment.—While the filing of a material
amendment to the petition after the case has been entered
"in default" will open the default so as to give the defend-
ant full right to plead, the filing of an immaterial amend-
ment, whether before or after the entry of default, will not
affect the validity of the judgment rendered, since the
judgment cures any defective statement of the original cause
of action. Henderson v. EUarbee, 35 Ga. App. 5, 131 S.
E. 524.
Applied in Land v. Pike's Peak Lumber Co., 35 Ga. App.
159, 132 S. E- 644; Taylor v. Keown, 36 Ga. App. 631, 634,
137 S. E. 907.
ARTICLE 2
Judgment by Default
§ 5653. (§ 5069.) Call of appearance-docket.
When Section Applies.—If on the call of the appearance
docket at the appearance term a case is called in which the
defendant has filed no demurrer, plea, or answer, and the
judge marks the case on the docket "in default," such entry
by the judge on the docket is a judgment that the case is
in default. But such an entry is not a "judgment by de-
fault." At most it can only be a judgment that the case
is "in default" and in no sense is a rendition of a final judg-
ment against the defendant in response to the prayers of
the petition. Love v. National Liberty Ins. Co., 157 Ga. 259,
262, 121 S. E. 648; Fraser v. Neese, 163 Ga. 843, 137 S. E.
550.
Effect of Agreement Extending Time.—The private stipu-
lation between the parties is not binding on the court, or op-
erative as extending the time provided by statute for filing
a defense. Fraser v. Neese, 163 Ga. 843, 137 S. E. 550.
Same—Manner of Taking Advantage of Agreement.—Not-
withstanding an agreement between the parties for a con-
tinuance, the defendant must appear before the court and
ask for a continuance as provided by law, or after being
marked "in default" must proceed as prescribed to open
the default. If he fails to follow such procedure the court is
[1
without power to open it at a following term. Fraser v.
Neese, 163 Ga. 843, 137 S. E- 550.
Power of Clerk to Alter Entry.—If after an entry by the
judge at the appearance term the clerk of the court during
the same term, without direction or authority from the
judge, erases the entry "in default" of the docket by draw-
ing a line through it, such action upon the part of the clerk
should be treated as a mere clerical act insufficient in law
to modify or alter the default judgment entered by the judge.
Fraser v. Neese, 163 Ga. 843, 137 S. E- 550.
Irregularity of Second Entry as Affecting First.—The orig-
inal entry of default made by the judge at the first term is
not affected by the fact that an entry is made at a subse-
quent term by virtue of an ex parte order of the judge eve.,
though the second entry might be irregular because the
defendant was not given a hearing. Fraser v. Neese, 163-
Ga. 843, 137 S. E. 550.
§ 5654. (§ 5070.) Opening default.
Effect of Failure to Make Proper Showings.—The movants
having failed to comply with the provisions of this and the
following section by not making the proper showing, it can
not be held that the court erred in denying the application,
especially as it does not appear that there was an abuse of
the discretion which the trial judge exercises over the
whole matter. Henderson v. EUarbee, 35 Ga. App. 5, 131 S.
E. 524.
§ 5656. (§ 5072.) Opening default at trial term.
Discretion of Court.—See Strother v. Harper, 36 Ga. App.
445, 446, 136 S. E- 828, following statement under this catch-
line in Ga. Code of 1926.
§ 5662. (§ 5078.) Verdict in suits in default.
Direction of Verdict.—While the judge may ordinarily have
no authority to render judgment without the verdict of a
jury, except in cases referred to in this section, and section
6516, this does not mean that, even in those cases where
the verdict of a jury is necessary, the court may not di-
rect it where it is demanded by the law and the facts. Pape
v. Woolford Realty Co., 35 Ga. App. 284, 134 S. E- 174. This
principle was applied with reference to a promissory note
and collection of attorney fees in State Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Jacobs, 36 Ga. App. 731, 137 S. E. 905.
Cited in Cochran v. Carter, 35 Ga. App. 286, 132 S. E- 921.
ARTICLE 3
Particular Pleas
SECTION 1 •
To the Jurisdiction
§ 5664. (§ 5080.) Jurisdiction, when admitted.
Motion to Vacate after Verdict Not Waiver of Jurisdic-
tion.—Where a nonresident learning that verdict and judg-
ment had gone against him, first moved to vacate the ver-
dict and judgment, the appearance by such motion after the
rendition of the verdict and judgment is not such an ap-
pearance as to amount to a waiver of jurisdiction. Christian
v. Terry, 36 Ga. App. 815, 816, 134 S. E- 244.
§ 5666. (§ 5082.) Contents of the plea.
Allegation as to Lack of Jurisdiction Must Be Substan-
tiated by Facts.—The caveat merely contains the statement
that the court which passed the order adopting the children
was without jurisdiction over them. The rules of good
pleading require the allegation of facts to support this con-
clusion. The allegation is that they were adopted by a
court having no jurisdiction; and if the caveator desired to
collaterally attack the adoption for want of jurisdiction in
the court which did pass the order, the burden was upon
him to allege in a proper plea such facts upon which he
relied to deprive the court of jurisdiction. Harper v. Lindsey,
162 Ga. 44, 47, 132 S. E. 639.
SECTION 4
Non Est Factum, etc.
§ 5678. (§ 5094.) Pleas of former recovery and
pendency of former suit.
Cause Not Identical.—The pendency of an action for dam-
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ages brought by the plaintiffs against the counties of Tel-
fair and Jeff Davis, for the wrongful taking and appropria-
tion of a right of way over their lands for a public road and
for a free public bridge, does not prevent the subsequent
proceeding brought by the state highway to condemn their
land for the same purposes. Cook v. State Highwav Board,
162 Ga. 84, 96, 132 S. E. 902.
Applied in Holston Box, etc., Co. v. Vonberg, 34 Ga. App.
298, 129 S. E. 562.
CHAPTER 2
Of Amendments
ARTICLE l
General Principles
§ 5681. (§ 5097.) Amendments of pleadings,
when allowed.
II. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Setting Out Cause of Action.—This section, properly con-
strued, means, that in order to admit of an amendment, a
valid cause of action must be set forth in the original dec-
laration. Macon v. Newberrv, 35 Ga. App. 252 132 S. E.
917.
IV. WHAT PLEADINGS AMENDABLE.
Material Evidence Omitted from Exceptions. — Where
within the time required by law a party files exceptions to
the auditor's report, but neglects to set forth in connection
with such exception the evidence necessary to be considered
in passing thereon, or to point out the same by proper ref-
erence, or to attach it as exhibits to his exceptions, such
exceptions can be thereafter amended so as to cure these
defects. Clements v. Fletcher, 161 Ga'. 21, 129 S. E. 846.
§ 5682. (§ 5098.) Enough to amend by.
Amendment Showing Insurable Interest.—A petition in a
suit on a fire insurance policy may be amended to show the
insurable interest of the plaintiff. Georgia Farmers Fire Ins
Co. v. Tanner, 34 Ga. App. 809, 131 S. E. 191.
§ 5683. (§ 5099.) New cause of action and par-
ties not allowable.
Editor's Note.
—See Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hazlip-
Hood Cotton Co., 161 Ga. 480, 483, 131 S. F- 283, quoting
from the case referred to under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926.
Instances of Amendments Allowable within Rule.—A new
cause is not added where the consignor of goods in an action
in tort for damages struck an allegation that the goods
were lost and substituted an allegation that they were car-
ried to a place other than the destination, sold and the pro-
ceeds paid to another. Strachan Shipping Co. v. Hazlip-
Hood Cotton Co., 161 Ga. 480, 131 S. F- 283.
Adding New Parties.—New and distinct parties can not
properly be added by amendment in a proceeding to remove
obstructions from a private wav. Troup v. Tomberlin, 34
Ga. App. 623, 130 S. F. 541.
§ 5689, (§ 5105.) Usee's name added and one
or more plaintiffs may be stricken.
Initial Right to Bring Action as Prerequisite.—A plaintiff
without the legal or equitable right to maintain a suit can-
not amend so as to sue for the use of another. Ludlam
Constr. Co. v. Cummings, 34 Ga. App. 786, 131 S. F. 191.
This principle was applied in a suit by a materialman who
attempted to substitute the obligee for his use where he im-
properly brought suit in his own name against a compensated
bonding company as surety, no indemnity being provided for
the materialman in the bond. American Suretv Co. v. Bibb,
162 Ga. 388, 134 S. F. 100.
ARTICLE 2
Particular Cases
SECTION i
Of Amending Verdicts, Judgments, and Execu-
tions
§ 5694. (§ 5110.) Amendment of verdict.
Applied as to separating the amount of the principal and
interest in a lump sum verdict. Morgan v. Colt Co., 34 Ga.
App. 630, 130 S. F. 600.
§ 5695. (§ 5111.) After dispersion of jury.
See annotation to § 5694.
SECTION 2
Amending Official Returns
§ 5701. (§ 5117.) May be made nunc pro tunc.
Applied in Freeman v. Stedham, 34 Ga. App. 143, 128 S. F-
702.
SECTION 4
Of Other Amendments
§ 5706. (§ 5122.) Amendment of affidavits to
foreclose, etc.
The affidavit for garnishment is amendable by striking
therefrom the words "for which judgment has been obtained,"
and inserting in lieu thereof the words "for which Is now
pending." Carrolton Bank v. Glass, 35 Ga. App. 89, 132 S.
F. 238.
Applied to amendment of distress warrant which failed to
allege that the tenant "is removing" or "seeking to remove '
his crops from the rented premises. Johnson v. Lock, 36 Ga.
App. 620, 137 S. F. 911.
§ 5707. (§ 5123.) Amendment of appeal and
other bonds.
The bond executed by an. applicant for garnishment, is
amendable under this section. Where neither the obliga-
tions of the sureties are altered nor the rights of the opposite
party prejudiced, such bond may be amended in any man-
ner to conform to the requirements of the statute, without
the consent of the sureties. Carrollton Bank v. Glass, 35
Ga. App. 89, 132 S. E. 238.
Instances of Amendments to Appeal Bonds.—The execu-
tion of a bond by the attorney in the attorney's own name
tor the plaintiff by name, instead of in the name of the
plaintiff by the attorney, is amendable. Whitley v. Jacksrm,
34 Ga. App. 286, 129 S. E. 662.
§ 5700. (§ 5125.) Clerical mistakes may be
amended,.
A clerical veriance in the name of the defendant as it ap-
pears in the petition and the process is curable by amend-
ment under this section. Grand Lodge Knights of Pythias
v. Massey, 35 Ga. App. 140, 132 S. F- 270.
CHAPTER 3
Of Continuances
§ 5710. (§ 5126.) But one continuance at com-
mon law.
Editor's Note and General Consideration.—The discre-
tion in refusing a continuance was held not to be abused
where a continuance had been granted at two previous
terms and for one day at the third term. Camp v. Lanier,
36 Ga. App. 54, 135 S, F- 224. See Yeates v. Yeates, 162 Ga.
153, 132 S. F. 768, where a third continuance was refused.
SIXTH TITLE
Of Evidence
CHAPTER 1
General Principles
§ 5732. (§ 5146.) How determined.
Number of Witnesses.—The ruling that it might amount
to reversible error, in charging the provisions of this sec-
tion, to fail to include in the charge the provision that "the
jury may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
oreponderance is not necessary with the greater number, '
does not apply to a case where the number of witnesses on
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both sides are the same. Atlanta Gas-Light Co. v. Cook,
35 Ga. App. 622, 134 S. E. 198.
§ 5736. (§ 5150.) Estoppels.
II. ESTOPPEL BY RECORD.
Admission in Pleadings.—In Duke v. Ayers, 163 Ga. . 444,
453, 136 S. E- 410, the court said: "His answer was filed and
became a part of the record in the cause in which the judg-
ment issued. His admission of the non-payment of this judg-
ment was a solemn admission in judicio that the judgment
had not been paid. The court acted upon it and amended
the judgment as prayed. By such admission, made in
judicio, the plaintiff is estopped from asserting that he had
paid off this judgment at a date prior to the making of suon
admission."
III. ESTOPPED BY DEED.
Conclusiveness of Recital as to Consideration.—Ordinarily,
where the statement in a deed as to its consideration is
merely by way of recital, the actual consideration of the
deed is subject to explanation; but if the consideration is
referred to in the deed in such a way as to make it one of
the terms or conditions of the contract, it can not be varied
by parol. Sikes v. Sikes, 162 Ga. 302, 304, 133 S. E. 239.
§ 5737. (§ 5151.) Estoppel as to title to real
estate.
If estoppel by acts or false declarations can in any case
be the basis upon which to predicate the recovery of land,
it falls clearly within the provisions of this section. Groover
v. Simmons, 163 Ga. 778, 780, 137 S. E. 237.
§ 5739. (§ 5153.) Trustees estopped to claim
title adverse to estate.
Executors.—Where the plaintiff maintained a suit for
specific performance of the contract alleged, in which he
sought to have decreed in himself title to the entire prop-
erty owned by his testatrix at the time of her death, and
devised by her and given to the executor (plaintiff) and
other beneficiaries, it was held that he was estopped on the
ground that he had had the will probated and qualified as
executor, and continued in the office of executor for two
years, during which time he had discharged the duties of
his office and had paid out large sums of money; this con-
duct being inconsistent with his claim of title to the entire
estate of his testatrix. Hardeman v. Ellis, 162 Ga. 664, 135
S. E. 195.
Trustee of Corporations.—The principles of this section
apply to a trustee holding choses in action for a corporation.
Caswell v. Vanderbilt, 35 Ga. App. 34, 132 S. E. 123.
§ 5740. (§ 5154.) Prima facie presumptions.
Insanity shown once to have existed is, in the absence ol
proof to the contrary, presumed to continue. Stanfield v.
Hursey, 36 Ga. App. 394, 136 S. E. 826.
§ 5743. (§ 5157.) Jury right to infer, what.
Cited in Yellow Cab Co. v. Nelson, 35 Ga. App. 694, 696,
134 S. E. 822.
CHAPTER 2
Of Rules Governing the Admission of Testimony
ARTICLE 1
General Rules
§ 5744. (§ 5158.) Must be relevant.
Editor's Note.—If the evidence offered by a party is of
doubtful relevancy, it should nevertheless be admitted and
its weight left to the jury. Even where irrelevant evidence
is admitted over timely objection, it affords no cause for a
new trial, unless the nature of the evidence is such as rea-
sonably to prejudice the rights of the objecting party. Con-
tinental Trust Co. v. Bank, 36 Ga. App. 149, 136 S. E. 319.
§ 5745. (§ 5159.) Character and conduct of
parties.
Applied in Swinney v. Wright, 35 Ga. App. 45, 48, 132 S.
E- 228.
§ 5746. (§ 5160.) Burden of proof.
The burden of proof of the lack of consideration to a con-
tract falls upon the party asserting the defense. Bankers
Trust v. Hanover Nat. Bank, 35 Ga. App. 619, 134 S. E. 195.
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§ 5751. (§ 5165.) Positive and negative testi-
mony.
Credibility of Witnesses.—Carter v. State, 34 Ga. App.
230, 129 S. E. 10, following Ga. Code 1926.
Cited in Yeates v. Yeates, 162 Ga. 153, 132 S. E. 768.
§ 5754. (§ 5168.) Officer de facto.
Applied in Howell v. State, 162 Ga. 14, 134 S. E. 59 to
establish that deceased was a deputy sheriff.
Secondary evidence, when§ 5759. (§ 5172.)
admitted.
Accessibility or Diligence.—Beall v. Francis, 163 Ga. 894,
137 S. E. 251, applying principle announced in Ga. Code 1926.
Certified Copy of Marriage Contract.—It appearing from
the record that both parties to an alleged marriage con-
tract were dead, and that it could not be found among their
papers the court did not err in admitting, as secondary evi-
dence of the contents of such paper, certified copy of a
record in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the
county in which the maker of the instrument died. Beall v.
Francis, 163 Ga. 894, 137 S. E. 251.
ARTICLE 2
Of Hearsay
§ 5763. (§ 5176.) Sometimes original evidence.
A memorandum found on the person of deceased was held
admissible on trial for murder, as original evidence under
this section. Etheridge v. State, 163 Ga. 186, 199, 136 S. E- 72.
Applied in Davis v. Farmer's Bank, 36 Ga. App. 415, 422,
136 S. E. 816; Alvation Mercantile Co. v. Caldwell, 34 Ga.
App. 151, 128 S. E. 781.
§ 5767. (§ 5180.) Declarations of persons in
possession.
Applied in Crider v. Woodward, 162 Ga. 743, 755, 135 S. E-
95.
§ 5769. (§ 5182.) Books of account.
Order of Proof.—No foundation for their admission hav-
ing been laid as required by this section the court did- not
err in refusing to admit in evidence certain pages from the
defendants' ledger. Kennedy v. Phillips, 34 Ga. App. 166,
128 S. E. 779.
Testimony of witness on for-§ 5773. (§ 5186.)
mer trial.
Inaccessibility. — Allen v» Davis, 34 Ga. App. 5, 128
S. E- 74, applying principle stated in Ga. Code, 1926.
ARTICLE 3
Of Admissions and Confessions
§ 5775. (§ 5188.) Admissions in pleadings, how
far evidence.
Pleadings Stricken or Withdrawn.—Where a part of a
petition or of a plea is stricken by amendment, the stricken
part may, if pertinent to any issue remaining in the case,
be offered in evidence; but, unless so offered and admitted
; n evidence, it is not evidence for the consideration of the
jury or proper matter for argument of counsel, save only
where the amendment is made after the evidence is closed.
Lydia Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gibbs, 108 Ga. 138, 33 S.
E. 945; Alabama Mid. R. Co. v. Guilford, 114 Ga. 627, 40
S. E. 794. A different rule is applicable to parts of plead-
ings that are not stricken. Continental Trust Co. v. Bank,
36 Ga. App. 149, 136 S'. E. 319.
§ 5776. (§ 5189.) Parties to record.
Admissions of Executors, etc.—On the investigation of an
issue of devisavit vel non, the admission of an ex-
ecutor before qualification, or of a legatee, unless tne
sole legatee, shall not be admissible in evidence to impeach
the will. To this general rule there is an exception: If
the admission be in reference to the conduct or the acts of
the executor or legatee himself as to some matter relevant
to the issue on trial, the same will be admitted to impeach
the will, although made by the executor before qualifica-
tion, or by a legatee who is not the sole legatee. Brown v'.
Kendrick, 163 Ga. 149, 135 S. E. 721.
Same—Before Execution of Will.—Declarations made uy
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a person before the execution of a will, but who is after-
wards named therein as executor and a legatee, are inad-
missible to impeach the will as those of an executor and
legatee. Brown v. Kendrick, 163 Ga. 149, 135 S. E. 721.
Declarations or admissions of the propounder of a will,
made before the execution of the instrument and before he
became clothed with the trust, are inadmissible to impeach
the will when offered by caveators as the declarations or
admissions of a party to the record. Brown v. Kendrick,
163 Ga. 149, 135 S. E. 721.
Declarations as to Title.—In the trial of a claim case dec-
larations of a defendant in execution, made after the pen-
dency of litigation and prior to the time of levy, but at a
time when she was not in possession of the property levied
on, that she owned such property, are not admissible as
evidence and of no probative value even if admitted with-
out objection. Nelson v. Brannon, 32 Ga. App. 455, 123 S.
E. 735 and citations. McSwain v. Estroff, 34 Ga. App. 183.
129 S. E. 16.
§ 5781. (§ 5194.) Admissions improperly ob-
tained.
Applied in Duncan v. Bailey, 162 Ga. 457, 134 S. E- 87,
to reject admission made with view of compromise.
§ 5785. (§ 5189.) Confidential communications,
etc.
Communications Overheard Admissible. — Confidential
communications between the husband and wife overheard by
a third person are not excluded under this clause of this
section. Sims v. State, 36 Ga. App. 266, 136 S. E- 460.
Terms of Attorney's Contract.—The terms of an attoi -
ney's contract do not come within the privilege provided by
this section. Bank v. Farmers State Bank, 161 Ga. 801,
816, 132 S. E. 221.
ARTICLE 4
Of Parol Evidence to Affect Written.
§ 5788. (§ 5201.) General rule.
Subsequent Agreement.—The rule of this section is not
violated by proof of a new and distinct subsequent agree-
ment in the nature of a novation. Wimberly v. Tannei,
34 Ga. App. 313, 129 S. E. 306.
§ 5790. (§ 5203.) Void instruments.
Contract to Evade Usury, Penalty or Forfeiture.—It is
always permissible to show by parol evidence that a paper
is but a cover for usury, penalty, forfeiture, or other illegal
advantage to one of the parties. For if the law did not
sedulously disregard form and seek for substance, nothing
would be easier than its evasion by giving innocent names
to prohibited acts. Flood v. Empire Invest. Co.. 35 Ga.
App. 266, 270, 133 S. E. 60.
§ 5794. (§ 5207.) Other cases.
Subsequent Agreement.—See note to sec. 5788. The new
agreement contemplated by this section must be based upon
a valuable consideration and embody the essentials of a
new contract. Guthrie v. Rowan, 34 Ga. App. 671, 131 S.
E. 93.
CHAPTER 3
Of Records and Other Written Evidence
ARTICLE 1
Of Records and Public Documents
§ 5821. (§ 5234.) Effect of judgment on party
vouched into court.
Use of Former Judgment Where Party Was Vouched.—
There is no error in introducing a judgment against a
vendee of a stolen car, taking the car away from the vendee,
in an action by the vendee against the vendor for the pur-
chase money, where the vendee gave the vendor notice of
the former suit and the vendor failed to defend. Barrett v.
Miller, 36 Ga. App. 48, 135 S. E. HI.
ARTICLE 2
Of Private Writings
§ 5833. (§ 5244.) Subscribing witness, excep-
jection is only collaterally material, it falls within this ex-
ception. Chance v. Chance, 163 Ga. 267, 135 S. E- 923.
§ 5834. (§ 5245.) Other proof.
Circumstantial Evidence.—The existence and genuineness
of a deed may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
Campbell v. Sims, 161 Ga. 517, 131 S. E. 483.
§ 5836. (§ 5247.) Comparison of hands.
Signatures.—The jury may render a verdict establishing
*he genuineness of an instrument from a comparison be-
tween the disputed signature and other signatures of the
defendant which are admittedly genuine, and from evidence
that the disputed signature "favors," "looks very mucn
like," "bears a great resemblance to," and "is the same
kind of handwriting" as the admittedly genuine signatures.
Collins v. Glisson, 35 Ga. App. Ill, 132 S. E. 114.
CHAPTER 5
Of Oral Testimony
tions.
Bond for Title. -Where a bond for title admitted over ob-
ARTICLE 1
Of Witnesses, Their Attendance and Fees
§ 5849. (§ 5260.) Subpoena.
Appeal or New Trial—Letter as Notice.—Before the pre-
sumption of the receipt of a letter by the addressee arises,
so as to constitute a sufficient notice under this section
the evidence must affirmatively show that the letter was
written, properly addressed and stamped, and mailed. Row-
land v. State, 34 Ga. App. 689, 690, 131 S. E- 96.
§ 5852. (§ 5263.) Failure to attend.
Forcing Attendance and Punishment of Witnesses. —
Where a witness has been subpoenaed to attend the su-
perior court and fails to obey the precept, the court may,
under this section, proceed by attachment to compel the at-
tendance of such witness, and also to punish him by a fine
not exceeding three hundred dollars. But in such a case
section 4849, par. 5 does not apply. Pullen v. Cleckler, 162
Ga. Ill, 132 S. E- 761. See' annotations to section 4849, par. 5.
ARTICLE 2
Of the Competency of Witnesses
§ 5856. (§ 5267.) Court decides competency.
Child of Tender Years.—Where, under the proof a child
of five years was not shown to possess sufficient intelligence
to understand the nature of an oath, or the penalty for its
violation, it was held that the court erred in permitting
the witness to testify. Edwards v. State, 162 Ga. 204, 132
S. E. 893.
Applied in Goodson v. State, 162 Ga. 178, 132 S. E. 899.
§ 5858. (§ 5269.) Who are competent to tes-
tify.
Witness Present in Transaction.—The fact that evidence
oy a disinterested witness may have been adduced for the
plaintiff, a personal representative, in support of a transac-
tion between the deceased and defendant would not operate
to alter the general rule. Shippey v. Carpenter, 36 Ga.
App. 61, 135 S. E. 220.
But the defendant may impeach the testimony of the
plaintiff's witness by denying that such witness was
present when the agreement between the decedent and
himself was made. Shippey v. Carpenter, 36 Ga. App. 6±.
135 S. E- 220.
Grantor as Witness.—In an action of ejectment, the op-
posite party to the deceased grantee of a deed is incompe-
tent under this section to testify in her own behalf to con-
versations and transactions with such deceased person
affecting adversely the title conveyed by the deed. Sikes
v. Sikes, 162 Ga. 302, 303, 133 S. E. 239.
Party to Testamentary Contract. — Where a nephew and
uncle contracted such that the property passing to the
uncle's wife should become the nephew's upon her death,
the nephew is not a competent witness as to the contract
in an action of specific performance by the nephew against
the wife to enforce the contract. Hardeman v. Ellis, 162
Ga. 664, 667, 135 S. E- 195.
Actions to Recover Purchase Price of Partnership. — On
the trial of an action to recover from a partnership a sum
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paid by the plaintiff on the purchase-price of the partner-
ship business, the death of a member of the firm did not
render inadmissible as evidence for the plaintiff a letter
addressed to the firm by the plaintiff, in the lifetime of that
member, stating that the latter told him that the firm would
return the money. Saunders v. Hudson, 34 Ga. App. 7St,
131 S. E. 115.
Testimony of Interpleader Competent When Representa-
tive Does Not Object.—On the trial of an action instituted
by an administrator praying for direction by the court in
the distribution of the estate of his decedent, testimony
by one of the interpleading claimants, tending to show an
executed contract in parol under which she was entitled to
the estate, was not subject to exclusion on the objection
of the other interpleaders (the administrator not objecting)
upon the ground that the witness was incompetent to give
such testimony, because it was as to transactions or com-
munications with the decedent whose administrator was a
party. The administrator was not seeking a recovery, and
was not interested in the result save as a stakeholder or a
third party entitled to maintain a petition for interpleadei
.
Cooper v. Reeves, 161 Ga. 232, 131 S. E. 63.
Witness Testifying against Interests.—Where the wit-
ness is not a party to the suit, and is not testifying in his
own interest, but is testifying against his interest, he
does not fall within the inhibition of this paragraph of this
section. Chance v. Chance, 163 Ga. 267, 135 S. E. 923.
Alleged Agent of Defendant, Witness against Adminis-
trator.—That a husband was present and looking after thi
transaction when his wife executed a deed of conveyance
did not raise the implication, as matter of law, that he was
her agent, and did not disqualify him as a witness on the
trial of a suit defended by her, in which the administrators
of the deceased grantee in the deed were plaintiffs; it not
otherwise appearing that he was her agent, or that he
looked after the transaction on her behalf, or that he had a
legal or pecuniary interest in the result of the suit. Sikes
v. Sikes, 162 Ga. 302, 133 S. E. 239.
Applied as to transactions, in Campbell v. Sims, 161 Ga.
517, 520, 131 S. E- 483; as to transferee, in Campbell v.
Sims, 161 Ga. 517, 520, 131 S. E- 483.
§ 5862. (§ 5273.) Idiots, etc.
Evidence Admitted Erroneously.—When an examination by
the court shows that the child has no such knowledge it
is error to permit the child to testify over proper objection.
Horton v. State. 35 Ga. App. 493, 133 S. E. 647.
ARTICLE 3
Of the Examination of Witnesses
§ 5869. (§ 5280.) Separate examination.
Liberal Construction.—In administering the rule of this
section, the judge is invested with a broad discretion which
is to be liberally construed, and the exercise of this dis-
cretion will not be controlled or overruled except in case of
an abuse of discretion. Under the circumstances disclosed
by the record in this case we can not hold that the trial
judge abused his discretion, and that the exclusion of the
witness in the circumstances stated would require the grant
of a new trial. Groover v. Simmons, 161 Ga. 93, 129 S. E-
778.
§ 5874. (§ 5285.) Opinions of witness.
Opinion—Facts upon Which Conclusion Based. — On the
trial of an issue as to general mental incapacity to make a
will, a subscribing witness to the paper propounded as a
will may give in evidence his opinion as to whether the
testator at the time of executing the paper appeared "to
have sense enough to know who his children were," with
or without stating any other facts on which his opinion was
based. Dyar v. Dyar, 161 Ga. 615, 131 S. E. 535.
The opinion of a witness may be given in evidence as to
the insolvency of a party, provided it is accompanied by
the facts upon which the opinion is founded. Bennett v.
American Bank, etc., Co., 162 Ga. 718, 729, 134 S. E. 781.
The court properly rejected the testimony of an affiant,
that as the result of years of study, observation, and ex-
perience, he was firmly convinced that the Masonic Order
in America is purely an altruistic, charitable institution,
and that the practice of charity is the real excuse for
its existence. The question was not one of opinion; and
if it had been, such testimony was a mere opinion and con-
clusions oi the witness, who was not shown to be an ex-
pert, without the facts upon which such opinion and conclu-
sion was based. Atlanta Masonic Temple Co. v. Atlanta.
162 Ga. 244, 133 S. E. 864.
Same—Specific Instances of Question of Opinion. — The
question as to whether the car furnished could and did af-
ford proper refrigeration between the points of shipment,
when re-iced at regularly established icing stations, was
held one of opinion. Central, etc., R. Co. v. Evans, 35 Ga.
App. 438, 143 S. E. 122.
Cited in Humphreys v. State, 35 Ga. App. 386, 133 S. E-
518.
§ 5875. (§ 5286.) Market value, how proved.
The jury are not bound by the opinion of experts as to
value. Black v. Automatic Sprinkler Co., 35 Ga. App. 8.
131 S. E- 543. »
Specific Applications.—Testimony as to the value of serv-
ices rendered is in the nature of opinion evidence. Western,
etc., Railroad v. Townsend, 36 Ga. App. 70, 72, 135 S. E. 439.
Applied in Blaylock v. Walker County Bank, 36 Ga. App.
377. 136 S. E. 924.
ARTICLE 4
Impeachment of Witnesses
§ 5879. (§ 5290.) Impeaching own witness.
Examination of Opposite Party.—An opposite party may-
be cross-examined without entitling counsel for any oppo-
site party or parties, as a matter of absolute right, to cross-
examine the witness. Scarborough v. Walton, 36 Ga. Ap^.
428, 136 S. E. 830.
§ 5881. (§ 5292.) By contradictory statements.
Sufficiency of Previous Statement.—A previous statement
made by a witness, to be impeaching, must refer to matters
relevant to his testimony and to the case, and must con-
tradict some matter testified to by • him. Otherwise, the
attempt to impeach will be unsuccessful. Tanner v. State,
163 Ga. 121, 129, 135 S. E- 917.
§ 5883. (§ 5294.) Credibility of witnesses.
Applied in United States Fidelity Co. v. Hall, 34 Ga. App.
307, 129 S. E. 305.
§ 5884. (§ 5295.) What credit to impeached
witness.
Section Analyzed with Respect to Contradictions. — The
phrase "successfully contradicted" applies where a witness
has not been really impeached, but only where there has
been an effort to impeach. In the next sentence of the sec-
tion there is a provision applicable to a witness who has
been really impeached, or "successfully" impeached. It will
be observed that the language employed in this last referred
sentence fits exactly the definition of perjury. The con-
clusion, therefore, is that when one has been guilty of per-
jury, he should not be believed, unless corroborated. The
last sentence applies where the circumstances do not prove
the witness guilty of perjury. Reed v. State, 163 Ga. 206,
218, 135 S. E. 748.
Same—Use of "Successfully Impeached."—The expression
"successfully impeached" is inappropriate because it is con-
fusing to use it in place of the words "successfully contra-
dicted," as used in this section. Reed v. State, 163 Ga. 206,
218. 135 S. E. 748.
CHAPTER 6
Of Interrogatories and Depositions
ARTICLE l
Commissions, How Issued and Returned
§ 5886. (§ 5297.) Who may be examined on
interrogatories.
See annotations to § 5910.
ARTICLE 5
Evidence before Court Commissioner
§ 5910. (§ 5315.) Depositions taken without
order or commission.
Effect of Refusal to Testify.—A» party to a pending action
who is a competent and compellable witness served with
proper notice for the taking of his depositions, but refuses
to answer proper questions upon the sole ground that he
does not come within any of the classes specified in section
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5886, is guilty of contempt. Stephens v. Liquid Carbonic
Co., 36 Ga. App. 363, 136 S. E. 808.
SEVENTH TITLE
The Verdict and Judgment
CHAPTER l
Verdict and Judgment
ARTICLE 1
Of the Verdict and Its Reception
§ 5926. (§ 5331.) Direct verdict, when.
Testing Propriety of Directing Verdict.—Where, under all
the circumstances, only one conclusion is reasonably possible,
the question ceases to be issuable as one of fact and be-
comes a question of law. Southern Pacific Co. v. DiCristina,
36 Ga. App. 433, 439, 137 S. E. 79.
Converse of Section.—Where there is conflicting evidence
as to material issues, it is error for the court to direct a
verdict. Bailey v. First Nat. Bank, 34 Ga. App. 454, 129 S.
E- 920.
Refusal to Direct Always Proper. — Roberts v. Groover,
161 Ga. 414, 131 S. E. 158.
In proceedings to probate a will, upon a caveat for mental
incapacity, where the evidence did not support such in-
capacity, directing verdict for the propounder was held not
erroneous. Mason v. Taylor, 162 Ga. 149, 152, 132 S. E- 89^.
Applied in Taylor v. Mentone Hotel & Co., 163 Ga. 3J7.
361, 136 S. E- 137.
§ 5927. (§ 5332.) Construction of verdicts.
Amount Where Verdict for Defendant.—A verdict in a
trover suit, which reads, "We, the jury, find the property
in dispute in favor of the defendant," will, at the instance
of the defenaant, be construed as a verdict finding for the
defendant for the value of the property in the amount
established by the plaintiff's affidavit for bail, which is
corroborated by the plaintiff's own personal testimony upon
the trial. This is true although the defendant may not,
prior to the rendition of the verdict, have elected to take a
verdict for the value of the property. Pound v. Baldwin, 34
Ga. App. 810, 131 S. E. 291.
A verdict is certain which can be made certain by what
itself contains or by the record. Smith v. Cooper, 161 Ga.
594, 595, 131 S. E. 478.
Verdict are to be construed in the light of the pleadings
and the evidence, and all that is essential to a valid verdict
is substantial certainty to a common and reasonable intent.
It appearing from the pleadings and evidence in the record
in this case that the validity of two deeds was involved,
both relating to a single transaction, the court did not err
in construing the finding of the jury finding "the deed'
invalid as a reference to both deeds involved in the common
issue. Short v. Cofer, 161 Ga. 587, 131 S. E. 362.
§ 5930. (§ 5335.) Plaintiff may choose verdict.
Section Construed with Section 4494. — The plaintiff does
not have the option given to him under this section, "if the
defendant at the first term will tender the property to the
plaintiff, together with reasonable hire for the same since
the conversion, disclaiming all claim of title." In such a
case the plaintiff is limited to a recovery of the property
under the tender; and is chargeable with the cost, unless
it be shown that a previous demand for the property had
been made and refused. Downs Motor Co. v. Colbert, 34 Ga.
App. 542, 130 S. E. 592.
Effect of Election upon Issue.—The sole issue in the trial
of an action of trover is that of title to the property m dis-
pute; and the fact that the plaintiff may elect to take a
money verdict under this section in lieu of the specific per-
sonalty claimed can in no event alter that issue. Citizens
Bank v. Mullis, 161 Ga. 371, 131 S. E. 44.
§ 5933. (§ 5338.) Juries may sustain verdict.
Applied in Anderson v. Howard, 34 Ga. App. 292, 297
S. E- 567.
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ARTICLE 5
How Attacked, and Herein of Motion in Arrest
of Judgment
§ 5960. (§ 5365.) Amendable defects, no
ground to arrest.
Applied to a distress warrant containing amendable defects.
Johnson v. Lock, 36 Ga. App. 620, 621, 137 S. E. 911.
Cited or applied in Hudson v. Cohen. 34 Ga. App. 119, 12b
S. E. 205.
Applied in Henderson v. EUarbee, 35 Ga. App. 5, 6, 131 S.
E. 524.
§ 5961. (§ 5366.) Judgments obtained by per-
jury will be set aside.
Subsequent Statement of Witness as to Falsity of Evi-
dence.—The fact that a witness for the state in a criminal
case, though he be the only witness for the prosecution, has
made declarations, since the trial, that this testimony g.ven
upon the trial was false, is not cause for a new trial. Mor-
row v. State, 36 Ga. App. 217, 136 S. E. 92.
§ 5964. (§ 5369.) Judgments, when void.
Setting Aside by Justice.—A justice of the peace has no-
authority to set aside a judgment rendered by him; the
subsequent entering of a second judgment purporting to set
aside the first mentioned judgment, was itself void and
should be treated as a nullity under this section. Edwards
v. Edwards, 163 Ga. 825, 137 S. E- 244.
Orders.—Where the judge's order shows on its face a
cotal lack of jurisdiction, the judgment is wholly void, anu
may, under this section, be attacked collaterally. Rogers v.
Toccoa Power Co.,' 161 Ga. 524, 528, 131 S. E. 517.
§ 5965. (§ 5370.) Equity may set aside judg-
ment.
Applied in Ehrlick v. Bell, 163 Ga. 547, 136 S. E. 423.
§ 5968(1). Jurisdiction to set aside judgment
on secured debt.—When a judgment shall be ren-
dered upon any obligation secured by a deed to
secure debt, a bond for title to realty, or a bill of
sale to personality, given under section 3306 of
the Civil Code, the court which rendered such
judgment, or the judge thereof in vacation, shall
have jurisdiction, power, and authority to vacate
and set aside said judgment at any time before
the sale of the property described in the deed,
bond for title, or bill of sale is made, upon mo-
tion of the attorney of the plaintiff and defendant
in fi. fa., and the pa}^ment of the costs. Acts
1927, p. 221.
§ 5968(2). Cancellation of fi. fa.—Whenever a
judgment shall be so vacated and set aside, the
clerk of the court in which it was rendered shall
mark the fi. fa. issued thereon cancelled and the
clerk of the Superior Court shall enter the same
upon the general execution docket, and make
thereon an appropriate reference to the order va-
cating the judgment. Whenever a judgment
shall as herein provided be vacated and set aside,
any deed reconveying the property to the defend-
ant in fi. fa. for the purpose of levy and sale shall
be, by virtue of the provisions hereof, automati-
cally cancelled and rendered null and void, and
the clerk of the Superior Court shall enter on the
record of such deed or reconveyance, when re-
corded, the word "cancelled," and make appro-
priate reference to the order vacating the judg-
ment.
§ 5968(3). Original status restored.—When a
judgment shall be vacated and set aside as here-
in provided, the obligation upon which the same
was rendered, as well as the deed, bond for title,
or bill of sale securing the same, shall be fully
restored in all respects to the original status of
the same which existed prior to the commence-
ment of the suit in which such iudgment was ren-
dered, and thereafter the same shall be for all
purposes whatsoever legally of force and effect as
if suit had not been instituted and judgment ob-
tained on the said obligation.
§ 5968(4). Applicable to mortgage foreclosure.
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—The jurisdiction, power, and authority to va-
cate and set aside a judgment, as hereinbefore
provided, shall extend to a judgment on pur-
chase-money note, conditional sale contract
where title is reserved as security, or bond for
title is given, and all other cases where it is nec-
essary under section 6037 of the Civil Code to re-
convey property to the defendant in fi. fa. for the
purpose of levy and sale. The provisions of this
Act shall also extend and be applicable in all re-
spects to a judgment and decree foreclosing a
mortgage.
EIGHTH TITLE
Costs in Civil Cases
CHAPTER l
Of Costs in Civil Cases
§ 5989(3). In counties containing cities of
more than 175,000 population.—One official court
reporter for each of the several divisions of the
superior and city courts in counties of this State
containing a city of more than 175,000 popula-
tion, according to the Federal census of 1920,
shall be paid out of the treasury of such county a
salary to be fixed by the commissioners of roads
and revenues of such county, not to exceed forty-
two hundred dollars per annum, payable monthly,
which salary shall be compensation in full for at-
tendance upon, and taking stenographic notes in,
any court or division thereof covered by this Act.
Acts 1923, p. 104; 1925, p. 164; 1927, p. 216.
Editor's Note.—The maximum salary to be paid to a court
reporter under this section was raised from three thousand
dollars to forty-two hundred dollars, by the amendment of
1927.
CHAPTER 3
Abolition of Fee System in Certain Counties
ARTICLE 1
Counties of 200,000 or More Population
§ 6017(1). County officers to receive salaries
instead of fees.
Cited in Georgia-Carolina L,umber Co. v. Wright, 161 Ga.
281, 285, 131 S. E. 173.
§ 6017(6). Commissions for collection of cor-
poration, occupation and other special taxes re-
turnable to state. — Provided however, commis-
sions now or hereafter allowed by law for the col-
lection of corporation, occupation and other special
taxes shall be collected by the officers aforesaid
for the use of the State and held as public moneys
belonging to the state and shall be remitted by
the officer collecting the same to the State in the
same manner and at the same time the taxes are
remitted, and none of said commissions shall be
turned into the county treasury. The provisions
of this section shall not apply to counties having
a population of not less than ninety thousand
(90,000) nor more than one hundred and fifty
thousand (150,000) inhabitants. Acts 1925, pp.
159, 160; 1927, p. 208.
Ed'tor's Note.—The last sentence of the section was added
by the amendment of 1927.
§ 6017(7). County officers to receive salaries
instead of fees; exception.—This Act shall apply
to all counties in the State of Georgia having by
the United States census of 1920 a population of
forty-four thousand to sixty thousand inhabitants
and to all counties in the State of Georgia having
by the United States census of 1920 a population
of seventy thousand to one hundred and fifty
thousand inhabitants and to all counties in the
State which may by any future census of the
United States have a population of seventy thou-
sand to one hundred and fifty thousand inhabi-
tants except as hereinafter provided. In all such
counties the fee system for compensating the offi-
cers herein named shall be abolished except those
fees that are paid by the State to the Tax Collec-
tor and Tax Receiver and the officers herein
named shall thereafter be paid salaries as herein
provided instead of fees as under the present
system except for the fees to be paid by the State
as will be hereinafter provided. Acts 1924, p. 90;
1925, p. 161; 1927, p. 207.
Editor's Note.—The phrase "except as hereinafter pro-
vided" at the end of the first sentence, was inserted by the
amendment of 1927.
§ 6017(8). Salaries to be fixed annually 90
days before January 1.—The salaries, in all such
counties as are described in Section 6017(7), of
the Clerk of the Superior Court, (whether he be
ex officio clerk of other courts or not) the Sher-
iff, the Ordinary, the Tax Collector, and the Tax
Receiver, shall be fixed for the terms of such offi-
cers, at least ninety days before the first of Jan-
uary, (beginning with January, 1926), by the
Commissioners of Roads and Revenues, if there
be such, (whether the bodv shall consist of one
or several commissioners) or, in event that there
are no such Commissioners, the Ordinary or
other County authorities having charge of the
Roads and Revenues of such counties and such
salaries shall be fixed for each term, at the time
aforesaid, and shall not be changed during said
terms. Provided that in counties having a popu-
lation of not less than ninety thousand (90,000)
nor more than one hundred and fifty thousand
(150,000) by the census of the United States,
the clerk of the Superior Court shall be paid a
salary of nine thousand ($9,000.00) dollars per
annum; the sheriff a salary of seven thousand
($7,000.00) dollars per annum; the ordinary a sal-
ary of six thousand, five hundred ($6,500.00) dol-
lars per annum; the tax-collector a salary of one
thousand ($1,000.00) dollars per annum for serv-
ices collecting the county taxes; the tax-receiver
a salary of three thousand, five hundred ($3,500.00.)
dollars per annum for receiving the returns
for county taxes; each of said salaries to be paid
in equal monthly installments. Provided that
nothing herein shall affect any fees or compensa-
tion that are now allowed b}' law to the said tax-
collector by the State of Georgia or that may be
fixed or allowed hereafter by law, it being the in-
tent of this proviso that the fees and compensa-
tion which said tax-collector receives from the
State shall not be abrogated and shall not be con-
sidered as any part of the salary he receives from
the County of Chatham. Acts 1924, p. 90; 1927,
p. 208.
Editor's Note.—Both of the provisos to this section were
added by the amendment of 1927.
§ 6017(11). Payment of salaries, how made.
—After said salaries and expenses are so fixed
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and determined, as provided in §§ 6017(8), 6017(9)
and 6017(10), it shall be proper and lawful for the
treasurer of the county, or other custodian or de-
pository of county funds, out of the county funds
which may be paid into the county treasury of
such county and derived under the provisions of
§ 6017(13) on or before the fifteenth day of each
month, to pay out the monthly portion of such
salaries and expenses to each officer herein named,
who shall retain his own salary, and disburse the
salaries of assistants and deputies and expenses
of the office. Provided, however, that it may be
lawful for the Treasurer of the County, or other
custodian or depository of County funds, to an-
ticipate the payment into the County Treasury
of funds derived under the provisions of § 6017(13)
and to pay out of County funds the monthly por-
tion of such salaries and expenses to each officer
herein named, as herein above provided. Such
disbursement shall be made in accordance with the
provisions of any local or special Act of any county
affected by the provision of this Act, regulating the
methods of disbursements of other county funds.
Provided, that as relates to counties having a pop-
ulation of not less than ninety thousand (90,000)
nor more than one hundred and fifty thousand
(150,000) inhabitants, the words and figures, "as
provided in §§ 6017(8), 6017(9) and 6017(10)" as
used in this section shall not apply. Acts 1924, pp.
90, 92; 1925, p. 162; 1927, p. 209.
Editor's Note,—The last proviso was added by the amend-
ment of 1927.
ARTICLE 2
Of Fi. Fas., How Levied, and Proceedings
Thereon
§ 6026. (§ 5421.) Form of levy.
Cited in Wiley v. Martin, 163 Ga. 381, 136 S. E- 151.
§ 6028. (§ 5423.) On what property first
levied, right of.
Section Not Applicable to Tax Execution.—This section
does not apply to tax sales. McDaniel v. Thomas, 162 Ga.
592, 133 S. E. 624.
Effect Where Defendant Not Allowed to Point out Prop-
erty—Notice to Surety.—It is not a ground of illegality that
the defendant surety was not notified of the impending levy
and was given no opportunity to point out property either
in his possession or in the possession of one of the principals
in the judgment. Mulling v. Bank, 36 Ga. App. 55, 135 S. E-
222.
§ 6029. (§ 5424.) Sale of separate parcels
subject to lien.
To What Liens Applicable.—Applied to the enforcement
of a tax lien. Columbia Trust, etc., Co. v. Alston, 163 Ga.
83, 135 S. E. 431.
§ 6030. (§ 5425.) Growing crop to be sold,
how.
Stage of Maturity When Subject to Levy.—As to crops,
such as cotton, which do not mature on the stalk at one time,
but whose maturity is extended throughout the latter portion
of the growing season, the rational construction of this sec-
tion would be, that 'the crop is subject to levy, whenever it
has reached that stage of maturity when it is ready fo
harvesting to commence. Barnesville Bank v. Ingram, 34
Ga. App. 369, 129 S. E. 112.
§ 6031. (§ 5426.) Notice of levy on land.
Cited in Wiley v. Martin, 163 Ga. 381, 384, 136 S. E. 151.
§ 6032. (§ 5427.) Setting aside execution
sale.
Applied in Davis v. Elliott, 163 Ga. 169, 175, 135 S. E- 731.
Cited in Wiley v. Martin, 163 Ga. 381, 136 S. E. 151.
ARTICLE 3
Levy and Sale Where Defendant Has not Legal
Title
§ 6037. (§ 5432.) Levy, when contract of
purchase or bond for title made.
I. EDITOR'S NOTE AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
Applied in Corley v. Jarrell, 36 Ga. App. 225, 136 S. E. 17/.
VI. FILING AND RECORDING.
Necessity for Filing and Recording Deed'—Proper Person
to Execute Deed.—Under this section, the "holder of the
legal title," and not the original vendor, is the proper per-
son to execute the quitclaim deed under the fi. fa. If a note
only is transferred and no deed is made conveying the legal
title to the land as security, then it is necessary, after the
transferee has obtained judgment, that the vendor execute a
quitclaim deed to the purchaser before the fi. fa. could have
been levied, because in that event the vendor would have
continued to be the holder of the legal title. Swinson v.
Shurling, 162 Ga. 604, 134 S. E. 613.
VII. LEVY AND SALE.
General Considerations.—Under this section, the holder
of a debt and of the legal title of land conveyed to him as
security by the debtor, may, upon default in payment, re-
duce the debt to judgment, place of record a quitclaim re-
investing the debtor with the legal title to the land, and
thereupon have the land levied on and sold in satisfaction
of the judgment, free from the claims of persons who pur-
chased the land from the debtor subject to the security
deed. Scott v. Paisley, 271 U. S. 632, 46 S. Ct. 591 affirming
S. C. 158 Ga. 876, 124 S. E. 726.
Notice.—There is no principle entitling such purchasers
to notice of the exercise of this statutory power by the
creditor, and that in failing to provide such notice the
statute does not deprive them of property without due proc-
ess of law or deny them the equal protection of the laws.
Scott v. Paisley, supra.
§ 6038. (§ 5433.) Where another than vendor,
etc., has judgment.
In General—Scope—Applies to Stranger to Security Deed.—
Where it appears that a conveyance of title to the property
levied on, made by the defendant in execution to a stranger
prior to the levy, would, if valid, operate, under the section
to deprive the defendant in execution of any leviable interest
in the property, the plaintiff in execution may, in the same
action, for the purpose of subjecting the property to the
execution, attack the conveyance upon the ground of fraud.
This case is distinguishable from Sloan v. Ldit'is, 157 Ga.
93, 120 S. E- 781, in which it appears conclusively, as a
matter of law, that the legal title was in the claimant, and
that the only interest the defendant in execution had ever
had in the property levied upon was as a purchaser holding
under a bond for title. Remington v. Garrett, 34 Ga. App. 715,.
130 S. E. 831.
No Levy Until Note Paid.—See Miller v. First Nat. Bank,
35 Ga. App. 334, 132 S. E- 783, holding the same as the
paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Cited in Duke v. Ayers, 163 Ga. 444, 454, 136 S. E. 410.
CHAPTER 2
Of Forthcoming Bonds
§ 6042. (§ 5437.) Rights of plaintiffs not af-
fected.
Section quoted in Garmany v. Loach, 34 Ga. App. 722, 131
S. E. 108.
CHAPTER 6
Of Sales under Execution
ARTICLE 1
When and Where Made
§ 6060. (§ 5455.) Place, time, and manner of
sales.
Not Applicable to Parties under Contract to Deliver.
—
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The provisions of the section, relieving levying officers in
certain instances from removing heavy property to the
court-house door, were made for the benefit of the officers
and the parties to processes levied by them, and not for the
benefit of other persons who may voluntarily contract in
writing by a statutory bond to deliver such property at the
court-house door. See Scruggs v. Bennett, 34 Ga. App. 131,
132, 128 S. 32. 703, and cases there cited.
ARTICLE 3
Sale of Perishable Property
§ 6068. (§ 5463.) Sale of perishable property.
As to amount of recovery, see note under section 5153.
Liens.—For a case holding substantially with the case
under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926, see Cham-
bers v. Planters Bank, 161 Ga. 535, 131 S. E. 280.
One Filing Intervention Charged with Notice of Applica-
tion for Short-Order Sale.—One who files an intervention
claiming title to a vehicle against which condemnation pro-
ceedings have been instituted for transporting prohibited
liquors along the public highways is chargeable with notice
of an application, already of file in the same court, for a
"short-order" sale of the property under the section. Parker
v. State, 36 Ga. App. 370, 136 S. E. 800.
§ 6069. (§ 5464.) How sold.
See note to preceding section under catchline "Liens."
Fd. Note.
TENTH TITLE
New Trials
CHAPTER l
By Whom and for What Causes Allowed
§ 6084. (§ 5479.) For erroneous charge to jury,
etc.
Section cited in May v. Yearty, 34 Ga. App. 29, 128 S. F.
67; Carr v. Hendrix, 34 Ga. App. 446, 129 S. F. 876.
§ 6085. (§ 5480.) On account of new evidence.
Facts Known by Summoned Witnesses Who Did Not
Testify.—Where witnesses summoned by the defendant are
present at me trial but are not examined, a new trial will
not be granted on the ground that since the verdict the de-
fendant has for the first time learned that they could have
testified to facts material to his defense. Rounsaville v.
State, 163 Ga. 391, 397, 136 S. F. 276; Hall v. State, 117 Ga.
263, 43 S. F. 718.
§ 6086. (§ 5481.) Rule in such cases.
Discretion of Trial Judge.—That it is no abuse of discre-
tion to refuse a new trial when the proper affidavits sup-
porting witnesses are absent is reaffirmed in Carpenter v.
State, 35 Ga. Aop. 349, 133 S. F- 350, and in Nelson v.
State, 35 Ga. App. 364, 133 S. F. 351.
Affidavits—In Support of Witnesses.—An affidavit in sup-
port of the witness upon whose newly discovered evidence
a new trial is sought must give the names of his associates,
a statement that he keeps good company not being suffi-
cient to meet this requirement, which is necessary to en-
able the prosecution to make a counter-showing; and
where such affidavit does not comply with this requirement,
the trial iudge does not abuse his discretion by refusing to
grant a new trial on this ground. Brice v. State, 34 Ga.
App. 240, 129 S. F- 665, citing Ivey v. State, 154 Ga. 63, 113
S. F. 175. See also, Carpenter v. State, 35 Ga. App. 34J,
133 S. F. 350; Wright v. State, 34 Ga. App. 505, 130 S. E.
216.
Rule of Industrial Commission.—Rule 26 of the industrial
commission follows this section, relating to newly discovered
evidence as a ground for a new trial. American Mutual
Liability Ins. Co. v. Hardy, 36 Ga. App. 487, 491, 137 S. F.
113.
Quoted in part in Hewett v. State, 36 Ga. App. 664, 137
S'. E. 853.
Applied in Shahan v. State, 36 Ga, App. 315, 136 S. F. 798.
§ 6092(1). Effect of failure to raise objections
before trial judge.
App'ied in City Nat. Bank v. Bridges, 34 Ga. App. 178,
128 S. E. 694.
§ 6093. (§ 5488.) Brief of evidence.
General Considerations.—The brief of evidence required
is a condensed and succinct brief of material portions of
oral testimony; the briefer the brief the better, provided
it includes the substance of all the material portions of the
evidence, oral and documentary. It is not dependent ex-
clusively upon the stenographic report. The use of tiit-
question and answer form in the brief, except in unusual
instances, is not permissible. Brown v. State, 163 Ga. 681,
137 S. E. 31.
What Constitutes Non-Compliance.—Where the document
purporting to be a brief of the evidence is made up ot
portions of the pleadings together with the captions of the
same and other documentary evidence copied without brief-
ing, and where many pages of the oral evidence are not
briefed but are set out as questions and answers, such a
paper will be held to constitute no compliance with the law.
Davis v Gray, 163 Ga. 271, 136 S. E. 81.
Same—Absence of Bona Fide Effort to County. — Wh re
chere had been no bona fide effort to comply with the re-
ouirement of this section, the court will not undertake to
determine any question the decision of which is dependent
upon a consideration of the so-called brief of evidence an-
nexed to the bill of exceptions. Clay v. Austell School Dist.,
36 Ga. App. 354, 136 S. E. 540.
ELEVENTH TITLE
Supreme Court
CHAPTER 1
The Supreme Court and Its Powers
§ 6103. (§ 5498.) Powers enumerated.
Cited in Gore v. Humphries, 163 Ga. 106, 115, 135 S. E-
481.
CHAPTER 2
Its Judges
§ 6116. Reversal and affirmance; number of
judges.
Applied as to affirmance by operation of law when the
justices are equally divided. Irby v. Allen & Co., 161 Ga.
858, 131 S. E. 910.
CHAPTER 4
What Causes May Be Taken to the Supreme
Court
§ 6138. (§ 5526.) Writ of error.
I. EDITOR'S NOTE.
For cases holding: substantially with the rule of the first
paragraph under this analysis line in the Georgia Code ot
1926, see American Agri. Chemical Co. v. Bank, 34 Ga.
App. 62, 128 S. E. 208; Brown v. Marbut- Williams Lumber
Co., 34 Ga. App. 348, 129 S. E. 575.
II. WHEN WRIT OF ERROR OR BILL OF EXCEP-
TIONS LIE.
A. Premature Jurisdiction Generally.
When Premature. — The direction of a verdict finding
against a plea of res adjudicata is not such a final judgment
as is subject to review by direct bill of exceptions. The
ruling may be excepted to by exceptions pendente lite, upon
which error may be assigned in a bill of exceptions contain-
ing an exception to a final judgment; but the error alleged
to have been committed can not be reviewed in the Supreme
Court until there has been a final judgment in the lower
court. Douglas v. Hardin, 163 Ga. 643, 136 S. E- 793.
C. Other Instances of Final Disposition.
Judgment on General Demurrer.—A judgment overruling
the general demurrer to a petition, is a final determinaticr.
of the case and would authorize the defendant to assign
error thereon in a direct bill of exceptions. Newton v. Rob-
erts, 163 Ga. 135, 135 S. E. 505.
Order for Making New Party.—An order for making a
new party is a final disposition of the cause as to such new
Darty if the trial court refuses to make him a party, and
consequently a writ of error sued out by him cannot oe
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(§ 5527.) Bills of exceptions; cross-
said to have been prematurely obtained. McMillan v.
Spencer, 162 Ga. 659, 134 S. E. 921.
Applied in Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Sarman, 36 Ga.
App. 448, 136 S. E- 920; Cooper v. Whitehead, 163 Ga. 662,
136 S. E 911.
§ 6139.
bills.
See annotation to section 6224.
III. CROSS-BILLS.
General Considerations.—Calhoun Oil, etc., Co. v. West-
ern, etc., Railroad, 35 Ga. App. 436, 133 S. E. 348, affirms
the holding of the second sentence under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926.
CHAPTER 5
Of Taking Cases to Supreme Court
ARTICLE l
Mode of Procedure
§ 6144. When motion for new trial, etc., not
necessary.
Cited in Home Ins. Co. v. Swann, 34 Ga. App. 19, 128 S.
E. 70.
§ 6147. (§ 5534.) Judge to examine certificate.
Section Will Not Prevent Dismissal of Improperly Certi-
fied Certificate.—The judge's certificate to the bill of ex-
ceptions must state that it is true; and for lack of such
certification the bill of exceptions will be dismissed. This
is not a mere "want of technical conformity to the statutes
or rules regulating the practice in carrying cases to" tne
Supreme Court; and this section will not prevent the dis-
missal of the bill of exceptions for the lack of such certifi-
cation. Cady v. Cady, 161 Ga. 556, 131 S. E. 282.
ARTICLE 2
Diminution of Record
§ 6149. (§ 5536.) Additional record, how pro-
cured.
What May Be Brought up.—For a case holding with the
principle set out under this catchline in the Georgia Code
of 1926, see Free Gift Lodge v. Edwards, 161 Ga. 832. 132 S.
E. 206.
Applied in Lewis v. Moultrie Banking Co., 36 Ga. App.
347, 351, 136 S. E. 554.
ARTICLE 3
Bills of Exceptions, When to Be Signed
§ 6152. (§ 5539.) Bill of exceptions, when to
be tendered.
General Considerations—Failure to Certify for More
than Thirty Days.—This section does not in any case au-
thorize delay in tendering a bill of exceptions for more
than thirty days after the final adjournment of the court
for that term. Birmingham Finance Co. v. Chisholm, 162
Ga. 501, 134 S. E- 301.
Delay or Extension of Time. — Cohen v. Brown, 35 Ga.
App. 508, 134 S. E. 119, affirms the holding given in the first
paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Burnett v. McDaniel & Co., 35 Ga. App. 367, 133 S. E. 268,
holds substantially the same as the second paragraph under
this catchline in the Georgia Code of 1926.
Same—Supersedeas Does Not Extend.—The fact that the
order of the superior court to which exception is taken pro-
vides that it shall operate as a supersedeas for twenty
days relate* merely to the enforcement of the judgment
Dending a valid writ of error, and did not have the effect of
changing the date of the order excepted to, or of extending
the time prescribed by law within which an appeal could e
taken. Cohen v. Brown, 35 Ga. App. 508, 134 S. E. 119.
Applied in Parrish v. Central, etc., R. Co., 36 Ga. App.
133, 135 S. E. 762; Forrester v. Frizzell, 35 Ga. App. 562.
134 S. E. 182; Hamilton v. Kinnebrew, 161 Ga. 495, 131 S.
E. 470; McDonald v. Dabney, 161 Ga. 711, 132 S. E. 547.
Cited in Miller & Co. v. Gibbs, 161 Ga. 698, 699, 132 S. E-
626.
§ 6153. (§ 5540.) Fast bills of exception.
Cited in Miller & Co. v. Gibbs, 161 Ga. 698, 132 S. E. 626.
§ 6154. (§ 5541.) Exceptions pendente lite.
Applied to cross bill of exceptions to review interlocutory
hearings to which no exception was filed within time pre-
scribed. Miller & Co. v. Gibbs, 161 Ga. 698, 132 S. E- 626.
ARTICLE 4
Proceedings in Case of Death or Refusal to
Sign
§ 6155. (§ 5542.) When the judge is dead or
absent.
Failure to Tender to Judge.—The provisions of the section
are not applicable where a so-called bill of exceptions wao
not certified by the judge of the trial court, but was verified
oy the oath of the attorney for the plaintiff in error, and
where it appears that the bill of exceptions was never ten-
dered to the presiding judge for certification although
the judge lived for more than ninety days after the ad-
journment of the term of the court during which the judg-
ment complained of was rendered, and was capable of act-
ing and could have certified the bill had it been presented
to him in time. Einthicum v. Trust Co., 36 Ga. App. 423,
136 S. E. 813.
§ 6158. (§ 5545.) Judge refusing to certify.
Applied in Nash v. Sheppard, 161 Ga. 192, 129 S. E. 639.
ARTICLE 5
Service of Bills of Exceptions
§ 6160(1). Parties bound by service on coun-
sel; waiver of defects.
General Considerations—Absence of Service or Acknowledg-
ment.—Where there is no service and no acknowledgment
of service or waiver thereof, the bill of exceptions will be
dismissed. Izlar v. Central, etc., R. Co., 162 Ga. 558, 134 S.
E- 315.
Parties Bound by Service upon Counsel—Non-residents o*
County.—Where it is attempted to serve a bill of exceptions
by leaving a copy thereof at the residence of the attorney
of the defendant in error, it must affirmatively appear that
the defendant in error is a non-resident of the county.
Saunders v. Saunders, 163 Ga. 770, 137 S. E. 15.
Sufficiency of Acknowledgment to Bind in Dual Capacity.
-
—Where an acknowledgment of service by "Atty. for X"
has been procured, X is bound both personally and in his
representative capacity, and the bill of exceptions can be
amended in the Supreme Court by making any person a
party defendant in error to the case who is bound by such
service, although such person may not have been named
in the bill of exceptions. Henderson v. Eott, 163 Ga. 326,
328, 136 S. E. 403.
Acknowledgment as Waiver—Service on Sunday. — The
Court of Appeals will not dismiss the bill of exceptions
merely because the service thereof appears to have been
acknowledged on a date which the court judicially knows
was Sunday, when counsel did not state in the entry of ac-
knowledgment that it was not to be construed as a waive;
of the defect. Bartow v. Smith, 35 Ga. App. 57, 132 S. E.
103.
Applied in Sanders v. Sanders, 163 Ga. 770, 137 S. E. 15.
§ 6160(2). Bill of exceptions amended to make
person a party defendant.
Applied in Sanders v. Sanders, 163 Ga. 770, 137 S. E. 15;
Henderson v. Eott, 163 Ga. 326, 328, 136 S. E. 403. See note
under preceding section.
ARTICLE 6
Supersedeas
§ 6165. (§ 5552.) Supersedeas, how obtained.
Applied in Tift v. Atlantic Coast Eine R. Co., 161 Ga. 432,
447, 131 S. E. 46.
ARTICLE 7
Duty of Clerks of Superior and City Courts
§ 6167. (§ 5554.) Filing in clerk's office.
Sufficient Filing.—For cases sustaining the principle stated
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in the second sentence under this catchline in the Georgia
Code of 1926, see Gibbs v. Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 35
Ga. App. 505, 133 S. E- 749; Norris v. Baker County, 135 Ga.
229, 69 S. E. 106; Goodin v. Mills, 137 Ga. 282, 73 S. E. 399;
Tatum v. Trappnell, 30 Ga. App. 104, 117 S. E- 251.
Effect of Non-Compliance. — Where it appears from tne
certificate of the clerk of the trial court that the section
was not complied with, and that counsel for plaintiff in error
was the cause of such failure, the writ of error must be dis-
missed. Atlanta, etc., Nat. Bank v. Goodwin, 34 Ga. App.
169, 128 S. E. 691.
Cited in Alford v. Gibson, 161 Ga. 567, 131 S. E. 529.
ARTICLE 3
Making Parties, etc.
§ 6176. (§ 5562.) Essential parties.
Instances of Essential Parties—Use May Be Essential Party.
—There may be cases in which the nominal plaintiff is so
wholly without interest in the suit, or the results thereof, as
to make the usee the proper person upon whom to perfect any
service required to be made in behalf of the defendant. Shgh
v. Smith, 36 Ga. App. 237, 239, 136 S. E. 175.
Applied in Whitehurst v. Holly, 162 Ga. 323, 133 S. E. 861.
ARTICLE 4
No Dismissals in Supreme Court, When
§ 6183. (§ 5569.) Unlawful to dismiss for tech-
nical defect.
Applied in Colquitt County v. Bahnsen, 162 Ga. 340, 34i,
345, 133 S. E. 871; Stephens v. Liquid Carbonic Co., 36 Ga.
App. 363, 367, 136 S. E. 808.
Cited in Flood v. Empire Invest. Co., 35 Ga. App. 266, 133
S. E- 60.
§ 6184. (§ 5570.) Dismissal avoided by amend-
ment.
Amending to Conform to Judgment.—The plaintiff in error
should be allowed to amend the bill of exceptions so as to
make it conform with technical accuracy to the judgment.
Flood v. Empire Invest. Co., 35 Ga. App. 266, 268, 133 S. E- 6U.
§ 6186. (§ 5572.) Benefits lost by negligence.
Applied in Barrett v. Union Banking Co., 163 Ga. 893, 137
S. E. 14.
§ 6187. No dismissal because not certified in
time.
Applied in Parrish v. Central, etc., R. Co., 36 Ga. App.
133, 135 S. E. 762.
ARTICLE 5
Amendments
§ 6190. (§ 5575.) Incomplete record, how cor-
rected.
Where a demurrer is not sent up as a part of record, the
Supreme Court is empowered under this section to require
it sent up. Bennett v. Benton, 162 Ga. 139, 140, 133 S. E-
855.
ARTICLE 7
Decisions
§ 6204. (§ 5585.) First grant of a new trial.
Where First New Trial Error.—It is error even to grant
a first new trial where the law and the evidence demands
the1 verdict as rendered, whether it was directed by the
court or returned at the volition of a jury. Jones Motor Co.
v. Finch Motor Co., 34 Ga. App. 399, 401, 129 S. E- 915.
Applied in Riggins v. Scott, 35 Ga. App. 465, 133 S. E.
647; Eouisville & N. R. Co. v. Barksdale, 34 Ga. App. 812,
131 S. E- 298; Nabros v. Nabros, 161 Ga. 382, 131 S. E. 45.
See Douglas v. Hardin, 161 Ga. 838, 131 S. E- 896.
§ 6207. (§ 5588.) Decision of, how reversed.
Applied in Hallman v. Atlanta Child's Home, 161 Ga. 247,
254, 130 S. E- 814.
ARTICLE 8
Record and Costs
§ 6210. (§ 5591.) Attorney liable for costs.
Advance of Costs by Attorney Does Not Defeat Levy.—
A levy under an execution for costs, issued in the name of
the' plaintiff for the use of officers of court, is not subject
to be arrested by affidavit of illegality on account of the
fact that the attorney for the plaintiff had advanced the
costs incurred in the appellate court. Harvey v. Long Cigar,
etc., Co., 36 Ga. App. 45, 135 S. E- 222.
ARTICLE 9
Judgment and Remittitur
§ 6213. (§ 5594.) Damages in cases of af-
firmance.
Court Not Convicted That Case for Delay.—See Guthrie
v. Rowan, 34 Ga. App. 671, 131 S. E- 93, holding the same
as the' paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia Code
of 1926.
Must Be Judgment for Sum Certain.—See Clark v. Union
School District, 36 Ga. App. 80, 135 S. E. 318, holding sub-
stantially the same as the first sentence under this catch-
line in the Georgia Code of 1926.
When Is Case Brought Up for Delay—Objection That Ver-
dict Contrary to Law and Evidence. — Where the only
ground of exception presented was that the' verdict is con-
trary to law and without evidence to support it, and where
it appears that under a proper application of the law the
evidence supports the verdict this section will be applied.
Yeomans v. Beasley, 36 Ga. App. 467, 137 S. E. 131.
Applied in Felker v. Still, 35 Ga. App. 236, 133 S. E. 519.
RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF GEORGIA
II. Bills of Exceptions and Records
§ 6224. (§ 5605.) Rule 6. Bills of exceptions.
Bill Held Sufficient.—See Colquitt County v. Bahnsen,
162 Ga. 340, 345, 133 S. E- 871, where the bill of exceptions
was held to specify plainly the decision of the court denying
the plaintiff a mandamus absolute.
IV. Costs
§ 6232. (§ 5613.) Rule 14. Attorneys, etc.,
bound.
Appointed Counsel Not Relieved of Payment.—Under this
rule of court the counsel can not be relieved from the pay-
ment of costs on the ground that he was appointed in the
court below to represent the defendant, the latter being un-
able to employ counsel, and being financially unable to re-
spond to him for the costs incurred. James v. State, 162 Ga.
42, 132 S. E. 417.
RULES OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS
Established by the Judges in Convention, at
Atlanta, July 5, 1907
COMMON-LAW RULES
XII. Illegality
§ 6288. (§ 5662.) Rule 29. No second affi-
davit.
General Considerations — When First Affidavit Void. —
This section has no application where the first affidavit of
illegality was void. Bridges v. Melton, 34 Ga. App. 480,
129 S. E- 913.
Ga—
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CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
GEORGIA
ARTICLE l
Bills of Rights
SECTION 1
Rights of the Citizen
§ 6359. (§ 5700.) Par. 3. Life, liberty, and
property.
See annotations to §§ 5206, 6700.
Right to Hearing—Condemnation Law.—The provisions of
the' act of the General Assembly to amend the charter of
Edison, approved August 4, 1923, relating to the condemna-
tion of land for school purposes, the proceedings for con-
demnation, and the notice to be given to the owners of prop-
erty sought to be condemned, are not in violation of this
section inasmuch as the act provides for a hearing before
assessors duly appointed after notice, in the same manner
and under the' same regulations as are contained in the gen-
eral law for condemnation of private property. Sheppard
v. Edison, 161 Ga. 907, 132 S. E- 218.
Same—Tax Law. — If the act of the General Assembly
furnishes the taxpayers notice and hearing before the act
becomes operative, there is no lack of due process. The tax-
payers are presumed to qualify, to inform themselves as to
the merits of the proposed issues, and to exercise their
rights as voters in all elections submitted to them. Where'
they have this opportunity, there is no lack of "due process
of law" which would nullify proposed legislation. Green v.
Atlanta, 162 Ga. 641, 648, 135 S. E- 84.
Zoning Ordinance which deprives a person of the lawful
use of his property held unconstitutional, under this section.
Morrow v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 228, 133 S. E- 345.
Instances Where Section Not Violated.—The automobile
law of 1915 is not invalid under this section. Lee v. State,
163 Ga. 239, 135 S. E- 912.
Expenditure of municipal funds for special services ren-
dered in tax valuation, does not deprive citizens of prop-
erty without due process of law. Tietjen v. Savannah, 161
Ga. 125, 126, 129 S. E- 653.
Section 125 of the Penal Code is not unconstitutional as
violative of this section. Rhoden v. State, 161 Ga. 73, 129
S. E. 640.
Same—Ordinances.—Ordinances making a tax assessment
for street improvement, a lien upon the property, is not vio-
lative of this section. Baugh v. LaGrange, 161 Ga. 80, 130
S. E. 69.
§ 6362. (§ 5703.) Par. 6. Crimination of self
not compelled.
Evidence Obtained from Receiver of Accused.—The intro-
duction of documentary evidence obtained from a receiver
of the property and assets of one accused of crime, by the
process of subpoena duces tecum, although such evidence
may be incriminatory in its nature and tend to convict the'
accused of crime, is not violative of this section. Rawlings
v. State, 163 Ga. 406, 136 S. E- 448.
§ 6364. (§ 5705.) Par. 8. Jeopardy of life,
etc., more than once, forbidden.
Cited in Reed v. State, 163 Ga. 206, 212, 135 S. E- 748.
§ 6370. (§ 5711.) Par. 14. Appropriations to
sects forbidden.
See annotations to § 6454.
§ 6376. (§ 5717.) Par. 20. Contempts.
Cited in Pullen v. Cleckler, 162 Ga. Ill, 114, 132 S. E- 761.
§ 6379. (§ 5720.) Par. 23. Legislative, judi-
cial, and executive, separate.
Editor's Note and General Considerations.—The judicial de-
partment of the government can not interfere with any pro-
vision made by the legislative branch of the government
which the General Assembly may deem to be necessary as
expenses in discharging its duties of legislation. Speer v.
Martin, 163 Ga. 535, 537, 136 S. E- 425.
Instances Where Section Not Violated.—The banking law
of 1919 is not repugnant with this section.
SECTION 3
Protection to Person and Property
§ 6388. (§ 5729.) Paragraph 1. Private ways;
just compensation.
Editor's Note and General Considerations—Effect of En-
hancement of Value upon Amount of Damages.
—In the ap-
plication of this provision of the fundamental law the courts
have uniformly recognized the rule that where none of the
property, or only a part of it, is actually taken for public
use', any enhancement of the market value which arises di-
rectly from such public improvement and which accrues
directly to the particular property remaining may be set
off against the gross damage which may be thus occasioned.
Muecke v. Macon, 34 Ga. App. 744, 131 S. E- 124.
Cited in Smith v. Floyd County, 36 Ga. App. 554, 137 S.
E. 646; Rogers v. Tocco'a Power Co., 161 Ga. 524, 528, 131
S. E. 517.
§ 6389. (§ 5730.) Par. 2. Attainder; ex post
facto and retroactive laws, etc.
Instances of Valid Acts.—Municipal ordinance requiring
deposits by consumers of light and water, though having
meters, not invalid under this section as impairing the ob-
ligation of contract. Young v. Moultrie, 163 Ga. 829, 831, 137
S. E. 257.
SECTION 4
Special Legislation Forbidden
§ 6391. (§ 5732.) Paragraph 1. General laws,
and how varied.
Instances of Special Laws.—The act of 1924 (Ga. Laws
1924, p. 275) authorizing counties to change road in a town,
is a special law and unconstitutional under this section.
Shore v. Banks County, 162 Ga. 185, 186, 132 S. E. 753.
Section not applied to special law creating a city charter.
Baugh v. LaGrange, 161 Ga. 80, 82, 130 S. E- 69.
§ 6392. (§ 5733)- Par. 2. What acts void.
Cited in Speer v. Martin, 163 Ga. 535, 539, 136 S. E- 425.
SECTION 5
Governmental Rights of the People
§ 6393. (§ 5734.) Paragraph 1. State rights.
Cited in Green v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 641, 648, 135 S. E- 84.
§ 6394. (§ 5735.) Par. 2. Enumeration of
rights not deny others.
Cited in Green v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 641, 648, 135 S. E- 84.
ARTICLE 2
Elective Franchise
SECTION 1
Qualification of Voters
§ 6397. Par. 3. Who entitled to register and
vote.
See note under section 34 paragraph 3.
ARTICLE 3
Legislative Department
SECTION 7
Enactment of Laws
(§ 5771.) Par. 8. One subject-matter§ 6437.
expressed.
See application as to section 3438, P. C. §§ 461(12), 419(1).
Instances Where Section Not Violated.—The banking law
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of 1919 is not repugnant with this section. Felton v. Ben-
nett, 163 Ga. 849, 137 S. E. 264.
The act of 1901 to create a new charter for the city of La-
Grange held not violative of this section. Baugh v. Ea-
Grange, 161 Ga. 80, 130 S. E. 69.
Acts of 1925 (Laws 1925, p. 896) amending incorporation
law of certain school was held not unconstitutional under
this section. English v. Smith, 162 Ga. 195, 133 S. E- 847.
Municipal ordinance relating to salaries of firemen was
held not unconstitutional under this section. Green v. At-
lanta, 162 Ga. 641, 135 S. E- 84.
§ 6445. (§ 5779.) Par. 17. Statutes and sec-
tions of Code, how amended.
Acts Not Violative.—The acts of 1924 as to recovery for
homicide of parent (Ga. L. 1924, p. 60) is not unconstitu-
tional as being in violation of this section. Peeler v. Cen-
tral, etc., R. Co., 163 Ga. 784, 137 S. E. 24.
This section was not violated by the act of 1925 amend-
ing the law under which Barnesville School is incorporated.
English v. Smith, 162 Ga. 195, 199, 133 S. E- 847.
§ 6446. (§ 5780.) Par. 18. Corporate powers,
how granted.
Cited in Free Gift Society v. Edwards, 163 Ga. 857, 864,
137 S. E- 382.
SECTION 9
Pay of Members
(§ 5788.) Paragraph 1. Compensa-§ 6454.
tion.
No Injunction Can Be Granted.—Where the question is
not raised that the mileage is in an amount in excess of
that allowed by this section, but this proceeding merely
seeks to determine under what circumstances such mileage
may be allowed by the proper committees and presiding
officers of the General Assembly, the courts can grant no
injunction to enjoin the Treasurer of the State from paying
mileage. Speer v. Martin, 163 Ga. 535, 537, 136 S. E. 425.
ARTICLE 4
Power of the General Assembly over Taxation,
etc.
SECTION 2
Regulation of Corporations
§ 6463. (§ 5797.) Paragraph 1. Railroad
tariffs.
Section Not Intended to Limit Powers.—Independently of
this provision, the General Assembly possesses the inherent
power to regulate public utilities. The conference upon the
General Assembly of the' powers stated in this section was
not intended to limit its powers to those expressed in that
provision. Atlanta Terminal Co. v. Georgia Public Service
Commission, 163 Ga. 897, 137 S. E- 556.
§ 6464. (§ 5798.) Par. 2. Right of eminent
domain; police power.
Police Power—Regulation of Busses Valid.—Ordinance
regulating busses for transportation of passengers in
streets, held not .violative of this section. Schlesinger v.
Atlanta, 161 Ga. 148, 129 S. E. 861.
ARTICLE 5
Executive Department
SECTION 1
Governor
Par. 12. Reprieves and§ 6481. (§ 5815.)
pardons.
Reprieve.—The constitution does not undertake to define
what is meant by a reprieve; properly construed, a reprieve
by the executive is nothing but a temporary suspension for
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the period named in the respite of the execution of the sen-
tence imposed by the court. Gore v. Humphries, 163 Ga.
106, 114, 135 S. E- 481.
Stay of Execution.—The contention that only the Governor
can stay the execution of a sentence in a case where such
sentence has been suspended by the Governor in the exer-
cise of his right to suspend the sentence by reprieve is un-
tenable under P. C. sec. 1069(7). Gore v. Humphries, 163
Ga. 106, 114, 135 S. E- 481.
ARTICLE 6
Judiciary
SECTION 2
Supreme Court, and Court of Appeals
§ 6502. (§ 5836.) Par. 5. Jurisdiction.
Editor's Note.—In regard to the holding set out in the
third paragraph under this catchline in the Georgia Code of
1926, it is said that the decision in the Yesbik case has since
been considered the chart and guide for the Supreme Court
in all subsequent cases where the rules there announced
were applicable. See King v. State, 155 Ga. 707, 712, 118 S-
E. 368. Eouisville. etc., R. Co. v. Tomlin, 161 Ga. 749, 759,
132 S. E. 90.
Constitutional Questions.—In Griggs v. State, 130 Ga. 16,
60 S. E. 103, the Supreme Court said: "This court will not
pass upon the' constitutionality of a statute unless it ap-
pears that the question was made in the court below and
passed upon by the trial judge, and further that the par-
ticular provision of the constitution alleged to have been
offended by the statute was clearly designated." United
States Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Watts, 35 Ga. App. 447, 451,
133 S. E. 476.
§ 6506. Par. 9. Court of Appeals.
Nature of Question Certified—Constitutional Question.—
See Daniel v. Claxton, 35 Ga. App. 107, 132 S. E- 411, hold-
ing the same as the second sentence under this catchline in
the Georgia Code of 1926, citing Gulf Paving Co. v. Atlanta,
149 Ga. 114, 99 S. E- 374.
Dismissal Case Reinstated.
—Since the court has never
formulated the rules contemplated by the amendment of 1916
and at present no statute or rule provides for the giving of
notice to counsel of the hearing of cases in this court, where
counsel did not receive the notice which was mailed to him
and hence failed to prosecute and the case was dismissed
the court will reinstate the case in its discretion. Winder
v. Winder Nat. Bank, 161 Ga. 882, 884, 132 S. E. 217.
Cited in Winder v. Winder Nat. Bank, 161 Ga. 882, 132
S. E. 217.
SECTION 4
Jurisdiction of Superior Courts
§ 6516. (§ 5848.) Par. 7. Judgment by the
court.
See note under section 5662.
Cited in Pierce v. Jones, 36 Ga. App. 561, 137 S. E- 296.
SECTION 16
Venue
§ 6540. (§ 5871.) Par. 3. Equity cases.
See annotation to § 5527.
SECTION 18
Jury Trials
§ 6545. (§ 5876.) Paragraph 1. Trial by
jury.
Contempt Proceeding-.—In a proceeding for contempt
against the defendant, growing out of his alleged violation
of a mandamus absolute, he is not entitled to a trial by a
jury when an issue of fact is raised. Gaston v. Shunk Plow
Co., 161 Ga. 287, 298. 130 S. E- 580.
Instances Where Section Not Violated.—Section 1697(13) is
not unconstitutional as violative of this section. Eewis v.
State Board, 162 Ga. 263, 133 S. E. 469.
ARTICLE 7
Finance, Taxation, and Public Debt.
§ 6551 AMENDMENTS § 6700
SECTION l
Power of Taxation
§ 6551. (§ 5882.) Paragraph 1. Taxation,
how and for what purposes exercised.
Power of Taxation Limited.—The General Assembly has
only those powers of taxation over the State which it is
permitted to exercise under the grant of power contained in
the constitution. Brown v. Martin, 162 Ga. 172, 174, 132 S.
E. 896.
SECTION 2
Taxation and Exemptions
§ 6553. (§ 5883.) Paragraph 1. Must be uni-
form, etc.; domestic animals.
II. TAXES IMPOSED BY MUNICIPALITIES.
Instances of Municipal Taxes.—Under the general language
of this section, a leasehold estate in state owned property
(governor's mansion) is taxable by a municipality. Henry
Grady Hotel Co. v. Atlanta, 162 Ga. 818, 135 S. E. 68.
SECTION 6
Purposes of Taxation by Counties and Cities
§ 6562. (§ 5892.) Par. 2. Taxing power of
counties limited.
The word "reads" does not include "streets'* of munici-
palities in the county. Mitchell County v. Cochran, 162
Ga. 810, 815, 134 S. E- 768.
Applied in Commissioners v. Martin, 161 Ga. 220, 130 S. E-
569.
Cited in Bank v. Hagedorn Constr. Co., 162 Ga. 488, 499,
134 S. E- 310.
SECTION 7
Limitation on Municipal Debts
§ 6563. (§ 5893.) Paragraph 1. Debt of coun-
ties and cities not to exceed seven per cent.
Definitions.—A registered voter under this section is one
who had been lawfully registered and who has the present
right to vote. Persons merely entitled to be registered or
those lawfully registered who have been disqualified to vote
are not included. Daniel v. Claxton, 35 Ga. App. 107, 132 S.
E. 411.
Issuance of Notes in Excess of Limit.—An issue of notes
in excess of the limit allowed by this section is void since
the tax digest of the county will show the assessed valua-
tion. And the county cannot make recitals which will estop
it from denying that the loan is in excess of the limit.
Baker v. Rockdale County. 161 Ga. 245, 130 S. E. 684.
Municipal Contract for Property Valuation.—Section is not
violated by municipal contract for special services in valu-
ing property for taxation. Tietjen v. Savannah, 161 Ga. 125,
134, 129 S. E. 653. Such contract was held not to constitute
a debt within the meaning of the section. Id.
Par. 2. County and city§ 6564. (§ 5894.)
bonds, how paid.
Installment Bonds.—Nothing in this section is inconsistent
with the authorization of an issue of bonds in installments
and the levy of the tax for the payment of each installment
in the year of its issue. Brady v. Atlanta, 17 Fed. (2d), 764.
Cited in Bank v. Hagedorn, etc., Constr. Co., 162 Ga. 488,
498, 134 S. E. 310.
ARTICLE 8
Education
SECTION 4
Educational Tax
§ 6579. (§ 5909.) Paragraph 1. Local taxation
for public schools.
Property Subject to Tax Levy.—The taxes provided for by
this section can only be levied upon "all taxable property of
the county outside of independent local systems" for the
support of county schools under the control of county boards
of education. Almand v. Board, 161 Ga. 911, 131 S. E- 897.
When Limit Is Reached.—Where the limit of five mills
has been reached by a local tax for the support of public
schools, the county authorities can not be compelled, on the
recommendation of the board of education, to levy an addi-
tional tax for educational purposes. Such additional tax is
not permissible under the law, outside of the independent
local systems. Brown v. Martin, 162 Ga. 172, 132 S. E. 896.
ARTICLE 9
Homestead and Exemptions
SECTION l
Homestead
§ 6582. (§ 5912.) Paragraph 1. Homestead
and exemption.
Constitutionality—Increase of Exemption.—A debtor's right
of exemption under this section cannot be increased as to
debts in existence without violating contract clause of
Federal Constitution. In re Trammell, 5 Fed. (2d), 326.
"Setting Apart" of debtor's exempt property is a mere
identification of property to which exemption shall be ap-
plied, the burden of securing which is put on the debtor. In
re Trammell, 5 Fed. (2d), 326. And is timely if made before
sale, though after levy. Id.
Same—Bankruptcy Proceedings.—Property exempt under
this section and section 3416, but not set apart prior to pe-
tition in bankruptcy, may be set apart in the bankruptcy
proceeding. In re Trammell, 5 Fed. (2d), 326. And the ac-
tion of the bankruptcy court is equivalent to action by
State Court in effectuating exemption. Id.
What Constitutes Head of a Family.—A resident of Georgia
having no family within State, but having mother in Poland
and sister in another state to whom he regularly sends
money, is not the head of a family within the meaning of
this section, and section 3416. In re Trammell, 5 Fed. (2d),
326.
Alienage of resident of state is no bar to claim of exemp-
tion provided by Const. Ga. Art. 9, section 1, and section
3416. In re Trammell, 5 Fed. (2d), 326.
ARTICLE 11
Counties and County Officers
SECTION 1
Counties
§ 6594. (§ 5924.) Paragraph 1. Counties are
corporate bodies.
Liability of County to Suit Generally.—This section sub-
jects the counties of this State to suit, but not to suits upon
all causes of action. It does not make them generally lia-
ble to suits, like individuals or as municipal corporations.
Being political subdivisions of the State, they can not be
sued unless made subject to suit expressly or by necessary
implication. Decatur County v. Praytor, etc., Contracting
Co., 163 Ga. 929, 931, 137 S. E. 247.
SECTION 3
Uniformity in County Offices
§ 6600. (§ 5930.) Paragraph 1. County of-
fices to be uniform.
Cited in McDaniel v. Thomas, 162 Ga. 592, 593, 133 S. E-
624.
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES
ARTICLE 8
Amendments.
§ 6700. (§ 6030.) Art. 14. [1.] Citizenship.
Tax Lien upon Property before Improvement.—An act
making a tax lien upon property before any paving or im-
orovement is begun on the street for which the tax is levied
is not unconstitutional as violative of the due process clause
of this section. Baugh v. LaGrange, 161 Ga. 80, 130 S. E- 69.
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THE PENAL CODE
Crimes and Their Punishment
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
§ 19. (§ 19). No conviction for an assault or
attempt when the crime is actually perpetrated.
Evidence held not authorizing conviction for attempt to
commit the crime of attempting the making of liquor. Raines
v. State, 34 Ga. App. 175, 176, 132 S. E- 243.
§ 30. (§ 30.) Limitations of prosecutions.
Exception as to Running of Limitation—Allegation and
Proof.—In a criminal case, where an exception is relied upon
to prevent the bar of the statute of limitations, it must be
alleged and proved. Bazemore v. State, 34 Ga. App. 773,
131 S. E- 177.
FIRST DIVISION
Definition of a Crime. Persons Capable of Com-
mitting. Persons Punishable
ARTICLE 2
Infants, Lunatics, Idiots, and Persons Counseling
Them
§ 34. (§ 34.) Infant under the age of ten years.
Applied in McRae v. State, 163 Ga. 336, 342, 136 S. E. 268.
SECOND DIVISION
Principals and Accessories in Crime
ARTICLE 1
Principals in Fir*st and Second Degree
§ 42. (§ 42.) Principals in first and second de-
gree.
Charge of section upheld. Coggeshall v. State, 161 Ga.
259, 131 S. E. 57.
Quoted in Bullard v. State, 34 Ga. App. 198, 200, 128 S.
E. 920.
FOURTH DIVISION
Crimes Against the Person
ARTICLE l
Homicide
§ 61. (§ 61.) Express malice.
Circumstances Tending to Show Malice.—On the trial of
a man for the homicide of his sister-in-law, growing out
of a difficulty in which her husband also was killed by the
accused, evidence tending to show a previous difficulty be-
tween the accused and the husband (although such difficulty
occurred several months prior to the homicide), and the ex-
istence of bad blood between them, was admissible as tend-
ing to show malice, intent, or motive in killing the deceased.
Jeffords v. State, 162 Ga. 573, 134 S. E- 169.
§ 67. (§ 67.) Involuntary manslaughter.
Death Caused by Speeding Involuntary Manslaughter.—
Where one operates an automobile upon a public street or
highway of this State at a rate of speed penalized by stat-
ute, or while he is under the influence of intoxicating li-
quors, and, in consequence thereof, he kills a human being
|
without any intention to do so, he is, under that view of the
|
case most favorable to him, guilty of involuntary man-
|
slaughter. Black v. State, 34 Ga. App. 449, 130 S. E. 591.
§ 68. (§ 68.) Punishment.
Refusal to Charge to Consider Words or Threats not Error.
—It is not erroneous for the court, in instructing the jury on
the law of voluntary manslaughter, as contained in this
section, to fail or refuse to charge in immediate connection
therewith the right of the jury to consider words, threats,
I
or menaces in determining whether the circumstances at-
tending the homicide were such as to justify the fears of a
reasonable man that his life was in imminent danger or that
a felony was about to be committed upon his person. Brown
v. State, 36 Ga. App. 83, 135 S. E- 513.
§ 70. (§ 70.) Justifiable homicide.
Where this Section Governs Case, § 73 Excluded.—Where
the law of justifiable homicide to prevent the commission
of a felony upon the person of the slayer, as embraced m
this section and section 71, is involved, it is error to limit
the defense to justifiable homicide in a case of mutual com-
bat as embraced in section 73. Boatwright v. State, 162
Ga. 378, 134 S. E. 91.
§ 71. (§ 71.) Fear must be reasonable.
Danger Apprehended Must Be Urgent and Pressing.—The
doctrine of reasonable fear does not apply to any case of
homicide where the danger apprehended is not urgent and
pressing, or apparently so, at the time of the killing. Martin
v. State, 36 Ga. App. 288, 291, 136 S. E- 324.
Request for Instruction as to Reasonable Fears.—Where
this section had been given in charge, if further instruc-
tions were desired, relating to the doctrine of reasonable
fears as applicable to the case, there should have been ap-
propriate written requests. Paramore v. State, 161 Ga. 166,
129 S. E. 772.
§ 72. (§ 72.) Killing in defense.
Application to Homicide of Officer.—The provisions of this
section are not applicable to killing of an arresting officer
who shot at a fleeing automobile. Howell v. State, 162 Ga.
14, 30, 134 S. E. 59.
§ 73. (§ 73.) The danger must be urgent.
Section Applicable for Cases of Mutual Combat.—Where
the law of justifiable homicide in cases of mutual combat is in-
volved, the court should instruct the jury that the provi-
sions of this section are applicable only in the event the
jury find that the accused and the deceased were engaged in
mutual combat. Boatwright v. State, 162 Ga. 378, 134 S. E-
91. See § 70.
§ 74. (§ 74.) Mutual protection.
Applied in Chisholm v. State, 162 Ga. 13, 132 &'. E- 388.
§ 94(1). Sexual intercourse with female under
fourteen.
Burden of Proving Capacity to Consent.—A female over
fourteen years of age is presumed to possess sufficient men-
tal capacity to intelligently assent to or dissent from acts
of sexual intercourse; and where in a rape case the conten-
tion of the State is that a woman above that age did not
possess such intelligence, the burden rests upon the State
to establish this fact. Smith v. State, 161 Ga. 421, 131 S.
E. 163.
Intercourse with an Imbecile Constitutes Rape Regardless
of Consent.—A man who has sexual intercourse with an im-
becile female, who is mentally incapable of expressing any
intelligent assent or dissent, or of exercising any judgment
in the matter, is guilty of rape, though no more force is
used than is necessary to accomplish the carnal act, and
though the woman offer no resistance. Smith v. State, 161
Ga. 421, 131 S. E- 163.
Indictment for Rape—Verd'ct for Fornication Void. —
Where one is tried on an indictment charging rape and
drawn under this section, a verdict finding the accused
guilty of fornication is null and void, and the judgment
based thereon should be arrested on motion of the defend-
ant. Holland v. State (this case), 161 Ga. 492, 131 S. E.
503. Holland v. State, 34 Ga. App. 824, 131 S E- 923.
ARTICLE 4
Rape
ARTICLE 5
Assault, and Assault and Battery
§ 97. (§ 97.) Assault with intent to murder.
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Effect of Section 115(1).—Section 115(1) of the Penal Code
does not in any sense modify or repeal this section. Gazaway
v. State, 34 Ga. App. 442, 444, 129 S. E- 888.
Intent Question for Jury. — The intent with which a shot
is fired is a question for the jury. Gazaway v. State, 34
Ga. App. 442, 444, 129 S. E- 888.
§ 103., (§ 103l) Opprobrious words may be
proved in defense.
Jury May Consider Conduct of Person Assaulted and De-
gree of Force Justified.—The jury may consider the actions
and conduct of the person assaulted at the time of the as-
sault, with other facts, in determining if force, and what
degree of force, on the part of the defendant was justified,
and if not justified, what, if any, effect should be given to
such facts as in mitigation. Hutchison v. Browning, 34
Ga. App. 276, 129 S. E. 125.
charges the offense of blackmailing substantially in the
language of this section is not demurrable. Beard v. State,
/36 Ga. App. 266, 136 S. E. 333.
ARTICLE 7
Kidnapping, and Industrial Home Children
§ 110. (§ 110.) Inveigling children.
Misapprehension as to the Age Is No Excuse. — The fact
that the accused was ignorant of the girl's age, and that
he believed, in good faith, and had good grounds to believe,
that she was more, than eighteen years of age, is no defense
to an indictment under this section. Smiley v. State, 34 Ga.
App. 513, 130 S. E- 359.
ARTICLE 9
Shooting at Another
§ 115. (§ 113.) Shooting at another.
Applied to officer shooting at an automobile in which the
plaintiff was riding. Copeland v. Dunehoo, 36 Ga. App. 817,
822, 138 S. E. 267.
Effect of Section 115(1).—Section 115(1) of the Penal Code'
does not in any way modify or repeal this section. Gazaway
v. State, 34 Ga. App. 442, 444, 129 S. E. 888. See annota-
tion to §' 115(1).
ARTICLE 9A
Shooting at Dwelling House
§ 115(1). Shooting at occupied dwelling pro-
hibited; penalty.
Intent under this Section and Section 115.—The misde-
meanor of unlawfully shooting into an occupied dwelling
house under this section may be committed without an in-
tention to maim or wound any person therein; but the in-
tent to wound under section 115 is an essential element of
the felony of unlawfully shooting at another. Gazaway v.
v. State, 34 Ga. 442, 444, 129 S. E- 888.
Shooting at a Dwelling with Intent to Shoot at Another.—
While it is a misdemeanor for any person to shoot at any
occupied dwelling house, yet if, in addition to the essentials
of that offense, the elements of unlawfully shooting at an-
other or of assault with intent to murder are made to ap-
pear, the offender may be punished for the felony so shown.
Gazaway v. State, 34 Ga. App. 442, 129 S. E- 888.
Effect of Section upon §§ 97, 115.—This section does not in
any sense modify or repeal section 115, defining the offense
of unlawfully shooting at another, or section 97, which de-
fines the offense of assault with intent to murder. Gaza-
way v. State, 34 Ga. App. 442, 444, 129 S. E- 888.
ARTICLE 9B
Eavesdropper or "Peeping Tom "
§ 115(2). Unlawful to be eavesdropper
'Peeping Tom."
Applied in Cobb v. Bailey, 35 Ga. App. 302, 304, 133 S.
or
E. 42.
ARTICLE 12
Blackmail and Threatening Letters
§ 118. (§ 116.) Blackmail defined.
Charge in the Language of Section.—An indictment which
ARTICLE 14
Interfering with Apprentices, Servants, Croppers,
Farm Laborers, and Employees
§ 125. (§ 122.) Enticing, and attempting to en-
tice away, a servant, cropper, or farm laborer.
Constitutionality.—This section is not violative of the
constitution, § 6359. Rhoden v. State, 161 Ga. 73, 129 S. E.
640.
FIFTH DIVISION
Crimes Against the Habitations or Persons
ARTICLE 2
Burglary
§ 146. (§ 149.) Burglary defined.
Allegation as to Place of Business.—Where the house en-
tered was not a "dwelling, mansion, or storehouse," it must
be alleged in the indictment that the house was a place
of business where valuable goods were contained or stored.
Moody v. State, 36 Ga. App. 284, 136 S. E. 464.
It is not essential that the house should be expressly de-
nominated in the indictment as a "place of business," if
descriptive words are used sufficient to show that the house
was used as a place of business of another. Moody v. State,
36 Ga. App. 284, 136 S. E. 464.
Same—Mere Existence of Valuable Goods Not Sufficient.—
The mere fact that valuable goods were contained or stored
therein is not alone sufficient to make the house a place of
business, within the meaning of section. Moody v. State,
36 Ga. App. 284, 136 S. E- 464.
Church Building.—Whether an ordinary church building
or edifice, appropriated to public worship, is subject to be
burglarized, is not decided. Moody v. State, 36 Ga. App.
284, 136 S. E. 464.
A smokehouse within, 65 feet of the owner's dwelling house
and used by him as an outhouse and place for storing meat
is among the buildings referred to in this section regard-
less of whether the smokehouse is within the same inclosure
as the dwelling. Moore v. State, 34 Ga. App. 182, 129 S.
E. 6.
SIXTH DIVISION
Crimes Relative to Property
ARTICLE 1
Robbery
§ 148. (§ 151.) Definition.
Request to Charge Definition of Robbery.—The omission
to give in charge the definition of robbery as in this sec-
tion is not error in the absence of request so to do. Gore
v. State, 162 Ga. 267, 134 S. E- 36.
§ 149. (§ 152.) By open force, punishment.
Charge of robbery upheld under the evidence in the case.
Watkins v. State, 36 Ga. App. 297, 136 S. E- 815.
ARTICLE 2
Larceny
§ 168. (§ 171.) Receiving stolen goods.
Conviction of Principal Thief.—An indictment under this
section must allege that the principal thief has been indicted
and convicted. Ford v. State, 35 Ga. App. 655, 134 S. E. 35 :
The conviction of the principal is not an element in the
crime defined in this section, but is a regulation which af-
fects the time when or the manner in which a person in-
dicted under said section can be tried. The gist of the of-
fense created by this section is buying or receiving goods
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with the felonious knowledge that they were stolen. Ford
v. State, 35 Ga. App. 655, 134 S. F. 353; 162 Ga. 422, 134
S. F- 95.
The record of the conviction of the principal thief is con-
clusive evidence of his conviction, but is merely prima facie'
evidence of his guilt; but the introduction of such record
in evidence by the State places the onus upon the accessory
of disapproving the guilt of the principal. Ford v. State,
35 Ga. App. 655, 134 S. F- 353.
The accessory could waive the conviction of the princi-
pal and go to trial on the charge preferred against him.
Ford v. State, 35 Ga. App. 655, 134 S. F- 353.
ARTICLE 3
Embezzlement and Fraudulent Conversions
§ 186. (§ 188.) Embezzlement by the bank or
other corporate officers, servants, or stockholders.
Substitution of Stock of Less Value for Stock of More
Value. — Where the corporate officer substituted certain
stock of less value for other stock of more value, deposited
as collateral security, with the intent to defraud, he was
held guilty of embezzlement under this section. Wilkins v.
State, 36 Ga. App. 743, 138 S. F. 253.
ARTICLE 5
Banking
§ 211(15). Falsely advertising that deposits are
insured.—Any officer, director, agent, or employee
of any bank, who shall advertise by any office sign
or upon any letterhead, billhead, blank note, re-
ceipt, certificate, circular, or on any written or
printed paper that the deposits in said bank are
insured or are guaranteed, unless such deposits
are in fact insured or guaranteed in a manner sat-
isfactory to the Superintendent of Banks and by
his express permission, shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor. Acts 1919, pp. 212, 214; 1927, pp. 196,
205.
Editor's Note.—This section prior to its amendment made
the act of advertisement an offense in the event the
deposits were not in fact insured or guaranteed. The phrase
"in a manner satisfactory to the superintendent of Banks
and by his express permission" did not then exist.
ARTICLE 11
Firing the Woods
§ 227. (§ 229.) Who may.—No person but a
resident of the county where the firing is done,
owning lands therein, or domiciled thereon, out-
side of any town incorporation, shall set on fire
any woods, lands, or marshes, nor shall such per-
sons, except between the first of January and the
first of March annually. Cobb, 824; 1927, p. 144.
Editor's Note.—By the amendment of 1927, the date con-
tained in the excepting clause was changed from February
20, April 1, to January 1, March 1.
SEVENTH DIVISION
Forgery, Counterfeiting, and Unlawful Cur-
rency
ARTICLE 1
Forgery, Counterfeiting, and Unlawful Cur-
rency
§ 231. (§ 233). Forging official certificates,
etc.
Where Forged Instrument Composed of Two Partis. —
Clause 7 applied in Johnson v. State, 36 Ga. App. 310, 136
S. F. 329, notwithstanding that the forged instrument was
composed of two parts, the other part being treated as sur-
plusage.
EIGHTH DIVISION
Crimes against the Public Justice and Official
Duty
ARTICLE 5.
Obstructing Legal Process, and Sentence or
Order of Court
§ 311, (§ 306). Obstructing legal process.
Allegation as to Serving of Lawful Process.—An indict-
ment or accusation based upon this section, which does not
allege that the officer was attempting to serve or execute a
lawful process or order, is fatally defective. Prichard v.
State, 34 Ga. App. 181, 129 S. F- 12.
ARTICLE 8
Receiving, Harboring, or Concealing Guilty
Persons, and Compounding Crimes and
Penalties
§ 326. (§ 321). Receiving, harboring, guilty
person.
Concealing Body of Murdered Person.—Where A, knowing
that B is guilty of murder, assists B in concealing the crime
and the body of the murdered person, A is not thereby
guilty of "receiving, harboring, or concealing" the murderer,
within the meaning of this section. Heath v. State, 34 Ga.
App. 218, 128 S. F. 914.
ARTICLE 11
Appointment of Peace-Officers and Detectives
§ 366. (§ 375.) Other offenses against public
justice.
Section Adopts Offenses Punishable at Common Law. —
This section and section 366 only adopts and make crimes
in this state offenses against public justice or against the
public peace which were punishable as such at common law.
Prichard v. State, 34 Ga. App. 181, 129 S. F- 12.
ARTICLE 12
Interfering with Board of Public Welfare
§ 339(1). Interference with inspection; refus-
ing access to records.
Obstructing Officer Arresting without Warrant. — Under
this section and section 366, a third person can not be pun-
ished for resisting or obstructing an officer in this state
who is attempting, without a warrant, to arrest another for
a violation of the prohibition law of this state. Prichard v
State, 34 Ga. App. 181, 129 S. F. 12.
NINTH DIVISION
Crimes against the Public Peace and Tranquility
ARTICLE 8
Other Offenses against Public Peace
§ 366. (§ 375). Other offences against public
peace.
See annotation to section 339.
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§ 389 ILLEGAL PRACTICE OF PROFESSIONS, ETC. § 476(13)
TENTH DIVISION
Offenses against Public Morality and Decency,
Public Health, Public Safety and Convenience,
Public Trade, Public Policy, Suffrage, Public
Police
ARTICLE 8
Gaming-Houses, Gaming-Tables, and Gambling.
§ 389 (§ 398). Gaming-houses.
Cited in Fenner v. Boykin, 3 Fed (2d), 674, 678.
ARTICLE 9
Lotteries, Gift Enterprises, Dealing in Futures,
and Trading-stamps
§ 397. (§ 406). Lottery tickets.
Punchboard constituting gambling device under this sec-
tion. See Hobbs v. K. & S. Sales Co., 35 Ga. App. 226, 230,
132 S. E. 775.
§ 398w (§ 407). Carrying on a lottery.
See annotation to preceding section.
ARTICLE 12
Human Bodies, Embalming Illegally, Arbitrary
,
Burial Regulations, and Cemeteries
§ 40& (§ 415). Illegal removal from grave.
Disinterment with Consent of the Relatives.—This section
does not apply in cases in which the disinterment is done by
and with the consent of relatives entitled to control the
burial and disposition of the bodies. Fairview Cemetery
Co. v. Wood, 36 Ga. App. 709, 720, 138 S. F- 88.
ARTICLE 13
Disturbing Divine Service, or Societies, Violat-
ing the Sabbath, Intruding on Camp-grounds,
Disturbing Schools, Dance-Halls
§ 419(1). Dancing in public places on Sunday.
Constitutionally.—The act which enacted this and the fol-
lowing section is not unconstitutional as violative of § 6437.
Durden v. State, 161 Ga. 537, 131 S. F. 496.
ARTICLE 14
Manufacture and Sale of Intoxicants, and Regu-
lations as to Liquors, and Substitutes for
Intoxicants
§ 442. Drunkenness in public places.
Acquittal as Bar.—Acquittal under this section was no bar
to a conviction on an indictment under section 528(21). Smitii
v. State, 34 Ga. App. 601, 130 S. F. 219.
Evidence held not authorizing conviction under this sec-
tion. Chandler v. State. 36 Ga. App. 121, 135 S. E. 494.
ARTICLE 14D
Subsequent Prohibitions and Regulations of
Intoxicating Liquors
§ 448 (36). Unlawful to carry, receive, or pos-
sess specified liquors.
Evidence Not Warranting Allegation.—Where a proceeding
is instituted under this act, to condemn an automobile al-
leged to have been used in conveying intoxicating liquors
over a designated public road, and the evidence does not
demand a finding that the vehicle was used in conveying
liquors "on the public roads named in the petition," the
direction of a verdict "for confiscation is reversible error."
Wells v. State, 33 Ga. App. 426, 126 S. F- 856. Citizens Aut i
Co. v. State, 35 Ga. App. 166, 132 S. F- 258.
§ 448(54). Contraband articles; destruction,
sale and proceeds.
Verdict Directed Not Warranted by Evidence Reversible.
—Where a proceeding is instituted under this section, to
condemn an automobile alleged to have been used in con-
veying intoxicating liquors over a designated public road,
and the evidence does not demand a finding that the ve-
hicle was used in conveying liquors "on the public roads
named in the petition," the direction of a verdict "for con-
fiscation" is reversible error. Citizens Auto Co. v. State,
35 Ga. App. 166, 132 S. F- 258.
Burden of Proof upon the State.—In a proceeding under
this section, to condemn a vehicle or conveyance used in
transporting liquor, the sale or possession of which is prohi-
bited by law, the burden is upon the State, the condemner,
to show that the vehicle or conveyance was used in con-
veying the prohibited liquors or beverages with the knowl-
edge of the owner or lessee. Seminole Securities Co. v.
State, 35 Ga. App. 723, 134 S. F- 625.
ARTICLE 14A
Manufacturing, Selling, Keeping, etc, of Prohib-
ited Liquors and Beverages
§ 448(3). Prohibited acts specified.
General Verdict Supported Only by One Court out of Two.
—It is error to refuse a new trial where an accusation con-
tained two counts, the first charging a sale of whisky, and
the second charging possession of whisky, both charges
growing out of the same transaction, where upon the trial
the evidence authorizes a conviction upon the second count
only and the verdict is a general verdict of guilty. Simmons
v. State, 162 Ga. 316, 134 S. F- 54.
ARTICLE 15
Vagrants
§ 449. Vagrancy defined.
Proof That Accused Was Able to Work.—A conviction of
vagrancy under this section is unauthorized where there is
no proof that the accused was able to work. Bryant v.
State, 34 Ga. App. 523, 130 S. F- 352.
Charge as to Age.—Failure to charge the jury that to con-
vict the defendants the evidence should show that they were
more than sixteen years of age, is not error, it not appearing
from the motion for a new trial, or from the evidence, that
either of the defendants was not of that age. Shank v.
State, 36 Ga. App. 301, 136 S. F. 332.
ARTICLE 17B
Sales of Securities
§ 461 (8). Unlawful sale, etc., of certain secun
ties.
The sale of bonds payable in one year from the date of
their issue is no offense, under the Georgia securities law.
Taylor v. State, 34 Ga. App. 4, 128 S. F- 228.
§ 461 (11). Selling Class "D" securities with-
out license; advertisements of illegal sales.
Constitutionality.—So much of this section as makes it a
felony for an issuer of securities falling within class D to
sell or offer to sell, etc., is unconstitutional as violative of
section 6437. Smiths v. State, 161 Ga. 103, 129 S. F- 766.
ARTICLE 18
Illegal Practice of Professions, Carrying on Busi-
ness, and Medical College Diplomas
§476(13). Motor fuel distributors; penalty.
—
Any distributor who shall fail to register, or
make monthly returns, or give bond, or pay the
tax, as herein provided, or who shall fail to do
any other act in sections 993(293) to 993(300) of
the civil code required, shall be guilty of a mis-
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§ 503(8) PUBLIC SAFETY § 528(4)
demeanor and shall be punished as provided m
section 1065 of the Penal Code of Georgia. Acts
1927, p. 108.
Editor's Note.
—Section 476(12) of the code upon the same
subject, simply provides a punishment for violation of »i
993(164)
-993(168) relative to occupation tax levied on motor-
fuel distributors.
ARTICLE 23A
Vital Statistics
§§ 503(8) and 503(9). Superseded by the Acts
of 1927 pp. 353 et seq., herein codified as §
503 (10).
§ 503 (10). Violation of vital statistic law by
any person.—Any person who, for himself or for
an officer, agent, or employee of any other per-
son or of any corporation or partnership, (a)
shall inter, cremate, or otherwise finally dispose
of a dead body of a human being, or permit the
same to be done, or shall remove such body from
the primary registration district in which the
death occurred or the body was found, withour
the authority of a burial or removal permit issued
by the local registrar of the district in which the
death occurred or in which the body was found,
or (b) shall refuse or fail to furnish correctly any
information in his possession, or shall furnish
false information affecting any certificate of rec-
ord, required by this Act, or (c) shall wil-
fully alter otherwise than is provided by
section 1681(43) or shall falsify any certificate of
birth or death, or any record established by §§
1681(27) to 1681(46) or, (d) being required by
§§ 1681(27) to 1681(46) to fill out a certificate of
birth or death and file the same with the local
registrar, or deliver it upon request, to any person
charged with the duty of filing the same, shall
fail, neglect or refuse to perform such duty in the
manner required by §§ 1681(27) to 1681(46) or,
(e) being a local registrar or deputy registrar,
shall fail, neglect, or refuse to perform his duty
as required by §§ 1681(27) to 1681(46) shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon con-
viction thereof shall for the first offense be fined
not less than five dollars nor more than fifty dol-
lars, and for each subsequent offense not less
than ten nor more than one hundred dollars, or be
imprisoned in the county jail not more than sixty
days, or be both fined and imprisoned in the dis-
cretion of the court. Acts 1927, p. 353.
§ 503(11) Enforcement of vital statistic law.—
Each local registrar is hereby charged with strict
and thorough enforcement of the provisions §§
1681(27) to 1681(46) in his registration district,
under the supervision and direction of the State
Registrar, and he shall make an immediate report
to the State Registrar of any violation of this law
coming to his knowledge, by observation or upon
complaint of any person, or otherwise. The State
Registrar is hereby charged with the thorough and
efficient execution of the provisions of said sec-
tions in every part of the State, and is hereby
granted supervisory power over local registrars
and deputy local registrars, to the end that all its
requirements shall be uniformly complied with.
The State Registrar, either personally or by an
accredited representative, shall have authority to
investigate cases of irregularity or violation of
law, and all registrars shall aid him upon requesi
in such investigations. When he shall deem it
necessary, he shall report such cases of violations
of any of the provisions of sections above referred
to, to the prosecuting attorney of the county, wuh
the statement o" the facts and circumstances; and
when any such case is reported to him by the
State registrar, the prosecuting attorney shall
forthwith initiate and promptly follow up the
necessary court proceedings against the person or
corporation responsible for the alleged violation
of law. And upon request of the State Registrar,
the Attorney-general shall assist in the enforce-
ment of the provisions of said sections.
ARTICLE 24
The Public Safety
§ 517. (§ 515.) Trains must stop within fifty
feet of each railroad crossing.
Violation as Negligence at Highway Crossing.—The pur-
pose of this section is to prevent collisions of trains and can-
not be invoked by a private individual in a suit for injuries
sustained at a railway and highway crossing for the purpose
of showing negligence because the engine failed to stop be-
fore crossing the track of a nearby intersecting railroad.
Central, etc., R. Co. v. Griffin, 35 Ga. App. 161, 132 S. E.
255.
§ 518(1). Penalty for not erecting blow-posts.
See notes under sections 2677(1) et seq., citing Iyime-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Atlanta, etc., R. Co., 34 Ga. App. 103, 128
S. E- 226.
§ 519(1). Penalty for breach of duty by engi-
neer.
See notes under sections 2677(1) et seq., citing l,ima-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Atlanta, etc., R. Co., 34 Ga. App. 103, 128
S. E. 226.
§ 526(1). Automatic fire-box door required.
Validity.—The case of Napier v. Atlantic Coast I,ine R.
Co., 272 U. S. 605, affirmed 2 Fed. (2d) 891, as annotated
under this catchline in Ga. Code of 1926.
§ 528(3). Violating Civil Code §§ 1770(1)-
1770(20) regulating motor vehicles.
Effect of Acquittal for Drunkardness upon Prosecution.—
Acquittal on an indictment under P. C. section 442 charging
the defendant with having appeared in an intoxicated condi-
tion on a public highway, which intoxication was made mani-
fest by boisterousness and indecent condition and acting,
and by vulgar, profane, and unbecoming language, was no
bar to a conviction on an indictment under this act, charg-
ing the defendant with having operated an automobile on
the public highway while in an intoxicated condition. Smith
v. State, 34 Ga. App. 601, 130 S. E. 219.
§ 528(3). Violating Civil Code §§ 1770(2)-
1770(48) regulating motor vehicles.
Constitutionality.—The title of the act is broad enough to
authorize the provision making penal the use of a number
-
plate not furnished by the Secretary" of State. This provi-
sion was germane to the object of the act, directly tending
to make the provisions of the act effective. I^ee v. State, 163
Ga. 239, 135 S. E- 912.
§ 528(4). Violating Civil Code §§ 1770(50)-
1770(60) regulating motor vehicles.
Constitutionality.—So much of the motor-vehicle act of
1921 as undertakes to make penal the failure of the operator
of a motor-vehicle, when meeting a vehicle approaching in
the opposite direction, to "turn his vehicle to the right so
as to give one half of the traveled roadway, if practicable.,
and a fair opportunity to the other to pass by without un-
necessary interference," is too uncertain and indefinite in its
terms to be capable of enforcement. Heath v. State, 36 Ga.
App. 206, 136 S. E- 284.
A defendant could not lawfully be convicted upon such
charges. Hale v. State, 21 Ga. App. 658, 94 S. E. 823; Heath
v. State, 36 Ga. App. 206, 136 S. E- 384; Shupe v. State, 36
Ga. App. 286, 287, 136 S. E- 331.
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§ 632 SPECIAL PROVISIONS AS TO JURIES § 875
ARTICLE 35
Terrapins, Turtles, Fishing, and Oysters
§ 612. Closed period; seines, nets, gigs, spears.
Applied in Camp v. State, 34 Ga. App. 591, 130 S. E- 606.
ARTICLE 39
Emigrant Agents
§ 632. (§ 601.) Acting as emigrant agent with-
out a license.
The word "emigrants," does not apply to persons who
have no intention of abandoning their residence in this
State or of acquiring a domicile outside the State, but who
leave the State merely for the purpose of temporarily en-
gaging in work in another State. Benson v. State, 36 Ga.
App. 87, 135 S. E- 514.
ARTICLE 43
Suffrage, Campaign Expenses, Campaign Funds,
and Political Mass Meetings
§ 658. (§ 623.) Superintendent to deliver list to
clerk, etc.
False Misstatement of Votes.—If the number of votes is
knowingly and falsely misstated by a superintendent of an
election, he has failed to discharge a duty imposed upon
him by law, and he is liable to be prosecuted, under this
section. Black v. State, 36 Ga. App. 286, 136 S. E- 334.
ELEVENTH DIVISION
Offenses Committed by Cheats and Swindlers
ARTICLE 1
Deceitful Means or Artful Practices
§ 703(1). Defrauding hotels and boarding
houses punishable.
Necessary for Fraudulent Intent. — The evidence in this
case did not authorize the jury to find that the defendant,
with intent to defraud, obtained food and lodging from the
boarding-house named in the accusation. Cowin v. State,
35 Ga. App. 499, 133 S. E. 880.
713. (§ 668). False information as to liens.
Substitution for Section 719.—Where the judge based his
instructions to the jury on this section, which was inappli-
cable to the case on trial, and made no reference to sec.
719, which was applicable, this was error, as the crime' de-
fined by the last-named section contains elements which it
is necessary to allege and prove, different and distinct from
those necessary to be alleged and proved under this section.
Sims v. State, 34 Ga. App. 683, 685, 131 S. E. 101.
§ 716. Proof of intent to defraud.
Fraudulent Intent — Presumptive Evidence — Burden of
Proof.—The burden of proving that one accused of a viola-
tion of this section did not have good cause for quitting the
hirer rests upon the prosecution (Thorn v. State, 13 Ga.
App. 10, 78 S. E- 853) ; and this essential proof is not fur-
nished by the hirer's testimony that the accused "did not
have any reason for not returning the money or picking
the cotton." Miller v. State, 34 Ga. App. 140, 128 S. E. 588.
See also Cofer v. State, 34 Ga. App. 220, 129 S. E. 110.
A conviction is unauthorized where the evidence fails to
show that the laborer did not have a good and sufficient
cause for his failure to perform the contract. Such essen-
tials are not supplied by statements of the hirer that he
knew of no good reasons why the laborer did not work for
him. King v. State, 36 Ga. App. 272, 136 S. E- 466; Cofer
v. State, 34 Ga. App. 220, 129 S. E- HO.
THE SUPERIOR COURT—ITS OFFICERS
AND JURIES
ARTICLE l
Jurisdiction of the Court, and Authority of the
Judges
§ 792(1). Certiorari on ground that venue or
time not proved.
Cited in George v. Rothstein, 35 Ga. App. 126, 132 S. E-
414.
ARTICLE 2
Sessions and Adjournments
§ 796. (§ 796.) Special terms for either civil or
criminal business.
Applied in Rawlings v. State, 163 Ga. 406, 136 S. E- 448.
ARTICLE 6
Stenographic Reporter
§ 810. (§ 810.) Reporters.
When Paid Out of Public Treasury.—The court could not
assess as costs against the public treasury in a civil case
between private parties the expense of requiring the notes
of the official stenographer to be written out for the benefit
of the judge. The case of Bugg v. State, 13 Ga. App. 672, 79
S. E- 748, is distinguished upon the ground that it was a
criminal proceeding. Macris v. Tsipourses, 35 Ga. App.
672, 134 S. E. 621.
ARTICLE 7
The Grand Jury
§ 824. Ineligible at next succeeding term.
Section Modified by Acts of 1921.—The act of 1921 (p. 135),
being a general law providing that the grand jurors of one
term might be compelled to serve the following term, modi-
fied, so far as jurors serving in Walton superior court were
concerned, the provisions of this section. L,ong v. State, 34
Ga. App. 125, 128 S. E. 784.
§ 827. (§ 824.) How summoned.
Section Directory.—The provision of this statute with re-
spect to the praecept is directory merely, and not mandatory,
and a failure of the clerk of the superior court to carry out
such provision affords no ground for a challenge to the ar-
ray of the jurors put upon a defendant in a criminal case.
Newham v. State, 35 Ga. App. 391, 133 S. E- 650, and cases
cited.
§ 833. (§ 829.) Duty of grand jurors.
Cited in Gibson v. State, 162 Ga. 504, 134 S. E. 326.
§ 851(1). Transfer of investigation to grand
jury of another county.
Necessity of Indictment Showing Change.—An indictment
was not void for the reason that the jurisdiction of the
grand jury of a county to which the investigation was trans-
ferred under this section to return the indictment did not
appear from the indictment, it not being stated therein
that the investigation of the crime had been transferred
from L,ong County to Tattnall County. Sallette v. State,
162 Ga. 442, 134 S. E- 68. Sallette v. State, 35 Ga. App. 658,
134 S. E. 203.
While it might be better for the indictment to show that
the trial judge had ordered the transfer, yet the omission of
such facts from the indictment would not render the in-
dictment void. See Howell v. State, 162 Ga. 14, 134 S. E.
59. Sallette v. State. 162 Ga. 442, 134 S. E. 68.
ARTICLE 9
The Petit Jury
§ 854. (§ 850.) Trial by jury.
Cited in Paramore v. State, 161 Ga. 166, 174, 129 S. E.
772.
§ 857. (§ 853). Panels, how made.
Number of Strikes in Consolidated Case.—Where several
cases pending against an estate are consolidated in one' pro-
ceeding against a receiver therefor, the parties so joined have
a right to only six strikes in selecting a jury. Ellis v. Geer,
36 Ga. App. 519, 520, 137 S. E- 290.
ARTICLE 10
Special Provisions as to Juries
§ 875. (§ 871.) Juries in special emergencies.
Applied in Rawlings v. State, 163 Ga. 406, 136 S. E. 448.
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§ 876 CONTINUANCES § 992
§ 876. (§ 872.) Compensation of jurors, and
court-bailiffs; subpoena clerks.—The first grand
jury impanelled at the fall term of the superior
courts of the several counties shall fix the com-
pensation of jurors and court bailiffs in the supe-
rior courts of such counties for the next succeed-
ing year, such compensation not to exceed $3.00
per diem; except in counties having a population
of 200,000 or more, according to the last United
States census, the compensation of court bailiffs
as fixed by the grand jury shall be $200.00 per
month, provided the Commissioners of Roads
and Revenues, or other authority having control
of county finances of such counties shall first ap-
prove the payment of such salaries and the num-
ber of deputies to be employed in each court; and
the same compensation shall be allowed to bailiffs
and jurors of the several city courts and special
courts in this State, as is allowed bailiffs and ju-
rors in the superior courts in which such city or
special court may be located. The pay of tales
jurors shall be the same as the regular drawn
traverse jurors, and there shall be no distinction
in the pay of tales and regular drawn jurors.
The commissioners of roads and revenues or
other authority having control of county finances
of such counties may designate one of said bail-
iffs as a subpoena clerk in the Superior Court,
may define his duty and fix his compensation at
not exceeding two hundred dollars per month, to
be paid monthly out of the county treasury. Acts
1890-1, p. 80; 1895, p. 74; 1919, p. 104; 1922, p.
50; 1925, p. 100; 1927, pp. 135, 193.
Editor's Note.—The compensation of court bailiffs in coun-
ties of 200,000 population or more was raised from $150 to
$200; and the last sentence was added, by the amendment of
1927.
§ 876(1). Compensation in counties of 200,-
000 or more.—In all counties having by the
United States census of 1920, or any future cen-
sus, a population of 200,000 inhabitants or more,
the salaries of court bailiffs appointed by the
judges of the Superior courts and by the judges
of the city courts shall be two hundred dollars
per month for each bailiff, to be paid monthly out
of the county treasury; provided, however, the
commissioners of roads and revenues, or other
county authority having charge of the fiscal af-
fairs of said county, may, in their discretion, re-
duce said salaries to any sum not less than one
hundred and fifty dollars per month for each
bailiff. Acts 1927, p. 194.
ARTICLE 3
Courts of Inquiry, and the Proceedings Therein
§ 947. (§ 922.) Bail.
Cited in Fox v. State, 34 Ga. App. 74, 75, 128 S. E. 222.
§ 948. (§ 923.) Waiving trial.
Cited in Fox v. State, 34 Ga. App. 74, 75, 128 S. E- 222.
§ 949. (§ 924.) Disposition of papers.
Cited in Fox v. State, 34 Ga. App. 74, 75, 128 S. F. 222.
INDICTMENT AND PRESENTMENT
ARTICLE l
Form of Indictment
§ 954. (§ 929.) Form of indictment.
Sufficiency of Indictment for Car Breaking.—See Whitener
v. State, 34 Ga. App. 697, 131 S. F. 301, and note to P. C.
section 181.
ARTICLE 2
When Two Returns of "No Bill" Are a Bar
§ 955. (§ 930.) Two returns of "no bill" are a
bar.
Change of Return after Entry on Minutes.—After a grand
iury has returned into court a true bill of indictment, and
the same has been entered on the minutes of the superior
court by its clerk, the court obtains jurisdiction of the case,
and the grand jury is without authority, at the same term
of the court, to recall the true bill, erase the entry of "true
Hill," and make an entry of "no bill" on the indictment.
Gibson v. State, 162 Ga. 504, 134 S. F. 326.
CHANGE OF VENUE
PROCEEDINGS TO COMMITMENTS, IN-
CLUSIVE
ARTICLE 2
Arrest
§ 917. (§ 896.) Arrest without warrant.
Charging Exact Language.—A charge in entire harmony
but not in exact language of this section and section 921 is
neither a misstatement of law nor misleading. Cobb v.
Bailey, 35 Ga. App. 302, 133 S. F. 42.
§ 918. (§ 897-) Selection of judge to try the
^ase.
Cited in Fox v. State, 34 Ga. App. 74, 75, 128 S. E. 222.
§ 922. (§ 901.) Duty of person arresting.
CSted in Fox v. State, 34 Ga. App. 74, 75, 128 S. E. 222.
§ 923. Arresting officer not to advise dismissal
of warrent.
Cited in Fox v. State, 34 Ga. App. 74, 75, 128 S. E- 222.
ARTICLE l
When and How Venue May Be Changed
§ 964. (§ 939.) Venue, when and how changed.
Venue changed under section in Howell v. State, 162 Ga.
14, 134 S. E. 59.
Cited in Sallette v. State, 162 Ga. 442, 134 S. E. 68.
§ 965. (§ 940.) Clerk to transmit papers, etc.;
subpoenas for witnesses.
Cited in Howell v. State, 162 Ga. 14, 134 S. E- 59.
FROM THE CALL OF THE DOCKET TO
SENTENCE
ARTICLE 4
Pleas of Insanity, and Misnomer
§ 979. (§ 954). Misnomer, plea of.
Applied in Rountree v. State. 34 Ga. App. 668, 670, 130 S.
E. 919.
ARTICLE 10
Continuances
§ 987. (§ 962). Continuance for absence of
witnesses.
Applied in Teems v. State, 34 Ga. App. 594, 130 S. E. 216.
§ 992, (§ 966). Discretion of the court.
Cross-Examination of Defendant on Motion.—It is not a
reversible error to permit the defendant to be cross-examined
on his motion for a continuance. Bell v. State, 36 Ga. App.
Ill, 112, 135 S. E. 521.
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§ 995 COMPETENCY OF WITNESSES § 1037
ARTICLE 11
Trial of Joint Offenders
§ 995. (§ 969). Trial of joint offenders.
Number of Arguments. — Where two are tried together
without objection they have a right to only one argument.
Bloodworth v. State, 161 Ga. 332, 346, 131 S. E. 80.
ARTICLE 12
Impaneling the Jury
§ 997. (§ 971). Putting panel on prisoner.
Cited in Rawlings v. State, 163 Ga. 406, 136 S. E. 448.
§ 998. (§ 972). Challenge to the array.
Grounds for.— If there is objection to individual members
of the panel of jurors, the challenge should be to the poll,
and not to the array. Thompson v. Buice, 162 Ga. 556, 134 S.
E. 303.
Form.—A challenge to the array, for any cause going to
show that it was not fairly or improperly empaneled, must
be in writing. Thompson v. Buice, 162 Ga. 556, 134 S. E- 303.
§ 999. (§ 973). Challenges for cause.
Relation in Ninth Degree Illustrated.—A juror who is re-
lated to the deceased in that his great great grandmother
was a sister to the deceased's grandfather is sufficient co
disqualify him. Ethridge v. State, 163 Ga. 186, 136 S. E. n2.
§ 1001. (§ 975). Questions on voir dire.
Paragraph One—When Hearing on Oath Disqualifies. —
Even though a juror had heard the evidence on a previous
trial of the same case, this would not disqualify him unless
he had formed and expressed an opinion from having heard
the testimony delivered under oath. Ford v. State, 35 Ga.
App. 655, 657, 134 S. E. 353, and citations.
ARTICLE 15
Evidence
§ 1008, (§ 982). Object of evidence.
Quoted in Groves v. State, 162 Ga. 161, 162, 132 S. E- "69.
§ 1010. (§ 984). Circumstantial evidence, when
sufficient.
Necessity of Charging Language of Section.—The failure
of the court to charge the law of circumstantial evidence in
the exact language of this section is not error. Sellers v.
State, 36 Ga. App. 653, 137 S. E. 912.
A charge of court using "should" instead of "must", in
quoting this section, does not require a new trial. Adams v.
State, 34 Ga. App. 144, 128 S. E. 924.
Cited in Hall v. State, 36 Ga. App. 670, 137 S. E. 915.
§ 1013. (§ 987). When testimony warrants a
conviction.
Charge of Court.—A charge substantially in the language
of this section is not erroneous in that the court failed to
charge the jury that the testimony should be sufficient to
satisfy the minds and conscience of a fair and impartial
jury, etc. Smith v. State, 34 Ga. App. 779, 131 S. E. 923.
Erroneous Charge under This Section.—The following
charge under this section was held inaccurate: "Whether
dependent upon positive or circumstantial evidence, the true
question in all criminal cases is not that the conclusion to
which the evidence points may be false, but whether or not
the state has satisfied the minds and consciences of the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused."
King v. State, 163 Ga. 313, 136 S. E- 154.
§ 1017. (§ 991). Number of witnesses neces-
sary.
Charging Part of Section When Inapplicable.—The courc
did not err in giving in charge this section as to the num-
ber of witnesses necessary to convict of perjury and certain
other offenses, although a part of the section was not appli-
cable to the case where the inapplicable part was explained.
Pence v. State, 36 Ga. App. 270, 136 S. E. 820.
§ 1018. (§ 992). Alibi, as a defense.
Section given in charge. Coggeshall v. State, 161 Ga
266, 131 S. E. 57.
ARTICLE IT
Of Hearsay
§ 1023. (§ 997). Sometimes original evidence.
Cited in Sloan v. State, 35 Ga. App. 347, 133 S. E. 269.
§ 1025 (§ 999.) Declarations of conspirators.
Applied in Ethridge v. State, 163 Ga. 186, 191, 136 S. E. 72.
§ 1027. (§ 1001). Testimony of witness on for-
mer trial.
Production of Articles Present at Former Trial.—Where
the testimony, of a deceased witness who had testified at
the former trial, contained references to certain physical ob-
jects, which at the former trial were in court, this fact did
not stop the operation of this section on the ground that
such articles were not produced in court at the trial now
under review nor offered in evidence, even though the state
did not account for their absence. Bloodworth v. State, 161
Ga. 332, 334, 131 S. E- 80.
ARTICLE 18
Of Admissions and Confessions
§ 1029. (§ 1003). Acquiescence or silence as
admission.
Admissibility of Statements Made by Wife.—A former
statement made in front of her husband and a third person
may not be proved by the third person unless the statemeir
when made required an answer or denial. Bowen v. State,
36 Ga. App. 666, 137 S. E. 793.
§ 1031. (§ 1005). Weight of such evidence.
Omission to Charge as to Confessions.—In absence of a
timely request, the court did not err in omitting to charge
this section. Even where under the special facts of the
case, it is the duty of the court without a request to charge
upon the law of confessions, the omission to do so is not
cause for a new trial, it appearing that without such con
fession there was sufficient evidence to warrant the con-
viction. Gore v. State, 162 Ga. 267, 134 S. E. 36.
Confession must be volun-§ 1032. (§ 1006).
tary.
See annotation to preceding section.
§ 1035. (§ 1009). Confession of conspirators.
Application of Phrase "After the Enterprise Is Ended."—
The phrase "after the enterprise is ended," necessarily
makes admissible any statements made by any of the con
spirators until the ultimate purpose of the conspiracy has
been accomplished. Hence where a killing is only an incident
in carrying out a purpose to accomplish some further ob-
ject, it would seem to follow from the very wording of the
section that where the enterprise had not ended, because the
real purpose of the conspiracy has not been achieved prior
to the completion of the enterprise, statements made even
after such a killing and until the purposes of the conspiracy
has been fully accomplished would be admissible on the trial
of any of those engaged in the conspiracy. Rawlings v.
State, 163 Ga. 406, 421, 136 S. E. 448.
ARTICLE 19
Prisoner's Statement
§ 1036. (§ 1010). Prisoner's statement.
Charge substantially in {lie language of the section up-
held. Coggeshall v. State, 161 Ga. 259, 265, 131 S. E. 57.
ARTICLE 20
Competency of Witnesses
§ 1037. (§ 1011). Persons not competent or
compellable.
4. Husband and wife shall not be competent or
compellable to give evidence in any criminal pro-
ceeding for or against each other, except that
either shall be competent, but not compellable,
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to testify against the other upon the trial for any
criminal offense committed, or attempted to have
been committed, upon the person of either by the
other. The wife is also competent witness to
testify for or against her husband in case of
abandonment of his child, as provided for in sec-
tion 116 of this Code. Acts 1866, pp. 138, 139;
1880-1, p. 121; 1887, p. 30; 1927, p. 145.
Editor's Note.—Prior to the amendment of 1927 the ex-
ception contained in the fourth subdivision of this section
concerned only the wife. Nfcw both the husband and wie
are competent for the purpose specified in the exception.
Only that subdivision was affected by the amendment.
Proof of Statements Made by Wife. — Notwithstanding
the statutory inhibition against the giving of testimony by
a wife against her husband in a criminal case, yet where
a wife makes statements in the presence of her husband and
a third person which would implicate her husband in the
violation of a criminal statute, and the husband makes no
denial thereof, the third person may testify as to these
statements. Bowen v. State, ,36 Ga. App. 666, 137 S. E. 793.
§ 1038. (§ 1012). Persons who are incompetent
witnesses.
Children.—The test as to the competency of a child of tender
vears to be a witness is knowledge by the child of che
nature of an oath, and when an examination by the court
shows that the child has no such knowledge it is error to
permit the child to testify over proper objection. Horton v.
State. 35 Ga. App. 493, 133 S. E- 647.
ARTICLE 21
Examination of Witnesses
§ 1045. (§ 1019). Leading questions.
When Discretion Not Abused.—The discretion of the trial
judge was not abused, under the facts of the case
in allowing the solicitor-general to ask certain lead-
ing questions of certain reluctant witnesses for the state.
Ethridge v. State, 163 Ga. 186, 195, 136 S. E. 72.
§ 1046. (§ 1020). Memorandum in aid of wit-
ness's memory.
Cited in Adams v. State, 34 Ga. App. 144, 128 S. E- 924.
§ 1047. (§ 1021). Opinions of witness.
Applied in Tanner v. State, 163 Ga. 121, 122, 127, 135 S. E.
917.
ARTICLE 22
Impeachment of Witnesses
§ 1052. (§ 1026). By contradictory statements.
Determination of Credibility within Province of the Jury.—
This rule provides for impeachment of a witness and for
sustaining him when his credibility has been attacked in the
manner designated, but leaves it to the jury to determine
whether the witness has testified truthfully. If the witness
has been sustained by proof of general good character, that
would go to his credit, but in the absence of such proof the
truthfulness of his testimony would still be for determination
by the jury. The mere fact that the witness had made
statements out of court, contradictory to his testimony at
the trial, would not as matter of law necessarily deprive his
testimony of all probative value. King v. State, 163 Ga.
313, 322, 136 S. E. 154.
ARTICLE 23
Argument of Counsel
§ 1055 (4). Extension of time.
Necessary Showing.—It is necessary that counsel make a
showing in the manner prescribed, as to the necessity of an
extension of time, in order to do justice to the case of their
client. Where the showing required by the statute is not
made it will not be held that there was any abuse of dis-
cretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to extend
the time for argument as requested. Bloodworth v. State.
161 Ga. 332, 346, 131 S. E. 80.
ARTICLE 24
Charge of the Court
§ 1058. (§ 1032.) Judge not to express opinion
on the facts.
Statement as to Irrelevant Letter.—Statement that a
letter offered, which was entirely irrelevant, had no proba-
tive value, was held not to be a violation of this section.
Tanner v. State, 163 Ga. 121, 122, 129, 135 S. E. 917.
Reason for Ruling on Objection to Evidence No Expres-
sion of Opinion.—When an objection is made to evidence
offered, the judge has a right, if he deems proper, to
give the reasons for his decision on the objections; and such
reasons so given if pertinent to the objections made, do not
constitute an expression of opinion. Reed v. State, 163 Ga.
206, 213, 135 S. E. 748.
Stating an admitted fact does not constitute an expression
or intimation of opinion. Swain v. State, 162 Ga. 777, 789,
135 S. E. 187.
Same—Assumption That Crime Committed.—There beiirs
nothing in the evidence or in the defendant's statement to
dispute the fact that the alleged crime was committed, and
his defense resting solely upon the contention that he did
not participate in the offense, the court did not violate this
section in assuming that a crime had been committed.
Pruitt v. State. 36 Ga. App. 736, 138 S. E- 251.
ARTICLE 25
The Verdict
§ 1059. (§ 1033). Jury judges of law and facts;
form and construction of verdicts.
interchanging "Maximum" and "Minimum."—It is rea-
sonable to construe a verdict finding the accused guilty of
making intoxicating liquor and fixing a "maximum" pen-
alty of one year, and a "minimum" penalty of one and a.
half years as meaning a minimum of one year and a
maximum of one and one-half years so as to uphold the
validity of it under this section. Jordan v. State, 36 Ga.
App. 648, 137 S. E- 798.
§ 1060 (1). Jury to prescribe minimum and
maximum term of punishment, when; rules of
Prison Commission.
Emphasis of Power to Fix Minimum and Maximum
Sentence. — The power given to the jury to prescribe a
minimum and maximum term is emphasized by the further
provision that "in cases of pleas of guilty, then the judge
shall have the right to prescribe such minimum and maxi-
mum term as he may see fit." Mitchell v. State, 34 Ga. App.
505, 506, 130 S. E- 355.
Effect of Jury Failing to Fix Maximum and Minimum.-*
Where the jury failed to prescribe the maximum and mini-
mum in a burglary case but merely recommended him t">
the mercy of the court, the verdict was not in proper form,
and it was error for the judge to receive it and fix the mini-
mum and maximum term of punishment. He should have
sent the jury back to their room with the instruction that
they fix the minimum and the maximum penalty. Mitchell v.
State, 34 Ga. App. 505, 130 S. E- 355.
Right to Poll Jury.—Where the jury returned a maximum-
minimum sentence and the judge immediately turned to
the accused and stated that that would be his sentence, the
accused was not deprived of his right to poll the jury. He
had this privilege while the verdict was being reduced to
writing and retired as a judgment. Taylor v. State, 36 Ga.
App. 639, 642, 138 S. E. 83. Case distinguished from Mc-
Cullough v. State, 10 Ga. App. 403, 73 S. E. 546.
§ 1060(2). Punishment to be fixed by city-
court jury in county of 60,000 to 70,000 popula-
tion.
—
Juries in their verdicts upon the trial of all
cases upon the criminal side of the court, involv-
ing misdemeanors, in constitutional city courts
having jurisdiction over counties whose popula-
tion under the 1920 census of the United States
was not less than sixty thousand inhabitants and
not more than seventy thousand inhabitants, and
over counties whose population under any future
census of the United States shall be not less than
sixty thousand inhabitants and not in excess of
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seventy thousand inhabitants, shall in their ver-
dicts prescribe the sentence or punishment to be
inflicted upon the defendant, in which verdict
may be imposed an alternative sentence or a sen-
tence imposing a fine, a term in jail, and a term
upon the chain-gang, all within the limits pre-
scribed by law for misdemeanors, either, any, 01
all of said punishments; and the judge in impos-
ing the sentence upon the defendant shall follow
that fixed by the jury in its verdicts.
In all such courts in cases wherein pleas of
guiltv shall be entered, then the judge shall have
the light to prescribe the punishment within the
limits -ixed by law for misdemeanors. Acts 1927,
p. 317.
§ 1061. (§ 1035.) Jury may find the attempt.
Attempting to Manufacture Liquor.—The evidence was
held not sufficient to support a verdict of attempting to
manufacture liquor. Hartline v. State, 34 Ga. App. 224, 129
S. E. 123.
ARTICLE 26
The Sentence
§ 1062. (§ 1036.) Punishment; recommenda-
tion of the jury.
Recommendation of Misdemeanor Punishment for May-
Tiem.—The failure of the court to instruct the jury that in
•case they should convict the defendant of mayhem, they
would have the right to recommend that he be punished as
for a misdemeanor was not error. Cowart v. State, 34 Ga.
App. 517, 130 S. E- 358.
§ 1065. (§ 1039.) Misdemeanors, how pun-
ished.
Judge's Discretion in Sentencing.—Where a female, unde^
indictment for a misdemeanor, pleads guilty, the judge may
in his discretion sentence her to labor and confinement in
the woman's prison on the state farm. Conley v. Pope, 161
Ga. 462, 131 S. E. 168.
Dividing Sentence into Two Periods.—The fact that the
judge divided the sentence into two periods of six months
each, did not make the total sentence to the chain-gang
exceed the period fixed by the statute. Scott v. McClelland,
162 Ga. 443, 445, 133 S. E- 923.
Sentence to Hard Labor.—A sentence in a misdemeanor
case which provides that the person convicted shall be con-
fined at hard labor for the- space of one year at the state
farm is not in conformity with this section as that section
orovides that the convict shall "work" or "labor," and this
does not necessarily mean "hard labor." Screen v. State,
107 Ga. 715, 33 S. E. 393; Potter v. State, 35 Ga. App. 248,
132 S. E- 783.
Power to Give Less than Maximum.—The court, having the
power to both pass upon the defendant a sentence of twelve
months and to impose a fine of not exceeding $1,000, could
do less than both, and could do so without giving the de-
fendant any election as to paying or refusing to pay the
fine. Dickson v. Officers of Court, 36 Ga. App. 341, 343, 136
S. E. 537.
§ 1066. (§ 1040.) Attempts, how punished.
Cited in Hartline v. State, 34 Ga. App. 224, 129 S. E. 123.
§ 1609(1). Electrocution substituted for hang-
ing.
Applied in Gore v. Humphries, 163 Ga. 106, 135 S. E. 481.
§ 1070. (§ 1044). Sentence shall specify time
and place.
Fixing New Date for Unexecuted Sentence.—When the day
fixed by the trial court for the execution of a capital
sentence has passed, and the sentence for any reason what-
ever has not been executed, it is the duty of the judge of the
superior court in which the sentence of death was imposed,
either in term or in vacation by an order as prescribed by
law to name and fix a new date for the execution of said
capital sentence, which shall be not less than ten days nor
more than twenty days from the date of said order. Gore v.
Humphries, 163 Ga. 106, 135 S.- E. 481.
§ 1081(1). Probation of offenders.
Constitutionality.—This act is not unconstitutional. Wil-
liams v. State, 162 Ga. 327, 133 S. E. 843; Rhodes v. State,
162 Ga. 627, 134 S. E. 448.
Oral Remarks to Sheriff as Constituting Probation.—The
oral remarks of the judge to the sheriff, in passing sentence
on the defendant, to watch after her, and if he had further
trouble with her to take her to the chain-gang, can not be
construed as placing the defendant upon probation, under
this act as such oral declarations of the judge constitute no
part of the sentence. Conley v. Pope, 161 Ga. 462, 131 S.
E. 168.
Power to Suspend Sentence.—Under this section the judge
has no power to pass a sentence and then suspend it, and
where he has attempted to do so this section has no applica-
tion. Kemp v. Meads, 162 Ga. 55, 132 S. E- 533.
The general rule is that a judge of the superior court of
this State has no authority to suspend execution of a
sentence imposed by him in a criminal case. Where he does
suspend such sentence, so much of the sentence as orders
a suspension may afterwards be revoked and the prisoner
be required to serve the sentence. Scott v. McClelland, 162
Ga. 443, 133 S. E. 923.
§ 1081(4). Delinquent probationers.
Limitation upon Power to Withdraw Parol.—A parole can
not lawfully be revoked as a mere matter of caprice. In
such hearing the judge is the sole judge of the credibility
of the witnesses, but he is not permitted to withdraw a
parole unless there be sufficient evidence to authorize a
finding that one or more of the conditions upon which the
parole was granted has been violated. Williams v. State,
162 Ga. 327, 133 S. E- 843.
Where it can not be determined whether the criminal act
charged against the probationer as in violation of his paroie
was committed prior to the imposition of the sentence or
subsequent thereto, a finding revoking the parole would be
contrary to law and would not be authorized. Williams v.
State, 162 Ga. 327, 133 S. E- 843.
Review on Bill of Exceptions.—Watts v. State, 36 Ga. App.
215, 136 S. E- 323, followed the cases cited under this catch-
line in Ga. Code 1926. See also Kennedy v. State, 36 Ga.
App. 602; 137 S. E- 573; Anderson v. State, 36 Ga. App. 602,
137 S. E. 572.
Cited in Taylor v. State, 36 Ga. App. 639, 642, 138 S. E. 83.
NEW TRIALS, AND THE SUPREME
COURT
ARTICLE 1
When New Trial Will, and Will Not Be
Granted
,
§ 1088. (§ 1061.) On account of new evidence.
See annotation under section 5480 of the Civil Code.
ARTICLE 2
The Motion and Proceedings Thereon
§ 1090(1). Objections before trial judge.
Cited in George v. Rothstein, 35 Ga. App. 126, 132 S. E-
414.
§ 1091. (§ 1064.) Motion made after adjourn-
ment of court.
Notice Relates to the Time for Absolute Rule.—The notice
required by this section "relates to the time when the party
(having at term regularly moved his rule nisi) shall apply
for his rule absolute," and is complied with when the oppo-
site party is served with the copy of the motion for new
trial and the rule nisi issuing thereon twenty days before
the time at which the hearing is to be had under the rule
nisi. Coggeshall v. Park, 162 Ga. 78, 80, 132 S. E. 632.
ARTICLE 3
The Supreme Court
§ 1101(1). Proof of venue or time of commis-
sion of offense.
Cited in George v. Rothstein, 35 Ga. App. 126, 132 S. E.
414.
[142]
§ 1138(3) GEORGIA TRAINING SCHOOL FOR GIRLS § 1259(5)
SALARIES AND FEES
ARTICLE 8
Jury Commissioners and Clerks
§ 1138(3). Jury Commissioners in Counties of
two hundred thousand or more.—Jury commis-
sioners and their clerks in all counties in the
State having a population, according to the
United States Census of 1920 or any future cen-
sus, of two hundred thousand or more shall be
paid ten dollars ($10.00) each for every day's
service in revising the jury list, said compensa-
tion to be paid from the county treasurer; pro-
vided, however, that any commissioner or clerk
who is already on the county payroll shall receive
no additional compensation for services under
this Act. Acts 1927, p. 222.
§ 1138(41). Jury Commissioners and clerks in
counties with population between 33,000 and 33,-
050.
—
Jury commissioners and their clerks in all
counties of this State having a population,
according to the United States census of 1920,
of not less than 33,000 and not more than
33,050, shall be paid five ($5.00) dollars each for
every day's service in revising the jury-list. Said
compensation to be paid from the county treas-
ury. Acts 1927, p. 147.
ARTICLE 13
Witnesses from Other Counties, and When
Venue Is Changed
§ 1143. (§ 1114.) Subpoena for non-resident
State's witness.
Void if Not Signed by Clerk and Solicitor General.—Unless
at the time a subpoena for a non-resident witness for the
state in a criminal case is issued it is signed both by the
clerk of the superior court and the solicitor-general of the
circuit, it is void. Cody v. Boykin, 163 Ga. 1, 135 S. E. 75.
THE PENITENTIARY
ARTICLE 3
Miscellaneous Provisions
§ 1230. (§ 1174.) Expenses of trials for es-
capes.
Fund Out of Which to Be Paid.—No reference is made
here or elsewhere in the code as to the fund from which
the expense is to be paid, and it seems that the provision in
the act of 1823, that it shall be paid out of the penitentiary
fund, remains unrepealed. Campbell v. Davison, 162 Ga. 221,
133 S. E. 468.
TAX TO SUPPORT PRISIONERS IN CER-
TAIN COUNTIES
§ 1236(1). County tax to support prisoners. —
In those counties in the State of Georgia having
a population, according to the United States
census of 1920, or any future census, of not less
than 44,195 nor more than 63,690 the commission-
ers of roads and revenues are hereby authorized,
in their discretion, to levy a tax annually upon
the taxable property in said counties, the pro-
ceeds of which are to be used by said commis-
sioners for the maintenance and support of pris-
oners, including the chain-gang operated by said
counties. Acts 1927, p. 339.
§ 1236(2). Use of chain-gang on municipal
streets.—Said commissioners may in their dis-
cretion, for the purpose of keeping said chain-
gang regularly engaged, employ said chain-gang
upon the streets or public works of municipali-
ties located in said counties, as well as upon the
rural roads and public works of said counties, so
long as the expense of maintaining and support-
ing said chain-gang does not exceed the amount
raised by said tax levy.
§ 1236(3). Separation of tax fund.—In those
counties coming within the terms of this Act, in
which the provisions of the alternative road law,
contained in the Code of Georgia of 1910, sec-
tions 694 to 704, inclusive, are in effect, the funds
derived from tax levies made for the maintenance
and support of prisoners and the funds derived
under the provisions of the alternative road law
shall be kept separate and apart, in order that no
portion of the tax funds derived under the alter-
native road law shall be applied to the expense of
maintaining and supporting the chain-gang while
engaged in work other than upon the rural roads.
GEORGIA TRAINING SCHOOL FOR
GIRLS
ARTICLE l
Establishment and Management
§ 1259(5). No compensation; Oath and bond;
expenses.—Said Board of Managers shall receive
no compensation for their services, and they
shall qualify on said board, taking and subscrib-
ing to an oath faithfully and impartially to dis-
charge their duties, and entering into bond in
such sums and in such securities as shall be pre-
scribed by the Governor, conditioned on the
faithful performance of all duties required of
them in this Act. The actual and necessary ex-
penses of this Board of Managers incurred in the
discharge of their official duties, together with
the expense of making said bonds herein provi-
ded, shall be paid out of the general appropria-
tion for said institution. 'Said Board of Mana-
gers shall organize by electing one of their mem-
bers as chairman and another as secretary of
said board; and when it may be deemed advisa-
ble, said board shall appoint a competent woman
as superintendent of said institution, at a salary
to be fixed by said Board of Managers, and shall
appoint such other employees as may be neces-
sary to carry on the work of said institution, pre-
scribing the duties of both the superintendent and
all other employees; provided, the salary of said
superintendent and said employees as well as the
expenses of the Board of Managers shall be paid
out of the maintenance fund, appropriated by
§ 1259(3). The superintendent and all other em-
ployees shall be subject to removal from office at
any time by said board. It shall be the duty of
said Board of Managers to meet once every three
months, for the purpose of attending to such
matters as may come before them in the man-
agement of said institution. Special meetings
may be called by the chairman. Absence from
any three meetings, unless excused by the
majority of the members present, shall be
treated by the Governor as a resignation from
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office. Acts 1913, pp. 87, 89; 1919, p. 285; 1927,
p. 341.
Editor's Note.—The amendment of 1927 combined this sec-
tion with § 1259(6), and, in addition to other immaterial
omissions, omitted the word "other" preceding the woi d
"members" in the last sentence of the combined section.
§ 1259(6). Included in the amendment to
§ 1259(5) by the Acts of 1927.
§ 1259(9). Who may be committed and how;
fees for carrying persons to school.—The Judges
of the City and Superior Courts may in their dis-
cretion commit to the Georgia Training School
for Girls any girl under eighteen years of age
who has committed any offense against the laws
of this State, not punishable by death or life im-
prisonment, or who habitually associates with
vicious or immoral people, or who is incorrigible
to such an extent that she cannot be controlled
by parent or guardian, there to be held until such
girl reaches the age of twenty-one, unless sooner
discharged, bound out, or paroled under the rules
and regulations of said Board of Managers; pro-
vided, however, that no girl who is insane or an
idiot or who comes under the classification of
mental defectives as defined in section 3 of Act
approved August 19, 1919, establishing the Geor-
gia Training School for Mental Defectives, or
who is afflicted with an incurable disease, shall
be sentenced or committed to said institution.
The Judges of the City and Superior Courts may
hear and determine such cases, presiding in a
court or in chambers; provided, that any girl
brought before a court shall have a right to de-
mand trial by jury, and may appeal from the
judgment of said court as provided by law. The
fees that are now allowed by law for carrying
persons to the penitentiary shall be allowed to
the sheriffs of the various counties of the State,
for services in taking such girls as may be com-
mitted by the several courts to the Georgia
Training School for Girls. Acts 1913, pp. 87, 90;
1927, p. 343.
Editor's Note.—The exception, in the proviso, as to girls
who came under the classification of mental defective as de-
fined by the Act of 1919, is new with the amendment of
1927.
§ 1259(10). Improper subjects retained; how
dealt with; parole. — The superintendent in
charge of such institution be and, with consent of
the chairman of Board of Managers, shall be
authorized and empowered to return whence she
came any girl who shall be found an improper
subject for admission, and who shall thereupon
be dealt with by the court or judge committing
her as would have been legal in the first instance
had not said girl been committed to the said
Georgia Training School for Girls; and provided,
that said Board of Managers shall be authorized
to discharge or release any inmate from said in-
stitution, or to liberate conditionally on parole
any inmate of said institution, under such rules
and regulations and upon such terms as said
Board of Managers may deem in the best inter-
ests of the inmate. Acts 1913, pp. 87, 90; 1927,
p. 349.
Editor's Note.—By the amendment of 1927 the Board or
Managers are authorized to discharge or release any inmate.
The amendment omitted a provision which authorized the
Board of Managers to bind out to some suitable person any
inmate, or return her to her parents or guardian.
SPECIAL QUASI CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
Habeas Corpus
ARTICLE 1
Proceedings in Applications for Habeas Corpus
§ 1307. (§ 1226.) How wife or child may be
disposed of.
See annotation to § 2972 of the Civil Code.
§ 1313. (§ 1232.) Proceedings must be re-
corded.
Filing Papers after Hearing by the Judge.—Manifestly this
section contemplates filing the papers in the proceedings
with the clerk of the superior court after the hearing by the
Judge. Collard v. McCormick, 162 Ga. 116, 119, 132 S. E-
757.
PENSIONS FOR COUNTY EMPLOYEES
§ 1519(44). County employees in counties of
more than 200,000 people.—There may be raised
and established funds for the aid, relief, and pen-
sions of the employees of the county and their
dependents, in all counties having a population
of more than two hundred thousand by the
United States census of 1920, or any subsequent
census of the United States. Acts 1927, p. 262.
§ 1519(45). Right to retire after 25 years
service.—Every employee and future employees
who may participate in the pension fund may as
a matter of right retire from active service, pro-
vided he shall have been an employee of the
county for twenty-five years at the time of his
retirement.
§ 1519(46). Voluntary retirement of disabled
employees.—Any employee who is eligible to
participate and future employees who are eligi-
ble to participate, who shall be injured or whose
health shall become permanently impaired to
render them totally disabled, shall upon applica-
tion be retired. Should the board of trustees re-
fuse to grant an order of retirement, the appli-
cant shall select a physician, the board shall se-
lect a physician, and the two physicians so se-
lected shall select a third, and their decision shall
decide the question.
§ 1519(47). Half-pay after retirement; pen-
sion for widow, etc.—When such employee shall
retire as a matter of right he shall be paid one-
half of his salary he was receiving at the time
of his retirement, for the rest of his life, to be
paid monthly. In case of death of a pensioner,
his widow and children or dependents shall draw
his pension as herein provided.
§ 1519(48). Half-pay for total disability.—
When such employees shall be retired for total
disability, he shall be paid one-half of the sal-
ary he was receiving at the time of his retire-
ment, for the rest of his life, to be paid monthly;
but this Act shall not affect any aid or relief or
pension received at the time of the passage of
this Act.
§ 1519(4=9). Board of trustees for fund; mem-
bers.—There is hereby established a board of
trustees whose duties it shall be to manage said
fund. The board of trustees shall consist of the
chairman of the commissioners of roads and rev-
enues, the chief of the county police department,
and the superintendent of public works of the
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county; and if there be no chairman of the com-
missioners of roads and revenues, and if there
be no chief of county police, and if there be no
superintendent of public works, the county au-
thorities having charge of the affairs of the
county shall manage said pension funds. The
trustees shall formulate rules for taking care of
employees, and prescribe regulations and con-
ditions under which said aid, relief, and pensions
shall be paid. The board shall keep a strict ac-
count of disbursements and receipts of all funds,
which shall be open at all times to public inspec-
tion. The board of trustees shall have its first
meeting on Friday following the first Monday in
October after the passage of this Act, and or-
ganize by electing a chairman, a vice-chairman,
and a secretary. The chairman shall sign all
vouchers.
§ 1519(50). Deduction from salaries.—All
county employees who desire to participate in the
pension fund shall have two (2) per cent, of their
salaries deducted monthly.
§ 1519(51). Return of amount deducted from
salary.—In case an employee who has not served
twfenty-five years and whose employment has
been severed by the county, he shall receive the
amount deducted from his salary for the pension
fund.
§ 1519(52). Involuntary retirement.—In case
an employee has served twenty-five years does
not desire to retire, the board of trustees may in
their discretion retire him, after first obtaining
the consent of the county commissioners.
§ 1519(53). Former pensions not affected.—
This Act shall not repeal nor in any wise affect
any pensions or benefits or aids now being paid
to those who were receiving the same and who
shall receive the same after the passage of this
Act.
§ 1519(54). Widow and children, pension of,
stops when.—When any employee has served
twenty-five years, and who has not taken a pen-
sion, dies, his widow and minor children shall re-
ceive his pension until such widow shall remarry,
or until such minor children or dependents shall
have reached the age of sixteen years.
§ 1519(55). Workmen's compensation law not
affected.—This Act shall not affect or be af-
fected by any workmens' compensation law or
other similar laws.
PENSIONS FOR MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES
§ 1519(56). City employees in cities of above
150,000 people.—There shall be raised and estab-
lished funds for the pension of all officers and
employees now in active service and on the pay-
rolls, and future officers and employees in all
cities in Georgia having a population of more
than one hundred and fifty thousand (150,000)
by the United States census of 1920, or any sub-
sequent census of the United States. Acts 1927,
p. 265.
§ 1519(57). Right to retire after 25 years serv-
ice.—Every regular officer and employee of such
city, in active service at the time of the passage
of this Act, now on the pay-roll, and future offi-
cers and employees, may as a matter of right re-
tire from active service, provided he shall have
served twenty-five (25) years in active service
of such city at the time of his retirement.
§ 1519(58). Half-pay—-When such officer or
employee shall retire as a matter of right, he shall
•be paid one-half of the salary he was receiving at
the time of his retirement, for the rest of his life,
to be paid monthly.
§ 1518(59). Board of trustees for fund; mem-
bers.—There is hereby established a board of
trustees, to serve without pay, whose duty it shall
be to see that the provisions of this Act are car-
ried out by such cities; that the funds are kept
separate; each of such cities shall have a board
of trustees composed of the mayor, city comp-
troller, and city treasurer, or such officials who
discharge duties usually assigned said officers.
This board shall make rules describing forms for
applicants for said pensions, and all other mat-
ters connected with their duties under this Act.
When a pension is awarded by said board, the
award shall be transmitted to the governing au-
thorities of said city, who shall provide some
manner for verifying the facts of the petition, or
other legal requirements; when so verified, a
check shall >be drawn on the fund provided for
the payment of the pension each month during
the life of the pension, signed by the mayor and
paid by the treasurer with the notation on each
check that the pension has been approved by the
governing authority of such city. Said board
shall designate times and place of meeting, method
of hearing and decisions, etc.
§ 1519(60). Deduction of 2 per cent, from sala-
ries.—The sum of two per centum shall be de-
ducted from the salaries or wages of all officers
and employees of such cities as and when paid.
This sum shall be retained by the city treasurer,
and is hereby set apart as a pension fund free
from the control of such cities for any other pur-
pose of expenditure.
§ 1519(61). Appropriation to meet deficiency in
fund.—When pensions are properly allowed and
become a charge on such cities, and the fund
derived from the deductions from the salaries and
wages is not sufficient to meet such pensions, the
governing authorities of such cities shall provide,
by appropriation from the current funds thereof,
a sufficient sum to meet said pensions as they fall
due.
§ 1519(62). Objectors to deduction excluded.-—
In case any emplo3^ee or officers objects to the
deduction of said salary or wages of said two per
cent, or otherwise objects to the payment of said
two per centum, such officer or employee shall
not be entitled to the pension provided by this
Act.
§ 1519(63). Supplementary ordinances.—The
governing authorities of such cities shall be au-
thorized! to pass ordinances supplementing the
provisions of this Act where its terms are found
not to be full enough to provide for the collection
and payment of such payment.
§ 1519(64). Funds not assignable or subject to
garnishment etc—None of the funds herein pro-
vided for shall be subject to attachment, garnish-
ment, or judgment, nor shall they be assigned,
but shall be paid to the pensioner only or on his
order.
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§ 1519(65). Effect as to pensioner under pre-
vious law.—This Act does not repeal nor in any-
wise affect any benefit or pension now being
paid under some previous ordinance or Act, but
no pensioner shall receive two pensions. Those
already receiving pensions are not eligible to pen-
sions under this Act.
§ 1519(66)- Workmen's compensation law not
affect d.—This Act shall not affect nor he affected
by any workmen's compensation law or similar
laws.
PENSIONS FOR MUNICIPAL OFFICERS
§ 1519(67). City officers in cities of above
150,000 people.—All cities in Georgia having a
population of more than 150,000 inhabitants by
the United States census of 1920, or any subse-
quent census of the United States, shall provide
pensions for the following heads of departments
of their assistants or subordinates, to wit: city
clerk and chief deputy; city attorney and assist-
ant and investigator; comptroller, assistant and
auditor; purchasing agent; treasurer and tax-
collector; tax-assessors, their tax investigator and
their chief clerk; marshal; building inspector; re-
corders; health officer; superintendent of Grady
and Battle Hill sanatorium's; chief of construction,
assistants in charge of sewers, streets, sidewalks,
repairs, plumbing, and bridges; chief sanitary in-
spector and assistant; street-improvement collec-
tor; superintendent of electrical affairs; warden;
superintendent of public schools; librarian; gen-
eral manager of parks and cemeteries; general
manager of waterworks, together with superin-
tendent of construction and two chief engineers
in the waterworks department. If said cities have
no officials or employees having these particular
titles then the officials or employees discharging
the duties nearest to those indicated shall receive
the pension herein provided. Provided, the of-
ficers named are in active service in their several
offices and positions at the time of the passage of
this Act, and their names are on the pay-roll, and
likewise for their successors in office or in said
positions, provided they have served twenty-five
(25) years in the active service of said city at the
time of their retirement. In counting this period
of service, any official who was serving in a mu-
nicipality annexed to said city, shall have con-
puted the time of service rendered in the annexed
municipality in making up said twenty-five (25)
years. Acts 1927, p. 269.
§ 1519(68). Right to retire on half-pay.—Said
officers and employees shall be and they are here-
by authorized to retire as a matter of right, when
they shall have passed or attained the required
years of service, and in such event they shall be
paid one half of the salary they are receiving at
the time of such retirement, for the rest of their
lives, to be paid monthly.
§ 1519(69). Committee in charge of pensions.
—It shall be the duty of the governing authori-
ties of said cities to provide that some standing
committee shall have charge of these pensions.
Said committee shall formulate the rules under
which applications therefor shall be made, and
provide for the method by which said pen-
sions may he set up, ordered and established.
When so ordered and established, they shall re-
port to the governing authorities and to the comp-
troller, and same shall thereafter become a fixed
and binding obligation on the part of the city.
When so found and reported, the city, through
its governing authorities shall provide for the pay-
ment thereof from fund herein provided and its
current funds, and these payments shall be kept
up during the lives of said pensioners and funds
shall be annually provided sufficient to cover the
payment of said pensions, and same shall be
promptly paid to said pensioners monthly, and
shall be one half of the sum received at the time
of their retirement.
§ 1519(70). Supplementary ordinances.—Such
cities shall by their governing .bodies be author-
ized to pass ordinances carrying into effect the
purposes of this Act, but not in violation of the
terms thereof. This is done in order to provide
for rules and regulations, so that the provisions
of this Act may he carried out and become ef-
fective, although its terms may not be sufficiently
specific to secure the results desired.
§ 1519(71). Pensions only for those paying 2
per cent, of salary to fund:—The fund with which
to pay the pensions herein provided for shall be
set up as follows: Each of said officials may pay
into a fund established and set apart by ordinance
the sum of (2) two per cent, of their salaries
monthly. Should said fund, at any time, be in-
sufficient to meet and pay said pensions, such
cities shall supplement, by approptitiation from
current funds, sufficient amounts to make up the
difference. In case any of said officials fail to pay
said per centum, they shall thereupon become
ineligible to receive pensions. These matters shall
be regulated by ordinance.
§ 1519(72). Not affected by workmen's com-
pensation law.—This Act shall not affect nor be
affected by any workmen's compensation laws;
nor any similar laws; nor shall any pensioner foe
paid more than one pension, if there are other
regulations by general law or charter amendment
under which the pensioner may be paid another
and different pension.
§ 1519(73). Meaning of "governing authori-
ties."—The words "governing authorities," here-
in used, mean either general council or council
or commission or other officials in charge of the
affairs of said city.
APPENDIX I
Amendments to Special Acts of 1926
§ 4(c). Merger; tax rate; counties excluded.—
Where any local or independent system is re-
pealed by and in the manner provided in this act,
the territory formerly included in such independ-
ent system shall become and constitute a school
district of the county in which it is located, and
shall enjoy the same privileges and shall be gov-
erned by the same laws as other school districts
in said county, including the authority to levy lo-
cal taxes for school purposes; provided that the
rate for such taxation shall not exceed the rate
allowed Iby law to other similar school districts.
Provided, that nothing herein contained shall ap-
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ply to a municipal or independent local school
system of a municipality having a population of
200,000 or more, according to the last or any
other United States Census. Acts 1926, pp. 40,
41; 1927, p. 160.
Editor's Note. — The last proviso was substituted for a
previous proviso which had excepted from the operation of
the section, counties having a population of 200,000 or more.
APPENDIX II
Proposed Amendments to the Constitution
§ 6452(1). Be it enacted by the General Assem-
bly of the State of Georgia, and it is hereby en-
acted iby authority of the same, that Article 3,
Section 7, of the Constitution of Georgia may be
amended by adding thereto the following para-
graph, to wit:
Paragraph 25. The General Assembly of the
State shall have authority to grant to the govern-
ing authorities of the cities of Atlanta, Savannah,
Macon, Augusta, Columbus, LaGrange, Bruns-
wick, Waycross, Albany, Athens, Rome, Darien,
Dublin, Decatur, Valdosta, Newnan, Thomaston
and East Thomaston, and cities having a popula-
tion of 25,000 or more inhabitants according to the
United States Census of 1920 or any future cen-
sus, authority to pass zoning and planning laws
whereby such cities may be zoned or districted
for various uses and other or different uses pro-
hibited therein, and regulating the use for which
said zones or districts may be set apart, and regu-
lating the plans for development and improve-
ment of real estate therein. The General As-
sembly is given general authority to authorize
the cities of Atlanta, Savannah, Macon, Augusta,
Columbus, LaGrange, Brunswick, Wayeross, Al-
bany, Athens, Rome, Darien, Dublin, Decatur,
Valdosta, Newnan, Thomaston and East Thom-
aston, and cities having a population of 25,000 or
more inhabitants according to the United States
census of 1920 or any future census, to pass zon-
ing and planning laws.
§§ 6490 to 6482. Be it enacted by the General
Assembly of the State of Georgia and it is hereby
enacted by authority of the same, that Article 5
Section 2, of the Constitution of the State of Geor-
gia be and the same is hereby amended by strik-
ing from Article 5, Section 2, paragraph two,
three, and four in their entirety, and inserting in
lieu of said paragraphs two, three and four a par-
agraph to be known as paragraph two and to read
as follows, to wit: "The General Assembly
shall have power to prescribe the duties, author-
ity, and salaries of the Secretary of State, Comp-
troller-General, and Treasurer, and to provide
help and expenses necessary for the operation of
the idiepartment of each."
§ 6523. An amendment is proposed to Article
6, Section 7, of the Constitution of this State,
§ 6523, by adding to paragraph one of said sec-
tion the following words, to wit: "And provided,
however, that the General Assembly may, in its
discretion, abolish justice courts and the office of
justice of the peace and notary public ex-officio
justice of the peace in any county in this State
having within its borders a city having a popula-
tion of over twenty thousand, and establish in
lieu thereof such court or courts or system of
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courts as the General Assembly may in its dis-
cretion deem necessary; or conferring upon ex-
isting courts, by extension of their jurisdiction*,
the jurisdiction as to subject-matter now exer-
cised by justice courts and by justices of the
peace and notaries public ex-offioio justices of the
peace; together with such additional jurisdiction,
either as to amount or to subject-matter, as may
be provided by law, whereof some other court
has not exclusive jurisdiction under this Consti-
tution; together also with such provisions as to
rules and procedure in such courts and as to new
trials and the correction of errors in and by said
courts; and with such further provision for the
correction of errors by the Superior Court or the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the
General Assembly may, from time to time, in its
discretion, provide or authorize. The Munici-
pal Court of Atlanta shall have jurisdiction in
Fulton County and outside the city limits of At-
lanta, either concurrently with, or supplemental
to, or in lieu of justice courts, as may be now or
hereafter provided by law. Any court so estab-
lished shall not be subject to the rules of uniform-
ity laid down in Paragraph 1 of Section 9 of Ar-
ticle 6 of the Constitution of Georgia. Provided
that nothing herein contained shall apply to Rich-
mond County."
§ 6533. An amendment is proposed to Para-
graph 1 of Section 13 of Article 6 of the Consti-
tution § 6533, as follows: By striking after the
words "Provided, that the County of Chatham
shall, from its treasury, pay to Judge of the
Superior Courts of the Eastern Circuit" the words
and figures "$3,000.00 per annum," and substitute
in lieu thereof the words and figures "$5,000.00
per annum," so that said proviso' when amended
shall read 1 : "Provided, that the County of Chat-
ham shall, from its treasury, pay to the judge oi
the Superior Court of the Eastern Circuit
$5,000.00 per annum; said payments are hereby
declared to be a part of the court expenses of
said county, and shall be made to the judge now
in office, as well as his successors."
§ 6563. An amendment is proposed to Article
7, section 7, Paragraph 1, of the Constitution of
Georgia, § 6563, as heretofore amended, shall be
further amended by adding at the end thereof a
new subparagraph in the following words, to wit:
"Provided that the City of Columbus may issue
and sell 'street-improvement bonds' without the
said assent of two thirds of the qualified voters at
an election called thereon, but upon a majority
vote of the members of its governing body, with
these limitations: First, the terms of such bonds
shall in no case exceed ten years. Second, the
amount of each issue shall be limited, to the
amount assessed by such municipality upon each
improvement. Third, these bonds shall be issued
only for the grading, including curbs and gutters,
or paving or repaving of streets or portions of
streets or sidewalks. Fourth, the interest thereon
shall not exceed six per centum per annum. Fifth,
these bonds may be issued without regard to the
amount of other outstanding debts or bonds or
such municipality. Sixth, these bonds not to be
issued except in case such grading, including
curbs and gutters, pavement, or repavement has
7]
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been petitioned for in writing by the owners of
more than fifty per cent, of the property abutting
on the street or portion of street paved or re-
paved."
Another amendment to the same section is pro-
posed as follows: by adding at the end of said
paragraph the following: Except that the City of
LaGrange, from time to time as necessary for the
purpose of repairing, purchasing, or constructing
a waterworks system, including all necessary
pipe-line, pumping-stations, reservoirs, or any-
thing else that may be necessary for the building,
constructing, or operating a waterworks system
for the City of LaGrange, may incur a bonded in-
debtedness in addition to and separate from the
amount of debts hereinbefore in this paragraph
allowed to be incurred, to an amount in the aggre-
gate not exceeding the sum of five hundred
thousand ($500,000.00) dollars, and such indebt-
edness not to be incurred except with the assent
of two-thirds of the qualified voters of said city
at an election or elections to be held as may now
or may hereafter be prescribed by law for the in-
curring of new debts b}' said City of LaGrange.
By a later act it is proposed that the section
shall be further amended by adding at the end
thereof a new subparagraph in the following
words, to wit: "And except that Fulton County
and/or Chatham County, and!/or Richmond
County may, in addition to the debts hereinbefore
allowed, make temporary loans between March 1st
and December 1st in each year, to be paid out of
the taxes received by the county in that year, said
loans to be evidenced by promissory notes signed
by the chairman, and clerk of the board having
charge of the levying of taxes in said county and
previously authorized by resolution by a -majority
vote at a regular monthly meeting of such board
entered on the minutes. The aggregate amount
of said loans outstanding at any one time shall
not exceed fifty per cent, of the total gross in-
come of the county from taxes and other sources
in the preceding year, and no new loans shall be
made in one year until all loans made in the
previous year have been paid in full."
And finally that the section as heretofore
amended, shall ibe further amended by adding at
the end thereof a new subparagraph in the follow-
ing words, to wit: "And except that the County
of Ware may be authorized to increase its bonded
indebtedness in the sum of two hundred and fifty
thousand dollars in addition to the debts hereinbe-
fore in this paragraph allowed to be incurred, and
at a rate of interest not to exceed five per centum.
per annum; which said -bonds shall run for a pe-
riod or periods of time not to exceed thirty years,,
and may be issued from time to time, and in such
denominations as may be determined by the
county authorities of said county, to be signed by
the commissioner of roads and revenues of said
county, and the clerk of said commissioner, and
shall be known and designated as Hospital Con-
struction and Equipment bonds, and which said
bonds shall be sold, and the proceeds thereof used
and handled by the commissioner aforesaid, acting
with the clerk and ordinary, or by a committee or
commission selected, appointed, and qualified in
such way or method as such county authority may
designate. The proceeds of all bonds issued and
sold under this authority shall be used for the pur-
pose of acquiring a hospital-site in the City of
Waycross, or outside of Waycross, in Ware
County, and building, constructing, and equipping
thereon a hospital where medical and surgical
treatment and care may be provided those in need
of such. The power conferred by this amendment
shall be exercised under such rules and regulations
respecting the acquiring of a site, the building
and equipping of said hospital, as well as the op-
eration of the same, providing for payment for
such medical and surgical treatment and care in
such hospital, excepting only charity oases as the
county authorities acting alone or in conjunction
with the Waycroiss medical society may deem
meet and proper.
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Application for chauffeur's license,
§ 1770 (60c).
Badges, § 1770(60c).
Definition, § 1770(60b).
Commissioner of vehicles, § 1770(60a)
;
Application for registration, §
1770(60c).
Salary, § 1770(60v).
Secretary of state, § 1770(60a).
Crossings. § 1770(601).
Definition, § 1770(60b).
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Definitions, § 1770(60b).
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:
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Inspector, § 1770(60x).
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Law.
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"Manufacturer," § 1770(60b).
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Municioal regulations of autos, §
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Restrictions as to traffic, § 1770(601).
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-
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of law, § 1770(60x).
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Restrictions as to speed, § 1770(60k)
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1770(60w).
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"Trailer," § 1770(6%).
1770(60b).
I770(60b).
size or weight, §
§ 1770(60o).
"Trucks,"
"Vehicle,'
Weight.
Permits or weight.for extra size
1770(60r).
Restriction as to, § 1770(60n).
Wheels, restriction on, § 1770(60p).
BAILIFFS.
Compensation of bailiffs, Penal Code,
§ 876.
BAILMENTS.
.
Teweler's liens for repair, see "Liens."
BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY.
Banks, see "Banks and Banking."
BANKS AND BANKING, §§ 2366(1)-
2366 (196B).
Bankruptcy and insolvency, see infra,
"Taking Possession of Bank by
Superintendent."
Branch banks, § 2366(3).
Checks, see "Negotiable Instruments.
Criminal law.
Falsely advertising that deposits are
insured. Penal Code, § 211(15).
Death.
Payment of deposit of deceased de-
positor, § 2366(194).
Depositions, § 1249.
Deoosits.
Falsely advertising that deoosits are
insured, Penal Code, § 211(15).
Ordinaries.
Deposit of funds, § 4804(7).
Payment of deposit of deceased de-
positor, § 2366(194).
Trust companies, §§ 2821(19). 2821-
(22).
Depositions, § 1249.
Directors.
Qualification of directors, § 2366(148).
Semi-annual examinations by di-
rectors, § 2366(151).
Dissolution, see infra, "Taking Pos-
session of Bank of Superintendent."
Examinations.
Semi-annual examinations by direc-
tors, § 2366(151)..
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BANKS AND BANKING (Cont'd)
Insolvency, see infra, "Taking Pos-
session of Bank of Superintendent."
Investments.
Purchase of stocks and investment
securities, § 2366(169).
Licenses, § 993(290).
Limit of loans by bank, § 2366(159).
Loans.
Limit of loans by bank, § 2366(159).
Purchase of stocks and investment
securities, § 2366(169).
Regulation of business. §§ 2366(148)-
2366(195B).
Short title, § 2366(196A).
Service of process.
Superintendent of banks, § 2366-
(196B).
Short title, § 2366(196A).
State depositories, § 1249.
Superintendent of banks, see infra,
"Taking- Possession of Bank by
Superintendent."
Service of process, § 2366(196B).
"Trust companies, § 2821(17).
Venue of suits, § 2366(196B).
Taking possession of bank by superin-
dent, §§ 2366(56) -2366(75).
Business resumed, how, § 2366(57).
Notice of taking possession, § 2366-
(56).
Objections to claims, § 2366(67).
Order of paying debts. § 2366(70).
Service of process, § 2366Q96B).
Superintendent may reject claims or
change rank, § 2366(66).
Unclaimed deposits and dividends, §
2366(75).
Venue of suits, § 2366(196B).
Taxation, § 993(290).
Trusty companies, see "Trust Com-
panies."
Venue.
Suits against superintendent, §
2366 (196B).
BASEBALL.
Licenses.
Selling in baseball parks, § 993(253).
BIRTH, see "Vital Statistics."
Birth certificate, §§ 1681 (39) -1681 (41),
1681(46).
BOND COMMISSIONER.
Fees pf commissioner, § 233.
State treasurer ex-officio bond com-
missioner, § 232.
BONDS.
Agriculture.
Commissioner of agriculture, §
2067(1).
Trust companies.
Dealing in stocks and bonds, § 2821-
(20).
BOWLING ALLEYS.
Licenses, § 993(216).
BRANCH BANKS, § 2366(3).
BRANDS AND MARKS, see "Marks
and Brands."
BRIDGES.
Licenses.
Toll-bridges, § 993(272).
BROKERS.
Licenses.
Insurance brokers, § 993(227).
Stocks and bonds, § 993(198).
Real estate brokers, §§ 993(199), 1896(13).
Fees for licenses, § 1896(13).
Licenses, §§ 993(199), 1896(13).
Provisions, where inapplicable, §
(<
1896(5).
"Real estate broker" and "real es-
tate salesman" defined, § 1896(5).
BUDGET.
Automobiles, § 1770(60t).
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIA-
TIONS.
Licenses, § 993(291).
Taxation, § 993(291).
BUREAU OF VITAL STATISTICS,
§ 1681(28).
BURIAL PERMIT,
(35) -1681(37).
CANALS.
Licenses, *§ 993(288).
Taxation, § 993(288).
CARNIVALS.
Licenses, § 993(212).
§§ 1681(31), 1681
CEMETERIES. I
Licenses, § 993(207).
Removal permit, § 1681(31).
CHAIN GANG.
Municipal corporations, Penal Code. §
1236(2).
CHATTEL MORTGAGE.
Setting aside judgment, § 5968(4).
CHECKS, see "Negotiable Instru-
ments."
CHIROPODIST.
Licenses, § 993(172).
CHIROPRACTIC.
Licenses, § 993(172).
Itinerant, § 993(261).
CIRCUSES.
Licenses, §§ 993 (208) -993 (209).
CLERKS OF COURT.
Maps and plats.
Endorsement of plat for laying out
street or highway, § 4901(6).
Report of city planning commission,
§ 4901(6).
Streets and highways.
Endorsement of plat for laying out
street or highway, § 4901(6).
COLLECTING AGENTS.
Licenses, § 993(175).
COLORED PERSON, §§ 2177 -2177(19).
Application for marriage license, §
2177(8).
Application for marriage license by
one not born in this State, § 2177-
.QD-
Filing application for marriage li-
cense, § 2177(9).
Form of application for marriage li-
cense, § 2177(8).
Non-residents, § 2177(11).
Report by state registrar of vital
statistics after examination as to
registration of applicant, § 2177(10).
Unlawful for whites to marry other
than white; penalty, § 2177(14).
Attorney -general.
Duty of attorney-general, § 2177(20).
Definitions, §§ 2177-2177(12).
Forms, §§ 2177(1) -2177(3).
Form of application for marriage li-
cense, § 2177(8).
Registration as to race, §§ 2177(1)-
2177(3).
Marriage.
Application for marriage license, see
infra, "Application for Marriage Li-
cense."
Filing application for marriage license,
§ 2177(9).
Report by state registrar of vital sta-
tistics after examination as to reg-
istration of applicant, § 2177(10).
Return of license after marriage, §
_
2177(12).
Miscegenation, see "Miscegenation."
Ordinary's noncompliance with law, §
2177(16).
Performing marriage ceremonv in vio-
lation of law, § 2177(17).
See infra, "Regulation."
Registration, § 2177(1).
False registration, felonv; punish-
ment, § 2177(7).
Fee for registration 30 cents: how
divided, § 2177(6).
Forms, §§ 2177(1) -2177(3).
Local registrar must cause each per-
son in district to execute form,
etc., § 2177(3).
Penalty for refusal to. execute regis-
tration certificate, etc., § 2177(5).
Registration as to race, §§ 2177(1)-
2177(7).
Untrue statement, § 2177(4).
Report of violation of law, § 2177(18).
Solicitor -general.
Duty of solicitor-general. § 2177(20).
Supply of forms, § 2177(2).
Vital statistics.
Local registrar must cause each per-
son in district to execute form,
etc., § 2177(3).
Registration as to race, § 2177(1).
Supply of forms, § 2177(2).
Who are persons of color, § 2177.
COMMERCIAL AGENTS.
Licenses, § 993 (175).
COMMISSIONER OF AGRICUL-
TURE, see "Agriculture."
COMMITMENT AND PRELIMINARY
EXAMINATION.
Georgia Training School for Girls,
Penal Code, §§ 1259(9), 1259(10).
COMPTROLLER-GENERAL.
Gasoline.
Appointment of state oil chemist, §
1814(12).
Duty to collect and test samples, §
1814(16).
Oils.
Appointment of state oil chemist, §
1814(12).
Duty to collect and test samples, §
1814(16).
Salary.
Proposed amendment to the Consti-
tution, Appx. II, §§ 6490-6492.
CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA.
Proposed Amendments to the Consti-
tution, Appx. II.
CONTRACTORS.
Licenses.
Plumbing, heating, steam- fitting and
tinning contractors, § 993(278).
CORPORATIONS, §§ 2209-2928(50).
Banks .and banking, see "Banks and
Banking.
'
Licenses, §§ 993(213), 993(214).
Foreign, § 993(214).
Presidents and officers of corpora-
tions. § 993(173).
Return by resident agents, § 993(292).
Officers and agents.
Licenses, § 993(173).
Stock and stockholders.
Trust companies dealing in stocks and
bonds, § 2821(20).
Taxation, see infra, "Licenses."
Return by resident agents, § 993(292).
Trust companies, see "Trust Compa-
nies."
COUNTIES.
Authority of Ware County to increase
bonded debt for hospital.
Proposed amendment to the Consti-
tution, Appx. II, § 6563.
Boards of education, § 1551(84^).
Bonds.
Residue of bond issue used for im-
provements, § 431(4).
Use of balance of proceeds of bond
issue, to pay warrants in certain
counties, § 431(4).
Boundaries.
Change of county lines.
Election in town of 400 to 500 pop-
ulation, § 471(1).
Countv officers.
Abolition of fee system in certain
counties, see "Fees."
Pensions, see "Pensions."
Salaries.
Abolition of fee system in certain
counties, see "Fees."
Elections.
Change of county lines.
Election in town of 400 to 5TK) pop-
ulation, § 471(1).
Fees.
Abolition of fee system in certain
counties, see "Fees."
Inter-county improvements.
Residue of bond issue used for im-
provements, § 431(4).
Use of balance of proceeds of bond
issue, to pay warrants in certain
counties, § 431(4)^
Ordinaries, see "Ordinaries."
Pensions for county employees, see
"Pensions."
Taxation.
Railroads.
Affidavit of illegality, § 1041.
COUNTY MANAGER FORM OF
GOVERNMENT.
Operation of statute, § 615(24).
Uniform county manager form of gov-
ernment provided, § 615(24).
COURTS.
Compensation, Penal Code, §§ 876,
876(1).
Ordinaries, see "Ordinaries."
CRIMINAL LAW.
Banks and banking.
Falsely advertising that deposits are
insured, Penal Code, § 211(15).
Convicts, see "Prisons and Prisoners.
Firing woods, Penal Code, § 227.
Gasoline.
Sale without test, § 1814(11).
Violation of act or rule, § 1814(20).
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CRIMINAL LAW (Cont'd)
Motor fuel distributors, renal Code, §
476(13).
Oils.
Sale without test, § 1814(11).
Violation of act or rule, § 1814(20).
Prisons and prisoners, see "Prisons and
Prisoners."
Vital statistics, see "Vital Statistics.
Witnesses.
Husband and wife, Penal Code, §
1037.
CROSSINGS.
Automobiles, § 1770(601).
Grade crossings.
Adoption of layout, § 2677(18).
Agreements as to relocation, etc., §
2677(20).
Agreement to apportion work, §
2677(19).
Automatic signaling device required,
§ 2677(2).
Closing crossings, § 2677(30).
Cost where different railroads in-
volved, § 2677(29).
Definition, § 2677(17).
Division of cost, § 2677(21).
Elimination of grade crossings, §
2677(16).
Improvement of underpass or over-
pass, § 2677(23).
Judicial review of order, etc., of de-
partment or board, § 2677(26).
Limit of annual expenditure of rail-
road, § 2677(31).
Maintenance of overpass, § 2677(24).
Notice to railroad company, § 2677(18).
Relocation, §§ 2677(27), 2677(30).
Selection of material, § 2677(25).
Space for additional track, § 2677(20).
Special agreements as to relocation,
etc., § 2677(27).
Status of crossings in case of relo-
cation, § 2677(30).
Underpass or overpass unsafe or in-
adequate, § 2677(23).
Use of right of way, § 2677(28).
DEATH, see "Vital Statistics."
Burial permit, §§ 1681(31), 1681(35)-
1681(37).
Death certificate, §§ 1681(33), 1681(46).
Physicians and surgeons.
Death without medical attention, §
1681(34).
Registration of death, see "Vital Sta-
tistics."
Removal permit, § 1681(31).
DENTISTS.
Licenses, § 993(172).
Itinerant, § 993(261).
Nurses, § 1711(11).
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
see "Agriculture."
DEPOSITORIES, see "State Depos-
itories."
DEPOSITS, see "Banks and Banking/"
DEPUTIES.
Tax collectors, §§ 1227(3), 1227(6).
DETECTIVE AGENTS.
Licenses, § 993(176).
DIRECTORS.
Banks and banking.
Qualification of directors, § 2366(148).
DOGS.
Licenses, § 993(282).
DRUGS AND DRUGGISTS.
Compounding.
Drugs to be compounded only by or
under supervision of registered
pharmacist, § 1731(11).Who may compound or sell drugs,
etc., § 1731(17).
Examinations, see "State Board of
Pharmacy."
Fees, § 1731(19).
Licenses.
License to one registered in another
State, § 1731(14).
Refusal or revocation of license, §
1731(16).
Meaning of "drug- store," "pharmacy,"'
"apothecary," § 1731(20).
Registered pharmacist, see "State
Board of Pharmacy."
State board of pharmacy, see "State
Board of Pharmacy."
Unlawful use of title "drug- store,"
etc., § 1731(21).
EDUCATION.
Boards of education.
Compensation of members in certain
counties, § 1551(84^).
ELECTIONS.
Counties.
Change of county lines.
Election in town of 400 to 500 pop-
ulation, § 471(1).
Fences, see "Fences."
General Assembly.
In certain counties, § 80(b).
When and how held, § 80(b).
Municipal corporations.
Precincts located in city or town
having population of 1,000 or more,
§ 80(b).
Referendum on repeal or amendment
of municipal charters, § 913(19).
Place.
. General Assembly, § 80(b).
Precincts.
Time polls kept open, § 80(b).
Primaries,. § 178(7^).
See "Primary Elections."
Referendum.
Repeal or amendment of municipal
charters, § 913(19).
Street improvements, § 913(24).
Stock laws, see "Fences."
Time.
General Assembly, § 80(b).
Time polls kept open, § 80(b).
ELECTRICITY.
Condemnation of road or highway for
power plant generating electricity, §
5240(1).
EMBALMER.
Licenses, § 993(172).
EMINENT DOMAIN.
Light and power.
Condemnation of road or highway
for power plant generating electric-
ity, § 5240(1).
United States.
Land for public buildings, §§ 26(1),
26(2).
ENGINEERS.
Licenses, § 993(172).
ESTATE TAX, see "Inheritance Tax."
EXECUTIONS.
Cancellation of fi. fa. when judgment
is vacated, § 5968(2).
Judgment set aside, § 5968(2).
Taxation.
Inheritance tax, § 1041(4).
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX, see "Inher
itance Tax."
FEES.
Abolition of fee system in certain coun-
ties, §§ 6017(6)-6017(11).
Commissions for collection of corpo-
ration, occupation and other special
taxes returnable to state, § 6017(6).
County officers to receive salaries in-
stead of fees; exception, § 6017(7).
Payment of salaries, how made, §
6017(11).
Salaries to be fixed annually 90 days
before January 1. § 6017(8).
Automobiles.
Disbursement of fees, § 1770(60u).
Half-rate fees between Aug. 1 and
Jan. 1, § 1770 (60e).
Licenses, § 1770(60d).
Permits, § 1770(60d).
Registration, licensing, and permit
fees, § 1770(60d).
Bond commissioner, § 233.
Drugs and druggists, § 1731(19).
Nurses.
Deposit fee by applicant, § 1711(11).
Undergraduate nurse, § 1711(16).
State board of pharmacy. § 1731(19).
FENCES.
Election for no fences.
Exemption of mountain districts from
no-fence or stock law, § 2042(2).
Petition of freeholders, § 2042(3).
Exemption of mountain districts from
no-fence or stock law, § 2042(2).
Petition of freeholders. § 2042(3).
FERRIES.
Licenses, § 993(272).
FIRE FACIAS, see "Executions."
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.
Licenses, § 993(214).
FORESTS.
Firing woods, Penal Code, § 227.
FORMS.
Colored persons, §§ 2177(1) -2177(3).
Form of application for marriage li-
cense, § 2177(8).
Registration as to race, §§ 2177(1)-
2177(3).
Marriage.
Form of application for marriage li-
cense, § 2177(8).
FUEL DISTRIBUTORS.
Licenses, §§ 993(295) -993(302).
Penalty, Penal Code, § 476(13).
Taxation, §§ 993(295) -993(302).
See "Taxation."
GAS AND GAS COMPANIES.
Licenses, § 993(288).
Taxation, § 993(288).
GASOLINE.
Acce&s for inspection, § 1814(19).
Analysis for buyer, § 1814(10).
Chemist, see infra. "State Oil Chem-
ist."
Comptroller- general.
Appointment of state oil chemist, §
1814(12).
Approval by state oil chemist and
comptroller-general, § 1814(6).
Duty to collect and test samples, I
1814(16).
Confiscation, § 1814(7).
Containers, § 1814(8).
Criminal law.
Sale without test, § 1814(11).
Violation of act or rule, § 1814(2.0).
Definition, § 1814(4).
Illegal sale, § 1814(7).
Inspection, see "Inspection."
Labels, § 1814(8).
Licenses.
Amount of tax, § 993(296).
Terms defined, § 993(295).
Trucks, § 993(273).
Notes as to shipments, § 1814(9).
Oil inspectors.
Appointment, § 1814(13).
Bonds, § 1814(24).
Dailv reports, § 1814(15).
Entire time, § 1814(24).
Expense accounts, § 1814(23).
Expense of equipment, supplies, cler-
ical help, etc.; allowance for; lim-
its, § 1814(22).
Expenses, § 1814(13).
Inspection fees, § 1814(25).
Inspectors' automobiles, § 1814(15).
Inspector's duty as to pumps, §
1814(18).
Number, § 1814(13).
Removal of chemist or inspector;
charges in writing, § 1814(21).
Salaries, §§ 1814(13), 1814(23).
Terms, § 1814(13).
Unlawful interest in sale, etc., §
1814(14).
Vacancies in offices, § 1814(26).
Registration of gasoline dealers, §
1814(17).
Sale without test, § 1814(11).
Samples. § 1814(9).
State oil chemist, § 1814(6).
Appointment, § 1814(12).
Approval by state oil chemist, §
1814(6).
Approval by state oil chemist and
comptroller-general, § 1814(6).
Bonds, § 1814(24).
Entire time, § 1814(24).
Expense accounts, § 1814(23).
Inspection fees, § 1814(25).
Removal of chemist or inspector;
charges in writing, § 1814(21).
Salaries, §. 1814(23).
Vacancies in offices, § 1814(26).
Taxation. §§ 993 (295) -993 (302).
Amount of tax, § 993(296).
Terms defined, § 993 (295).
Test, §§ 1814(10), 1814(11).
GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
Elections.
#
In certain counties, § 80(b).
When and how held. § 80(b).
Primary elections, § 138(7^4).
GEORGIA BOARD OF PHARMACY,
see "State Board of Pharmacy."
GEORGIA TRAINING SCHOOL FOR
GIRLS, Penal Code, §§ 1259(5)-
1259(10).
Board of managers, Penal Code, §
1259(5).
Commitment and preliminary examina-
tion, Penal Code, §§ 1259(9) 1259(10).
Compensation of managers, Penal Code,
§ 1259(5).
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GEORGIA TRAINING SCHOOL FOR
GIRLS (Cont'd).
Expenses of managers, Penal Code, §
1259(5).
Fees for carrying persons to school,
Penal Code, § 1259(9).
Improper subjects, Penal Code, §
1259(10).
Oath of managers. Penal Code, §
1259(5).
Parole, Penal Code, § 1259(10).
Who may be committed and how,
Penal Code, §§ 1259(9), 1259(10).
GUARANTY.
Trust companies, § 2821(18).
GUARDIAN AND WARD.
Marriage.
Consent of parent or guardian, §
2938.
Ordinary.
Custody and distribution when no
legal guardian, § 4804(1).
HAWKERS AND PEDDLERS.
Licenses, § 993(255).
Fish and sea food peddlers; non-
resident, § 993(281).
HOSPITALS AND ASYLUMS.
Authority of Ware County to increase
bonded debt for hospital.
Proposed amendment to the Consti-
tution, Appx. II, § 6563.
Licenses.
Sanitariums, § 993(265).
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Witnesses, Penal Code, § 1037.
ICE CREAM DEALERS.
Licenses, § 993(226).
IMPROVEMENES.
Street improvements in certain cities,
see "Special Assessments."
INFANTS.
Attorney and client.
Employment of counsel, § 4804(2).
Ordinaries.
Custody and distribution when no
legal guardian, § 4804(1).
Deposit of funds. § 4804(7).
Employment of counsel, § 4804(2).
Payment authorized, § 4804(6).
Record open to inspection, § 4804(4).
INHERITANCE TAX, §§ 1041(1)-
1041(21).
Authority to prescribe rules and forms,
§ 1041(20).
Discount, § 1041(19).
Duties of county ordinaries, § 1041(2).
Executions, § 1041(4).
Exemption, § 1041(21).
Failure to pay, § 1041(4).
Federal estate tax return; duplicate to
to be filed with State tax commis-
sioner, § 1041(1).
Interest, § 1041(19).
Ordinaries, § 1041(2).
Payment, §§ 1041(4). 1041(19).
Transfer ot property of non-resident
decedent, § 1041(17).
Valuation, § 1041(18).
INJUNCTIONS.
Limitation of actions.
Street improvements in certain cities,
§ 913(34).
Street improvements in certain cities,
§ 913(34).
INNS AND INNKEEPERS.
Licenses, § 993(224).
INSANE, EPILEPTIC, FEEBLE-
MINDED AND INEBRIATE.
Attorney and client.
Employment of counsel, § 4804(2).
Ordinaries.
Custody and distribution when no le-
gal guardian, § 4804(1).
Deposit of funds, § 4804(7).
Employment of counsel, § 4804(2).
Payment authorized, § 4804(6).
Record open to inspection, § 4804(4).
INSPECTION.
Apples and peaches, §§ 2119(11),
211904).
Gasoline, see infra, "Inspection of
Oils."
Inspection of oils, §§ 1814(4) - 1814(26).
Access for inspection, § 1814(19).
Allowances. § 1814(22).
Approval T5y state oil chemist and
comptroller-general, § 1814(6).
Bonds, § 1814(24).
Charges in writing, § 1814(21).
Clerical help, § 1814(22).
INSPECTION (Cont'd)
Inspection of oils (Cont'd)
Confiscation, § 1814(7).
Containers, § 1814(8).
Daily reports, § 1814(15).
Duty to collect and test samples, §
1814(16).
Entire time of chemist and inspect-
ors to be given to duties; bonds,
§ 1814(24).
Expense accounts, § 1814(23).
Expense of equipment, § 1814(22).
Fees, § 1814(25).
"Gasoline." "kerosene," defined, §
1814(4).
Illegal sale, § 1814(7).
Inspection of gasoline and kerosene,
§ 1814(5).
Inspectors' automobiles, § 1814(15).
Inspector's duty as to pumps, §
• 1814(18).
Labels, § 1814(8).
Notes as to shipments, § 1814(9).
Oil inspectors, § 1814(13).
Registration of gasoline dealers, §
1814(17).
Removal of chemist, § 1814(21).
Removal of inspector, § 1814(21).
Reports, § 1814(15).
Salaries and expense accounts; how
paid, § 1814(23).
Sale without test, § 1814(11).
Samples, § 1814(9).
State oil chemist. § 1814(12).
Supplies, § 1814(22).
Test or analysis for buyer, § 1814(10).
Unlawful interest in sale, § 1814(14).
Vacancies in offices, § 1814(26).
Violation of act or rule, § 1814(20).
Kerosene, see infra, "Inspection of
Oils."
Oils, see infra, "Inspection of Oils."
INSURANCE.
Licenses, § 993(286).
Insurance agents, § 993(227).
Taxation, § 993(286).
JEWELER'S LIEN FOR REPAIR,
see "Liens."
JUDGES.
Ordinaries, see "Ordinaries."
Primary elections, § 138(7^).
Salaries.
Proposed amendment to the Constitu-
tion, Appx. II, § 6533.
JUDGMENT AND DECREES.
Jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction to set aside judgment on
secured debt, § 5968(1).
Setti^"- aside judgment, §§ 5968(1)-
5968(4).
Apolicable to mortgage foreclosure, §
5968(4).
Cancellation of fi. fa., § 5968(2).
Jurisdiction to set aside judgment on
secured debt, § 5968(1).
Original status restored, § 5968(3).
Vacating, see infra, "Setting Aside
Judgment."
JUNK DEALERS.
Licenses, § 993(228).
JURISDICTION.
Judgment and decrees.
Jurisdiction to set aside judgment
on secured debt, § 5968(1).
United States.
Land acquired bv the United States,
§ 26(2).
JURY.
Compensation of jurors, Penal Code,
§ 876.
Jury commissioners.
Compensation.
Compensation of jury commission-
ers and clerks in counties with
population between 33,000 and
33,050, Penal Code, § 1138(41).
Compensation of jury commission-
ers in counties of two hundred
thousand or more. Penal Code, §
1138(3).
JUSTICES OF THE PEACE.
Abolition of justices' courts.
Proposed amendment' to the Consti-
tution, Appx. II, § 6523.
KEROSENE, see "Fuel Distributors;"
"Inspection;" "Oils."
Confiscation, § 1814(7).
Gasoline, § 1814(4).
Illegal sale, § 1814(7).
Inspection, see "Inspection."
LAUNDRIES.
Licenses, § 993(231).
LAW OF THE ROAD.
Automobiles, § 1770(601)'.
LICENSES.
Adding machines, § 993(238).
Advertising agents, § 993(174).
Amusement parks, § 993(177).
Animals.
Live-stock dealers. § 993(234).
Architects, § 993(172).
Athletic clubs, § 993(178).
Auctioneers, § 993(179).
Automatic sprinklers, § 993(268).
Automobiles, see "Automobiles."
Automobile and truck dealers, §
993(180).
Awning and tent makers, § 993(188).
Bagatelle tables, § 993(189).
Banks and banking, § 993(290).
Barber-shops, § 993(191).
Barber supplies, § 993(192).
Baseball.
Selling in baseball parks, § 993(253).
Baseball parks, § 993(190).
Beauty parlors, § 993(193).
Bicycle dealers, § 993(194).
Bill distributors, § 993(195).
Billiard tables, § 993(189).
Book agents, § 993(196).
Bottlers (non-resident). § 993(197).
Bowling alleys, § 993(216).
Bridges.
Toll-bridges, § 993(272).
Brokers.
Insurance brokers, § 993(227).
Real estate, § 993(199).
Stocks and bonds. § 993(198).
Building and loan associations, §
993(291).
Burglar-alarms, § 993(200).
Cafes, § 993(201).
Calculating machine, § 993(237).
Canals, § 993(288).
Cane racks, § 993(216).
Carbonic acid gas, § 993(202).
Carnivals, § 9^93(212).
Cash registers, § 993(236).
Cemeteries, § 993(207).
Chain of stores, § 993(280).
Chiropodist, § 993(172).
Chiropractic, § 993(172).
Itinerant, § 993(261).
Circuses, §§ 993(208), 993(209).
Circus side-shows, § 993(209).
Coke and coal. § 993(206).
Collecting agents, § 993(175).
Commercial agents, § 993(175).
Commercial reporting agencies, §
993(211).
Concerts, shows, and exhibitions, §
993(210).
Contractors.
Plumbing, heating, steam -fitting and
tinning contractors, § 993(278).
Corporations, § 993(213), 993(214).
Domestic, § 993(213).
Foreign, § 993(214).
Presidents and officers of corporations,
§ 993(173).
Return by resident agents^ § 993(292).
Cotton warehouses, § 993(275).
Dance halls, § 993(215).
Definitions.
"In cities and towns" defined, §
993(294).
Dentists, § 993(172).
Itinerant, § 993(261).
Detective agents, § 993(176).
Directories, § 993(217).
Dogs, § 993(282).
Dog show. § 993(266).
Drugs and druggists.
License to one registered in another
State, § 1713(14).
Refusal or revocation of license, §
1731(16).
Dry-cleaning, § 993(218).
Duties of tax-collectors, sheriffs, etc.,
§ 993(293).
Electrical contractors, § 993(219).
Embalmer, § 993(172).
Emigrant agents, § 993(220).
Employment agencies, § 993(221).
Engineers, § 993(172).
Equipment, § 993(241).
Ferries, § 993(272).
Fire-engines and apparatus, § 993(222).
Fish.
Fish and sea food peddlers; non-resi-
dent, § 993(281).
Fish dealers, § 993(223).
Foreign corporations, § 993(214).
Fuel distributors, §§ 993 (295) -993 (302).
Amount of tax, § 993(296).
Bond 'bv distributor, § 993(302).
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LICENSES (Cont'd)
Fuel distributors (Cont'd)
Invoices and bills, § 993(299).
Kerosene distributors, § 993(297).
Monthly reports of fuel distributors,
§ 993(300).
Payment to comptroller- general, §
993(301).
Registration of fuel distributors, §
993(298).
Terms denned, § 993(295).
Gas and gas companies, § 993(288).
Gasoline, see infra, "Fuel Distribu-
tors."
Amount of tax, § 993(296).
Terms denned, § 993(295).
Trucks, § 993(273).
Graphophones, § 993(249).
Gypsies, § 993(225J.Hawkers and peddlers, § 993(255).
Fish and sea food peddlers; non-
resident, § 993(281).
Horse-traders, § 993(225).
Hospitals and asylums.
Sanitariums, § 993(265).
Ice cream dealers, § 993(226).
Inns and innkeepers, § 993(224).
Insurance agents, § 993(227).
Insurance companies, § 993(286).
Itinerant horse-traders. § 993(225).
Itinerant practitioners, § 993(261).
Jenny lind, § 993(189).
Tunk dealers, § 993(228).
Laundries, § 993(231).
Legerdemain, § 993(229).
Legislative agents, § 993(230).
Light and power, § 993(288).
Lighting systems, § 993(232).
Lightning-rods, § 993(233).
Live-stock dealers, § 993(234).
Lobbyists, § 993(230).
Logs and logging.
Lumber dealers, § 993(235).
Lumber dealers, § 993(235).
Machinery, § 993(241).
Machines, §§ 993 (236) -993 (241).
Malt syrups, § 993(279).
Manufacturing companies, § 993(287).
Marriage, see "Marriage."
Master and servant.
Salary and wage buyers, § 993(263).
Merry-Go-Round, § 993(242).
Monument dealers, § 993(243).
Motor-busses, § 993(244).
Moving pictures, § 993(247).
Supply houses, § 993(248).
Municipal corporations.
"In cities and towns" defined, §
993(294).
Musical instruments, § 993(249).
Navigation companies, § 993(288).
News dealers, § 993(250).
Nurses, see "Nurses."
Oils, §§ 993(295) -993(302).
Trucks, 993(273).
Optician.
Itinerant, § 993(261).
Optometrist.
Itinerant, § 993(261).
Organs, § 993(249).
Osteopathy, § 993(172).
Itinerant, § 993(261).
Packing-houses, § 993(251).
Patents.
Patent rights, § 993(252).
Pawnbrokers, § 993(254).
Payment.
How paid, § 993(285).
Peddlers. § 993(255).
Phonograph pianos, § 993(249).
Photographs, § 993(259).
Physicians and surgeons, § 993(172).
Itinerant, § 993(261).
Pictures and picture -frames, § 993-
(256).
Pistols, § 993(257).
Playing-cards, § 993(258).
Plumbing, § 993(278).
Pony show, § 993(266).
Pool tables, 993(189).
Pressing-clubs, § 993(260).
Professional tax, § 993(172).
Public accountant, § 993(172).
Racing parks, § 993(190).
Radios, § 993(249).
Radio supplies, § 993(249).
Railroads. § 993(288).
Railroad returns and bv whom
made, §§ 993 (288) -993 (289)."
Real estate brokers.
Fees for licenses, § 1896(13).
Reporting agencies, § 993(211).
Restaurants, § 993(201).
Returns.
How returned, § 993(284).
Rinks, § 993(262).
Safes, § 993(264).
Salary and wage buyers, § 993(263).
LICENSES (Cont'd)
Sanitariums, 993(265).
Sea food peddlers, § 993(281).
Second-hand dealers, § 993(228).
Sewing-machines, § 993(283).
Sheriffs.
Duties of tax-collectors, sheriffs,
etc., § 993(293).
Shooting galleries, § 993(216).
Skating rinks, § 993(262).
Sleeping car companies, § 993(288).
Sleight of hand, § 993(229).
Slot-machine, § 993(240).
Soda-fountains, § 993(269).
Soft drinks.
Soft-drink syrups, § 993(270).
Sprinklers, § 993(268).
Steam -fitting, § 993(278).
Street carnivals, § 993(212).
Street railroads, § 993(288).
Swimming-pools, § 993(271).
Taxation, § 993 (295) -993 (302).
Telegraphs and telephones. § 993(288).
Ten-pin alleys, § 993(216).
Tent makers, § 993(188).
Theaters and shows, §§ 993(208)-993-
(210), 993(212).
Circus, §§ 993(208), 993(209).
Concerts, shows and exhibitions, §
993(210).
Dog and pony, 993(266).
Vaudeville, § 993(267).
Tinning contractors, § 993(278).
Tivoli tables, § 993(189).
Toll-bridges, § 993(272).
Typewriters, § 993(239).
Undertakers, § 993(274).
Vaults, § 993(264).
Veterinary.
Itinerant, § 993(261).
Victrolas, § 993(249).
Wage buyers, § 993(263).
Warehouses and warehousemen.
Cotton warehouses, § 993(275).
Merchandise, § 993(276).
Water companies and waterworks, §
993(288).
Weapons.
Pistols, § 993(257).
Weighing machine, § 993(237).
Wood dealers, § 993(277).
LIENS.
Jeweler's liens for repair, §§ 3364(1)-
3364(5).
Application of proceeds, § 3364(4).
Creation of lein, § 3364(1).
Display of sign as to intention to
sell, § 3364(5).
Notice before sale, § 3364(2).
Sale. § 3364(1).
Sale at public outcry before court-
house, § 3364(3).
Special assessments.
Street improvements in certain cities.
Date of lien, § 913(31).
Lien of assessment, § 913(31).
Proceeding to validate lien, § 913-
Street improvements in certain cities.
Date of lien, § 913(31).
Lien of assessment, § 913(31).
Proceeding to validate lien. § 913-
(38).
LIGHT AND POWER.
Eminent domain.
Condemnation of road or highway
for power plant generating elec-
tricity, § 5240(1).
Licenses. § 993(288).
Taxation, § 993(288).
LIGHTNING-RODS.
Licenses, § 993(233).
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
Injunction.
Street improvements in certain
cities, § 913(34).
LOCAL IMPROVEMENTS.
Street improvements in certain
cities, see "Special Assessments."
LOGS AND LOGGING.
Licenses.
Lumber dealers, § 993(235).
MANUFACTURING COMPANIES.
Licenses, § 993(287).
Taxation, § 993(287J.
MAPS AND PLATS.
Clerks of court.
Endorsement of plat for laying out
street or highway, § 4901(6).
MARKS AND BRANDS.
Apples and peaches. §§ 2119(9)2119
(15).
MARKS AND BRANDS (Cont'd)
Apples and peaches (Cont'd)
Appointment of inspectors, § 2119-
(11)..
Commissioner of agriculture to es-
tablish grades and making rules,
§ 2119(9).
Dealers protected by inspection,
etc., § 2119(14).
Delivery prima facie evidence of
offer to sell, § 2119(12).
Inspection, §§ 2119(11), 2119(14).
Packages to be marked, § 2119(10).
Penalty, § 2119(13).
Stamps, § 2119(10).
Unfit fruit not to be shipped, § 2119-
(15).
MARRIAGE.
Application for marriage license, §
208(1).
Application for marriage license by
one not born in this state, § 2177
(11).
False statement, § 2177(15).
Filing application for marriage li-
cense, § "2177(9).
Form of application for marriage li-
cense, § 2177(8).
Information as to impediments, S
2938(1).
Non-residents, § 2177(11).
Notice of application to be posted, §
2938.
Report by state registrar of vital
statistics after examination as to
registration of applicant, § 2177(10).
Unlawful for whites to marry other
than white; penalty, § 2177(14).
Attorney -general.
Duty of attornev-general § 2177(20).
Colored persons, see "Colored Persons;"
"Miscegenation."
Consent of parent or guardian, § 2938.
Forms.
Form of application for marriage li-
cense, § 2177(8).
Guardian and ward.
Consent of parent or guardian, §
2938.
Impediments, information as to, §
2938(1).
License, see infra, "Application* for
Marriage License."
Application for license; information
as to impediments, etc., § 2938(1).
False statement in application; pen-
alty, § 2177(15).
Filing application fof marriage li-
cense, § 2177(9).
Form of application for marriage li-
cense, § 2177(8).
Notice of application to be posted, §
2938.
Report by state registrar of vital
statistics after examination as to
registration of applicant, § 2177(10).
Return of license after marriage, §
2177(12).
Miscegenation, see "Miscegenation."
Notice.
Notice of application for license to
be posted, § 2938.
Ordinary's noncompliance with law, §
2177(16).
Parent and child.
Consent of parent or guardian, §
2938.
Performing marriage ceremony in vio-
lation of law, § 2177(17).
Return of license after marriage, §
2177(12).
Solicitor- general.
Duty of solicitor -general, § 2177(20).
MASTER AND SERVANT.
Licenses.
Salary and wage buyers, § 993(263).
MIDWIVES.
Registration, § 1681(42).
MISCEGENATION, see "Colored Per-
sons."
Attorney-general's duties, § 2177(20).
False statement in application; penalty,
§ 2177(15).
Ordinary's noncompliance with law, §
2177(16).
Performing marriage ceremony in vio-
lation of law, § 2177(17).
Report of violation of law, § 2177(18).
Return of license after marriage, §
2177(12).
Solicitor-general's duties, § 2177(20).
Unlawful for whites to marry other
than white; penalty, § 2177(14).
"White person" defined, § 2177(13).
Who are persons of color, § 2177.
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MORTGAGES AND DEEDS OF
TRUST.
Foreclosure.
Jurisdiction to vacate or set aside
judgment, § 5968(4).
MOTOR-BUSSES.
licenses, § 993(244).
Cars operated for hire over fixed
routes, § 993(204).
MOTOR VEHICLES, see "Automo-
biles."
MOVING PICTURES.
Licenses, § 993(247).
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
Amendment of charter.
Referendum, § 913(19).
Automobiles.
Municipal regulations of autos, §
1770(60s).
Chain gang, Penal Code, § 1236(2).
Charters.
Amendment, § 913(19).
Referendum, § 913(19).
Repeal, § 913(19).
City planning commission.
Report, § 4901(6).
Clerks of court.
Endorsement of plat for laying out
street or highways, § 4901(6).
Report of city planning commission,
§ 4901(6).
Flections.
Precincts located in city or town hav-
ing population of 1,000 or more, §
80(b).
Referendum on repeal or amend-
ment of municipal charters, §
913(19).
Licenses, see "Licenses."
"In cities and towns" defined. §
993(294).
Limitation on municipal debt.
Proposed amendment to the Consti-
tution, Appx. II, § 6563.
Authority .of Ware County to in-
crease bonded debt for hospital,
Appx. II, § 6563.
Officers, see infra, "Pensions."
Pensions.
Appropriation to meet deficiency in
fund, Penal Code, § 1519(61).
Board of trustees for fund; mem-
bers, Penal Code, § 1519(59).
Cities of above 150,000 population,
Penal Code, § 1519(67).
City employees in cities of above
150,000 people, Penal Code, §
1519(56).
Committee in charge of pensions,
Penal Code, § 1519(69).
Deduction of 2 per cent from sal-
aries, Penal Code, § 1539(60).
Effect as to pensioner under pre-
vious law. Penal Code, § 1519(65).
Funds not assignable or subject to
garnishment, etc., Penal Code. §
1519(64).
Meaning of "governing authorities,"
Penal Code, § 1519(73).
Objectors to deduction, excluded,
Penal Code, § 1519(62).
Pensions only for those paying 2
per cent, of salary to fund, Penal
Code, § 1519(71).
Retirement as a matter of right,
Penal Code, § 1519(58).
Right to retire after 25 years' serv-
ice, Penal Code, § 1519(57).
Right to retire on half-pay, Penal
Code, § 1519(68).
Supplementary ordinances, Penal
Code, f§ 1519(63), 1519(70).
Workmen's compensation act. Penal
Code, §§ 1519(66), 1519(72).
Referendum.
Repeal or amendment of municipal
charters, § 913(19).
Street improvements in certain cities,
§ 913(24).
Repeal of charter.
Referendum, § 913(19).
Special assessments.
Street improvements in certain cities,
see "Special Assessments."
Street improvements in certain cities,
see "Special Assessments."
Bonds, § 913(32).
Zoning.
Proposed amendment to the Consti-
tution, Appx. II, § 6452(1).
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES.
Counties.
Residue of bond issue used for im-
provements, § 431(4).
MUNICIPAL SECURITIES (Cont'd)
Counties (Cont'd)
Use of balance of proceeds of bond
issue, to pay warrants in certain
counties, § 431(4).
Prior issue.
Bonds for refunding or paying off
prior issue, § 461.
Refunding.
Bonds for refunding or paying off
prior issue, § 461.
Taxation.
Ad valorem tax for sinking fund for
retirement of State Bonds, §
993(171).
Validating bond.
Bonds for refunding or paying off
prior issue, § 461.
NAVIGATION COMPANIES.
Licenses, § 993(288).
Taxation, § 993(288).
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.
Checks.
Stale checks, § 2366(195A).
NEGROES, see "Colored Persons."
NOTICE.
Animals.
Tuberculosis, § 2064(2).
Value of tuberculin animals, §
2064(3).
Jeweler's sale for repair, §§ 3364(2)-
3364(5).
Marriage.
Notice of application for license to be
posted, § 2938.
NURSES, §§ 1711(7)-1711(22).
Board of examiners of nurses.
Books to be property of new .board,
§ 1711(21).
Continuation of members of existing
board, § 1711(21).
Creation, § 1711(7).
Members, § 1711(7).
Certificates. § 1711(9).
Certificates of registration without
examination, § 1711(20).
Nursing without certificate, §
1711(14).
Revocation of certificate; notice to
holder, § 1711(18).
Dental nurses, § 1711(11).
Deposit fee by applicant, § 1711(11).
Emergency nursing, § 1711(17).
Examinations, §§ 1711(10), 1711(13).
Certificates of registration without
examination, § 1711(20).
Registration without, § 1711(13).
Fees.
Deposit fee by applicant, § 1711(11).
Undergraduate nurse, § 1711(16).
Licenses, see infra, "Certificate."
Licenses to undergraduate nurses, §
1711(15).
Notice of examinations, § 1711(10).
Notice of revocation,
_
§ 1711(18).
Nursing without certificate from board,
§ 1711(14).
Officers, § 1711(8).
Practical nurses, § 1711(22).
Profession regulated, §§ 1711 (7) - 1711 (22)
.
Qualifications, § 1711(12).
Quorum, § 1711(9).
Records, § 1711(9).
Registration without examination, §
1711(13).
Salary of secretary, § 1711(19).
Seal, § 1711(9).
Statutes.
Nurses not affected by Act, §
1711(22).
OFFICIAL BONDS.
Commissioner of agriculture, § 2067(1).
OILS.
Access for inspection, § 1814(19).
Analysis for buyer, § 1814(10).
Chemist, see infra, ''State Oil Chem-
ist."
Comptroller- general.
Appointment of state oil chemist, §
1814(12).
Duty to collect and test samples, §
1814(16).
Confiscation, § 1814(7).
Containers, § 1814(8).
Criminal law.
Sale without test, § 1814(11).
Violation of act or rule, § 1814(20).
Illegal sale, § 1814(7).
Inspection, see "Inspection."
Labels, § 1814(8).
Licenses, §§ 993 (295) -993 (302).
Trucks, § 993(273).
Notes as to shipments, § 1814(9).
OILS (Cont'd)
Oil inspectors.
Appointment, § 1814(13).
Bonds, § 1814(24).
Daily reports, § 1814(15).
Entire time, § 1814(24).
Expense accounts, § 1814(23).
Expense of equipment, supplies, cler-
ical help; etc., allowance for; lim-
its, § 1814(22).
Expenses, § 1814(13).
Inspection fees, § 1814(25).
Inspectors' automobiles, § 1814(15).
Inspectors' duty as to pumps, §
1814(18).
Number, § 1814(13).
Removal of chemist or inspector;
charges in writing, § 1814(21).
Salaries, §§ 1814(13), 1814(23).
Term, § 1814(13).
Unlawful interest in sale, etc., §
1814(14).
Vacancies in offices, § 1814(26).
Sale without test, § 1814(11).
Samples, § 1814(9).
State oil chemist, § 1814(6).
Appointment, § 1814(12).
Approval by state oil chemist, §
1814(6).
Bonds, § 1814(24).
Entire time, § 1814(24).
Expense accounts, § 1814(23).
Inspection fees, § 1814(25).
Removal of chemist or inspector;
charges in writing, § 1814(21).
Salaries, § 1814(23).
Vacancies in offices, § 1814(26).
Taxation, §§ 993 (295) -993 (302).
Test. §§ 1814(10), 1814(11).
OPTICIAN
Licenses.
Itinerant, § 993(261).
OPTOMETRIST.
Licenses.
Itinerant, § 993(261).
ORDINANCES.
Street improvements in certain cities,
§§ 913(25), 913(28).
ORDINARIES.
Authority of ordinaries, §§ 4804(1)-
4804(7).
Guardian and ward.
Custody and distribution when no le-
gal guardian, § 4804(1).
Infants.
Custody and distribution when no
legal guardian, § 4804(1).
Deposit of funds, § 4804(7).
Employment of counsel, § 4804(2).
Payment authorized, § 4804(6).
Record open to inspection, § 4804(4).
Inheritance tax, § 1041(2).
Insane, epileptic, feeble-minded and ine-
briates.
Custody and distribution when no le-
gal guardian, § 4804(1).
Deposit of funds, § 4804(7).
Employment of counsel, § 4802(2).
Payment authorized, § 4804(6).
Record open to inspection, § 4804(4).
Records.
Records open to inspection, § 4804(4).
OSTEOPATHY.
Licenses, § 992(172).
Itinerant, § 993(261).
PACKING-HOUSES.
Licenses, § 993(251).
PARDONS.
Parole.
Georgia Training School for Girls,
Penal Code, § 1259(10).
PARENT AND CHILD.
Abandonment.
Witnesses, Penal Code, § 1037.
Adoption of children, § 3016.
Marriage.
Consent of parent or guardian, § 2938.
PAROLE.
Georgia Training School for Girls,
Penal Code, § 1259(10).
PATENTS.
Licenses.
Patent rights, § 993(252).
PAWNBROKERS.
Licenses, § 993(254).
PAYMENT.
Payment of money into treasury, see
"Treasury."
PEACHES, see "Marks and Brands."
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PEDDLERS.
Licenses, § 993(255).
PENITENTIARY.
Tax to support prisoners in certain
counties, Penal Code, §§ 1236(1)-
1236(3).
PENSIONS.
County employees, Penal Code, §§
1519(44)-1519(59).
Board of trustees for fund members,
Penal Code, § 1519(49).
Children, Penal Code, § 1519(54).
City employees in cities of above
150,000 people, Penal Code, §§
1519(56)-1519(59), 1519(67).
County employees in counties of
more tfian 200,000 people, Penal
Code, § 1519(44).
Deduction from salaries, Penal Code,
§ 1519(50).
Former pensions not affected, Pe-
nal Code, § 1519(53*.
Half-pay after retirement, Penal
Code, § 1519(47).
Half-pay for total disability. Penal
Code, § 1519(48).
Involuntary retirement, Penal Code,
§ 1519(52).
Pension for widow, etc., Penal Code,
§ 1519(47).
Return of amount deducted from
salary, Penal Code. § 1519(51).
Right to retire after 25 years' serv-
ice, Penal Code, § 1519(45).
Voluntary retirement of disabled
employees, Penal Code, § 1519(46).
Widow, Penal Code, §_ 1519(54).
Workmen's compensation Act, Pe-
nal Code, § 1519(55).
Municipal corporations.
Appropriation to meet deficiency in
fund. Penal Code, § 1519(61).
Board of trustees for fund members,
Penal Code, § 1519(59).
Cities of above 150,000 population,
Penal Code, § 1519(67).
City employees in cities of above
150,000 people, Penal Code, §
1519(56).
Committee in charge of pensions,
Penal Code, § 1519(69).
Deduction of 2 per cent from sala-
ries, Penal Code, § 1519(60).
Effect as to pensioner under previ-
ous law, Penal Code, § 1519(65).
Funds not assignable or subject to
garnishment, etc., Penal Code, §
1519(64).
Meaning of "governing authorities,"
Penal Code, § 1519(73).
Objectors to deduction, excluded,
Penal Code, § 1519(62).
Pensions only for those paying 2
per cent, of salary to fund, Penal
Code, § 1519(71).
Retirement as a matter of right,
Penal Code, § 1519(58).
Right to retire after 25 years' serv-
ice, Penal Code, § 1519(57).
Right to retire on half-pay, Penal
Code, § 1519(68).
Supplementary ordinances, Penal
Code, §§ 1519(63), 1519(70).
Workmen's compensation act, Penal
Code, §§ 1519(66), 1519(72).
Workmen's compensation law not af-
fected. Penal Code, § 1519(66).
Workmen's compensation act. Penal
Code, §§ 1519(55), 1519(66), 1519(72).
PHARMACY, see "State Board of
Pharmacy."
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS.
Death.
Death without medical attention, §
1681(34).
Licenses, § 993(172).
Itinerant, § 993(261).
PLACEMENT AND ADOPTION OF
CHILDREN.
Notice of adoption, § 3016.
PLUMBING.
Licenses, § 993(278).
POLL TAXES.
Exemptions, § 993(170).
POWER COMPANIES, see "Light and
Power."
PRIMARY ELECTIONS.
General Assemblv, § 138(754).
Judges, § 138 (754).
Municipal corporations.
Keeping polls open in precincts lo-
cated in city or town having pop-
ulation of 1,000 or more in certain
counties, § 80(b).
PRIMARY ELECTIONS (Cont'd)
Nomination for General Assembly
members, § 138(754).
Nomination of Superior Court judges,
§ 138(754).
Plurality, § 138(754\
Specification of incumbent opposed, §
.138(754).
Time of keeping polls open in certain
counties, § 80(b).
PRISONS AND PRISONERS.
Chain gang. Penal Code, § 1236(2).
Tax to support prisoners in certain
counties, Penal Code, §§ 1236(1)-
1236(3).
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, see
"Corporations."
PROFESSIONAL NURSING, see
"Nurses."
PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT.
Licenses, § 993(172).
PUBLIC BUILDINGS.
United States.
Exemption from taxation, § 26(2).
Land for public buildings, §§ 26(1),
26(2).
PUBLIC OFFICERS,
Abolition of fee system in certain
counties, see "Fees."
Bonds.
Commissioner of agriculture, § 2067(1).
Pensions, see "Pensions."
Salaries.
Abolition of fee system in certain
counties, see "Fees."
Secretary of State, comptroller-
general, and treasurer.
Proposed amendment to the Con-
stitution, Appx. II, §§ 6490-6492.
PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM.
Amendments to Special Acts of 1926,
Appx. I.
Appropriation for consolidated schools,
§ 1151(97).
Consolidation.
Appropriation for, § 1551(97).
Merger of independent school system,
Appx. I.
Municipality having a population
of 200,000 or more, Appx. I.
Taxes, Appx. I.
Territory becomes independent
school district, Appx. I.
County boards of education.
Compensation of members, § 1551-
(8454).
Merger, see infra, "Consolidation."
Payment of teachers, §§ 1551 (154a)-
1551(154c).
Pupils, transportation of, § 1551(100).
Taxation.
Repeal of independent school system,
Appx. I.
Teachers.
Payment of teachers, §§ 1551 (154a)-
1551 (154c).
Authority to use funds allocated for
other purposes,
.
§ 1551(154b).
Governor's authority to make debt
to pay teachers, § 1551(154a).
Limit of -authority, § 1551(154c).
Transportation of pupils, § 1551(100).
RAILROADS.
Crossings, see "Crossings."
Elimination of grade crossings, see
"Crossings."
Licenses, § 993(288).
Railroad returns and by whom
made, §§ 993(288). 993(289).
Special assessments.
Street improvements in certain cities,
§ 913(27).
Taxation, § 993(288).
County taxation of railroads.
Affidavit of illegality, § 1041.
Railroad returns and by whom
made, §§ 993(288), 993(289).
REAL ESTATE BROKERS, see
"Brokers."
RECORDING ACTS, see "Registra-
tion."
RECORDS.
Ordinaries.
Record open to inspection, § 4804(4).
REGISTRATION.
Automobiles. § 1770(60c).
See "Automobiles."
Colored persons.
False registration, felonv; punish-
ment, § 2177(7).
REGISTRATION (Cont'd)
Colored persons (Cont'd)
Fee for registration 30 cents; how
divided, § 2177(6).
Forms, §§ 2177(1) -2177(3).
Local registrar must cause each
person in district to execute form,
etc., § 2177(3).
Penalty for refusal to execute reg-
istration certificate, etc., § 2177(5).
Registration as to race, §§ 2177(1)
-
2177(7).
Untrue statement, § 2177(4).
REGISTRATION OF BIRTHS AND
DEATHS, see "Vital Statistics."
REPORTER, see "Stenographers and
Stenographic Reporters."
REPORTS.
City planning commission, § 4901(6).
RESTAURANTS.
Licenses, § 993(201).
REVENUE, see "Taxation."
Payment of revenue into treasury, see
"Treasury."
SALES.
Conditional sales.
Setting aside judgment, § 5968(4).
SECOND-HAND DEALERS.
Licenses, § 993(228).
SECRETARY OF STATE.
Automobiles.
Secretary of state, ex-officio com-
missioner of vehicles, § 170(60a).
Salary.
Proposed amendment to the Consti-
tution, Appx. II, §§ 6490-6492.
SERVICE OF PROCESS.
Banks and banking.
Superintendent of banks, § 2366-
(196B).
SERVICE STATION, § 993(180).
SHERIFFS AND CONSTABLES.
Automobiles.
Attention to be called to provisions
of law, § 1770(60x).
Sheriff's duties "defined—inspector, §
1770 (60x).
Licenses.
Duties of tax-collectors, sheriffs,
etc., § 993(293).
Taxation.
Duties of tax-collectors, sheriffs,
etc., § 993(293).
Sheriff ex-officio tax collector, §§
1225-1227(6).
Tax collectors, §§ 1225-1227(6).
SINKING FUND.
Ad valorem tax for sinking fund for
retirement of State Bonds, § 993-
(171).
SLEEPING CAR COMPANIES.
Licenses, § 993(288).
Taxation, § 993(288).
SLOT-MACHINE.
Licenses, § 993(240).
SOFT DRINKS.
Licenses.
Soft -drink syrups, § 993(270).
SOLICITOR-GENERAL.
Colored persons.
Duty of solicitor-general, § 2177(20).
Marriage.
Duty of solicitor-general, § 2177(20).
SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS.
Injunctions.
Street improvements in certain
cities, § 913(34).
Liens.
Street improvements in certain cities.
Date of lien, § 913(31).
Lien of assessment, § 913(31).
Proceeding to validate lien, §
913(38).
Railroads.
Street improvements in certain cities,
§ 913(27),.
Street impi-ovements in certain cities,
§§ 913(23)-913(38).
Affidavit of illegality, § 913(33).
Apportionment of cost to abutting
owners, § 913(30).
Appraisers to apportion cost to abut-
ting land, § 913(30).
Assessment, § 913(25).
Affidavit of illegality, § 913(33).
156 INDEX
SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS (Cont'd)
Street improvements in certain cities
(Cont'd)
Appraisers to apportion cost to
abutting land, s 913(30).
Assessment on basis of frontage, §
913(26).
Assessment where county is land
owner, § 913(35).
Intersecting streets, § 913(26).
Lien of assessment, §§ 913(31),
913(38).
Resolution, § 913(25).
Sales to pay assessment, § 913(33).
Suit to enjoin assessn'ient, § 913(34).
Treasurer's duty as to collection.
§ 913(33).
Bonds, § 913(32).
County land owner, § 913(35).
Date of lien, § 913(31).
Definitions, § 913(23).
Liens, § 913(25), 913(31).
Date of lien, § 913(31).
Lien of assessment, § 913(31).
Proceeding to validate lien, §
913(38).
Municipality paying part of cost,
§ 913(37).
Number of streets included in one
resolution, § 913(25).
Ordinances, §§ 913(25). 913(28).
Payment of part bv municipality,
§ 913(37).
Petition by majority of abutting
owners, § 913(25).
Powers as to ordinances, § 913(28).
Proceeding to validate lien, § 913-
(38).
Protest, § 913(25).
Publication of resolution, § 913(25).
Railroads, § 913(27).
Referendum as to adoption of this
Act, § 913(24).
Repeal of special laws, § 913(36).
Resolution, § 913(25).
As to kind and extent of improve-
ment; contracts; bonds, etc., §
913(29).
Declaring improvement necessary,
§ 913(25).
Petition of majority of abutting
owners, § 913(25).
Protest, § 913(25).
Publication, § 913(25).
When not necessary, § 913(25).
Sales to pay assessment, § 913(33).
Special laws not repealed, § 913(36).
Suit to enjoin assessment, § 913-
Time limit of suit to enjoin assess-
ment, § 913(34).
Treasurer's duty as to collection of
assessment, § 913(33).
Validation of lien, § 913(38).
STATE BOARD OF HEALTH.
Registration of births and deaths,
see "Vital Statistics."
STATE BOARD OF PHARMACY,
§§ 1731(1)-1731(24).
Annual election of member for next
vacancy, § 1731(4).
Annual registration, § 1731(22).
Creation, § 1731(1).
Drugs to be compounded only by or
under supervision of registered
pharmacist, § 1731(11).
Election of representative to meeting
of association of other States, §
1731(15).
Examination, § 1731(18).
Examination fee, § 1731(13).
Examinations by board, time of, §
1731(10).
Fees, § 1731(19).
Fees to go to fund in state treasury
for pay and expenses of board, §
1731(19).
Governor to commission members;
term 5 years § 1731(3).
Licenses.
License to one registered in another
State, § 1731(14).
Refusal or revocation of license, §
1731(16).
Meaning of "drug-store," "pharm-
acy," "apothecary," § 1731(20).
Members of existing board to be new
board, § 1731(2).
New board, § 1731(2).
Oath of appointee, § 1731(6).
Organization of board, § 1731(8).
Pay of members, § 1731(7).
Power to make_ rules, § 1731(23).
Qualifications of applicants, § 1731-
(12).
STATE BOARD OF PHARMACY
(Cont'd)
Registration, § 1731(22).
Secretary's salary. § 1731(9).
Term, § 1731(3).
Unexpired term, § 1731(5).
Unlawful use of title "drug- store,"
etc.. § 1731(21).
Violation of act a misdemeanor, §
1731(24).
Who may compound or sell drugs,
etc., § 1731(17).
STATE DEBT.
Bond commissioner, § 232.
Taxation.
Ad valorem tax for sinking fund
for retirement of State Bonds, §
993(171).
STATE DEPOSITORIES, § 1249.
Buchanan, § 1249.
Dexter, § 1249.
Glennville, § 1249.
STATE OIL CHEMIST, see "Oils.
STATE VETERINARIAN.
Notice to owner of tuberculin animal,
J 2064(2).
Tuberculosis in domestic animals, see
"Tuberculosis."
STATISTICS, see "Vital Statistics."
STENOGRAPHERS AND STENO-
GRAPHIC REPORTERS.
In counties containing cities of more
than 175,000 inhabitants, § 5989(3).
STILLBORN CHILD.
Stillborn child to be registered twice,
§ 1681(32).
STOCK LAWS, see "Fences."
STREET RAILROADS.
Licenses, § 993(288).
Taxation, § 993(288).
STREETS AND HIGHWAYS.
Automobiles, see "Automobiles."
Clerks of court.
Endorsement of plat for laying out
street or highway, § 4901(6).
Crossings, see "Crossings."
Eminent domain.
Condemnation of road or highway
for power plant generating elec-
tricity. § 5240(1).
Special assessments, see "Special
Assessments."
Street improvements in certain cities,
see "Special Assessments."
Throwing things on highways, § 1770-
(60w).
SUBPOENA.
Compensation of subpoena clerks,
Penal Code, § 876.
SUCCESSION TAX, see
tance Tax."
"lnheri-
TAXATION.
Advertisements of sales, $§ 1227(2)-
1227(5).
Banks and banking, § 993(290).
Building and loan associations, § 993-
(291).
Business taxes, see "Licenses."
Canals, § 993(288).
Corporations.
Return by resident agents, § 993-
(292).
Deputies.
Tax collectors, §§ 1227(3), 1227(6).
Duties of tax-collectors, sheriffs, etc.,
§ 993(293).
Estate tax, see "Inheritance Tax."
Executions.
Inheritance tax, § 1041(4).
Exemption from taxation.
Inheritance tax, § 1041(21).
Land acquired by the United States
for public buildings, § 26(2).
Poll tax, § 993(170)7
United States, § 26(2).
Fuel distributors, §§* 993(295) -993(302).
Amount of tax, § 993(296).
Bond by distributor, § 993(302).
Invoices and bills, § 993(299).
Kerosene distributors, § 993(297).
Monthlv reports of fuel distribu-
tors, § 993(300).
Payment of comtroller-general, §
993(301).
Registration of fuel distributors, §
993(298).
Terms defined, § 993(295).
Gas and gas companies. § 993(288).
TAXATION (Cont'd)
Gasoline, §§ 993(295) -993(302).
See infra, "Fuel Distributors."
Amount of tax, § 993(296).
. Terms defined, § 993(295).
Inheritance tax, see "Inheritance
Tax."
Insurance companies, § 993(286).
Licenses, §§ 993(169), 993(295)-993-
(302).
See "Licenses."
Light and power, 993(288).
Manufacturing companies, § 993(287).
Municipal securities.
Ad valorem tax for sinking fund
for retirement of State Bonds, §
993(171).
Navigation companies, § 993(288).
Occupation taxes, see "Licenses."
Oils, §§ 993 (295) -993 (302).
Payment.
How paid, § 993(285).
Payment of revenue into treasury,
see "Treasury."
Prisons and prisoners.
Tax to support prisoners in certain
counties, Penal Code, §§ 1236(1)-
1236(3).
Professional tax, § 993(172).
Railroads, § 993(288).
County taxation of railroads.
Affidavit of illegality, § 1041.
Railroad returns and by whom
made, §§ 993(288), 993(289).
Returns.
How returned, § 993(284).
Sheriffs.
Duties of tax-collectors, sheriffs,
^
etc., § 993(293).
Sheriff ex officio tax collector, §§
1225-1227(6).
Sinking fund.
Ad valorum tax for sinking fund
for retirement of State Bonds, §
993(171).
Sleeping car companies, § 993(288)
Specific taxing, § 993(169).
State debt.
Ad valorem tax for sinking fund
for retirement of State Bonds, §
993(171).
Street railroads, § 993(288).
Succession taxes, see "Inheritance
Tax."
Tax collectors.
Advertisements of sales, §§ 1227(2),
1227(5).
Counties with population of 7,320.
§ 1227(1).
Counties with population of 15,160,
§ 1227(4).
Deputies, §§ 1227(3). 1227(6).
Duties of tax-collectors, sheriffs,
^
etc.. 993(293).
Sheriff, ex-officio in some counties,
§ 1225.
Sheriff ex officio tax-collector, §§
1225-1227(6).
Tax sale.
Advertisements of sales, §§ 1227(2),
2127(5).
Telegraphs and telephones, § 993(288).
Transfer of property of non-resident
decedent, § 1041(17).
United States.
Exemption of land ceded United
States, § 26(2).
Water companies and waterworks, §
993(288).
TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES.
Licenses, § 993(288).
Taxation, § 993(288).
TEN-PIN ALLEYS.
Licenses, § 993(216).
THEATERS AND SHOWS.
Licenses, see "Licenses."
TRAINED NURSES, see "Nurses."
TREASURER.
Bond commissioner, ex-officio, § 232.
Salary.
Proposed amendment to the Con-
stitution, Appx. II, §§ 6490-6492.
State treasurer ex-officio bond com-
missioner, § 232.
Street improvements in certa'n cities.
Collection, § 913(33).
TREASURY.
Payment of revenue into treasury.
§§ 1248(1) -1248(7).
Appropriation or allocation of cer-
tain funds not affected, § 1248(6).
Exception of funds collected to
match Federal aid funds, § 1248(4).
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TREASURY (Cont'd)
Payment of revenue into treasury
(Cont'd)
Exceptions, § 1248(3).
Expenses of maintenance to be paid
from treasury, § 1248(2).
Money collected by departments,
etc., for maintenance, to be paid
into State Treasury"; § 1248(1).
Penalty for violation of Act, § 1248-
Time of payment to treasury, §
1248(5).
TRUST COMPANIES, §§ 2821(15)-
2821(25).
See "Banks and Banking."
Amendment to charters, § 2821(21).
Time in which amendment obtained,
§ 2821(23).
Bonds.
Dealing in stock and bonds, § 2821-
(20).
Corporations not affected by this
Act. § 2821(25).
Criminal law, § 2821(24).
Dealing in stocks and bonds, § 2821-
(20).
Definitions. § 2821(15).
Deposits, § 2821(19).
Surrender of authority to receive
deposits, etc., § 2821(22).
Guaranty, § 2821(18).
Penalties, § 2821(24).
Superintendent of banks, § 2821(17).
Unauthorized use of the word trust
company, § 2821(16).
TUBERCULIN.
Restriction of use or sale, § 2064(4).
TUBERCULOSIS.
Animals, §§ 2064(1) -2064(6).
Annual appropriation, § 2064(5).
Notice agreement on value, § 2064-
(3~).
Notice as to owner of animal, §
2064(2).
Penalty, § 2064(6).
Restriction of use or sale of tuber-
culin, § 2064(4).
State veterinarian's duty as to
eradication of tuberculosis in ani-
mals, § 2064(1).
State veterinarian, §§ 2064(1) -2064(5).
See infra, "Animals."
Veterinarian, see infra, "Animals."
UNDERTAKERS.
Licenses, § 993(274).
UNITED STATES.
Eminent domain.
Land for public buildings, §§ 26(1),
26(2).
Jurisdiction.
Land acquired by the United States,
§ 26(2).
UNITED STATES (Cont'd)
Public buildings.
Exemption from taxation, § 26(2).
Land for public buildings, §§ 26(1),
26(2).
Taxation.
Exemption of land ceded United
States, § 26(2).
VEHICLES, see "Automobiles."
VENUE.
Banks and banking.
Suits against superintendent. §
2366(196B).
VERDICT.
Punishment to be fixed by city-court
jury in county of 60,000 to 70,003
population, Penal Code, § 1060(2).
VETERINARY.
Licenses.
Itinerant, § 993(261).
Tuberculosis in animals.
Notice to owner, § 2064(2).
State veterinarian, §
_
2064(1).
Tuberculosis in domestic animals, see
"Tuberculosis."
VITAL STATISTICS, Penal Code, §§
503(10), 503(11).
Birth certificates, §§ 1681 (39) -1681 (41),
1681(46).
Certified copies, § 1681(46).
Colored persons.
Local registrar must cause each
person in district to execute form,
etc., § 2177(3).
Registration as to race, § 2177(1).
Supply of forms, § 2177(2).
Death certificate, §§ 1681(33), 1681-
(44), 1681(46).
Enforcement of vital statistic law,
Penal Code, § 503(11).
Evidence.
Certified copies, § 1681(46).
Marriage license, §§ 2177(8)-2177(10).
Registration districts, § 1681(29).
Registration of births and deaths. §§
1681(27)-1681(46).
Appointment of State registrar, §
1681(28).
Birth certificate, §§ 1681(39), 1681-
(40), 1681(46).
Birth registration, § 1681(38).
Blanks supplied by State registrar,
§ 1681(43).
Bureau of vital statistics, § 1681(28).
Burial permit, §§ 1681(31), 1681(35)-
1681(37).
Burial without permit prohibited, §
1681(37).
Certificate of birth to be filed, §
1681(39).
Certificate of death unsatisfactory,
§ 1681(44).
VITAL STATISTICS (Cont'd)
Registration of births and deaths
(Cont'd)
Certified copies, § 1681(46).
Contents of birth certificates, §
1681(40).
Contents of burial* permit, § 1681-
(36).
Contents of death certificate, §
1681(33).
Death certificate. §§ 1681(33), 1681-
(46).
Death certificate unsatisfactory, §
1681(44).
Death without medical attention, §
1681(34).
Districts for registration, § 1681(29).
Duties of local registrar, § 1681(44).
Fees, § 1681(45).
Indorsement and return of burial
permit, § 1681(37).
Local registrars, §§ 1681(30), 1681-
(44).
Medical attention, § 1681(34).
Procedure in obtaining burial per-
mit, § 1681(35).
Qualifications of State registrar, §
§ 1681(28).
Registrar, §§ 1681(28), 1681(30), 1681-
(43).
Registration of midwives, § 1681-
(42).
Removal permit, § 1681(31).
State board of health. § 1681(27).
State registrar, §§ 1681(28), 1681(43).
Stillborn child to be registered
twice, § 1681(32).
Supplemental report, § 1681(41).
Stillborn child. § 1681(32).
Violation of vital statistic law by any
person, Penal Code, § 503(10).
WAREHOUSES AND WARE-
HOUSEMEN.
Licenses.
Merchandise, § 993(276).
WATER COMPANIES AND
WATERWORKS.
Licenses, §'993(288).
Taxation, § 993(288).
WEAPONS.
Licenses.
Pistols, § 993(257).
WHITE PERSONS.
Definition, § 2177(13).
WITNESSES.
Abandonment of child. Penal Code, §
1037.
Husband and wife, Penal Code, § 1037.
Persons not competent or compellable,
Penal Code, § 1037.
WORKMEN' S COMPENSATION
ACT.
Pensions, Penal Code, §§ 1519(55),
1519(66), 1519(72).
Do not ffflffl
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